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1IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on behalf) 
of itself and all others similarly situated, ) 
ED QUINN, on behalf of himself and all ) 
other similarly situated, ) 
Plaintiffs/ Appellants, 
vs. 
CTIY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
municipality, 
Defendant/Respondent, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Supreme Court No. 44074 
---------.) 
CLERK'S RECORD 
Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Bannock. 
Before HONORABLE Stephen S. Dunn District Judge. 
For Appellant: 
For Respondent: 
TITLE PAGE 
Blake G. Hall 
Hall Angell Starnes, LLP 
1075 S Utah Avenue, Suite 150 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Nathan M. Olsen 
Petersen Moss Hall & Olsen 
485 E. Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
2Date: 5/25/2016 
Time: 04:14 PM 
Page 1 of 9 
.. Sixth Judicial District Court - Bannock County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2014-0001520-0C Current Judge: Stephen S Dunn 
Hill -VU Mobile Home Park, etal. vs. City Of Pocatello 
User: OCANO 
Hill -VU Mobile Home Park, ED Quinn vs. City Of Pocatello 
Date Code User Judge 
4/15/2014 LOCT KENDRAH er Robert C Naftz 
NCOC KENDRAH New Case Filed-Other Claims Robert C Naftz 
COMP KENDRAH complaint Jury Demand and request for class Robert C Naftz 
certification; 
SMIS KENDRAH Summons Issued Robert C Naftz 
KENDRAH Filing: A - All initial civil case filings of any type not Robert C Naftz 
listed in categories B-H, or the other A listings 
below Paid by: Petersen Moss & Hall Attorneys 
At Law Receipt number: 0012514 Dated: 
4/15/2014 Amount: $96.00 (Check) For: 
ATTR CAMILLE Plaintiff: Hill - VU Mobile Home Park Attorney Robert C Naftz 
Retained Michael D Gaffney 
ATTR CAMILLE Plaintiff: Quinn, ED Attorney Retained Michael D Robert C Naftz 
Gaffney 
ATTR AMYW Plaintlff: Hill - VU Mobile Home Park Attorney David C Nye 
Retained Nathan M. Olsen 
ATTR AMYW Plaintiff: Quinn, ED Attorney Retained Nathan M. David C Nye 
Olsen 
5/6/2014 MOTN NICOLE Plaintiff's Motion to Disqualify Without Cause Robert C Naftz 
I.R.C.P. 40(d)(1)(E) 
5/14/2014 ORDR NICOLE Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion to Disqualify Robert C Naftz 
Without Causes/ J. Naft 5-14-14; transferred to 
Judge Dunn for reassignment 
5/16/2014 DISA KARLA Disqualification Of Judge -Automatic Robert C Naftz 
ORDR KARLA Administrative Order of Reference; matter Stephen S Dunn 
referred to Judge Nye for resolution; /s J Dunn 
05/16/14 
DISQ KARLA Disqualification Of Judge David C Nye 
6/16/2014 CAMILLE Plaintiffs motion to disqualify for cause I RCP David C Nye 
40d2A2: aty Nathan Olsen for plntfs 
CAMILLE Notice of hearing; on Motion to Disqualify for David C Nye 
Cause IRCP on 7-17-2014@ 2pm: aty Nathan 
Olsen for plntf 
CAMILLE Affidavit of counsel in support of motion to David C Nye 
disqualify for cause: aty Nathan Olsen for plntf 
6/27/2014 KENDRAH Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other David C Nye 
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: Hall Angell 
& Starnes Receipt number: 0021231 Dated: 
6/27/2014 Amount: $66.00 (Check) For: City of 
Pocatello (defendant) 
CAMILLE Objection to plaintiffs motion to disqualify for David C Nye 
cause; aty Blake Hall for def City of Pocatello 
CAMILLE Answer to Complaint; aty Blake Hall for Def City David C Nye 
of Pocatello 
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Sixth Judicial District Court - Bannock County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2014-0001520-0C Current Judge: Stephen S Dunn 
Hill - VU Mobile Home Park, etal. vs. City Of Pocatello 
User: OCANO 
Hill - VU Mobile Home Park, ED Quinn vs. City Of Pocatello 
Date 
6/27/2014 
7/1/2014 
7/7/2014 
7/10/2014 
7/14/2014 
7/28/2014 
7/31/2014 
8/6/2014 
8/7/2014 
8/11/2014 
8/18/2014 
8/21/2014 
8/29/2014 
9/2/2014 
Code 
ATTR 
HRVC 
HRSC 
ORDR 
HRSC 
ORDR 
AFFD 
APPL 
HRSC 
OSCI 
MOTN 
NOTC 
User 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
AMYW 
CAMILLE 
AMYW 
CAMILLE 
AMYW 
AMYW 
AMYW 
AMYW 
AMYW 
AMYW 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
AMYW 
AMYW 
Judge 
Defendant: City of Pocatello Attorney Retained David C Nye 
BlakeG Hall 
Affiavit of service - srvd on City of Pocatello on David C Nye 
6-18-2014 
Affidavit of Nathan Olsen; aty Michael Gaffney David C Nye 
for plntfs 
Notice vacating hearing; Plaintiffs Motion to DQ David C Nye 
on 7-17-2014 @2pm: 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 
07/17/2014 02:00 PM: Hearing Vacated 
David C Nye 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 07/17/2014 02:00 David C Nye 
PM) 
Order for Submission of Information for David C Nye 
Scheduling Order; /s/ J Nye, 7-14-14 
Joint submission of information for scheduling David C Nye 
order; aty Blake Han for ef 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 07/20/2015 01 :30 David C Nye 
PM) 
Order Setting Jury Trial; /s/ J Nye, 8-6-14 David C Nye 
Affidavit of Nathan M. Olsen; atty Nathan Olsen David C Nye 
for pltfs 
Application for Pre-Judgment Write of David C Nye 
Attachment Pursuant to IC §8-502; atty Nathan 
Olsen for pltfs 
Hearing Scheduled (Order to Show Cause 
09/08/2014 02:00 PM) 
David C Nye 
Order To Show Cause; atty Nathan Olsen for pltfs David C Nye 
Certificate of service - (Order to Show cause and Davld C Nye 
this certiicate) aty Nathan Olsen 
Notice of service - first set of discovery requests David C Nye 
to to def and this notice: aty Nathan Olsen for 
plntf 
Defendants intent to appear and contest entry of David C Nye 
pre judgment writ of attachment; aty Blake Hall 
Affidavit of Nathan R Starnes; aty Blaek Hall for David C Nye 
def City of Pocatello 
Affidavit of Joyce A Stroschein ; aty Blake Hall David C Nye 
for Def. city of Pocatello 
Defendants response to plaintiffs order to show David C Nye 
cause; aty Blake Hall for city of Pocatello 
Motion for Order Shortening Time; atty Blake Hall David C Nye 
for def 
Notice of Hearing; atty Blake Hall for def David C Nye 
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Sixth Judicial District Court - Bannock County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2014-0001520-0C Current Judge: Stephen S Dunn 
Hill - VU Mobile Home Park, etal. vs. City Of Pocatello 
User: OCANO 
Hill -VU Mobile Home Park, ED Quinn vs. City Of Pocatello 
Date 
9/2/2014 
9/5/2014 
9/8/2014 
9/9/2014 
9/11/2014 
9/24/2014 
10/16/2014 
12/2/2014 
12/15/2014 
12/19/2014 
2/17/2015 
Code 
MOTN 
ORDR 
NOTC 
DCHH 
MEOR 
ORDR 
ORDR 
ORDR 
ORDR 
HRVC 
HRSC 
HRSC 
User 
AMYW 
AMYW 
AMYW 
AMYW 
AMYW 
AMYW 
CAMILLE 
AMYW 
KARLA 
CAMILLE 
KARLA 
KARLA 
KARLA 
KARLA 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
Judge 
Defendant's Motion to Quash Subpoena to David David C Nye 
Swindell; atty Blake Hall for def 
Order Shortening Time; Isl J Nye, 9-5-14 David C Nye 
Defendant's Notice of Intent to Produce David C Nye 
Testimony and Evidence at Hearing on Order to 
Show Cause; atty Blake Hall for def 
Hearing result for Order to Show Cause 
scheduled on 09/08/2014 02:00 PM: District 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Stephanie Morse 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Less than 100 pages. 
Minute Entry; Motion to Quash Subpoena is 
GRANTED, OSC hearing vacated; /s/ J Nye, 
9-9-14 
Order Quashing Subpoena; /s/ J Nye, 9-11-14 
Notice of service - Defs responses to plaintiffs 
first discovery requests, and this notice: aty 
Blake Hall 
David C Nye 
David C Nye 
David C Nye 
David C Nye 
Order Transferring Case; matter transferred to J David C Nye 
Dunn based on agreement by the parties; /s/ J 
Nye, 10-16-14 
Order for Submission of Information for Stephen S Dunn 
Scheduling Order /s J Dunn 12/01/14 
Parties agreed response; aty Michael Gaffney Stephen S Dunn 
for plntf 
Order Setting Jury Trial /s J Dunn 12/19/14 Stephen S Dunn 
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 
07/20/2015 01:30 PM: Hearing Vacated 
Stephen S Dunn 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 08/04/2015 09:00 Stephen S Dunn 
AM) 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 01/05/2016 09:00 Stephen S Dunn 
AM) 
Motion for certification; aty Michael GAffney for Stephen S Dunn 
plntf 
Affidavit of Logan Robinson;' aty Micahel Stephen S Dunn 
Gaffney for plntf 
Plaintiffs Memorandum in support of class Stephen S Dunn 
certification; aty Michael Gaffney for plntf 
Affidavit of Ed Quinn; aty Michael Gaffney for Stephen S Dunn 
plntf 
Affidavit of Michael D Gaffney; aty Michael Stephen S Dunn 
Gaffney for plntf 
Notice of hearing; set on 3-16-2015 @2pm: Stephen S Dunn 
aty Micahel Gaffney for plntf 
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Sixth Judicial District Court~ Bannock County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2014-0001520-0C Current Judge: Stephen S Dunn 
Hill - VU Mobile Home Park, etal. vs. City Of Pocatello 
User: OCANO 
Hill - VU Mobile Home Park, ED Quinn vs. City Of Pocatello 
Date 
2/17/2015 
2/26/2015 
2/27/2015 
3/16/2015 
3/18/2015 
3/27/2015 
3/30/2015 
4/1/2015 
4/7/2015 
4/8/2015 
4/10/2015 
Code 
HRSC 
HRSC 
HRSC 
CONT 
MOTN 
ORDR 
User 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
KARLA 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
KARLA 
KARLA 
Judge 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 03/16/2015 02:00 Stephen S Dunn 
PM} 
Amended notice of hearing; set for 4-13-2015@ Stephen S Dunn 
2pm: aty Michael Gaffney for plntf 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/13/2015 02:00 Stephen S Dunn 
PM} 
Defendants Motion for summary judgment; aty Stephen S Dunn 
Blake Hall for def 
Notice of hearing; set for 4-13-2015 @ 2pm: 
aty Blake Hall 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary 
Judgment 04/13/2015 02:00 PM) 
Second Affidavit of Joyce A Stroschein; aty 
Blake Hall 
Stephen S Dunn 
Stephen S Dunn 
Stephen S Dunn 
Defendants Memorandum in support of motin for Stephen S Dunn 
summary judgment; aty Blake Hall 
Plaintiffs Fact and expert witness disclosure; 
aty Michael Gaffney for plntf 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 
03/16/2015 02:00 PM: Continued 
Matin for enlargement of time and to continue 
hearing, IRCP 56(c): aty Micahel Gaffney for 
plntf 
Affidavit of Michael D Gaffney; aty Michael 
Gaffney for plntf 
Stephen S Dunn 
Stephen S Dunn 
Stephen S Dunn 
Stephen S Dunn 
Withdrawal of motin for enlargement of time and Stephen S Dunn 
to continue hearing, IRCP 56(c): aty Michael 
Gaffney for plntf 
Affidavit of Nathan M Olsen in support of plaintiffs Stephen S Dunn 
Memorandum in opposition to Citys Motion for 
Summary Judgment; aty Nathan Olsen 
Plaintiffs Memorandum in opposition to Citys 
motion for summary judgment; aty Nathan 
Olsen for plntfs 
Stephen S Dunn 
Defendants response in objection to motin for Stephen S Dunn 
class certification; aty Blake Hall fair def 
Third Affidavit of Joyce A Stroschein; aty Blake Stephen S Dunn 
Hall forded 
Affidavit of Blake G Hall; aty Blake Hall for def Stephen S Dunn 
Defendants reply memorandum in support of Stephen S Dunn 
motin for summary judgment; aty Blake Hall for 
def 
Motion to Shorten Time (Gaffney) 
Order Shortening nme /.s J Dunn 04/10/15 
Stephen S Dunn 
Stephen S Dunn 
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Sixth Judicial District Court - Bannock County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2014-0001520-0C Current Judge: Stephen S Dunn 
Hill - VU Mobile Home Park, etal. vs. City Of Pocatello 
User: DCANO 
Hill - VU Mobile Home Park, ED Quinn vs. City Of Pocatello 
Date 
4/10/2015 
4/20/2015 
5/22/2015 
5/29/2015 
6/5/2015 
6/12/2015 
6/15/2015 
Code 
MOTN 
User 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
OCANO 
OCANO 
OCANO 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
Judge 
Defendant response in opposition to plaintiffs Stephen S Dunn 
motion to strike portions of stroschien affidavits: 
aty Blake Hall for def 
Defendants response in oppositin to plaintiffs 
motin to strike affidavit of Blake Hall and third 
affldavit of Joyce Stroschein ; aty Blake Hall 
Affidavit of Blake Hall; aty Blake Hall for def 
Affidavit of Sarah Roberts; aty Blake Hall 
Stephen S Dunn 
Stephen S Dunn 
Stephen S Dunn 
Affidavit of Leslike Georgeson'; aty Blake Hall for Stephen S Dunn 
def 
Motion to Strike Portions of the Affidavit of Joyce Stephen S Dunn 
A. Stroschein Filed August 28, 2014, The Second 
Affidavit of Joyce A. Stroschein Filed March 13, 
2015 and Third Affidavit of Joyce A. Stroschein 
Dated 4-2-15. Michael D. Gaffney, Attorneys for 
Plntfs. 
Motion to Strlke Affidavit of Blake G. Hall and Stephen S Dunn 
Third Affidavit of Joyce A. Stroschein (IRCP 7 
(b)(3)), Michael D. Gaffney, Attorneys for Plntfs. 
Affidavit of Michael D. Gaffney In Support of Stephen S Dunn 
Motion to Strike Affidavit of Blake G. Hall and 
Third Affidavit of Joyce A. Stroschein, Michael D. 
Gaffney, Attorneys for Plntfs. 
Defendants Fact and expert witness disclosure; Stephen S Dunn 
aty Blake Hall for def 
Affidavit of Logan Robinson; aty Nathan Olsen Stephen S Dunn 
for plntf 
Affidavit of Nathan Olsen; aty Nathan Olsen for Stephen S Dunn 
plntf 
Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum ; aty 
Nathan Olsen for plntfs 
Stephen S Dunn 
Affidavit of Ed Quinn; aty Nathan Olsen Stephen S Dunn 
Fourth affidavit of Joyce Stroschein; aty Blake Stephen S Dunn 
Hall for def 
Defendant Sur Reply Memorandum in support of Stephen S Dunn 
motion for summary judgment; aty Blake Hall for 
def 
Motion objecting to and to strike the fourth Stephen S Dunn 
affidavit of Joyce Stroschein; aty Nathan Olsen 
for plntf 
Motion forleave to file first Amended complaint; Stephen S Dunn 
aty Nathan Olsen forplntf 
Amended complaint Jury demand and request for Stephen S Dunn 
class certification; aty Micahel Gaffney for plntf 
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Sixth Judicial District Court - Bannock County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2014-0001520-0C Current Judge: Stephen S Dunn 
Hill - VU Mobile Home Park, etal. vs. City Of Pocatello 
User: OCANO 
Hill - VU Mobile Home Park, ED Quinn vs. City Of Pocatello 
Date 
6/18/2015 
7/6/2015 
7/7/2015 
7/8/2015 
7/10/2015 
7/13/2015 
7/16/2015 
7/27/2015 
8/7/2015 
8/10/2015 
Code 
HRVC 
DCHH 
AFFD 
MOTN 
ORDR 
HRSC 
User 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
KARLA 
KARLA 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
OCANO 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
KARLA 
KARLA 
KARLA 
KARLA 
Judge 
Defendant response in oppositin to plaintiffs motin Stephen S Dunn 
to strike fourth stroschien affidavit ; aty Blake 
Hall 
Motion for leave to file AMICUS Curiae Brief of Stephen S Dunn 
Notional Association of Home Builders in 
Opposition to Defs Motion for Summary 
Judgment; aty Steven Taggart for national 
AMJCUS CURIAE Brief of Notional Association of Stephen S Dunn 
Home Builders in Opposiiton of Def City of 
POcatello's Matin for Summary Judgment; aty 
Steven TAggart 
Defendants response in oppositin to plaintiffs Stephen S Dunn 
motion to amend complaint; aty Blake Hall for 
def 
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 
08/04/2015 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 
Stephen S Dunn 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Stephen S Dunn 
04/13/2015 02:00 PM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: Sheri Nothelphim 
Number ofTranscript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less 100 
Defendants opposition to motion for leave to file Stephen S Dunn 
Amicus Curiae Brief; aty Blake Hall for def 
Renewed motion for leave to file first amended Stephen S Dunn 
complaint; aty Michael Gaffney 
Memorandum in support of renewed motion 
forleave to file first amended complaint; aty 
Michael Gaffney for plntf 
Stephen S Dunn 
Notice of Hearing; Renewed Motion for Leave to Stephen S Dunn 
File First Amended Complaint on 8-10-15.; 
Michael D. Gaffney, Attorney's for Plntfs. 
Notice of hearing on motin forleave to file Amicus Stephen S Dunn 
Curiae Brief on national association of Home 
Builders in opposition to Defendants Motion for 
Summary Judgment; aty Steven Taggart · 
Defendants response in opposition to plaintiffs Stephen S Dunn 
renewed motion to amend complaint; aty Blake 
Hall for def city of pocatello 
Affidavit of Blake G. Hall Stephen S Dunn 
Motion to Vacate Hearing on Plaintiffs REnewed Stephen S Dunn 
Motion to File Amended Complaint (Hall} 
Order; vacate and reset hearing to 08/1715 at Stephen S Dunn 
2:30 p.m. /s J Dunn 08/07/15 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 08/17/2015 02:30 Stephen S Dunn 
PM) 
8Date: 5/25/2016 
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Sixth Judicial District Court - Bannock County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2014-0001520-0C Current Judge: Stephen S Dunn 
Hill - VU Mobile Home Park, eta!. vs. City Of Pocatello 
User: OCANO 
Hill - VU Mobile Home Park, ED Quinn vs. City Of Pocatello 
Date 
8/14/2015 
8/21/2015 
8/31/2015 
9/2/2015 
9/3/2015 
11/10/2015 
11/20/2015 
11/24/2015 
12/4/2015 
12/8/2015 
12/11/2015 
Code 
DCHH 
MEOR 
HRVC 
DEOP 
JDMT 
CSTS 
User 
KARLA 
KARLA 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
KARLA 
MARLEA 
KARLA 
KARLA 
KARLA 
KARLA 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
Judge 
REply in Support of Renewed Motion for Leave to Stephen S Dunn 
File First Amended Complaint (Olsen for 
Plaintiff)_ 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Stephen S Dunn 
08/17/2015 02:30 PM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: Sheri Nothelphim 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less 100 
Defendants Response in opposiitn to plaintiffs 
motin to amend complaint; aty Blake Hall 
Defendants Opposiitn to Amicus Curiae Brief: 
aty Blake Hall for def 
Stephen S Dunn 
Stephen S Dunn 
Minute Entry and Order; Court allow Amicus Stephen S Dunn 
Curiae Brief; Court take Motion for Leave to File 
First Amended Complaint under advisment; s/ J 
Dunn 09/02/15 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any Stephen S Dunn 
File Or Record By The Clerk, Per Page Paid by: 
petersen moss & hall Receipt number: 0028214 
Dated: 9/3/2015 Amount: $10.00 (Check) 
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 
01/05/2016 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 
Stephen S Dunn 
Memorandum Decision Granting Defendant's Stephen S Dunn 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Discussing 
Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification, and 
Denying Plaintiffs Renewed Motion for Leave to 
File First Amended Complaint; /s J Dunn 11/09/15 
Judgment entered in favor of Defendant and Stephen S Dunn 
against Plaintiff and case is dismissed; /s J Dunn 
11/09/15 
Case Status Changed: Closed Stephen S Dunn 
Affidavit of Blake G Hall in support of request for Stephen S Dunn 
costs and attorneys fees: aty Blake Hall for def 
Defendants Memorandum of authority in support Stephen S Dunn 
of costs and attorneys fees against plaintiffs: aty 
Blake Hall 
Motion to reconsider; aty Michael Gaffney for Stephen S Dunn 
plntfs 
Motion to disallow; aty Nathan Olsen for plntf Stephen S Dunn 
Memorandum in support of motin to reconsider; Stephen S Dunn 
aty Nathan Olsen for plntfs 
Notice of hearing; set on 1-11-2016 @ 2pm: 
Defendants response to plaintiffs motin to 
disallow; aty Blake Hall 
Notice of hearing; set for Plaintiffs Motion to 
disallow on 1-11-2016 @2pm: aty Blake Hall 
Stephen S Dunn 
Stephen S Dunn 
Stephen S Dunn 
9Date: 5/25/2016 
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Sixth Judicial District Court - Bannock County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2014-0001520-0C Current Judge: Stephen S Dunn 
Hill -VU Mobile Home Park, etal. vs. City Of Pocatello 
User: OCANO 
Hill - VU Mobile Home Park, ED Qulnn vs. City Of Pocatello 
Date 
12/22/2015 
12/23/2015 
1/6/2016 
1/12/2016 
2/10/2016 
3/22/2016 
3/24/2016 
4/12/2016 
4/15/2016 
Code 
HRSC 
CSTS 
MEMO 
DCHH 
DEOP 
ORDR 
APSC 
NOTC 
MISC 
MISC 
User 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
KARLA 
KARLA 
KARLA 
KARLA 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
OCANO 
OCANO 
OCANO 
OCANO 
OCANO 
KARLA 
TAMILYN 
Judge 
Defendants opposition to plaintiffs motin to Stephen S Dunn 
reconsider; aty Blake Hall 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 01/11/2016 02:00 Stephen S Dunn 
PM) 
Case Status Changed: Closed pending clerk Stephen S Dunn 
action 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider Stephen S Dunn 
(Olsen for Plaintiff) 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Stephen S Dunn 
01/11/2016 02:00 PM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: Sheri Nothelphim 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less 100 
Memorandum Decision Denying Plaintiffs Motion Stephen S Dunn 
for Reconsideratlon /s J Dunn 02/08/16 
Order Granting Defendant's Request for Costs as Stephen S Dunn 
a Matter of Right, Denying Defendant's REquest 
for Discretionary Costs and Denying Defendant's 
Request for Attorney Fees; Is J Dunn 02/08/16 
Amended Judgment; Judgment is entered in Stephen S Dunn 
favor of the Def and ag the plaintifss this case is 
DISMISSED, costs are awarded to the def inthe 
amount of $66.00: s/ Judge Dunn 2-8-2016 
Filing: L4 -Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Stephen S Dunn 
Supreme Court Paid by: Michael Gaffney 
Receipt number: 0009679 Dated: 3/22/2016 
Amount: $129.00 (Check) For: Hill -VU Mobile 
Home Park (plaintiff) and Quinn, ED (plaintiff) 
Appealed To The Supreme Court 
NOTICE OF APPEAL: Michael D. Gaffney, 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
Stephen S Dunn 
Stephen S Dunn 
Recerved check # 52624 in the amount of Stephen S Dunn 
$100.00 for Clerk's Deposit. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL: Signed Stephen S Dunn 
and Malled to SC and Counsel on 3-24-16. 
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPT Stephen S Dunn 
AND RECORD UNDER RULE 19 OF THE 
IDAHO APPELLATE RULES; Bake G. Hall, 
Attorney for City of Pocatello. 
Request for Additional Transcrlpt and Record Stephen S Dunn 
Under Rule 19 of the Idaho Appellate Rules (Hall) 
Request for Addltional Transcript and Record Stephen S Dunn 
Under Rule 19 of the Idaho Appellate Rules-thru 
atty Blake Hall 
10
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Sixth Judicial District Court - Bannock County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2014-0001520-0C Current Judge: Stephen S Dunn 
Hill-VU Mobile Home Park, etal. vs. City Of Pocatello 
User: OCANO 
Hill - VU Mobile Home Park, ED Quinn vs. City Of Pocatello 
Date 
4/29/2016 
5/16/2016 
5/25/2016 
Code 
MISC 
MISC 
MISC 
MISC 
NOTC 
MISC 
User 
OCANO 
OCANO 
OCANO 
OCANO 
OCANO 
OCANO 
Judge 
IDAHO SUPREME COURT; Received Notice of Stephen S Dunn 
Appeal with Exhibit A Attached and Respondent's 
Request for Additional Transcripts and Record -
See Attachement. Set Due Date - Reporter's 
Transcripts lodging date is 5-27-16. and Clerk's 
Record Due 7-1-16. 
NOTICE OF LODGING; Rodney M. Felshaw Stephen S Dunn 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPTS Received in Court Stephen S Dunn 
Records on 5-16-16 for the following hearing: 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT 
OFTHESTATEOFIDAHO,INANDFORBANNOCKCOUNTY NAFTZ ROBERT C. 
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on behalf 
of itself and all others similarly situated, ED 
QUINN, on behalf of himself and all others 
similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
municipality, 
Defendant. . 
CaseNo.Q.l·JJ)\4-1520 ·()(... 
COMPLAINT JURY DEMAND AND 
REQUEST FOR CLASS 
CERTIFICATION 
COMES NOW the Plaintiffs,liill-Vu Mobile Home Park, Ed Quinn and all others 
similarly situated and for ·a complaint against the above named Defendant alleging as follows: 
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JURISDICTION 
1. This action is brought for damages and other appropriate relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
for violation of the Plaintiffs' civil rights under the color of state and federal law. 
2. Defendant, the City of Pocatello (City) is a municipality incorporated in the State of 
Idaho and administered pursuant to LC.§ 50-101 et. al., and located within Bannock County. 
3. The Court has jurisdiction over the City under LC.§ 5-514. 
4. Bannock County is the proper venue for this action under l.C. § 5-402 or 404. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
5. The City has implemented "system capacity fees," sometimes referred to as 
"connection fees" or "capacity fees" which a person must pay along with a separate "building 
pennit fee" prior to or in relation to new construction. Capacity Fees consist of separate fees 
charged for water, waste water, and waste collection as set by the City Council on an annual 
basis. 
6. Usually at the same time the City sets Capacity Fee rates, the City sets monthly "User 
Fees" for customers of the City water, wastewater and sanitation collection system. 
7 The City deposits the collected Capacity and User Fees into separate accounts for 
water, waste water, and sanitation. 
8. Pursuant to Idaho law and the State and Federal Constitution, Capacity and User fees 
can only be used for their intended purposes, including operation, maintenance, repair, 
replacement of the existing system and bond repayment. 
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9. Around 2005, the City initiated a policy with regard to the Capacity and User Fees 
titled under various names, including "Return on Equity,"''Rate of Return," "Franchise Fee," and 
"Payment in Lieu of Taxes" hereafter collectively referred to as "PILOT. 
10. In late 2006, City Mayor Chase requested an opinion from the Attorney General for 
the State ofldaho (IAG) on the legality of the PILOT policy. In an opinion dated February 6, 
2007, the IAG told the City that the policy did not comply with law, setting forth the statutes and 
case law supporting such opinion. The City did not disclose the IAG's opinion to the public. It 
also disregarded the opinion and continued with the PILOT policy. 
11. Since 2007, no less than $30 million has been transferred by the City from the 
water, sewer and sanitation accounts under the guise of its PILOT program to fund the general 
activities of the City. No less than $6 million has been transferred as such since 2011. 
12. The City has also admittedly promoted, planned and spent Capacity Fees for capital 
improvement projects that expand the water, wastewater and waste collection systems without 
first obtaining a bond as required under the Idaho Revenue Bond Act (IRBA). The IRBA only 
allows Capacity Fees to be utilized for maintenance, repair and replacement of the existing 
system. 
13. The Building Contractoi:s Association of Southeast Idaho (BCASEI) filed an action 
in the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State of Idaho in and for Bannock 
County (Case No. CV-2011-5228-0C) (Idaho Case) challenging the legality of the City's 
Capacity Fee and User Fee policies, and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. 
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14. In a November 15, 2013, Memorandum Decision and Order the Idaho Court held that 
the City's PILOT programs, or any other program with a similar intent are unconstitutional and a 
violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond Act. 
15. During the discovery stages of the Idaho case, the City failed to produce the 2007 
IAG opinion and any related correspondence or documents pertaining to that opinion although 
such information was clearly requested. The IAG opinion and its related correspondence was 
provided only through a subpoena by the BCASEI issued directly to the State ofldaho in January 
of 2013. 
16. The BCASEI had to pay the City over $2,500 just to obtain the City's financial 
records to determine the flow of the Capacity and User Fees. 
17. The City has also either destroyed or failed to keep and maintain records 
pertaining to its Capacity and User Fee policies. Some records have been destroyed after the City 
became aware of pote~tial claims with regard to these policies. Such conduct constitutes a 
violation of the Idaho Municipal Records Retention Act I.C. § 50-907, et al., and spoliation of 
evidence. 
18. During the course of the litigation in the Idaho case, as a reaction to a court decision, 
the City withdrew no less than $2,608,220 from the general fund equivalent to the amount of 
Capacity Fees collected by the City since 2007, and have deposited such funds into separate 
accounts, $1,391,089 in City"Fund 37" and $1,217,131 in City "Fund 38" which remain 
unallocated by the City. 
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COUNT I - UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKING 
19. All previous allegations are restated and incorporated herein by reference. 
20. The 5th Amendment of the United States Constitution, as applied to the states under 
the 14th Amendment, prevents the talcing of private property without due process of law or 
without just compensation. 
21. Idaho Const. Art. I§ 14 essentially incorporates the 5th Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution. 
22. Under U.S. C. 42 § 1983, a person who is deprived of their rights under the color of 
·any act, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any public entity is entitled to redress 
at law or in equity. 
23. Under the doctrine of"Res Judicata" the Court should accept and adopt the 
declaratory ruling by the Idaho court that the fees transferred for use under the City's PILOT 
policy were impennissibly assessed and collected. 
24. In addition, the City's use of Capacity fees for the purpose of capital improvement 
projects that expand the system are likewise impermissible and a violation of the IRBA. 
25. The City's unlawful fee policies have resulted in the taking of private property of the 
plaintiffs and similarly situated individuals. 
26. The City's actions have resulted in a violation of the Constitutional rights, by the 
taking of private property without due process of law and without just compensation. 
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27. The plaintiffs and similarly situated individuals and entities have suffered injury 
caused by the City charging an unlawful fee and seek compensation for damages in an amount 
which will be proven at trial, which in any event is many times in excess of$25,000. 
COUNT II - UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
28. All previous allegations are restated and incorporated herein by reference. 
29. Plaintiffs have conferred a benefit on the City in the form of Capacity and/or User 
Fees which have been used by the City for purposes not authorized by the Idaho Constitution. 
30. The City has been knowingly and willingly receiving an improper benefit at the 
expense of the plaintiffs and other similarly situation individuals and entities. 
31. Under the circumstances, it would be unjust for the City to retain this benefit 
without properly reimbursing plaintiffs and other who have paid the fees. 
COUNT III""'" EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL AND/OR EQUITABLE TOLLING 
32. All previous allegations are restated and incorporated herein by reference. 
33. The City knowingly made a false representation of, concealed and/or destroyed 
material facts to the detriment of the Plaintiffs. 
34. Alternatively or in addition, essential information bearing on the Plaintiffs' claims 
could not be discovered through reasonable diligence. 
35. Alternatively or in addition, the City's fee policies, i.e. PILOT program and capital 
expansion without proper bonding procedures, were void as a matter of law. 
36. The Plaintiffs had no knowledge of the concealed or falsely represented material 
facts. 
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COUNT IV-ATTORNEY FEES 
37. All previous allegations are restated and incorporated herein by reference. 
38. The Plaintiffs have retained the services of the above named legal counsel to 
pursue their rights. 
39. The Plaintiffs are entitled to recover their attorneys fees and expenses under I.C. 
§§ 12-117, 58-115, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and any other applicable statute or rules. 
CLASS ACTION CERTIFICATION 
40. All previous allegations are restated and incorporated herein by reference. 
41. Plaintiffs bring this action individually and on behalf of a Class consisting 
of all individuals or entities who have paid Capacity or User Fees to the City since 2007. 
42. Class certification, including the possibility of subclasses, is warranted and 
appropriate under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
Plaintiffs pray for the following relief: 
1. For a monetary judgment consisting of all improperly collected and spent Capacity and 
User Fees since 2007, plus interest at the statutory rate of 12% per annum. 
2. That there be immediate injunctive relief and/or pre-judgment writ of attachment 
freezing and prohibiting the use of funds contained in City Fund 37 and 38 as referenced in this 
complaint, pending the outcome of this case as a potential source for recovery. 
COMPLAINT JURY DEMAND AND REQUEST FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION -Page 7 
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3. That the City should be required to deposit all monies collected from the unlawful fee 
into a common fund and all members of the class should be allowed to petition the fund for a 
recovery of their damages. 
4. That punitive damages be awarded for the City's wrongful conduct pertaining to the 
Plaintiffs' equitable estoppel claim. 
5. An award of attorney fees and costs, and further that the City should be required to 
reimburse the damages fund for any such awarded attorney fees based upon the allegations 
contained herein so as not to further harm the class. 
6. Any other legal or equitable relief deemed justified by the Court. 
PLAINTIFFS REQUEST A JURY TRIAL FOR ANY ISSUES ABLE BY JURY 
DATED this 1f:___ day of April, 2014. 
Nath ··. . sen 
PETERSEN Moss HALL & OLSEN 
Attorneys for the Plaintiffs 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY 
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on behalf 
of itself and all others similarly situated, ED 
QUINN, on behalf of himself and all others 
similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
municipality, 
Defendant. 
Case No.CV-2014-1520-0C 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION TO DISQUALIFY WITHOUT 
CAUSE 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Disqualify Robert C. Naftz as the presiding Judge having been 
received and reviewed and the requirements for disqualification without cause having been met; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Honorable Robert C. Naftz is disqualified from 
presiding over this case without cause and a different Judge will be assigned. 
DATED this 1!:l._ day of May, 2014. 
District Judge 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO DISQUALIFY WITHOUT CAUSE- Page 1 
20
.. 0 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am a duly certified Clerk of this Court, and on this Ji_ 
day of May, 2014, I served a true and correct copy of the forgoing on: 
Nathan M. Olsen, Esq. 
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN 
485 "E" Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
[ ~ U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand-Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile @ (208) 524-3391 
ROBERT POLEKI 
Clerk of the District Court 
Deputy 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO DISQUALIFY WITHOUT CAUSE- Page 2 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDlcir!JL gi~· 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on behalf 
of itself and all others similarly situated, ED 
-QUINN, on behalf of himself and all others 
similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs . 
. CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
municipality, 
Defendant. 
Case No: CV-2014-01520-0C 
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER OF _ 
REFERENCE 
The Honorable Robert C. Naftz, District Judge, having been disqualified by the 
Defendant under I.R.C.P.40(d)(1)(E), 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above entitled matter is 
hereby REFERRED to the Honorable David C. Nye for complete resolution. 
IT IS SO ORDERED . 
. DATED this 161h day of May, 2014. 
Case No.: CV-2014-01520-0C 
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER OF REFERENCE 
Page 1 of 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the \\ R day of 2014, I 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document upon eac oft e following individuals 
in the manner indicated. 
Suzrume Johnson 
Trial Court Administrator 
Michael D. Gaffney 
Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Nathan M. Olsen 
Petersen Moss Hall & Olsen 
485 "E" Street 
Pocatello, ID 83402 
Judge Robert Naftz 
Judge David Nye 
Deputy Clerk 
Case No.: CV-2014-01520-0C 
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER OF REFERENCE 
Page 2 of 2 
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BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ. 
SAM L. ANGELL, ESQ. 
NATHAN R. STARNES, ESQ. 
HALL ANGELL STARNES, LLP 
1075 S Utah Avenue, Suite 150 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Telephone (208) 522-3003 
Fax (208) 621-3008 
/SB No. 's 2434, 7012 & 7484 
bgh@hasattomeys.com 
sla@hasattomeys.com 
nrs@hasattomeys.com 
Attorneys for Defendant City of Pocatello 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY 
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on 
behalf of itself and all others similarly 
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself 
and all others similarly situated, -
Plaintiffs, 
v. -
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
municipality, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2014-1520-0C 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT 
By and through counsel of record, Defendant the City of Pocatello, submits the following 
as an Answer to Plaintiffs' Complaint Jury Demand and Request for Class Certification, filed 
April 15, 2014, (hereinafter "Complaint"). 
In answering this Complaint, Defendant expressly reserves, in addition to the defenses set 
forth below, all defenses provided for or authorized by Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and all 
other defenses provided by law. Moreover, Defendant states that its investigation of this matter 
ANSWER TO COMPlAINT -1 
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is continuing and as such, certain averments, statements and defenses may change in the future in 
light of additional or newly discovered information. 
GENERAL DENIAL 
Defendant denies any and all allegations in Plaintiffs' Complaint not expressly admitted 
herein. 
JURISDICTION 
1. With regard to Paragraph 1, Defendant denies the same. 
2. With regard to Paragraph 2, Defendant admits the same. 
3. With regard to Paragraph 3, Defendant denies the same. 
4. With regard to Paragraph 4, Defendant denies the same. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
5. With regard to Paragraph 5, Defendant admits only the existence of a connection fee 
or capacity fee, but denies the remainder of this paragraph. 
6. With regard to Paragraph 6, Defendant denies the same. 
7. With regard to Paragraph 7, Defendant denies the same. 
8. With regard to Paragraph 8, Defendant denies the same. 
9. With regard to Paragraph 9, Defendant denies the same. 
10. With regard to Paragraph 10, Defendant denies the same. 
11. With regard to Paragraph 11, Defendant denies the same. 
12. With regard to Paragraph 12, Defendant denies the same. 
13. With regard to Paragraph 13, Defendant admits the same. 
14. With regard to Paragraph 14, the Memorandum Decision and Order speaks for itself. 
Therefore, Defendant denies the same. 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT - 2 
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15. With regard to Paragraph 15, Defendant denies the same. 
16. With regard to Paragraph 16, Defendant denies the same. 
17. With regard to Paragraph 17, Defendant denies the same. 
18. With regard to Paragraph 18, Defendant denies the same. 
COUNT I- UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKING 
19. With regard to Paragraph 19, this paragraph contains· no allegations of fact, and 
therefore, Defendant denies the same. 
20. With regard to Paragraph 20, the 5th Amendment speaks for itself. Therefore, 
Defendant denies the same. 
21. With regard to Paragraph 21, the Idaho Constitution speaks for itself. Therefore, 
Defendant denies the same. 
22. With regard to Paragraph 22, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 speaks for itself Therefore, 
Defendant denies the same. 
23. With regard to Paragraph 23, Defendant denies the same. 
24. With regard to Paragraph 24, Defendant denies the same. 
25. With regard to Paragraph 25, Defendant denies the same. 
26. With regard to Paragraph 26, Defendant denies the same. 
27. With regard to Paragraph 27, Defendant denies the same. 
COUNT II - UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
28. With regard to Paragraph 28, this paragraph contains no allegations of fact, and 
therefore, Defendant denies the same. 
29. With regard to Paragraph 29, Defendant denies the same. 
30. With regard to Paragraph 30, Defendant denies the same. 
ANSWER TO COMPlAINT · 3 
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31. With regard to Paragraph 31, Defendant denies the same. 
COUNT III-EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL AND/OR EQUITABLE TOLLING 
32. With regard to Paragraph 32, this paragraph contains no allegations of fact, and 
therefore, Defendant denies the same. 
33. With regard to Paragraph 33, Defendant denies the same. 
34. With regard to Paragraph 34, Defendant denies the same. 
35. With regard to Paragraph 35, Defendant denies the same. 
36. With regard to Paragraph 36, Defendant denies the same. 
COUNT IV -ATTORNEY FEES 
37. With regard to Paragraph 37, this paragraph contains no allegations of fact, and 
therefore, Defendant denies the same. 
38. With regard to Paragraph 38, Defendant is without information sufficient to either 
admit or deny, and therefore, deni~ the same. 
39. With regard to Paragraph 39, Defendant denies the same. 
CLASS ACTION CERTIFICATION 
40. With regard to Paragraph 40, this paragraph contains no allegations of fact, and 
therefore, Defendant denies the same. 
41. With regard to Paragraph 41, Defendant is without information sufficient to either 
admit or deny, and therefore, denies the same. 
42. With regard to Paragraph 42, Defendant denies the same. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
1. Plaintiffs' Complaint, and each and every allegation contained therein, fails to state a 
claim against Defendant upon which relief can be granted. 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT -4 
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2. Plaintiffs have failed to comply with requirements of the Idaho Tort Claims Act. 
3. Defendant is entitled to immunity as set forth in the Idaho Tort Claims Act. 
4. Plaintiffs are barred from maintaining this action against Defendant under the doctrines 
of absolute immunity and/or qualified immunity. 
5. All relevant decisions regarding or affecting Plaintiffs made by Defendant were based on 
legitimate constitutional and statutory reasons. 
6. Plaintiffs have failed to exhaust administrative remedies with regard to some or all of the 
claims asserted for which exhaustion is required under applicable law. 
7. Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue claims in this matter and/or Plaintiffs' claims are moot 
and/or not yet ripe. 
8. Plaintiffs have failed to establish an "actual controversy'' as required by law for the relief 
sought. 
9. Plaintiffs' claims are precluded by the doctrines of Waiver, Estoppel and/or Laches. 
I 0. Plaintiffs' claims are precluded by the applicable Statutes of Limitations, including but 
not limited to Idaho Code§ 5-219 and other applicable statutes. 
11. Plaintiffs have failed to mitigate damages, if any. 
12. The actions of Defendant were at all times carried out in good faith. Defendant had 
objectively reasonable belief that all conduct was lawful at all times stated in Plaintiffs' 
Complaint. 
13. Equitable remedies are not appropriate. 
14. Defendant has not engaged in any conduct that would violate or be contrary to public 
policy. 
15. Plaintiffs' purported tort claims are barred by the economic loss rule. 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT - 5 
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16. The actions of Defendant alleging a violation of statute and purported tortious conduct 
were totally unforeseeable to Defendant and therefore had no duty nor opportunity to 
prevent the alleged hann. 
17. Plaintiffs' and any of the purported "similarly situated" Pocatello residents lack standing 
to assert a claim under the Complaint. 
18. Plaintiffs and some or all memb_ers of the purported class lack standing to assert claims 
because they have not suffered any damage or injury. 
19. Plaintiffs and any of the purported class cannot satisfy the requirements for class 
certification. 
20. Plaintiffs' Complaint and the averments contained therein fail sufficiently to allege the 
times and places at which certain material events described in the complaint allegedly 
occurred, and such claims therefore are barred and/or subject to dismissal pursuant to 
Rule 9 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
21. The foregoing defenses are applicable, where appropriate, to any and all of Plaintiffs' 
claims for relief In asserting these defenses, Defendant does not admit that Defendant 
has the burden of proving the allegations or denials contained in the defenses, but, to the 
contrary, asserts that by reasons of the denials and/or by reason of relevant statutory and 
judicial authority, the burden of proving the facts relevant to many of the defenses and/or 
the burden of proving the inverse to the allegations contained in many of the defenses is 
upon the Plaintiffs. Defendant does not admit, in asserting any defense, any 
responsibility or liability, but, to the contrary, specifically denies any and all allegations 
ofresponsibility and liability in Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT• 6 
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22. Defendant may have additional defenses to Plaintiffs' Complaint, but cannot at this time, 
consistent with Rule 11 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, state with specificity those 
defenses. Accordingly, Defendant reserves the right to supplement the Amended Answer 
and add additional defenses as discovery in this case progresses. 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
Defendant has been· required to retain counsel to defend this action, and is enti.tled to 
· recover reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in the defense of this action from Plaintiffs, 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, Idaho Code§§ 12-117, 12-120, 12-121, Rules 54 and 58 of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and all other applicable laws allowing for the recovery of costs or 
attorney fees in this action. Defendant denies that Plaintiff is entitled to any award of attorney 
fees. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays for judgment as follows: 
1. That Plaintiffs' Complaint be dismissed with prejudice, with Plaintiffs taking nothing · 
thereunder; 
2. That the Court no certify the purported class; 
3. That Defendant be awarded costs and attorney fees necessarily incurred in defending 
this action; 
4. For such other relief as the Court may deem just and proper. 
DATED this di& day of June, 2014. 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT· 7 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following 
this~ day of June, 2014, by the method indicated below: 
Michael D. Gaffuey, Esq. -
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls,,ID 83404 
Fax: 529-9732 
Nathan M. Olsen, Esq. 
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN 
485 "E" Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Fax: 524-3391 
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Michael D. Gaffuey 
- Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
ISBN: 3558 
Nathan M. Olsen 
Petersen Moss Hall & Olsen 
485 "E" Street, Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Telephone: (208) 523-4650 
Fax: (208) 524-3391 
ISBN: 7373 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY 
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on behalf 
of itself and all others similarly situated, ED 
QUINN, on behalf of himself and all others 
similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
municipality, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2014-1520-0C 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court on Plaintiffs' Application for Prejudgment 
Writ of Attachment Pursuant to I.C. § 8-502 and the Court having made a preliminary 
determination from the file that the Plaintiffs have met the requirements of LC. § 8-502 and 
I.R.C.P. 6{c)(2) for the Court to issue an order to show cause as to why a prejudgment writ of 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE - I 
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attaclunent should not be entered pending a hearing and Plaintiffs meeting their burden at said 
hearing set below. 
Now THEREFORE, IT Is HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. On the 8th day of September, 2014 at the hour of 2:00 o'clock p.m., at the 
Bannock County Courthouse, Defendant shall appear and show cause if there be any, why a 
Writ of Attaclunent should not be issued in the manner requested by Plaintiffs in their 
application. 
You ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED that in the absence of such appearance, such order shall be 
issued without further notice to you. You are notified that any party electing to produce 
testimony or other evidence, or to cross examine the adverse party at the hearing scheduled 
herein, must give to the court and to opposing counsel notice thereof which must be received 
at least 24 hours prior to· such hearing. This order constitutes such notice to Defendant by 
Plaintiffs. 
IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED that the Plaintiffs cause a copy of this order to be 
served on the Defenq.ant as soon as practicable, but in no event less than five (S) days prior to 
the hearing scheduled above. 
DATED this If!. day of August, 2014. 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE'- 2 
David C. Nye 
District Judge 
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BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ. 
SAM L. ANGELL, ESQ. 
NATHAN R. STARNES, ESQ. 
HALL ANGELL STARNES, LLP 
1075 S Utah Avenue, Suite 150 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Telephone (208) 522-3003 
Fax (208) 621 .. 3008. 
ISBNo. 's 2434, 7012 & 7484 
bgh(@,hasattorneys.com 
s1a@hasattorneys.com 
nrs@hasattomeys.con1 
Attorneys for Defendant City of Pocatello 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, lN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY 
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on 
behalf of itse]f and all others similarly 
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself 
and a1l others similarly situated, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, anJdaho 
municipality, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
., 
: ss. 
County of Bannock 
_Case No. CV-2014-1520-0C 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A. 
STROSCHEIN 
Joyce A. Stroschein, being first duly sworn. deposes and states as follows: 
I. I am the designated Interim Chief Financial Officer ("CFO") for the City of Pocatello._ I 
have served in the finance department of the City since October, 20~1 including City Controller 
from 2006-2008 and the Finance Manager from 2008-2014. I am knowledgeable regarding the 
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financial affairs of the City and its adoption of policies related to the Payment-In-Lieu-Of-Taxes 
("PILOT") component of the user fees, return on equity. and the Capacity/Connection fees. 
2. The City owns and operates a municipal sewage collection and treatment system that 
includes sewer trunk lines to. transport sewage to treatment plant facilities designed to treat raw 
sewage. That system was financed, in part. by the issuance of revenue bonds, pursuant to Article 
8, Section 3, Idaho Constitution and the Idaho Revenue Bond Act, Idaho Code §§ 50-1027 
through 50-1042. 
3. The City owns and operates a sewage collection system and treatment system pursuant to 
Idaho Code Section 50-1028, et seq. The wastewater treatment facility is called the Water 
Pollution Control Facility (WPCF). The area served by the WPCF includes the cities of 
. . 
Pocatello and Chubbuck and some connections within the area of city impact within Bannock 
County but outside the city boWidaries. The WPCF was originally constructed as a primary_ 
treatment plant in 1959. 
4. The "Return on Equity" policy, which no longer exists, referred to city-owned public 
utilities {i.e. water, sewer) making a transfer to the general fund. Prior to the Court's holding in 
Building Contractors Association of Southeast Idaho v. City of Pocatello, the City charged the 
city-owned public utilities a fee. The general theory behind the implementation of this fee was 
that these public utilities are businesses operated by the public that could and do operate in other 
comn1unities as for-profit private enterprises. The utilities were treated commensurately with 
privately owned utilities 
S. In prior years, the City described the transfer as a ''rate of return" or "return on equity" as 
if the taxpayers were the shareholders (which they are). In approximately 2011, the City re-
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described the transfer as a Payment-In-Lieu-Of-Taxes ("PILOT9'). The phrase "rate of return," 
"return on equity," or "PILOT" are synonymous. This change made the PILOT directly 
comparable to private utilities operating in the·community. The PILOT was calculated on the 
prior year city property tax levy rate multiplied by the-estimated market value per the most recent 
financial plan prepared by an outside consulting engineer. The rate of return was part of the 
annual budget process and the rates were set each year and approved by the City Council. 
6. The PILOT expense component of the user f~ (rate of return) was a payment in lieu of 
taxes fee charged directly to the utility. The charge operated like property taxes assessed to and 
paid by Idaho Power or Intermountain Gas ( except the PILOT charge does not include County or 
school district taxes). The PILOT charge would most accurately be described as a cost of doing 
business for both the water and sewer departments. Both the water and sewer department 
recovered the PILOT charge through the fee charged to all users of the water and sewer system .. 
7. Payment in lieu of Taxes (PILOT), as well as the predecessor "rate of return" or "return 
on equity," was designed to be a fair and reasonable payment implemented to keep Pocatello 
resident• s property taxes lower and still provide the necessary water and sewer services at 
reasonable rates. The City's water and wastewater utility were financially self-sufficient with 
funding for capital and operating requirements derived primarily from rates, w_hich included the 
PILOT charge. The utilities are responsible for planning, construction. operatin~. and 
maintaining water and wastewater facilities. 
8. The existence of the PILOT is irrelevant to the policy decision to require capacity fees for 
new utility connections. There is no overlap between the PILOT component of the user fee and 
the coJmection/capacity fee. The City has never charged a PILOT component to the 
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connection/capacity fee. 
9. Following the Court's decision in Building Contractors, however, the City immediately 
discontinued the PILOT charge to the utilities and therefore each of the Pocatello resident users 
saw an immediate decrease in their water and sewer utility bills. On December 19, 2013, the 
City lowered utility user fees in compliance with the Building Contractors decision. Pocatello 
residents saw an approximately 1 Oo/o decrease in their monthly water and wastewater bills. 
10. The focus of the Connection/Capacity fee is on backbone utility infrastructure that serves 
all utility customers with a capacity that was purchased and constructed by ratepayers long ago. 
The connection/capacity fee has nothing to do with taxes. The capacity fee is intended to 
recover a new connector's proportionate share of the Citis wastewater and water backbone 
facility costs. A new customer must "buy-in" to the existing system by making a contribution 
-equal to the amount of equity a similar existing customer has in the system. The 
connection/capacity fee is not the cost to provide new service to the new customer. Rather, when 
new capacity is needed, all customers will bear the cost proportionately. The 
connection/capacity fee is not used for future expansion. 
11. The Cmmection/Capacity Fee is a fee that is a one-time fee charged to all new connectors 
to a system. The connection/capacity fee was phased in during FY2007 after several years of 
increasing numbers of new connections. This fee is intended to recover a new connector's 
proportionate share of the City's wastewater backbone facility costs. The Connection fee is a 
contribution equal to the amount of equity a similar existing customer has in the system. The 
connection fee is to offset the cost for existing users whose capacity will be diminished by the 
new users and will, thus, require replacement of existing infrastructure more regularly. The 
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collection of the capacity fee is based on the size of the connection requested by the customer 
and is generally paid at the time a building permit is issued so that all permit fees and utility 
hookup fees are known in advance. The connection fee is a one-time fee assessed prior to 
connection to the line in accordance with the current fee resolution adopted by the City Council. 
12. The connection /capacity fee is a policy choice adopted by the City upon 
recommendation of a water and wast~ater study provided by Red Oak Consulting. The 
connection fee was deemed a fair method of ensuring that new users were providing fmancial 
support for the use of the existing infrastructure. Capacity fees are irrelevant if there are no new 
connections. They may be immaterial if new connections are infrequent. But when growth is 
more rapid, new connectors can r~pidly consume existing capacity; restoring it can cause rates to 
increase for existing: ratepayers with no compensation for the capacity that they paid for. 
Industrial users can consume capacity in bulk amounts with little notice. 
13. Following the Court's decision in Building Contractors, the City made no changes to the 
connection/capacity fee. The City has never charged a PILOT component to the 
connection/capacity fee and the two different fees have no relationship. Based on the Building 
Contractors decision, the connection/capacity fee was deemed appropriate and the amount was 
upheld. Because no PiLOT component charge has ever been collected from the 
connection/capacity fee it was not improperly collected. Because the fee was declared 
constitutional and the amounts were correct, the City's collection of the connection/capacity fee 
should not serve as a source of recovery for the PILOT component of the user fee. Attached 
hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of a December 26, 2013 memorandum I prepared 
for the Mayor, City Council members, and the City's legal department addressing the Capacity 
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Fee calculations. 
14. The water and wastewater departments have money held in four different fund groups. 
The first fund group is Fund 31 and 32. Funds 31 and 32 are the operating funds. This fund is 
comprised entirely of user fees that are collected by the water and wastewater departments, 
respectively. Funds 31 and 32 would be the only funds which record user fees that contain a 
PILOT component charged by the water and wastewater departments. The second fund group is 
Funds 37 and 38. Funds 37 and 38 are the funds which record the connection/capacity fees. 
These :funds are comprised entirely of connection/capacity fees that have been collected by the 
City's water and wastewater departments. At no point has the City ever deposited any user fees 
that contain a PILOT component into Funds 37 or 38, these funds represent the entirety of the 
connection/capacity funds collected by the City since its inception in 2007. The third fund group 
is Funds 60 and 61. Funds 60 and 61 are the debt service funds for the water and wastewater 
departments. The debt service funds are reserves that are set aside to meet the annual debt 
service payments required by the bond covenants. In the past monies are transferred into these 
funds from Funds 31 and 32, but after the creation of Funds 37 and 38 we have budgeted and 
transferred monies to Funds 60 and 61 to cover the required current debt service payment. The 
final group is FWids 73 and 74. Funds 73 and 74 are the construction funds. These funds are 
where all of the proceeds from the bonds are placed for water and wastewater. Money for 
bonded projects will be withdrawn from these funds to pay for approved bonded projects. 
Attached hereto as Exhibit Bis a true and correct copy of the City's Monthly Cash Report for 
July 2014. 
·ts. The Monthly Cash Reports are public records and can be accessed on the City's website 
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at http://www.pocatello.us/finance/finance_cash.htm. The Monthly Case Report identifies the 
current cash in each of the City's respective funds, including the funds above. 
16. Flllld 37 holds the connection/capacity fees for the water department. Fund 38 holds the 
connection/capacity fees for the wastewater department ("WPC"). Each of the respective funds 
contains all of the connection/capacity fees gathered between 2007 and current. Fund 37 and 38 
is dedicated to holding only the conneetion/capacity f~s. There .are no other funds that are held 
here, including PILOT component user fees. 
17. Funds 37 and 38 were initially created in March 2013 to increase transparency of how the 
connection/capacity fees were spent. Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of 
the Monthly Cash Reports for February 2013 and March 2013 showing no fund 037 or 038 in 
February 2013 but showing those as created in March 2013 with beginning balances drawn from 
the corresponding operating funds in an amount equal to the amount ever collected in the 
capacity fees since inception in 2007. 
18. Consistent with the FY2014 Budget for the City, the City has detennined that the 
eonnection/capacity1fees will be used for debt service. As such, the City budgeted approximately 
$725,826.00 for debt service for the water dep~ent in FY2014. The City intends to use the 
remaining funds from Fund 37 for debt Service in FY2015. The City has budgeted 
approximately $1,384,780.00 for debt service for the wastewater department in FY2014. This 
will exhaust nearly all Qf the funds in Fund 38. Both Fund 37 and 38 have scheduled September 
payments and will execute as budgeted. 
Fund Budget· Year to Date Actual Remaining Budget Balance 
03 7-3000-520.95-03 $725,826.00 $553,831.24 $171,994.76 
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038-0000-520.95-03 $1,384,780.00 $237,961.74 $1,146,81826 
19. · At present, the remaining balance will be $171,994.76 for Fund 37 and $1,146,818.26 for 
Fund 38. Using this approach, all of the connection/capacity fees can be accounted for and there 
has been no funds transferred to the general funds from the connection/capacity fees. As of June 
30, 2014, Fund 37 contained $1,057,908.12 and Fund 38 contained $1,285,169.46. These funds 
hold all the cash ever received since 2007 for all the capacity fees. The only expenditures are the 
year to date transfers noted above for related debt service. For FY2015, the water department is 
scheduled to draw on their capacity fee cash for debt service substantially as was done in 
FY2014. Because virtually all oft.he capacity funds from Fund 38 will be expended in FY2014, 
the wastewater department will rely on operating funds for debt service transfers during FYIS. 
20. Freezing Funds 37 and 38 will have significant implications on the City's retirement of 
debt obligations. As previously, addressed, none of the cash found in Funds 37 and 38 contain 
any user fees with the PILOT component and freezing these funds will effectively nullify the 
Building Conwactor's decision that the connection/capacity fee was constitutional and properly 
assessed. 
FURTHER YOURAFFIANT SAVETH NAUGHT. 
Dated thiso'f day of August, 2014. 
<e:~~ fj_ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO, before me the undersigned. a Notary Public in and for said State, this~ 
day of August, 2014. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
_JJ~.·eby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following 
this-~-ay of August, 2014, by the method indicated below: · 
Michael D. Gaffney, Esq. 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Fax: 529-9732 
Nathan M. Olsen, Esq. 
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN 
485 "E" Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Fax: 524-3391 
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Mayor Blad, Council Members, Legal Department 
FROM: David Swindell, Chief Financial Officer·~~ 
SUBJECT: Capacity Fee Calculations 
DATE: December 26, 2013 
1. FORINFORMATION. 
2. Purpose; To provide information regarding how ca.pa.city fees are determined and to prove that 
the calculation does not involve Payment In lieu Of Taxes (PILOT) or any other operating cost. 
3. Discussion. 
a. General. On December 19, 2013 the City lowered utility user fees in compliance with a 
court decision. That decision said that charging the PILOT was improper and we needed to lower 
user utility rates commensurate with this utility expense reduction. All of this came about from a 
lawsuit :from the contractors association that objected to the utility capacity fees. The capacity fees 
do not involve the PILOT and were not adjusted. Representatives of the contractors association 
complained to you during the meeting of December 19 and threatened "contempt of court" among 
other things. When asked "what are we missing?'' the representatives skirted the question; but it 
was obvious to everyone that the complaint was that user rates had been lowered, but the capacity 
fees had not. 
b~ Understading Essential. Given stakeholder complaints, it is important that evecyone 
understand a few things about capacity fees. This memo attempts to accomplish the following: 
• Convey the rationale for ·capacity fees 
• Demonstrate the calculations involved 
• Assure you that the calculation does not involve a PILOT or any other operating expense 
• Provide some history and context for the fees. 
c. Rationale. A capacity fee is a "buy-in" contribution from a new connector to 
compensate the utility for the value of the capacity ~ up by the new connector. Absent a 
capacity fee, the existing ratepayers will be responsible for re .. generating the capacity. The impact 
on ratepayers varies with the situation. If there· are no new connectors, then the whole thing is 
irrelevant. If new connections are very low, then the impact may be immaterial. But if new 
connections start to rise, the impact on ratepayers can be big. Mrs. Jones on Maple Street who has 
lived here for 30 years starts to see utility rates rise because of new subdivisions on the periphery 
(or in Chubbuck, since we run the wastewater treatment plant for them). 
Right now, with new connections at about l/3 of normal (normal being about 1SO new single family 
home starts per year), capacity fees equal about 2% of water revenue and 3% of sewer revenue. But 
lUlder normal conditions it would be double or triple that.· In 2006, we had 306 single :tlunily 
connections; 6 times the present rate -with concurrent impacts on capacity and need to re-generate. 
A capacity fee helps to mitigate the impact on c~t ratepayers. There is always some judgment 
1 
45
· involved. A community doesn't have to have capacity fees or doesn't have to charge the full 
recommended rate (in 2007, the city charged 75% of the rate in an attempt to moderate the impact 
on new connectors). . ' . 
A community can pmchase capacity and then give it away for free. But it doesn't have to. As the 
utility systems become ever more complex and expensive, each unit of capacity becomes more 
valuable. That's why most utilities have capacity fees these days. The court decision upheld your 
right to charge such fees and upheld the calculations. Naturally, the builders would like to have the 
capacity for free-they want their subsidy back. Unable to win that policy argument, they engaged 
in a lawsuit that has now come full circle. PILOT fees and the impact on rates aside, the capacity 
fee issue is right back where it always was - a policy decision. There is always some room for 
compromise, ~ut in the long~ the city utilities will find it difficult to buy capacity and then give 
it away for free. These are busmess-like activities and that is obviously not a sustainable business 
practice. 
d. Calculation. The basis for the calculation of our capacity fees is to value the "backbone" 
system and divide by the capacity (in residential equivalents). This results in dollars per unit of 
capacity. Note that this calculation does not include any operating expense. There is no labor, no 
chemicals, no electricity, and no PlLOT or taxes or transfers of any kind There is no relationship 
to the operating expense nor oper~ting revenues. 
e. Detailed calculations. Per above, the capacity fee calculation should not contain any 
PILOT, But did it? To know for sure, we need to look at the calculations in the last rate analysis 
an4 verify that. 
Water: An excerpt from the Water Financial Planning Study of2010 is at TAB A. Page 6-1 
provides a dis_cussion of the calculation method. Appendix D shows the detailed calculations. 
Table 6-1 shows the value of the backbone system at $54.548,685 as of 2010. Table 6-2 adds 
$311,000 to that total from planned 2010 additions to the backbone (from line 28, table 2-2; it was 
the land pmchase for the planned new operations facility). The resulting $54,859,685 is adjusted 
for estimated 2011 inflation. We then add planned 2011 backbone investments of 445,000 and 
subtract existing principal debt and planned principal debt (which we did not take on but did plan 
for in the study). The result is $48,135,185 net backbone equity. The system has 18,623 single 
family residential equivalents. Dividing the $48M by the 18,623 units= the capacity fee of $2,580 
per single family equivalent 
Note that the addition or elimination of the PILOT or any other operating cost has no bearing on 
these calculations. · 
Wastewater: An excerpt from the Wastewater Financial Planning Study of2010 is at TABB. 
Page 6-1 provides a discussion of the calculation method. Table 6-1 shows the summary 
calculations the value the backbone of the collection system at $33,056,000 and the value of the 
treatment plant at $51,885,300. These 2009 replacement costs are adjusted for 2010 inflation (line 
27). Table 6-2 provides allocation percentages of various components of the system to either basic 
volume, or to constituent components used in industrial customer calculations. 
Treatment Plant: Table 6-3 shows the Treatment Plant calculation. It takes 1he 2010 values from 
Table 6-1 and adds a 2011 inflation component, for a 2010 value of $58,113,650. Line 4 adds 
2 
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$525,000 for scheduled 2011 improvements and lines 5-7 subtract existing debt. The resul1ing 
equity value of the plant is $41,932,986 Qine 8). The system averages 6,966,200 gallons per day of 
flow. Dividing the $41M by the daily flow provides a cost per gallon per day of flow of$6.02. Per 
the· discussion, a residential equivalent in our community is 185 gallons per day. The indicated 
capacity fee is $6.02 x 185 = $1,113.70, which was ro1mded down to $1,110 (table 6-5). 
CoHection System: Table 6-4 displays the Collection System calculation. The $34,708,800 from 
table 6-1 is adjusted for 2010 debt payments and additions to $35,593,159 (line 11). 'Inflation for 
2011 is added on line 12 and scheduled improvements are added on line 14. This results in equity 
in the collection system of$37,622,859 Qine 18). The system.has an average flow per day of 
5~~60,900 gallons after subtracting Chubbuck's collection system. Dividing $37,622,859 by 
5,960,900 gallons per day = $6.31 per gallon, per day. The indicated collection system capacity fee 
is $6.31 x 185 gallons per day or$1,167.35, rounded upto tb.enearest$l0 as 1,170 for aresidential 
%" or 1" connection (table 6a6). 
AJJ with water, operating expenses are nrelevant to these calculations. There is some professional 
judgment for inflation rates and so o~ but it sho"Qld be obvious by inspection that 1he capacity fees 
should not have involved the PILOT and they did not involve the PILOT. · 
f. Histeriea1 eontext. Another way to label this section might be "It's not 1960 anymore." 
Capacity fees in most utilities started to appear in the 1980's, 1argely in response to expenses 
associated with the Clean Water Act of 1970. Water and wastewater utilities were a far cry from 
the simple cheap systems of the previous generation. One does not have to go that far back in 
Pocatello history to find a sewer system of basic lagoons ,.... a lot of raw sewage went into the river. 
But with growth and increasing dissatisfaction with pollution, those systems became untenable and 
ultimately illegal. As the systems were improved, they became more expensive - a unit of capacity 
became more 'dear. The trends continued. In the 1990's, the city imposed a modest capacity fee for 
the first time. The building community didn't like it and persuaded the city council to remove it. 
But the cost pressures remained. Between 1994 and 2005, the sewer system added $26,252,969 in 
debt, largely to meet new EPA requirements. Water systems were also ever more complicated, 
regulated and expensive. Once again, a unit of capacity was ever more dear. In 20061 the city 
experienced significant growth (306 single family building permits, double prior years). Given this, 
in 2007 the Council once again voted for capacity fees, this time much larger and in both water and 
sewer. 
The building community again objected and this time filed a lawsuit. The lawswt 
detennined that the city should not charge a PILOT operating cost to nu:epayers, but confirmed the 
· capacity fees. The builders will undoubtedly come &aclc to the political mode. That is where this 
policy decision should reside, but one should note that all the pressures that created capacity fees 
still exist. The latest BP A sewer permit may require $19M of additional capital related debt within 
the next two years. We're not going to add much capacity; rather·once again it makes the existing 
capacity compliant and legal. Once again, a unit of capacity becomes more dear. The ability to 
create it and give it away for free becomes ever less sustainable. 
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6. System Capacity Fees 
6.1. Introduction 
The City charges water capacity fees to all new connectors. This fee is intended to 
recover the new connector's proportionate share of the City's water backbone :facility 
costs. The current water fees have been in effect since October 2009. 
8.2. System Buy-in Method 
The capacity fee calculations performed in this study are based on the system buy•in 
method. This method is based on the concept that existing customers, through rates and 
other assessments, have developed a valuable water system. A new customer must "buy. 
inn to this system by making a contribution equal to the amount of equity a similar 
existing customer has in the system. Note this is not the cost to provide new service to the 
new customer, and when new capacity is needed, all customers will bear the cost. 
To compute the system capacity fees using the system buy-in inetho~ the following 
general procedure is used: 
II Determine existing water system equity. 
I! Estimate system capacity. 
II Calculate unit equity cost. 
• Calculate capacity fee. 
Implementation of fees desisned using the system buy•in method results in new 
customers paying their proportionate share of facility costs incurred to serve them. The 
fees are dependent on the capacity required to serve a customer and the unit equity cost of 
existing :lacilities expressed. as dollars per unit of capacity. Fees using the system buy.in 
method can readily be calculated using utility fixed asset records. Because fees can be 
traced to such records, they are generally understood by customers and supported on an 
engineering economic basis. 
6.2.1, System Equity 
Determination of the system value is the first important consideration in using the system 
buy-in methodology to compute capacity fees. System value is calculated by adding 
replacement cost of existing backbone system jnvestment to the cost of planned capital 
improvements. The backbone system includes all major water distribution and production 
facilities . 
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System Capacity Fees 
Replacement cost represents the cost of duplicating existing facilities at current prices. 
The cost to replace the City's water system was developed using historical cost 
information :from fixed asset records and restating these costs in current dollars using the 
Construction Cost Index (CCI) published by Engineering Newa-Record (ENR). Table 6-1 
shows the allocation of system assets to functional cost components to arrive at 2010 
replacement costs. 
To determine net equity in the system, replacement cost of the existing bacJ.cbone system 
is reduced by the outstanding debt on related facilities. Equity is not reduced by 
accumulated depreciation. Once a new customer connects to the water system, that 
customer begins paying charges for service sbnilar to all existing cusromers. These 
charge, typically Jnelude payment for retirement of outstanding debt For this reason, it is 
necessary to deduct outstanding debt :from system value before developing these fees. 
Table 6-2 develops the system capacity fee for the study period. System net equity is 
projected to increase from $48.l million in2011 to $625 million in 2015. These 
increases are due to the addition of scheduled major capital improvements, reduction in 
outstanding debt, and ail annual inflation allowance of 5 .0 percent. 
6.2.2. Equivalent Capacity Units 
In order to apply an equitable fee to new customers, all customer classes and meter sizes 
need to be expressed in common capacity units. The standard capacity unit is defined as 
having the average water oharacteristics of an existing customer with a I-inch meter. 
Meter .sizes 1-inch and smaller serve about 66 percent of the Citys water customers. 
Capacity units are determined for all other meter sizes based on the meter capacity ratios 
of maxbnum safe continuous capacity as published in the A WW A M6 manual. The 
number of capacity units is projected to increase from 18,623 in2011 to 19,363 in 2015. 
8.2.3. Unit Fee Calculatlon 
The capacity fee per capacity unit is the result of dividing the net equity of backbone 
system investments by the total capacity units. The proposed 2011 capacity fee is $2,580 
for a customer with a I-inch water meter or smaller. Table 6-3 shows existing and 
proposed water capacity fees for each meter size for the study period. 
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City of Pocatello1 Idaho Table 6-1 
Water Utility 6/1812010 
Total System Assets 
Replacement 
2009 CostNew 
Une Original (RCN) Backbone 
No Descr1,t1on Cost 2009-CCI lndeJ1; ·facHltles 0 $ $ $ 
1 Transmission and DiStribution Mains 24,805,400 66,364,975 30,527,900 
2 Land 1,034,650 1,034,650 1,034,600 
3 Booster Pump S1al:ions 607,968 1,311,825 1,311,600 
4 Wells 997,827 3,271,559 3,271,600 
5 Intake 23,QOO 125,984 126,000 
6 Storage 5,566,445 15,679,385 15,679,385 
7 Meters 25,892 41,710 0 
B General Plant 5,801,039 9,188,690 0 
9 Total System Assets 38.863,019 97,018,577 51,951,085 
10 2010 Inflation Allowance of 5 Percent 4,850,900 2,597,600 
11 Total System Assets at RCN 101.869,477 ·· !54,j~;sas 
f'repared by Red Oak Consulting 
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City of Pocatello, Idaho Table a .. 2 
· Water Utility 6/18/2010 
Development of System Capacity Fees 
Line Fiscal Year Ending See!!mber 30 
No. Description 2011 2012 2013 2014 2016 
$ $ $ $ $ 
1 Backbone System Investment 54,859,685 58,047,685 60,995,085 64,324,885 67,571,085 () 2 Annual Inflation of 5% 2,743,000 2,902,400 3,049,800 3,216,200 3,378,600 
3 Total Water System Backbone Investment 57,602,685 60,950,085 64,044,885 67,541,085 70,949,685 
4 Scheduled Backbone Improvements 445,000 45,000 280,000 30,000 311,143 
Less: Outstanding Principal 
5 Existing 8,495,000 .8,140,000 7,770,000 7,385,000 6,990,000 
6 Proposed 1,417,500 2,748,375 2,425,500 2,102,625 1,779,750 
7 Tata.I Outstanding Principal 9,912,500 10,888,375 10,195,500 9,487,625 8,769,750 
8 Net Water System Backbone Equity 48,135,185 50,106,710 54,129.385 58,083,460 62,491,078 
9 Tota!Single Family Equivalents (SFE} 18,623 18,835 19,007 19,187 19,363 
10 Capacil¥ Fee, $ per-SFE -2,510 2,660 2,850 3,030 3,230 
(a) 1 SFE iB maximum capacity requ}Ted iD service a typical single tamily home. 
,....---, 
'--,) 
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City of Pocamllo, Idaho 
Water Utility 
Proposed Capacity Fee Schedule 
Cunent Proposed Faes 
Description Fee 2011 2012 2013 
$ $ $ $ 
Water Capacity 
lleterfa) Ratios 
Size 
3/4" 1.00 2,600 2,580 2,660 2,850 
1" 1.00 2,600 2,580 2,660 2,850 
1112• 2.00 5,200 5,180 5,320 5,700 
Z' 3.20 8.320 8,260 8,510 9,120 
3n 7.00 18,200 18,060 18,620 19,950 
(a) Meter sizeS greater than 3 inches assessed on an indMdtJal basis. 
-----·----
, I .•• 
.... -·-·-----·-.. -·-··•-·--·~·-··-·-··-.. ·-· .u.~· ... ~ .••• 
...... ····-·-···I .. --·-·-----
Table 6-3 
6118/2010 
2014. 2015 
$ $ 
3,030 3,230 
3,030 3,230 
6,080 6,460 
9,700 10,340 
21,210 22,610 
Prepared by Red Oak Consulting 
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City of Pocatello, Idaho 
Water Utilily 
Capital Improvement Program 
Line 
OPTIMAL I Constraint 
RJNDING Fundlnn Descri1111on 
No. OP I CAP I IYJ!e I Fund 
1 ()OA, 0% Cash 2 Waler line Replacement Projecls (2 Miles per year @ $28 ff) 
2 0% 0% Cash 2 Gravel Crushing 
3 ()OJI, 0% Caah 2 Cuib and Guler Replacement 
4 004 0% Cash 2 Asphalt Replacement 
5 0% 0%- Cash 2 Water Line Replacement Projeds 
6 0% 0% Cash 2 Chlorine Building per DEQ 
7 ()OA, 0% Cash 2 Soft Starts I Electrical Upgrades 
8 0% 0% Cash 2 Well #22 &#30- Replac:ement 
9 0% 0% Cash 2 Satterfield Well-Connect to H"ighland Golf Course Water System 
10 0% 0% Cash 2 Highland Tank- Interior Painting 
11 0% 0% cash 2 Booster Upgrade - Spaulding & Barton 
12 0% 0% Cash 2 Decommlslon Westello Tank- small 
13 0% 0% Cash 2 High Country Tank Liner 
14 0% 0% Cash 2 PocateUo Creak Area-Well for H"ighland Tank 
15 0% 0% Cash 2 Aquifer Recharge and Recovery Area 
16 0% 0% Cash 2 North well Field 
17 0% 0% INT 2 Central Water Shop Facirlty 
18 0% 0% Cash 2 Vehicles and Equipment 
19 0% 0% C&sh 2 Gravel 
20 0% 0% Cash 2 Cum and Gutter Replacement 
21 0% 0% Cash 2 Asphalt Replacement 
22 0% 0% Gash 2 Ma!nllne Replacement 
23 0% 0% Cash 2 Qni, Ton Diesel Truck 
24 0% D"A. Cash 2 Valve Truck 
25 0% 0% Cash 2 KVABackup Generator 
26 0% 0% Cash l?. S~DASysmm 
2:1 0% 0% cash 2 Wa18r Rlgh1s Acquisition 
28 0% 0% Cash 2 Land Purchase for Water Shoe 
29 0% 0% Cash 2 South vallev Waler Tank 
30 Total Capital lmprowmentiS 
.. 
1 2 3 
2010 2011 2012 
$ $ s 
300,000 300,000 
30,000 30,000 
30,000 30,000 
·200,000 200,000 
400,000 400,000 
'15,000 15,DOD 
30,000 30,000. 
250,000 
200,000 
200,000 
1,500,000 1,500,000 
283,270 317,270 
30,000 
30,000 
100,000 
385,000 
32,000 
150,000 
85,000 
25,000 
1,240,000 
~~-
1,240,000 -1,240,000 
.... __ ............. _1_ .... __ -~· 
4 5' 
2013 2014 
$ $ 
300,000 300,000 
30,000 30,000 
30.000 30,000 
200,000 200,001) 
400,000 400,000 
30,000 30,000 
250,000 
250,000 
319,670 340,170 
1,240,000 1,240,000 
TableZ-2 
6/18/2010 
6 
2016 
$ 
31ltl,OOO 
30,000 
30,000 
200,000 
400,000 
30,000 
200,143 
75,000 
299,000 
4,D2.a,722 4A28,270 ~12,270 2.799,670 2,820,170 1,570,143 
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6. System Capacity Fees 
6.1. Introduction 
The City charges wastewater capacity fees to all new connectors. This fee is intended to 
recover a new connector~s proportionate share of the City's wastewater backbone facility 
costs. The current wastewater fees have been in effect since October 2009. 
6.2. System Buy-in Method 
The capaoity fee calculations performed in this study are based on the system ·buy-in 
method. This method is based on the concept that existing customers, through rates and 
other assessments. have developed a valuable wastewater system. A new customer must 
"buy-in" to this system by making a contribution equal to the amount of equity a similar 
existing customer has in the system. Note this is not th~ cost to provide new service to the 
new customer, and when new capacity is needed, all customers will bear the cost. 
To compute the system capacity fees using the system buy-in method, the following 
general procedure is used: 
II Determine existing wastewater system·equity. 
II Estimate system capacity. 
1111 Calculate unit equity cost. 
• Calculate treatment plant capacity fee. 
II Calculate collection system capacity fee 
Implementation of fees designed using the system buy-in method results in new 
customers paying their proportionate share of filcility costs inourred to serve them. The 
fees are dependent on the capacity required to serve a customer and the tmit equity cost of 
existing facilities expressed as dollars per unit of capacity. Fees using the system buy-in 
method can readily be calculated using utility fixed asset records. Because fees can be 
traced to such records. they are generally understood by customers and supported on an 
engineering economic basis. 
8.2.1. System Equity 
Determination of system value is the first important consideration in using the system 
buy-in methodology to compute capacity. System value is calculated by adding 
replacement cost of existing backbone system investments to the cost of planned capital 
improvements. The backbone sysmm includes all major wastewater collection and 
1111 : •, Dt::nr\A V ~ ..... ~
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Section 6 
System Capacity Fees 
treatment facilities. Backbone collection mains are defined as the system of major 
wastewater collection interceptor sewer mains, typically including those greater than 12-
inches in diameter. Assets have been grouped into two categories, treatmentwrelated 
facilities and oollectionwsystem facilities. This separation recognizes that certain 
customers will not receive benefit ftom the collection system inftastructure, such as 
Chubbuck customers located north ofl~86. 
Replacement cost represents ~ eost of duplicating existing facilities at current prices. 
The cost to replaoe the City's wastewater system was developed using·historical cost 
infonnation ;from· fixed asset records and restating these costs in current dollars using the 
Construction Cost Index (CCI) published by Engineering NewswRecord (ENR). Table 6~ 1 
shows the allocation of system assets to furictional cost components to arrive at 201 O 
replacement costs. Table 6-2 shows the percent allocation to functional cost components 
for each asset category. 
To determine net equity in the system, replacement cost of the existing backbone system 
is reduced by the outstanding debt on related :facilities. Equity is not redtJ,ced by 
accumulated depreciation._ Once a new customer connects to the wastewater system, that 
customer begins paying charges fur service like all existing customers. These charges 
typically include payment for retirement of outstanding debt. For this reason, it is 
necessary to deduct outstanding debt from system value before developing these fees. 
Table 6-3 develops the treatment plant capacity fee for the study period. Treatment plant 
net equity is projected to Increase ftom $41.9 million in 2011 to $60.1 million in 2015. 
Table 6-4 develops the collection system capacity fee for the study period. Collection 
system net equity is projected to increase from $37.6 miHion in 2011 to $48.4 million in 
· 2015. These increases are due to the addition of scheduled major capital improvements, 
reduction in outstanding debt. and an annual inflation allowance of 5.0 percent. 
6.2.2, Equivalent Capacity Units 
In order to apply an equitable fee to new customerst aU customer classes need to be 
expressed in common capacity units. For purposes of this caleulation, the standard 
capaoity unit is based on the syst.em maximum month flow in gallons per day (gpd). The 
standard capacity unit is a single fiunily equivalent with a 1 winch water meter contributing 
185 gpd of wastewater flow. Fees for other water meter sizes are based on meter capacity 
ratios of maximum safe continuous capacity as published in 1he A WW A Manual 1116. The 
number of capacity units is projected to increase :from 6,966,200 gpd in 2011 to 
7,I06,600gpd in2015; 
, • : :: REDDAK Olly of Pocatello 
•. ~•a•. CONSULTING Wasfawatar Finanalal Planning Study 
• • • .. OIVJHIM •• 1111.114.CDLfil NUii ·64BSD03 
59
l 
i 6.2.3. Fee Calculation 
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- System Capacity Fees 
The treatmeQt plant capacity fee per unit is determined by dividing the net equity of 
treatment plant assets by the total capacity units. This unit cost is multiplied by 185 gpd 
and the relative meter capacity ratio for the mef.er size caloulated. The proposed 2011 
treatment plant capacity fee is $1,110 for a customer with a 1-inch water meter. 
Table 6-S details the capacity fees for each ineter size for the study period. 
The collection system capacity fee per unit is detennined by dividing the net equity of 
collection system assem by the total capacity units. Total capacity units are reduced by 
the amJUal flows from Chubbuck customers north of l-86 since these customers do not 
benefit from the collection system inftastructure. This unit cost is multiplied by 185 gpd 
and the relative meter capacity ratio for each meter size. The propose4 2011 collection 
system capacity fee is $1,170 for a customer with a 1-inch wa1er meter. Table 6-6 details 
the capacity fee for each water meter size for 1he study ~eriod. 
Table 6~ 7 details the proposed 2011 capacity me for a large industrial user. This fee is 
based on the Individual fl.ow and strongth characteristics for c;aeh customer. The fee is 
split by the functional components of the sysrem .. Line 31 states the functional unit costs 
on a unit per day basis, depending on the unit basis for each functional cost component. 
Line 32 states the functional unit costs on a mm per gpd basis. 
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City of Pocatello, Idaho Table 6-1 
Wastewater Utility 6f18i2010 
Total System .Assets 
Replacement 
Cost New Backbone Facilities ] 
Line Original (RCN) Collection Treatment 
No Descrlf!!ion Cost 2009..CC[ Index Sr!tam Plant total ~ 
$ $ $ $ $ '""..;J 
1 Aeration Basins 2,954,610 5,548,395 5,548,400 5,548,400 
2 Airport Farm 17,688 34,762 34,800 34,800 
3 Aeration Lift Station 10,294 19,052 19,100 19,100 
4 Blower Building 1,342,590·· 1,961,460 1,961,500 1,961,500 
5 Biosoftds Land Development 859,891 1,172,098 1,172,100 1,172,100 
6 Chlorine Con1act basins 216,113 430,607 430,800 430,BOO 
7 Co-Generation Bultding 4,477,999 6,045,208 6,045,200 6,045,200 
8 Chloline Room 893,334 1,477,453 1,477,500 1,477,500 
9 Collection System 23,076,199 82;640,089 33,058,000 0 33,056,000 
10 DAF #1 and #2-WAS Thickener 2,138,543 2,875,628 2,875,600 2,875,600 
11 Digester Control Building 95,148 464,642 464,600 464,600 
12 General Plant 827,583 2;156,031 0 0 
13 Headworks. 2,508,985 3;297,754 3,297,800 3,297,800 
14 General Plant. Treabnent 8,614,558 13,077,543 13,077,500 13,077,500 
15 Outfall 532,875 "689,318 689,300 689,300 
16 Primary Clariffers 2,599,925 4,058,765 4,058,800 4,058,800 
17 Primary Digesters 2,524,668 4,603,528 4,608,500 4,603,500 
18 Primary Pump House 168,120 491,405 491,400. 491,400 () 19 RAS Pump House 4,800 12,189 12,200 12,200 
20 Raw Sludge Pump Hause 934,022 1,209,965 1,210,000 1,210,000 
21 Secondary Clartfiers 294,952 1,264,496 1,26,4,500 1,264,500 
22 Sludge Lagoon 892,365 1,637,385 1,637,400 1,637,400 
23 Sludge Storage Tank 27,781 119,099 119,100 119,100 
24 Land 889,185 1,394,411 1,394,400 1,394,400 
25 Total System Assets 56,900,224 136,681,281 33,056,000 51,885,300 84,$41,300 
26 2010 Inflation Allowarme of 5 Percent 1,652,800 2,594,300 4,247,100 
27 Total System Assets at 2010 RCN . 34,708,800 54,479,600 89,188,400 
Prepared by Red Oak ConsuJt;ng 
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Ci\f gf Pocatello, Idaho 
Wastewater Utility 
Percent Allocation of Backbone Assef:a 
Line 
No. Daacript1on 
1 Aeration l!asins 
2 Airport Farm 
3 · Aendlon Lift staUon 
4 Blower Billlding 
5 Blosolfds Land Development 
I Chlorine Conlacl basins 
7 Co-Genel'811on Building 
8 Chlorine Room 
a Colection systam 
10 OAF #1 and #2 .WAS Thlnkener 
11 ClgesterConlnil BuDdl~ 
12 General Plant 
13 Headworl!s 
14 Other 
16 Outfall 
1S Primary Clariliers 
17 Primary DlgesteJs 
ti Primary Pump HoUae 
19 RAS Pump Hause 
2D Raw Sludge Pump House 
21 Seeondal)' Ciarifiels 
22 Sludge Lagoon 
23 Sludge Slorage Tank 
·---.-~.J. ..... _____ J .. ,1~ .... -_ ............ ..........__ 
Table&,2 
611812010 
Ccnnmon 
.--------------,,,------,--=------------ to Cun,mers 
._ __________ _.;:Com=::.ma:.D::.n:.:m::.=::AD~.....,,......---------1f serwd by the 
Total Vollmle BOO 
Slranpth Collection 
TSS TKN Ph0a1Jhorus System 
100% 
100% 
10~,(, 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
10!m 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
55% 
25% 
55% 
26% 
50% 
25% 
25% 
25% 
25% 
25% 
25% 
25% 
50% 
· '100% 
25% 
100% 
25% 
100% 
25% 
25%. 
25% 
- ·- ----- - ------------~- ---- - -.--···---··-.···-- ---
~---,-~·--·- ··-··•-·"'······- · 
35% 10% 
25% 25%. 
35% 10% 
25% 25% 
100% 
25'lr, 25% 
25% 25% 
25% 25% 
25% 25% 
25% 25% 
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City of Pocatello, Idaho Table 6-3 
Wastewater Utility 6/1812010 
Development of Treabnent Plant System Capacity Fees 
Une Fiscal Year Endl!!Q seetember 30 
No. Descrie!!2n 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
$ $ $ $ $ 
Backbone System Investment <) 
1 Treatment Plant Fadities 55,346,350 58,638,650 65,120,550 68,376,550 76,795,350 
\,.:£"-.:i.'y: 
2 Annual Inflation of 5% 2,767,300 2,931;900 3,256,000 3,418,800 3,838,800 
3 Total WWTP System lnvesbnent 58,113,850 61,510;550 68,37&,550 71,795,350 80,635,150 
4 Scheduled Backbone Improvements 525,000 3,650,000 0 5,000,000 1,100,000 
Less: Outstanding Principal 
5 Existing 16,705,664 15,704,301 14,664,426 13,584,558 12,463,156 
6 Proposed 0 3,689,892 3,569,067 9,464,671 9,134,255 
1 Total Outslanomg Principal 16,705,664 19,394,193 1.8,233,493 23,049,229 21,597,411 
8 Net Backbone WWTP Equity 41,932,986 45,726,357 50,143,057 53,746,121 60,137,739 
9 System Average Day Flow, gpd 6,966,200 7,001,000 7,036,000 7,071,200 7,106,600 
10 Capacity Fee, $ per gpd 8.02 6.53 7.13 7.60 8A6 
C) 
Prepared by Red Oak Consulting 
---------- , __ _ 
---~-- --------~------------~-·-------·---··-·· 
. 'I I ·· 
......... ···········-··········-------·------~----------------
64
City of Pocatello, Idaho 
Wastewater Utility 
Development of Collection System Capacity Fees 
Line 
No. 
Backbone Syslem Investment 
11 Collection System Facilities 
12 Annual Inflation of4% 
13 Total Collection System l11vestment 
14 Scheduled Backbone lmprovements 
Less: Outstanding Principal 
15 Existing 
16 Prcposed 
17 Tot.al Outstanding Principal 
18 Net Backbone Collection System Equity 
19 System Average Day Flow, gpd 
20 ·Less: ChUbbuck N of 1-86, gpd 
21 Net Collecffon System Average Mon1h Flow 
22 Capacity Fee,$ per gpd 
2011 
$ 
35,593,159 
1,779,700 
37,372.859 
250,000 
0 
0 
0 
37,622,859 
6,968,200 
. 1,005,300 
. 5,960,900 
6.31 
••--•••• I , - • .,.,,---· •• • . ,, ----- • 1 .,.,, ... ,..u .--1. .... -, ,, 11.~•••• .. --.,-•o.&.d-,~·••""· : 
Fiscal Year Ending September 30 
2012 2013 2014 
$ $ $ 
37,822,859 
1,881,100 
39,503,959 
300,000 
0 
0 
0 
39.803,969 
7,001,000 
1,025,400 
6,975,600 
6.66 
39,803,959 
1,990,200 
41,794,159 
460,000 
D 
D 
0 
42,.244,159 
7,036,000 
1,045,900 
5,990,100 
7JJ5 
42,244,159 
2,112,200 
44,356,359 
1,200,000 
0 
D 
0 
48,556,359 
7,071,200 
1,066,800 
6,004,400 
7.59 
Table6-4 
6/18/2010 
2015 
$ 
45,556,359 
2,277,800 
47,83~159 
600,000 
0 
0 
0 
48,434,159 
7,106,600 
1,088,100 
6,018,500 
8.05 
. PrepaffJd by Red Qak Consulting 
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City of Pocatello, Idaho Table 6..S 
Wastewater Uti~ity 6/18/2010 
Proposed Treatment Plant Capacity Fee Schedule 
CUrrent ( : Proeosad Faes 
Description Fee 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
$ $ $ $ $ $ 
Water Capacity () 
Meier la) Ratios 
Size 
Single Family Residential, gpd 185 185 185 185 185 
314• (b) 1.00 1,100 1,110 1,210 1,320 1,410 1,570 
1" 1.00 1.100 1,110 1,210 1,320 1,410 1,570 
1112" 2.00 2,200 2,220 2,420 2,640 2,820 3,140 
2" 3.20 3,520 3,550 3,870 4,220 4,510 5,020 
3" 7.00 7,700 7,770 8,470 9,240 9,870 10,990 
(a) Water meter sizes greater than 3 inohes a8898S8d on an individual basis. 
(b) Based on skrgle ti:lmily equiVa/9nt (SFEJ with a contributed volume of 1B5 gallons per day (gpd). 
r)'-t ) 
···.;;.,.4.-•·· 
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City of Pocatello,. Idaho Table 6-6 
Wastewater Utility 6/18/2010 
Proposed Collection Syetem Capacity Fee Sch_edule 
eurrant I Proposed Fees 
De8Crll!tiDn Fee 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
$ $ $ $ $ $ 
-~· 
Water capacity \.__) 
Me1Br(a! Ratios 
Size 
Single Family Rasidentlal, gpd 1·85 185 185 185 185 
3/48 (b) 1.00 690 1',170 1,230 1,300 1,400 1,490 
1· 1.00 690 1,170 1,230 1,300 1,400 1,490 
1112" 2.00 1,380 · 2,340 2,460 2,600 2,800 2,980 
2" 3..20 2,210 3,740 3,940 4,160 4,480 4,770 
3" 7.00 4,830 8,190 8,610 9,100 9,800 10,430 
(a) water meter sizes greater than 3 Inches assessed on an indMdual basis. 
(b} Based on :single family equivalent (SFE) with a contributecl volume of 185 gallons per day (gpd). 
Prepared by Red oak Consulting 
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Clly of PocateDo, Idaho 
Wast.ewa1er Utility 
Development of Capacity Faa for Large lndUsbial Uaer 
Line 
. N11. Descril!!!llll Total 
$ 
System AssllS at Raplaeement Cost New (RCN) (a) 
1 Aerallon Basins 5,548,400 
2 Airport Farm 34,800 
3 Aemllcn Ufl stalitm 19,100 
4 BloWer Building 1,961,500 
5 Bloaollds Lend DSW1lopmi,nt 1.172,100 
6 Chklrlne Ccntacl basins 430,600 
7 Co-Generauon Building 8.045,200 
8 Chlcllne Room 1,477,l:iDO 
9 Cclleclion System 3S,115!J,DDO 
10 OAF 01 andt12.•WAS lhinkener 2,875,800 
11 Dlgealer Conliul Building 454,60D 
12 General Plant 0 
13 Keadwnrks 3,297,800 
14 other 13,077,500 
15 OUlfall 1189,800 
16 Primary Clariliera 4,058,800 
17 Primay Digesters. 4,803,500 
18 Pmay Pump House 491,400 
19 RAS Pump House 12.211D 
ao Raw Sludge Pump House 1,210,000 
21 secondary Clarffi"'"" 1,264.l!OO 
22 Sludge lagoon 1,637,400 
23 Sludge storsge Tank 119,100 
24 Gelll!l'III Plant 1,394,400 
25 T11tal Syllfem Assets at RCN 84,941,3UO 
26 2010 Inflation Allowance Df 5 Percant 4,247,100 
27 Total System AsSelll at RCN 89, 18B,411D 
28 Less: outstandl119 Fmclpal on Debt 17,669,942 
29 Net System Equity 71;5111,458 
Units 
3D Ml!Dlimum Cllpacll.y Units 
31 capaclly.Fea,$ per unit per day 
32 capacity Fee,$ per unit per gpd 
(l!J lm:lllrtes lnffatirm allDWem.:s ors ,,_t 111r 2010. 
--------·----~------. ·-----, 
• ·1 , ····- • 
. Bukbon• Tl'Hbnent Plant: r:wwrP1 . 
Slnnlltb 
Ylllllme BOD TSS 1KN 
$ $ $ s 
3,061,600 1,941,900 
8,700 8,700 8,700 
19,iDD 
1,076,800 686,500 
295,000 298,000 293,000 
430,600 
3,022,800 3,022,800 
1,477,500 
2,675.BDD 
116,2GO 116,200 116,200 
D 
3,'2$1,800 
688,300 
4,058,800 
1,150,900 1,150,900 1,150,900 
491,400 
12,20D 
1,210,000 
316,100 318,100 318,100 
409,400 409,400 408,400 
. 29,800 29,800 29,800 
538,4110 261,700 872,600 136,800 
6,956,,3GO 9,738,800 . 13,883,700 6,0S9,300 
347,'BOD 486,900 693,7.110 264.lilJQ 
7,3114, 10D 1D,22S,1DI! 14,556,91111 5,343,800 
6,822,5-42 3,316,SOD 4,721,4DII 1,733,200 
48'f,BSB 8,909,100 9,835,500 3,810,BIIO 
IP.!! lbrlid!!l llelldar lbaldg: 
6,931,600 2.1,40D 28,700 2,DDD 
D.D7 822.88 415,00 1,BD5.30 
0.07 1.00 1.42 0.52 
-------------···-··----
' J-=------il.l.-., ',I ,,,-L.,..,...,,,...........__. • • '-----.1--, I., '!I, 
-· 
Table8~7 
6/18/2010 
Backbon. 
Collact"ion 
Phll&l!hOIU5 $Yalem 
$ s 
() 554,BDD 8,700 
196,200 
298,000 
33,056,000 
116,200 
1,150,900 
31Ei,1DO 
409,<IUD 
29,BOO 
84,900 
3,180,000 33,056,0CO /..,..,,...~ 
158,000 1,852,100 "~,,) 
3,318,0DD 34,708,800 
1,078,200 0 
2,241,BOO 34,7DB,800 
lbsld!!! SPJ! 
600 5,845,000 
3,736.33 5.84 
o.:az 5.84 
Ptvpan!d by Red Oak Consulting 
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. "" .. . () 
CITY OF POCATELLO 
(~ \, ! 
....... ~· 
. STATEMENT OF CASH, CASH EQUIVALENTS AND INVESTMENTS BALANCES FOR .CITY FUNDS 
-~- AS OF FBBRUARY 28, 2013 . ..... . ....._._ 
·--~-::r --=+ .1 -- . F - ----- -- --- -' .. -=t=-=+=----------- --
··----~3-·--·-1------ - --·--·--- -·4--·---=e-·-· ·---====~·:=-:±~==----~. ---, 
----- ·-,--...... _,__ .-...-....... __...__....J ............... -.... ............. __ .._._...___..__, ___ .,. ·-
Cash on Hand!·-------i-·--·------· -------- ··------ $ Value at2:.:~:\o 
Cash in Banks · -·--1·-· ---~ --------- · ·- 12,658,226.76 
Cash held b)l third parties __ ___l -- - - -]_. ----=---=-L____ ___ 684,271.95 
Cash held at the St~~-of Idaho Investment Pool . -~------- ·--· -~-+--·--·-· 6 676,027.59 
~nnai:;r~- _-±==:==i=_ ~ i 
-------1·-c-u-r-re_n_t~l-n_v_e-st_m_._e_n_ts __ , ____ , __ ---+----- ·--i -~- --------·---
==-----·--·-···--· CityGov~:=c~~=.Deposit ___+_,, ____ -~ 2,593,9;:; 
--·------- -·--· Total cash equivalents _ "The Oumber'': I 1own ,J- $2,593,954.73 
Total cash and cash equivalents :i;,, .... _ · 17 rrom 1ast 1 $ 22,638,093.73 
--··-- ---·1 =· ] I -&!'It. ·--8AiS~-i-n-' 
... _ .. ___ , ~ --- -- - cash O 'short term • ·--·----- ·-----·------
Long-Term Investments ! invest, 1ents 
---- !General Government -- ----- -·---· 
·r· State Investment Pool Bond Fund --=r------$·~=-,-5-,0-3-7-, 7-9-4-.9-?_-11 
-----·- ---=~+--=---.. ·=--·--1-··-t-----i- . Rec !iJSGnts isl ---------· 
___ ..; ____ 1_, ___ _j1_ _ Total lon1 g-tenn investments tota in longe"iferm -+ $ 5,037,794.97 imv istments ! 
____ _,_ ___ __,., _______ .___ __ _J___,_ ---·- -,--=-=:!====:::f::==!.-____ji-,-- -·-----11 
Total Cash, Cash Equ!valents and ··-·--·-·- ----1.l!A l·l-the-city-i noney-wei---.f.--1----------4 
-~Lon~!m .!~v~stm~~--------t-.-------·--- ·-----t~:·;~~~~1~~,011.,.T_ f:"-' $ 27,675,888.70 
_______ [ ··--- L _--·-· r·_- ... J~ _ --] __ ·- _ I ·- --~ ··-.: _____ · --~ ~~-----·--~ --:, 
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BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ. 
SAM L. ANGELL, ESQ. 
NATHAN R. STARNES, ESQ. 
HALL ANGELL STARNES, LLP 
1075 S Utah Avenue, Suite 150 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Telephone (208) 522-3003 
Fax (208) 621-3008 
!SB No. 's 2434, 7012 & 7484 
bgh@hasattomeys.com 
sla@hasattomeys.com 
nrs@hasattomeys.com 
Attorneys for Defendant City of Pocatello 
(, .... ,-.":\ 
~-- .... i 
FJ.Lf:LJ-
B.l\NNOCr( COl..t\ry 
r·1 ... DI! OF., ..• ,- c·o• ,,·,·1· 
,., ... ~r1.t\ r ! r'lf: .,-\ •Ut\. 
~~4S'~~ 
~PUTYCLERK 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY 
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on 
behalf of itself and all others similarly 
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself 
and all others similarly situated, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
municipality, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Boruieville ) 
Case No. CV-2014-1520-0C 
AFFIDAVIT OF NATHAN R. 
STARNES 
Nathan R. Starnes, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am one of the attorneys for the Defendant in the above-referenced matter. I am over 
the age of eighteen and competent to testify. This affidavit is based on my personal 
knowledge unless otherwise stated. 
AFFIDAVIT OF NATHAN R.STARNES-1 
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2. That attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the Complaint in the 
case of Building Contractors Association of Southeast Idaho v .. City of Pocatello, 
Bannock County Case No. CV-2011-5228-0C (minus exhibits). 
3. That attached hereto as Exhibit Bis a true and correct copy of the Affidavits of David 
Swindell filed in the case of Building Contractors Association of Southeast Idaho v. 
City of Pocatello, Bannock County Case No. CV-2011-5228-0C (minus exhibits). 
4. That attached hereto as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of the Court's 
Memorandum Decision and Order dated March 28, 2013, in the case of Building 
Contractors Association of Southeast Idaho v. City of Pocatello, Bannock County 
Case No. CV-2011-5228-0C. 
5. That attached hereto as Exhibit D is a true and correct copy of the Court's 
Memorandum Decision and Order dated November 15, 2013, in the case of Building 
Contractors Association of Southeast Idaho v. City of Pocatello, Bannock County 
Case No. CV-2011-5228-0C. 
6. That attached hereto as Exhibit Eis a true and correct copy of the Court's Order 
Denying Costs dated January 10, 2014, in the case of Building Contractors 
Association of Southeast Idaho v. City of Pocatello, Bannock County Case No. CV-
2011-5228-0C. 
7. That attached hereto as Exhibit Fis a true and correct copy of the Court's Decision on 
Plaintifrs Application to Show Cause dated February 3, 2014, in the case of Building 
Contractors Association of Southeast Idaho v. City of Pocatello, Bannock County 
Case No. CV-2011-5228-0C. 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT. 
AFFIDAVIT OF NATHAN R.STARNES-2 
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~ 
Dated this A day of August, 2014. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO, before me the undersigned, a Notary Public ir1 and 
for said State, this ZEI- day of August, 2014. 
LESLIE GEORGESON 
Notary Public 
State of Idaho 
AFFIDAVIT OF NATHAN R.STARNES-3 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
...JJE_eby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following 
this ~ aay of August, 2014, by the method indicated below: 
Michael D. Gaffney, Esq. 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Fax: 529-9732 . 
Nathan M. Olsen, Esq. 
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN 
485 '"E" Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Fax: 524-3391 
AFFIDAVIT OF NATHAN R. STARNES - 4 
~ Mailing 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ('I: Mailing 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
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Nathan M. Olsen STEPHEN S. DUNN 
Petersen Moss Hall & Olsen 
485 "Eu Street, Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Telephone: (208) 5234650 
Fax: (208) 524-3391 
IS13N: 73'73 (~~~ ar:, ·~·~\\1u~ 0 ,- .1,_r . , ... ~, . ! 
.•• ,.,,,,.,JF. -
~ ••. ..,f 
a-;. •• ! · .. ' 
r· 9- -· ,.-
·• t \,_.,- : :; ::.. • 
. ··-~} ~; .. ·~-=-
.:.:.r;:1; \.oL 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY 
BUILDING CONnt,\CTORS 
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST IDAHO, 
an Idaho non-profit corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
municipality, 
Defendants. 
- f\JJ A'/ .<.!'Jl'!v .!ff ' Case No. \..,t • wL . J 4.4::r, 'l.1 ~
COMPLAINT 
I. Plaintift Building Contrac~ors Association of Southeast Idaho (Bui~ders Ass'n) is 
a non-profit corporation in good standing with the State ofldab.o. 
2. Defendant, the City of Pocatello·(City) is a municipality incorporated in the State 
ofidaho and ·administered puisuantto I.C. § 50-101 et. al. . 
3. Builders Ass'n is a trade association cons~sting of members in and aroup.d the City 
of Pocatello. The·purpose of Builders Ass'n is to fost~r trade and commerce of the residential 
and commercial housing industry, including providing ~liable infonnation about the industiyJ 
. 
the promotion ofunifonnity and certainty in customs and usages of trade and commercet 
79
advance the civic, commercial and industrial inter,;!stS of the industry within the territory covered 
by the association. 
4. Members of the Builders Ass'n routinely do business in the City of Pocatello, 
have obtained construction pennits, paid sewer and water system capacity fees(Connection Fees) 
to the City, a,nd in m~y cases are themselves users of the City's water and sewer system. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
Background 
5. The City requires a builder to pay a Connection Fee in order to obtain a building 
pennit fee for the construction of any new residential or commercial building. Such fees are set 
hy resolution by the ·city Council, and vary depending on the size of the connection and other 
fact,m, 
6. In recent years the City has dmm.ati¢allv increa.sed Connection Fees. In 1997 the 
Connection Fee was approximately $300 per residential dw.clling, .hut.has rose to o:vei:.$5)000 on 
- --~--- ... .. -- ~~ ~-----~ . . .... 
average by 2008. 
7. Members of the Builders Ass'n have been greatly concerned about these increases 
because of their impact on the industry and on consumers and because of concerns about the 
legality of such increases. Accordingly, the Builders Ass'n attempted to work with the City to 
discuss and resolve their concerns·. In particularJ the Builders Ass'n was concerned that 
Connection Fees were being improperly imposed as an unauthorized tax 11Tlfairly targeted to a 
small minority. 
8. On August 3, 2006, the Builders Ass'n's attorney wrote to the City Council 
· questioning the legality of the Connection Fee as it was being charged ( attached and incorporated 
COMPLAINT - fage 2 ..... 
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herein as Exhibit "A.") The letter noted strong precedent under Idaho law that connection fees 
are not to be used primarily for revenue raising purposes or for "future expansionn of the City's 
water and sewer services, but rather for operation and maintenance of the system. The letter 
further stated the Builders Asstn• s position that "growth pay for itself' through the proper 
implementation of an .. impact fee" through the Idaho Development Impact Fee Act, and 
encouraging the city to pursue such an approach. 
9. On August 18, 2006, the City responded to the Builders Ass'n's letter 
acknowledging that conneGtion fees cannot "be used to :finance the future expansion needs for the 
City's water and wastewater fees" and were therefore not "impact fees.,, (See Exhibit "B' 
. . 
attached and incorporated herein.) The City claimed that the Connection Fees charged· were 
within the guidelines of Loomis v. Hailey, 119 Idaho 434, 807 P2d. 1272 (1991), which allows 
for calculation of Connection Fees under an "equity buy-in" scheme that talces into account the 
new users' portion.ofwha.tit woJJ,ld oo~t to.replace the system. 
10. Through subsequent communications with the City. Builders Ass'n learned that 
the City had based its Connection Fee on calculations perfonned by a consulting finn retained by 
the City (Red Oak.) Builders Ass'n obtained the summary report from Red Oak, which makes 
the claim that the study W!!S based in part on planned "capital improvements." (See Exhibit "C" 
attached and incorpqrated herein.) The study listed a number of proposed capital improvements 
that were clearly designed to increase capacity of the system. 
11. The City issued a public flyer "Question and Answer" handout with regard to the 
purpose of Connection Fees titled "Growth Pays for Growth" which indicated that development 
81
results in "capacity fee increases'' that are "dedicated for capital improvements/' (See Exhibit 
('D" attached and incorporated herein.) 
12. In subsequent meetings between the City and the Builders Ass'n, the City 
reiterated its position that the fees should be and are only being utilized only for operation and 
maintenance, and that improv~ments that "increase capacity'' will be funded by some other 
means than connection fees. 
13. · Conc~med about whether such a policy was truly being implemented, the Builders 
Ass'n requested detailed records from the City about its calculations of fees and other relevant 
informati?n, The City responded by indicating that such a request involved thousands of 
documents and would charge the association a substantial sum for copying those records. 
14. About mid 2007, the housing and construction sectors throughout the country and 
in Pocatello experienced a severe decline that continues to this day. The number of new 
_£_0:1)Struction pennits issu~4_inJ~Q~~t~UP dm.PP~.21lllicantlv) During this decline, .:the-mneunt 
charged for Connection Fees as a part of the pemrlt increased or remained the same. 
15. After nwnerous attempts to obtain the City's complete records through inform.al 
measures failed, on June 9, 2010, Builders Ass'n submitted a fonnal request under Idaho's 
freedom ofinformation laws, I.e. § 9-337 et. al., consisting of nine separate categories of 
• 
records. After a great deal of resistence, follow-up, and demand from the City for costs well 
ab.ove what should have been necessary to gather the records. the.City finally on October 15, 
2010, provided the Builders Assn 'n enough records for the· association _to conduct an adequate 
examination. 
COMPLAINT-Page 4 
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16. In total, the Builders Ass'n paid at leas.r$2.565 directly to the City for the 
production of the requested records. AU of those funds were paid under protest, reserving all 
rights, and on,ty for the purpose of expediting the obtaining of such records. 
Improper Transfers to the General Fund 
- 17 .J City records indicate that water Connection Fees were deposited and co-mingled 
into an account with water user fees (the "Water Fund.") Likewise, sewer connection fees were 
deposited and co-m~gled with the sewer user fees (the "Water Pollution Control Fund;" 
lS., Since at least 2005, the City has transferred substantial funds from both the Water 
Fund and the Water Pollution Control Fund into the Cny·s general revenue fund. In 2011 alone, 
$2,848,891 has been transferred from these two funds in the general ftm.d. Since 2005, at least 
$17,952,136 has been tran~ferred from these two :funds into the general fund. 
19., The City's stated pmpose for the transfers from the Water Fund and the Water 
Ii. 
Po11ution Control Fund into the general fund is_to ~'.gejgfimgJh_e_a..Qtivities of the General Fund.'!.-· --
20. The City's attempted justification for the transfer of fees in the general fund is a 
so called "return on equity" _or "enterprise funds" policy that was never approved by any 
ordinance, resolution or any other formal or public procedure, other than by a "draft letter" to a 
constituent prepared by the City Mayor in 2005 (attached and in~orporated herein as Exhibit 
"E"). According to the policy stated in the letter, the City treats the transfers to the general fimd 
as a "rate of return" or profit on the "equity" of the public owned utilities. The policy further 
states that "the money goes to the General Fund which the City Council utilizes as a property tax 
substitution." 
COMPLAINT-Page 5 
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21. Since lea.ming this infonnation, the Builders Ass'n has since independently 
Ieamed that in 2007 City Attorney Dean Tramner sought an opinion from the Idaho State 
Attorney General regarding the legality of the so called "return on equity" policy. Dep·uty 
Attorney General S. Kay Christensen, Chief of the Contracts and Administrative Law Division, 
rendered a vvritten opinion to 1v.Cr. Tranmer dated February 6, 2007 (attached and incoiporated 
herein as Exhibit "F"Jtbat unequivocally declares that the return on equity "practice, as it is 
currently being applled, does not confonn to the requirements of existing law." The opinion 
concludes that the policy is illegal as an improperly levied and "disguised tax." 
22.- Notwithstanding the Atto:m~y General's 2007 opinion, the City has continued to 
'implementthe ureturn r:>n equity" palicy.The City did not provide the Attomey General's 2007 
opinion to the Builders Ass'n in response to its June 9, 2010, freedom ofinfonnation request, 
. I 
even though it clearly fit within the documents requested. 
I' 
· Im_p_!~e!JJse of Fees .(or Capital Improvements_and.Expansion~-stem 
- ----- .......... 
23. The records provided by the City identify no less than 50. capital improvement · 
l 
projects in waste management and no les~ than 30 water related capital improvement projects in 
the last sevenyears.)Ofthese 80 projects, the City identified only five projects (one related to 
· water and four related to sewer) that were financed through the bo~ding procedures required by 
I4~.P Code §50-1026 et. al. 
24. The City's records further indicate that major funding for capital improvements 
was taken from the Water Flllld and the Water Pollution Control Fund. From 2003-2009, the 
City spent $6t323,738 out of the these funds for sewer projects, with an additional $960,000 that 
was budgeted for 2010. During that same period the City spent $7,255,766 out of these ftmds 
IL, 
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toward water projects, with a staggering $7,255,766 that was budgeted for 2010. In total, nearly 
$25 millfon was spent or budgeted for water & sewer capital improvement projects from 2003 
through 2010, all of which was financed with Connection Fees and user fees. 
25. Many if not most of the projects were for expansion of the system, rather than 
repair or maintenance. In the early 2000's the City retained MWH Associates to prepare a 
"Recommended Plan and Capital Improvement Plan" that contmns a number of recommended 
"improvements" to ~'expand the distribution system and provide additional sources of water 
supply in response to growth." 
The Arbitrary Method for Calculating the So-Called "Equity Buy~In" 
26. The City has attempted to justify the calculation of Connection Fees under the 
"equity buy in" concept as set forth in Loomis v. Hailey, 119 Idaho 434 (1991). In this decision, 
the Idaho Supreme Court upheld a method used by the City of H~~y to calculate connection 
fees, whereil! ~~ qty ~f:EJ~ley dete;cmine.d the new user's proportionate-Share-ofwhat:-it-weulcl--
cost to "replace'~ the system. 
27. The Citis records suggest several major departures or deviations 
from the equity buy-in method allowed 1U1der Loomis, including the following: 
a. A portion of the connection fees ·~e being utilized for general 
expenditures by the City, as admitted by the City as a "property t~ 
substituti~n." Under Loomis such fees can only be utilized for 
"maintenance, repair or replacement" of the system, and not as a revenue 
raiser. 
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b. A portion of the fees are being utilized for improvements designed to 
expand the system, strictly forbidden by Loomis. 
c. A portion of the fees are being utilized for capital improvements, meaning 
improvements with a useful life of 10 or more years, which were not 
approved under the bonding procedures set forth under §50-1026 et. al. 
d. The Connection Fees were not d~posited into a separate or "segregated 
account" where they were only used for repair, maintenance or 
replacement of the system, as was the case in Loomis. 
e. The exponential increases in the connection fees are wildly 
disproportionate to both the increases in the ratepayer user fees and the 
actual growth (as detennined by increase in new connections), which have 
consistently been less than l % annually, suggesting that ColUlection Fee 
pa~ers. are tnifairlyshoulderingJ~e brudens of growth_and otber._Cify.. - -· ---- --·--- -
Projects; 
f. The City has provided no calculations regarding the ''equity buy in" 
method, other than the summary statements by Red Oak consultants. 
g. No effort has been made by the City to determine if the assumptions about 
the Connection Fee provided by its consultants in previously years occurs 
in actuality. fustead, it has simply accepted and adopted additional 
assumptions by the consultants. 
h. The City's shoddy record keeping, as evidenced by the more than 1 DO man 
hours it allegedly took to gather the records and the unorganized manner in 
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which the records were kept and monitored; suggests_ that there was little 
or no accounting for the planning and use of CoDilection Fees. It appears 
that the planning and tracking of such fees and the projects was done, if at 
all. on an ad hoc basis. 
COUNT I -DECLARATORY ACTION 
~QLATION OF THE TAX AND POLICE POWER 
LIMITATIONS OF THE IDAHO CONSTITUTION 
28. Under the Idaho Constitution Art. 7 § 2 only the State Legislature has the 
authority to issue or authorize taxes or "forced public contributions" to generate revenue. 
29. The City's authority to collect fees, including Connection Fees, are limited to the 
police powers found under Idaho Const. Art. 12 §2. There must be a Pf?portionate nexus 
between the fees and their regulated use. Such fees must be rationally related to the cost of 
enforcing the regulation and cannot be assessed purely as a revenue-:generating scheme. 
30. T~e Idaho Revenue ~':~~ ~ct, I.C. _§ _ ?0-1026 et. _al. allows the collection qf 
Connection Fees, but only for operation, maintenance, replacement, and depreciation of the 
system, including maintaining reserves for bond expenses, but not for generating revenue that is 
transferred to the general fund or paying for expansion of the sy~em. 
31. The City's Connection Fee policies are beyond the scope allowed under the Idaho 
Constitution, including but not limited to the following: 
a By its own admission and against the counsel of the Idaho State Attomey 
General's office, the City has transferred a portion of the Connection Fees 
into the general fund as a ''property ~ax substitute'; to be used for the 
general and unlimited purposes of the City. 
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b. The City has been and continues to utilize the Connection Fees for 
mu1tiple water and sewer capital improvements that expand the system. 
c. Neither the calculations of nor the use of Connection Fees are based on 
maintenance, repair, or replacement of the system. 
d. There is a weak or woeful lack of accounting for the Connection Fees, 
which are coNmingled with user fees and utilized as general revenues, for 
capital improvements or for other purposes on an "ad hoc" basis. 
32. A real controversy exists between the City and Builders Ass'n, including its user 
fee and Connection Fee paying members. 
33. Builders Ass'n is an interested person entitled to obtain a declaration of rights, 
status or other legal relations pursuant to Idaho Code § 10-1202. 
34. Builders Ass'n and the public at large is entitled to a declaration that the City's 
Connection Fee policy, as it has been implemented since at lea~ 2005, and. as currently 
--- ·- ..... .-...,--··-··--- ....... -- ,__ . 
constituted, is in-violation of Idaho's Constitution with regard to taxing and regulatory authority. 
·C()UNT II-DECLARATORY ACTION 
FAD.,URE TO FOLLOW THE BONDING PROCEDURES 
35. All previous allegations are restated and incorporated herein by reference. 
36. Pursuant to Idaho Constitution Art. III§ 3, municipalities are prevented from 
incurring debt without first securing a two-thirds vote of the electorate. This includes 
expenditures fot'capital improvements/' meaning the purchase of new equipment or facilities 
with a: useful life of 10 or more years. 
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37. Special bonding procedures for water and sewer projects are set forth under I.C. § 
50-1026 et. al:. I.C. § 50-1028 prohibits municipalities from constructing projects 11primarily as a 
source of revenue to the city." 
38. I.C §§ 50-1030 through 50-1033 limits th~ collection of fees for "maintenance, 
repair and replacen1:ent" of the system, and prohibits use of fees for "expansion" of the system. 
39. The City has violated these bonding requirements set forth under the Idaho 
Constitution and the Code, including but not limited to the following: 
a. Incurring debt by engaging in a mun.her of capital improvement projects 
without first obtaining a two thirds vote of the electorate. 
-b. Improperly utilizing Connection Fees through its so called "return on 
equity" or "enteiprise funds". policy to provide a source of revenue to the 
city. 
c. Utilizing Connection Fees and user f~~-s _!'U)f!.Y. .. fQJ,'. capital imt2fOYement 
__.__. "'"'" ~-~-- • -H --~ ...... . 
projects without first obtaining a two thirds vote of the electorate. 
d. Utilizing Connection Fees and user fees for projects that expand the 
system. 
40. A real controversy exists between tI:e City and Builders Ass'n, including its user 
fee arid Connection Fee paying members. 
41. Builders Ass 'n is an interested person entitled to obtain a declaration of rights, 
status or other legal relations pursuant to Idaho Code§ 10-1202. 
42. Builders Ass'n and the public at large is entitled to a declaration_ that the Citf s 
Connection Fee and user fee policy, as it has been implemented since at least 2005, and as 
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currently constituted, is in violation of Idaho's Constit1,.1.tion and Code with regard to the bonding 
requirements. 
COUNT III -INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
43. All previous allegations are restated and incorporated herein by reference. 
44. The City has and continues to impl~ment a Connection Fee polic)' that is 
unlawful, inequitable, and a violation of Plaintiffs members' rights. · 
45. The c<;>ntinuance of the City's Connection Fee policies will result in waste or 
irreparable injury to Plaintiff and its members. 
46. Plaintiff and its members are entitled to mjunctive relief requiring the City to 
cease and desist its current unlawful Connection Fee collections and policies. 
• 
COUNT IV -DECLARATORY RIGHTS UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKING 
47. All previous allegations are restated and incorporated herein by reference. 
48 .. _ _'I~h~ ?~ ~endment o~I)nited States Constitution,_as.applied.to the..statci 
under the 14~ Ame~dment, prevents the taking of private property without due process of law or 
withoutjustco:rnpensation. 
49. Idaho Const. Art. I§ 14 essentially incorporates the 5th Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution. 
50. Under U.S.C. 42 § 1983, a person who is deprived of their rights under the color 
of any act, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any public entity is entitled to 
redress at law or in equity. 
51. The City's unlawful Connection Fee policy has resulted in the taking of private 
property of members of the Builders Ass'n. 
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52. On behalf of its members, Builders Ass •n is entitled to a declaration that the 
City's policies have resulted in a violation of their Constitutional rights, by the talcing of private 
property without due process oflaw and without just compensation. 
COUNT V-ATTORNEY FEES 
52. All previous allegations are restated and incorporated herein by reference. 
53. The Builders Ass'n has retained the services of Petersen Moss Hall & Olsen to 
pursue its rights. 
S4. The Builders Ass'n is entitled to recover its attorneys fees and expenses unde~ I.C. 
§ 12-117, 42 U .S .C. § 1983, and any other applicable statute or rule. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
Plaintiff prays for the following relief: 
1. That the Court declare the City's connection fee policies to be a violation of the 
Idaho State Constitution.~ Cg_~_as 3.U.unauthorized tax. · - · ... -- · -· 
2. That the Court declare the City's connection fee policies to be a violation of the 
Idaho State Constitution and Code in regafd to bonding requirements. 
3. Thatthe Court declare the City's connection fees policies to be a violation of the 
: United States Constitution and Idaho Constitution as a taldng of private property without just 
compensation, for which the Plaintiff is entit1ed to equitable and legal remedies under U.S.C. 42 
§ 1983. 
4. That the Plaintiff be provided injwictive relief by cease and desist of the 
enforcement and collection of the City's current connection fees. 
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5. That the City be required to repeal all prior co1111ection fee policies and prepare a 
· new connection fee policy that is valid under Idaho and U.S. law, and that the Plaintiff and any 
other interested memb~r of the public have the opportunity to review and provide input in the 
development of such policy. 
6. A declaration by the Court that any proposed fee by the qty to "fund the costs of 
growth" be implemented according to the strict provisions of the Idaho Development Fee hnpact 
. Act. 
. 
7. That a detennination be made of the precise amount of connection and user fees 
that have been improperly collected and utilized since at least 2005. 
8. That Plaintiff be awarded damages in an amount to be determined by the court at 
trial for overcharging the amount due it for search and copying costs of records under Plaintiff's 
freedom ofinfonnation request. 
9. That the Plaintiff 1,~ !!,Y@'!;l~q its~asg,nable a;ttorney fees and costs. In the event of-
default a reas9nable fee is the sum of $20,000. 
IO. Any other legal or equitable relief deeme · justified by the Court. 
DATED: December k, 2011 
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N than M. Olsen 
Of Petersen Moss Hall & Olsen 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ. 
SAM L. ANGELL, ESQ. 
NATHAN R. STARNES, ESQ. 
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, P.A. 
490 Memorial Drive 
P. 0. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630 
Telephone (208) 522-3001 
Fax (208) 523-7254 
!SB No. 's 2434, 7012 & 7484 
bghall@nhptlaw.net 
slangell@nbptlaw.net 
nrstarnes@nhptlaw.net 
Attorneys for Defendant City of Pocatello 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY 
BillLDING CONTRACTORS 
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST IDAHO, 
an Idaho non-profit corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
municipality, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Bannock ) 
Case No. CV-2001-5228-0C 
AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID K 
SWINDELL IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
David K. Swindell, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am the current Chief Financial Officer ("CFO") for the City of Pocatello. I have served 
as the CFO of the City since August, 2001. I am intimately familiar with the financial affairs of 
the City and its adoption of policies related to franchise fees, Return on Equity policies, 
Enterprise Funds, and the Capacity/Connection fees. 
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2. The City owns and operates a municipal sewage collection and treatment system which 
includes sewer trunk lines to transport sewage to treatment plant facilities designed to treat raw 
sewage. That system was financed, in part, by the issuance of revenue bonds, pursuant to Article 
8, Section 3, Idaho Constitution and the Idaho Revenue Bond Act, Idaho Code§§ 50-1027 
through 50-1042. 
3. The City owns and operates a sewage collection system and treatment system pursuant to 
Idaho Code Section 50-1028, et seq. The wastewater treatment facility is called the Water 
Pollution Control Facility (WPCF). The area served by the WPCF includes the cities of 
Pocatello and Chubbuck and some connections within the area of city impact within Bannock 
County but outside the city boundaries. The WPCF was originally constructed as a primary 
treatment plant in 1959. 
4. A franchise fee is a fee for use of the public right of way imposed on most utilities for 
operating within the public right of way within the City limits. Telephone is exempted by the 
state constitution. The fee is calculated as a percentage of gross revenw,s. For example, electric 
has a franchise fee of l %; natural gas has a franchise fee of3%; cable has a franchise fee of 5%. 
5. An impact fee is governed by Idaho Code§ 67-8201 et seq. The impact fee is designed 
to ensure that new growth does not pay for more than its share of new growth. The focus of an 
impact fee is capital expansion of specific new facilities to accommodate specific new 
development such as construction of a new fire station to serve a new subdivision. The 
connection fee ( capacity fee) that is the subject of this litigation is not appropriately classified as 
an impact fee. The focus of a capacity fee is on backbone utility infrastructure that serves all 
utility customers with a capacity that was pmchased and constructed by ratepayers long ago. 
The capacity fee is intended to recover a new connector's proportionate share of the City's 
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wastewater and water backbone facility costs. "A new customer must "buy-in" to this system by 
making a contribution equal to the amount of equity a similar existing customer has in the 
system. Note this is not the cost to provide new service to the new customer, and when new 
capacity is needed, all customers w,11 bear the cost." (City of Pocatello Wastewater Utility 
Financial Planning Study, June 18, 2010 Red Oak Consulting, page 6-1 "System Capacity Fees", 
emphasis added). Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the June 18, 2010 
City of Pocatello Wastewater Utility Financial Planning Study prepared by Red Oak Consulting. 
Attached hereto as Exhibit Bis a true and correct copy of the June 18, 2010 City of Pocatello 
Water Utility Financial Planning Study prepared by Red Oak Consulting. 
6. The "rate of return" policy refers to city-owned public utilities (i.e. water, sewer, etc.) 
making a transfer to the general fund. These are businesses operated by the public that could and 
do operate as for-profit private enterprises in other communities. For example, Pocatello 
operates a public water department, while most water service in Boise is provided by United 
Water, a for-profit private company. Similarly, in Pocatello the electric service is provided by 
Idaho Power, a for-profit private company, while in Idaho Falls the electric service is provided 
by the city government. Private utilities have their natural monopoly power regulated by the 
Idaho Public Utilities Commission; government-owned utilities have their monopoly power 
regulated by both state law (rates reasonably related to cost of service) and by voters directly 
electing the Mayor and City Council (CEO and Board of Directors of the city water enterprise, 
etc). 
· 7. In prior years, the city government described the transfer as a "rate of return" or "return 
on equity" as if the taxpayers were the shareholders (which they are). Fairness and 
reasonableness was established by comparing the city's rate of return on the utility equity at a 
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rate of 6.5% compared to the 11.5% to 13.5% allowed for private companies by the Idaho Public 
Utility Commission. The rate of return is part of the annual budget process and the rates are set 
each year and approved by the City Council. 
8. For the past two years~ the rates have been re-described as a franchise fee (% of gross 
revenues) and a payment-in-lieu-of-taxes (PI~OT) to make it directly comparable to private 
utilities operating in the community such as Intermountain Gas. The PIWT is calculated on the 
prior year city property tax levy rate multiplied by the estimated market value per the most recent 
financial plan prepared by an outside consulting engineer. 
9. For FYJ 3 the budget entry for the internal franchise fee is: 
Account ..••• : 2013 1-0000-393-99.00 
Description •.• : TRANSFERS/ NONRECIPROCAL 
Seq# Code Freeform information 
1.00 2013 FROM 030-3001-520-9503 6% FRANCHISE 
2.00 2013 FROM 031-3001-520-9503 6% FRANCHISE 
3.00 2013 FROM 032-3010-520-9503 3% FRANCHISE 
Amount 
408,368 
571,033 
252,051 
4.00 2013 NOTE 1) 6% AND 3% FRANCHISE BASED ON FY11 ACTUAL 
5.00 2013 REVENUE 
6.00 2013 NOTE 2) LONG TERM GOAL TO REDUCE SANITATION & 
7.00 2013 WATER FRANCHISE FROM 6% TO 3% SO THAT AU ARE 
8.00 2013 EQUAL. TO BE PHASED IN FUTURE RATE REVISIONS AND 
9.00 2013 BUDGETS. 
For FY13 the budget entry for the Payment-in-lieu~of-Taxes (PILOT) is: 
Account ...•. : 2013 1-0000-370-61.00 
Description .•. : INTERFUND REVENUES/ PAYMENT IN LIEU OF TAXES 
Seq # Code Freeform information 
1.00 2013 030-3001-530.9615 SANITATION 
2.00 2013 031-3001-530,9615 WATER 
3.00 2013 032-3010-530.9615 WPC 
4.00 2013 050-5000-530.96-15 INFO TECHNOLOGY 
5.00 2013 052-5200-530.9615 UTILITY BILLING 
6.00 2013 SANITATION VALUE: 6,899,332 
7.00 2013 WATER VALUE: 102,912,607 
8.00 2013 WPC VALUE: 142,439,166 
9.00 2013 PM1' IN LIEU OF TAXES BASED ON FY12 TAX RATE 
10.0 2013 0.008955293 
Amount 
61,786 
921,613 
1,275,584 
3,703 
2,644 
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1.0. These amounts are equal or less than the amounts calculated into each utility's five year 
financial plan, which provided for these payments as well as planned operating, maintenance, 
debt service capital and reserve requirements. Idaho code regulates transfers to the General Fund 
via two sections of law: 
• Idaho Code§ 50-1033 states that no transfer can be made until full and adequate 
provision has been made for debt service, operation and maintenance, and reserves. The 
city has made full and adequate provisions by incorporating all aspects into the financial 
plan prepared by an outside consulting engineer. 
• Idaho Code § 50-1028 states that the city cannot operate the utilities primarily as a source 
of revenue to the City. 
11. The City of Pocatello complies because the: amounts involved are far less than 50% of the 
utility revenue. The combined amounts ofFY13 franchise fee and PILOT are 13.8% of planned 
revenue for water and 16.5% for sewer. Both amounts are reasonable for businesses that operate 
in the public right of way. That they are as large as they are is also a function of modest revenue 
provided by rates that are modest in comparison to others in our region. For example, FY12 
single family residential sewer rates were $22.47, compared to $25.90 (Blackfoot); $42.14 
(Nampa) and $43.77 (Meridian). 
12. The internal franchise fee/ Payment in lieu of Taxes (PILOT). as well as the predecessor 
"rate of retum" or "return on equity," is fair, reasonable and legal. The utilities are treated 
commensurately with privately owned utilities. Further, the existence of such franchise fees and 
PILOT is irrelevant to the policy decision to require capacity fees for new utility connections. 
Irrespective of the franchise/PILOT fees, it is only a policy decision as to whether new 
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com1ectors should be required to buy into the utility system from which they have consumed 
existing co1U1ection capacity. 
13. In stark contrast to impact fees, the Corutection/Capacity Fee is a fee that is a one•time 
fee charged to all new corutectors to a system. The connection/capacity fee was phased in during 
FY2007 after several years of increasing numbers of new collllections. This fee is intended to 
recover a new connector's proportionate share of the City's wastewater backbone facility costs. 
In essence, a new customer must "buy-in" to the existing system that has been developed and 
paid for by prior uses of the system. The Collllection fee is a contribution equal to the amount of 
equity a similar existing customer has in the system. The Connection fee is not the cost to 
provide new service to new customers; when new capacity is needed, all customers will bear the 
cost equally. The connection fee is to offset the cost for existing users whose capacity will be 
diminished by the new users and will, thus, require replacement of existing infrastructure more 
regularly. The collection of the capacity fee is based on the size of the connection requested by 
the customer and is generally paid at the time a building permit is issued so that all permit fees 
and utility hookup fees are known in advance. The collllection fee is a one-time fee assessed 
prior to connection to the line in accordance with the current fee resolution adopted by the City 
Council. 
14. The com1ection /capacity fee is a policy choice adopted by the City upon 
recommendation of a water and wastewater study provided by Red Oak Consulting. The 
connection fee was deemed a fair method of ensuring that new users were providing financial 
support for the use of the existing infrastructure. The City could have adopted other policies but 
the City felt the connection/capacity fee was the more equitable method for both new and 
existing users. Capacity fees are irrelevant ifthere are no new connections. They may be 
99
immaterial if new connections are infrequent. But when growth is more rapid, new connectors 
can rapidly conswne existing capacity; restoring it can cause rates to increase for existing 
ratepayers with no compensation for the capacity that they paid for. Industrial users can 
consume capacity in bulk amounts with little notice. Fairness requires policy in the matter to be 
in place before growth occurs. Capacity fees are common and a recognized "best management 
practice" for utilities. A 2010 voluntary survey in the Association of Idaho Cities shows that 
many cities have capacity fees or the equivalent (AIC 2010 utility survey, pp. 51 - 57). Attached 
hereto as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of the AIC 2010 utility survey. 
15. The City's water and wastewater utility are financially self-sufficient with funding for 
capital and operating requirements derived primarily from rates. The utilities are responsible for 
planning, construction, operating, and maintaining water and wastewater facilities. Once a user 
is connected to the system, they begin paying charges for service like all existing customers. The 
service charges typically include payment for retirement of outstanding debt. 
16. The capacity/connection fees are collected and segregated into the appropriate water and 
wastewater funds. They are not dedicated to any particular capital project because it is a "buy in 
fee" to compensate the ratepayers for the capEJcity that they already purchased and installed. It is 
not an impact fee and not accounted for as such. 
17. Water and wastewater capacity fees are reviewed annually. The fees were last modified 
on August 16, 2012 and became effective on October 1, 2012. The current fees are: 
Water: 
System capacity fees: 
1 inch connection 
1 '12 inch connection 
2 inch connection 
3 inch connection 
4 inch connection 
6 inch connection 
8 inch connection 
FY2013 
$2,850.00 
$5,700.00 
$9,120.00 
$19.950.00 
assessed individually 
assessed individually 
assessed individually 
100
IO inch connection 
12 inch connection 
assessed individually 
assessed individually 
Water Pollution Control (sewer): 
System Capacity Fees, Treatment plant 
%" water connection 
l" water collllection 
I W' water connection . 
2" water connection 
System Capacity Fees, Collection system 
%" water connection 
l" water connection 
1 W' water connection 
2" water connection 
FY2013 
$1,320.00 
$1,320.00 
$2,640.00 
$4,220.00 
FY2013 
$1,300.00 
$1,300.00 
$2,600.00 
$4,160.00 
Large Industrial User Capacity fee (abnormal strengths, multiple meters, meters larger than 2", or BODs 
or total suspended solids greater than 200 ppm, or TKN greater than 35 mg.11, or phosphorus greater than 
7mgll) 
Volume, gallons per day 
BOD, lbs per day 
TSS, lbs per day 
TKN, lbs per day 
Phosphorus, lbs per day 
Collection system, gallons per day 
FY2013 
$0.07 
$322.86 
$415.00 
$1,805.30 
$3,736.33 
$5.84 
These fees are as recommended by an outside consulting engineer for FY2013 in studies 
prepared by Red Oak Consulting in June 2010. (See Exhibit A and B). 
18. The City breaks the sewer capacity fees into two parts, one for the sewage treatment plant 
and one for the sewer collection system. This is because Chubbuck operates its own collection 
system but discharges to the City of Pocatello~s wastewater treatment plant. By agreement, new 
connectors in the City of Chubbuck pay the Pocatello treatment plant capacity fee; Chubbuck 
remits that to the City of Pocatello monthly. Chubbuck operates its own collection system and 
administers its own capacity fee for that system. 
\\ 
\\ 
\\ 
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FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO, before me the undersigned, a Notary Public in and 
for said State, ~s 'f'lb day of October, 2012. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
.,J hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following 
this L day of October, 2012, by hand delivery, mailing with the necessary postage affixed 
thereto, facsimile, or over.night mail. 
Nathan M. Olsen 
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN 
485 "E" Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Fax: 208-524-3391 
Jlq Mailing 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[] Fax . 
[ ] E-Mail 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Courthouse Box 
. id ~~ _-. a -> - L 
. --
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BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ. 
SAM L. ANGELL, ESQ. 
NATHAN R. STARNES, ESQ. 
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, P.A. 
490 Memorial Drive 
P. 0. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630 
Telephone (208) 522-3001 
Fax (208) 523-7254 
/SB No. 's 2434, 7012 & 7484 
bghall@nhptlaw.net 
slangell@nhptlaw.net 
nrstarnes@nhptlaw.net 
Attorneys for Defendant City of Pocatello 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY 
BUILDING CONTRACTORS 
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST IDAHO, 
an Idaho non-profit corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
municipality, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Bannock ) 
l Case No. CV-2001-5228-0C 
:t 
I 
l 
I SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID K. 
·/ SWINDELL 
i 
i 
-~ 
I 
.f 
l 
I 
! 
I 
David K. Swindell, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am the current Chief Financial Officer ("CFO'') for the City of Pocatello. I have served 
as the CFO of the City since August, 2001. I am over the age of eighteen and competent to 
testify in this matter. This affidavit is based on my personal knowledge unless otherwise stated. 
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2. In my capacity as the CFO for the City of Pocatello, I am intimately familiar with the 
financial affairs of the City and its adoption of policies related to franchise fees, Return on 
Equity policies, PILOT fees, Enterprise Funds, and the Capacity/Connection fees. 
3. The capacity/connection fees are irrelevant to the PILOT (rate of return) fees. The 
capacity/connection fee is a one-time fee charged to all new connectors to a system. This fee is 
intended to recover a new connector's proportionate share of the City's wastewater backbone 
facility costs. 
4. The PILOT fee (rate of return) is a payment in lieu of taxes fee cbarged directly to the 
utility. The fee operates like property taxes assessed to and paid by Idaho Power or 
Intermountain Gas (except the PILOT fee does not include County or school district). The 
PILOT fee is a cost of doing business for both the water and sewer departments. Both the water 
and sewer department recover the PILOT fees through the fee charged to all users of the water 
and sewer system. 
5. If a resident in Pocatello is using the sewer and water facilities in Pocatello, they will pay 
the monthly user rate (which includes a pro rata share of the PILOT fee). If a resident fails to 
pay their monthly user rate, their water and sewer services will be discontinued. 
\\ 
.\ \ 
\\ 
\\ 
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FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT. 
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID K. SWINDELL - 2 
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MAY/09/2013/THU 01:53 PM POCATELLO CITY LEGAL FAX No. 208 239 6986 P. 003 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
. .,..,.Jhereby .certify t~atl served a tru~ copy of the fo~oing document upon the following 
this ~dayqfl'l4ay, 2.0J.3, by hand dehvel'y, 1nafHngw1th the necessary postage affixed 
thereto, fa~simUe, or Qvemight mail. 
Nathan M. Olsen 
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN 
48S .. B" Stl'eet 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Fax: 208wS24-3391 
SBCOND APPIDAVI1" 011 DA VIP K. SWINDELL - 3 
[ ] Mailing 
[ ] .Hro1d De1ive1'Y 
[~K 
[ ] B-Mai1 
[ ] Overnight Mall 
[ J Courthouse Box 
iiilfffi~ !--
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BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ. 
SAM L. ANGELL, ESQ. 
NATHAN R. STARNES, ESQ. 
HALL ANGELL STARNES, LLP 
901 Pier View Drive, Ste. 203 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Telephone (208) 522-3003 
Fax (208) 646-7108 
/SB No. 's 2434, 7012 & 7484 
bgh@hasattomeys.com 
sla@hasattomeys.com 
nrs@hasattomeys.com 
Attomeys for Defendant City of Pocatello 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY 
BUILDING CONTRACTORS 
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST IDAHO, 
an Idaho non-profit corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
municipality, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of B8Ill1ock ) 
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David K. Swindel], being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am the current Chief financial Officer ("CFO") for the City of Pocatello. I have served 
as the CFO of the City since August, 2001. I am over the age of eighteen and competent to 
testify in this matter. This affidavit is based on my personal knowledge unless otherwise stated. 
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2. In my capacity as the CFO for the City of Pocatello, I am intimately familiar with the 
financial affairs of the City and its adoption of policies related to franchise fees, Return on 
Equity policies, PILOT fees, Enterprise Funds, and the Capacity/Connection fees. 
3. Plaintiff has a fundamental misunderstanding of how capital improvements are financed 
by the City. A capital improvement do~ not have to be paid for by a bond. There is no 
requirement that a municipality go into debt to build capital improvements. Often times, the City 
will pay for capital improvements projects without any debt being incurred. These projects are 
financed entirely from user fees that are col1ected and accumulated over time. Where a very 
large project is required and it is not practical to finance the project without debt, a bond will be 
requested. Under Idaho law, a revenue bond is appropriately issued pursuant to Article 8, 
Section 3, Idaho. Constitution and the Idaho Revenue Bond Act, Idaho Code §§ 50-1027 through 
50~ 1042. It is worth emphasizing, however, that not all capital improvement projects are 
financed through a revenue bond and there is no legal requirement that a municipality undertake 
debt to finance capital improvements when the improvement can be paid using existing cash 
reserves. 
4. User fees have no relationship to the connection/capacity fee. The connection/capacity 
fee is only charged to recover a new connector's proportionate share of the City's wastewater 
and water backbone facility costs. "A new customer must "buy-in" to this system by making a 
contribution equal to the amount of equity a similar existing customer has in the system. Note 
this is not the cost to provide new service to the new custon,er, and when new capadty is 
needed, all customers will bear the cost." (City of Pocatello Wastewater Utility Financial 
Planning Study, June 18, 201 O Red Oak Consulting, page 6-1 "System Capacity Fees", emphasis 
added). Of importance, and framing how the City views a capacity fee, the connection/capacity 
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fee does not cover expansion. Thus, the Connection fee is a contribution equal to the amount of 
equity a similar existing customer has in the system. The Connection fee is not the cost to 
provide new service to new customers; when new capacity is needed, all customers will bear the 
cost equally. The connection fee is to offset the cost for existing users whose capacity will be 
diminished by the new users and will, thus, require replacement of existing infrastructure more 
regularly. 
5. The water and wastewater departments have money held in four different fund groups. 
The first fund group is Fund 31 and 32. Funds 31 and 32 are the operating funds. This fund is 
comprised entirely of user fees that are collected by the water and wastewater departments, 
respectively. The second fund group is Fµnds 37 and 38. Funds 37 and 38 are the capacity fees. 
This fund is comprised entirely of the connection/capa~ity fees that have been collected by the 
water and wastewater departments. The third fund group is Funds 60 and 61. Funds 60 and 61 
are the debt service funds for the water and wastewater departments. The debt service funds are 
reserves that are set aside to meet the annual debt service payments required by the bond 
covenants. The final group is Funds 73 and 74. Funds 73 and 74 are the construction funds. 
These funds are where all of the proceeds from the bonds are placed for water and wastewater. 
Money for bonded projects will be withdrawn from these funds to pay for approved bonded 
projects. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the City's Monthly Cash 
Report for June 2013. 
6. The Monthly Cash Reports are public records and can be accessed on the City's website 
at http://www.pocatello.us/finance/finance_cash.htm. The Monthly Case Report identifies the 
current cash in each of the City's respective funds, including the funds above. 
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7. Currently, the City· has not spent any of the connection/capacity fees. Rather, these fees 
have been placed in a dedicated fund (Fund Nos. 37 and 38). Fund 37 holds the -
connection/capacity fees for the water department. Fund 38 holds the connection/capacity fees 
for the wastewater department ("WPC"). Each of the respective funds contains all of the 
connection/capacity fees gathered between 2007 and current (as of July 2013). As of June 2013, 
Fund 37 contained $1,391,089.36 and Fund 38 contained $1,217,131.20. Fund 37 and 38 is 
dedicated to holding only the connection/capacity fees. There are no other funds that are held 
here. 
8. Funds 37 and 38 were initially created in March 2013 to increase transparency of how the 
connection/capacity fees were spent. As of todays date, none of the connection/capacity fees 
have been spent Attached hereto as Exhibit Bis a true and correct copy of the Monthly Cash 
Report for February 2013. Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of the 
Monthly Cash Report for March 2013. 
9. Currently, I am in the process of compiling the FY2014 Budget for the City. The City 
has determined that the connection/capacity fees will be used for debt service. As such, the City 
has budgeted approximately $725,000 for debt service for the water department in FY2014. The 
City intends to use the remaining funds from Fund 37 for debt service in FY2015. The City has 
budgeted approximately $1,384,000 for debt service for the wastewater department in FY2014. 
This will exhaust nearly all of the funds in Fund 38. Using this approach, all of the 
connection/capacity fees can be accounted for and there has been no funds transferred to the 
general funds from the connection/capacity fees. 
10. All of the bond funds have been placed and segregated into construction accounts found 
in Funds 73 and 74. Of the initial $9.5 million dollar water bond from 2008, there remains 
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approximately $1,303,841.57 of that bond. The remaining amount has been spent on capital 
improvements projects ( e.g., water main replacement or construction of the South Valley Water 
Tank). Currently, there are no bond proceeds in Fund 74 (WPC). Despite the construction funds 
being exhausted, the City still must retire the bond. This is done using funds from user fees and 
connection/capacity fees over the course of several years. The funds that are used to make the 
annual debt service payment sit in a reserve account fund (Funds 60 and 61 ). 
l l. While the City does budget for certain items, the amounts actually expended may not be 
consistent with the budget. More specifically, a budget is simply an attempt to identify how 
money that is collected by the City will be spent in a given year. If the money collected for the 
year is lower than that budgeted, the money cannot be spent consistent with the budget. 
Furthennoret as it relates to water and wastewater budgets, the budget does not differentiate 
between bonded funds and user fee funds. The City wi11 spend fees consistent with the available 
funds in the operational fund (and when available, funds in the construction fund). Simp]y 
because a project is budgeted for does not mean that the project actually was carried out. 
Moreover, just because a project is budgeted at a certain amount does not mean the project 
actually cost that same amount. 
12. It is also important to emphasize that the connection/capacity fee is entirely separate from 
the ROE or PILOT fee. As I have explained previously, the PILOT fee (rate of return) is a 
payment in lieu of taxes fee charged directly to the utility. The fee operates similar to the 
property taxes assessed to and paid by Idaho Power or Intennountain Gas ( except the PILOT fee 
does not include County or school district). The PILOT fee is a cost of doing business for 
both the water and sewer departments. TI1e respective departments charge user fees and those 
fees take into consideration the PILOT fees that have been charged. The PILOT fee is set by the 
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City, with my assistance. The PILOT fee is derived from the City's property tax against the 
systeins valuation. The PILOT fees are not assessed to any specific individual or entity in the 
City but are only assessed against the water or wastewater department respectively (there are 
other departments that a1so pay PILOT fees). Attached hereto as Exhibit D is a true and correct 
copy of the FY2014 Budget worksheet accounting for the PILOT fees (including the FY2013 tax 
rate being applied). 
13. I have reviewed the expert report and affidavit of Mr. Hunter. Mr. Hunter incorrectly 
asserts that the finance department of the City lacks appropriate oversight. I personally am 
involved with multiple discussions with the City's legal department regarding all aspects of the 
City's budget and fee systems. Numerous discussions with legal counsel have occurred about 
the appropriateness of the PILOT fee and the best method to implement this fee. The PILOT fee 
has no relationship to the connection/capacity fee. If the connection/capacity fee is detennined 
to be unreasonable, the PILOT fee is not invalidated. 
14. I have also infonned the auditor of all potential legal issues, including the PILOT fee. 
Each year the auditor has separate meetings with the City's legal staff and the Mayor. I am 
present at both meetings to explain the nature of the office call (make sure the auditor is aware of 
the City's lawsuits and that Management understands their role). I then leave to ensure my 
presence does not improperly influence the auditor. Following the meetings, the auditor prepares 
a note disclosure in the published financial report that identifies any financial exposure that is 
material to the entity. The City takes its responsibility in keeping the auditor infonned very 
seriously and has done so each year. Mr. Hunter's assertions that the City's financial department 
lacks oversight is conc1usory, false, speculates about what conversations were had with the 
City's auditor. The City complies with all aspects ofGAAP. 
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15. Because I have a background in accounting. I am aware of general accepted accounting 
principles ("GAAP"). I employ those principles when I prepare financial statements for the City. 
Mr. Gallagher's statement that GAAP is not applicable in developing his recommended rates is a 
correct statement of fact. Accounting principles relate to how transactions have occurred and 
what the financial position of the entity is at a specific point in time. Accounting principles are 
not forward-looking with an attempt to predict future needs. Conversely, the purpose of a 
financial rate study, such as the rate studies used to detennine the capacity fees, is necessarily 
forward-looking. Accounting principles can help determine what fuel costs may be in 3-5 years, 
what an EPA discharge pennit may require, or what the effect a significant boom in development 
might be on the existing water systems. A financial rate study is designed to specifically address 
these concerns in an effort to assist the City can maintain viable and long-lasting infrastructure. 
Without a rate study, the City would never be able to plan for future needs based on current 
trends. As the City's CFO, I rely heavily on these types of studies, in conjunction with 
discussions with the various utility superintendents and the Direct of Public Works to ensure the 
City's future needs are accounted for and met. The failure to use rate studies that project future 
needs wou]d be a breach of my obligations to the City and its residents. 
II 
II 
II 
'/ I 
II 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SA YETH NAUGHT. 
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I 
• 
DAVID K. SWINDELL 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO, before me the tmdersigned, a Notary Public in and 
for said State, this _b2. day of August, 2013. 
-----·--
- -
KONNI R. t<~NDELL 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
STATE OF IDAHO 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following 
this 4 day of August, 2013, by hand delivery, maiJing with the necessary postage affixed 
thereto, facsimile, or overnight mail. 
Nathan M. Olsen 
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN 
485 "E" Stt'eet 
Idaho Fa11s, Idaho 83402 
Fax: 208-524-3391 
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BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ. 
SAM L. ANGELL, ESQ. 
NATHAN R. STARNES, ESQ. 
HALL ANGELL STARNES, LLP 
901 Pier View Drive, Ste. 203 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Telephone (208) 522w3003 
Fax (208) 646· 7108 
JSB No. 's 2434, 7012 & 7484 
bgh@hasattorneys.com 
sla@hasattorneys.com 
nrs@hasattorneys.com 
Attorneys .for Defendant City of Pocatello 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY 
BUILDING CONTRACTORS Case No. CV-2001 w5228·0C 
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST IDAHO, 
an Idaho nonwprofit corporation, 
FOURTH AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID K. 
Plaintiff, SWINDELL 
v. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
municipality, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Bannock ) 
David K. Swindell, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
I. I am the current Chief Financial Officer ("CFO") for the City of Pocatello. I have served 
as the CFO of the City since August, 200 I . I am over the age of eighteen and competent to 
testify in this matter. This affidavit is based on my personal knowledge unless otherwise stated. 
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2. The PILOT fee is charged to the water operating fund (Fund 031) and the wastewater 
op_erating fund (Fund 032). The City does not charge a PILOT to the water capacity fee fund 
(Fund 037), nor the wastewater capacity fee fund (Fund 038). 
3. The PILOT fee is independent from and has zero relationship to the connection capacity 
fee. 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SA VETH NAUGHT. 
~~-~ 
DAVID K. SWINDEL 
SUBSCRI!1~.4itf,m SWORN TO, befol'e me the undersigned, a Notary Public in and 
for said State, this~y of August, 2013. 
_. .... - - ..._ ... 
KONNI R. KENDELL 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
STATE OF IDAHO Residing at: -'+*"'-- =-::.-~-,,,_.-=---...RF--
My commission expires:_..:....,;,.~..:...:~~--
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I sel'ved a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following 
this~ day of August, 20 I 3, by the methoo indicated below:. 
Nathan M. Olsen 
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN 
485 "E" Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Fax: 208-524-3391 
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[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] E-Mail. 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, JN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
Register No.CV -2011-5228-0C 
) 
BUILDJNG CONTRACTORS, ) 
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ) 
IDAHO, an ·Idaho non-profit corporation, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
-vs- ) 
) 
) 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho ) 
Municipality, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
) 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
This matter is before the Court on the City of Pocatello's (Defendant or City) Motion for 
Summary Judgment, filed with accompanying memorandum and affidavits on November 13, 
2012. · The Building Contractors Association of Southeast Idaho (Plaintiff or Association), filed a 
response memorandum on January 4, 2013, along with the affidavits of Nathan Olsen, Syd 
Wood, and Ed Quinn. Also under consideration are Plaintiff's Motion to Strike the affidavit of 
David Swindell and Motion for Relief under I.R.C.P. 37(b), filed on January 4, 2013, and 
Defe.t~dant's Motion to Strike Affidavits of Ed Quinn and Syd Wood, filed on January 1 lt 2013. 
The Court heard oral argument on all these matters on January 14, 2013, taking them under 
advisement. Subsequently, on February 13, 2013, the Association filed a Supplemental Response 
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to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of Plaintiff's IRCP 37 Motion for 
Sanctions, which included an Affidavit by Nathan Olsen with attachments that included new 
evidence. In response, the City filed Defendant's Surreply in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment on February 27, 2013. Neither party objected to these new submissions. Since the last 
two submissions were further evidence and argument on the merits of the Motion for Summary 
Judgment pending before the Court, the Court deems these as new filings that the Court was 
required to consider before entering a final decision on the pending Motions. Therefore, the 
Court considers the matter submitted for final decision on the date of the Defendant's last 
submission, February 27, 2013. After carefully reviewing the motions, memorandums, affidavits, 
and oral argument on these matters, the Court now issues its opinion on the 1) Defendant's 
Motion to Strike Affidavits of Ed Quinn and Syd Wood; 2) Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment; and 3) Plaintiff's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of David Swindell and 4) Plaintiff's 
Motion for Relief under I.R.C.P. 37(b). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"Summary judgment is proper 'if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" I.R.C.P. 56(c); Arreguin v. 
Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 145 Idaho 459, 460, 180 P.3d 498, 500 (2008); Northwest Bee-Corp 
v. Home Living Service, 136 Idaho 835, 838, 41 P.3d 263,267 (2002); see also Cox v. Clanton, 
· 137 Idaho 492, 494, 50 P.3d 987, 989 (2002). When considering a motion for summary 
judgment, a court should liberally construe all facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor 
of the nonmoving party. Id. ( citing S. Griffin Contr., Inc. v. City of Lewiston, 135 Idaho 181, 
185, 16 P.3d 278,282 (2000)). "I.R.C.P. S6(e) provides that the adverse party may not rest upon 
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mere allegations in the pleadings, but must set forth by affidavit specific facts showing there is a 
genuine issue for trial." Carnell Y. Barker Mgmt., Inc., 137 Idaho 322, 327, 48 P.3d 651, 656 
(2002) (citations omitted). "Affidavits supporting or opposing the motion for summary 
judgment 'shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show 
affinnatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein."' Id. "The 
admissibility of the evidence contained in affidavits and depositions in support of or in 
opposition to a motion for summary judgment is a threshold question to be answered before 
applying the liberal construction and reasonable inferences rule to determine whether the 
evidence is sufficient to create a genuine issue for trial." Id Normally, summary judgment must 
be denied where reasonable persons could reach different conclusions or draw conflicting 
inferences from the evidence presented. Id 
-The moving party has the burden of showing the lack of a genuine issue of material fact. 
Northwest Bee-Corp, 136 Idaho at 838, 41 P.3d at 267. To meet this burden, the moving party 
must challenge, in its motion, and establish through evidence that no issue of material facts exists 
on an element of the nonmoving party's case. Id. The nonmoving party "may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as 
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue 
for trial." Id (quoting IRCP 56 (e)). Summary judgment is properly granted in favor of the 
moving party, when the nonmoving party fails to esta~lish the existence of an element essential 
to that party's case upon which that party bears the burden of proof at trial. Smith v. Meridian 
Joint School Dist. No. 2, 128 Idaho 714,719,918 P.2d 583,588 (1996). 
Evidentiary rulings shall be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Perry v. 
Magic Valley Reg'/. Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 46, 50, 995 P.2d 816 (2000). Upon review to 
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detennine whether a trial court abused its discretion, this Court inquires: (1) whether it correctly 
perceived the issue as discretionary; (2) whether it acted within the boundaries of its discretion 
and consistent1y with applicable legal standards; and (3) whether it reached its decision by an 
exercise of reason. Id.; Swallow v. Emergency Med of Idaho, P.A., 138 Idaho 589, 592J 67 P.3d 
68, 71 (2003) (citing State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 962 P.2d 1026 (1998); Sun Valley 
Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co .• 119 Idaho 87, 94,803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991)). 
Once the moving party establishes the absence of a genuine issue the burden shifts to the 
nonmoving party to make a showing of the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. 
Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc .• 126 Idaho 527, 530-31, 887P.2d 1034, 1037-38 (1994). 
This standard is set out in a United States Supreme Court case which has been adopted by the 
Idaho Supreme Court: 
The plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of Summary Judgment, after 
adequate time for discovery and upon motion, agamst a party who fails to make a 
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential.to that party's 
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a 
situation, there can be no genuine issue as to any material fact, since a complete 
failure of proof conceming an essential element of the non-moving party's case 
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The moving party is entitled to a 
Judgment as a matter oflaw ... 
Cellotex Corp. v. Catrett, 417 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986) (see Bade/Iv. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101,102 
(1998)). Thus, a responding party cannot raise meritless defenses or claims to defeat summary 
judgment. Rather, a Defendant must introduce facts into the record that support each element of 
each defense or claim asserted. 
Summary judgment is mandated when a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
I.R.C.P., Rule 56(a); Myers v. A.O. Smith Harvestor Products, Inc., 114 Idaho 432, 437 (Ct. 
App. I 988). That is, if there is no cognizable claim or defense, then no genuine issues of 
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material fact are at issue and, as a matter of law, the motion for summary judgment should be 
granted. 
Upon a party's request for summary judgment, a district court has the authority to render 
summary judgment in favor of any party, moving or non-moving, even if the non-moving party 
has not filed its own motion. Sirius LC v. Erickson, 144 Idaho 38, 40-41, 156 P.3d 539, 541--42 
(2007). "The district court may grant summary judgment to a non-moving party even if the party 
has not filed its own motion with the court. A motion for summary judgment allows the court to 
rule on the issues placed before it as a matter of law; the moving party runs the risk that the court 
will find against it." Fuller v. Dave Callister, 150 Idaho 848,851,252 P.3d 1266, 1269 (2011) 
(quoting Harwoodv. Talbert, 136 Idaho 672,677, 39 P.3d 612,617 (2001)). 
BACKGROUND AND FACTS 
This cause of action arises out of connection or capacity fees for water and sewer services 
that the City assesses to builders of new constructions. The City owns and operates a sewage 
collection and treatment system. 1 The wastewater treatment facility is called the Water Pollution 
Control Facility (WPCF) and serves the cities of Pocatello and Chubbuck and other areas within 
Bannock County.2 The WPCF was originally constructed as a primary treatment plant in 1959. 
The system was financed by issuing revenue bonds pursuant to Article 8, Section 3, Idaho 
Constitution and the Idaho Revenue Bond Act 3 The connection/capacity fee was phased in 
during FY2007 and was adopted by the City upon the recommendation of a water and 
wastewater study provided by Red Oak Consulting.4 According to the City, the 
1 Affidavit of David K Swindell in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, 1 3, filed on November 13, 2012. 
~Swindell Aff.). 
Id. 
3 ld at !2. 
4 Id at, l4. 
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connection/capacity fees are based on an "equity buy-in" system, which is designed to recover a 
new connector's proportionate share of the City's wastewater backbone facility costs. The new 
user's one-time contribution is intended to be equal to the amount of equity a similar existing 
customer already has in the system. 5 When new users connect to the system, the existing 
capacity that has been funded by the existing users is diminished as the cost of replacing and 
maintaining existing infrastructure is accelerated. 6 Therefore, the City maintains that the 
connection fee is simply the necessary amount that new users must pay to buy-in to the currently 
existing equity that old users have funded. The assessment of the collection fee is based on the 
size of the connection requested by the customer and is generally paid at the time a building 
permit is issued. 7 Connection fees are a one-time assessment as opposed to user fees that are 
assessed monthly to each existing user for services. 8 
DISCUSSION 
I. Motions to Strike 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) gives the following direction regarding affidavits in 
support of or in opposition to motions for summary judgment: 
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall 
set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show 
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
A. Defendant's Motion to Strike Affidavit of Ed Quinn 
The City moves to strike paragraphs 7; 8-12; and 13 of Ed Quinn's affidavit, arguing the 
statements are irrelevant, lack foundation, or constitute hearsay. The Court will address each of 
the paragraphs in turn: 
5 Id at113. 
6 Id 
7 Id. 
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1. Paragraph 7. Mr. Quinn's statements as to the impact of the capacity fees generally 
on his personal business, although of questionable relevance because the financial impact is not 
an issue dealt with in appellate decisions on this type of fee, will, nevertheless, be considered by 
the Court. However, the remainder of the statements in this paragraph lack foundation as to 
personal knowledge, make legal conclusions (i.e., that members have been "deprived" of their 
money and property, suggesting that the fee is illegal), or are argumentative (i.e., "draconian.") 
To this extent paragraph 7 is STRIKEN. 
2. Paragraphs 8~12. As in paragraph 7, Mr. Quinn's statements in paragraphs 8·12 deal 
primarily with the economic impact of the fee on his personal business. Although such 
statements could be relevant to showing an injury in fact if the connection fees are unreasonably 
and arbitrarily imposed contrary to ldaho law, no damages are sought in this case, so the 
relevance is questionable. Although Quinn may have not laid a sufficient foundation to support 
authoritative and broad statements about the housing and construction markets in Southeastern 
Idaho, the Court finds that Quinn, as a business owner and builder of new constructions in 
Southeaster Idaho, has the requisite personal knowledge to state whatever knowledge he has 
about housing and construction conditions in Idaho are affecting his business and his ability to 
make a profit. The Court DENIES the City's Motion to Strike paragraphs 8 through 12. 
3. Paragraph 13. The Court STRIKES the first two sentences of paragraph 13, finding 
that they lack a foundation for personal knowledge The Court STRIKES the word "artificial" ·in 
the last sentence as being argumentative and making a legal conclusion, but does NOT STRIKE 
the remainder of the last sentence for the same reasons outlined above. 
8 Id at,i 15. 
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B. Defendant's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Syd Wood 
The City moves the court to strike paragraphs 3; 5; 6~7; 8; 9; 10.1; 10.2; and llof Syd 
Wood's affidavit. The City genera1ly objects to any commentary or conclusions that Wood 
makes to exhibits that he attaches to his affidavit, arguing that the exhibits speak for themselves 
· and that such commentary is irrelevant and inappropriate. The Court will address each of the 
paragraphs in tum: 
1. Paragraph 3. The Court STRIKES paragraph 3 as stating information which is 
hearsay and not relevant to the issues in this case. The connection fees that were implemented in 
FY2007 are the subject matter of this litigation. 
2. Paragraph 5. The Court agrees that there is no foundation to qualify Wood to offer 
an opinion on whether the methodologies Gallagher used in calculating the connection fees in 
2006 are sound. The Court STRIKES the last sentence of paragraph 5. 
3. Paragraphs 6N8. The Court STRIKES all of paragraphs 6 through 8, excepting the 
first sentence of paragraph 6, as lacking foundation, offering legal conclusions or argument, and 
as hearsay without foundation or identified exception. The Exhibits attached to the affidavit 
which are identified in these paragraphs are NOT STRIKEN and are considered for any relevant 
evidence or inference they may offer. 
4. Paragraph 9. The Court DENIES the motion to strike paragraph 9 and Exhibits F, G, 
and H. The City argues that the full and complete exhibits were never presented with the 
affidavit and that Wood cannot lay a foundation that the exhibits are true and correct copies. But 
Wood testifies that he submits the exhibits which were a portion of the City's discovery 
responses, which lays a sufficient foundation. The City does not argue that the exhibits are 
inaccurate as submitted nor does the City identify how the exhibits are incomplete. Although the 
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Court will detennine how "significantn the documents are, the three pamphlets/binders labeled as 
Exhibits F through Has follows: 1) Exhibit F - J-U-B Final Report for City of Pocatello, Idaho 
Facilities Plan for the Wastewater Collection System update, 2002; 2) Exhibit G - a 
Montgomery Watson June 1997 report entitled "City of Pocatello, Idaho Facilities Plan for the 
Water Pollution Control FaciHties"; and 3) Exhibit H - City of Pocatello Water System Master 
Plan and Development of Water System Model - August 2006. These exhibits will be considered 
by the Court as it deems appropriate. 
5. Paragraph 10.1.9 As to paragraph IO.I, the City argues that Exhibits F and G speak 
for themselves and that Wood~s commentary regarding the exhibits is· inappropriate and 
ittelevant. The Court STRIKES paragraph 10.1, except as it is used to simply enter Exhibits F 
and G into evidence. The Court will make its own determinations as to what relevant material the 
reports contain. 
6. Paragraph 10.2. As to paragraph 10.2, the City argues that Wood does not have the 
foundation to state whether the documents referenced in this paragraph are complete, or whether 
the projects listed in the JUB reports have or have not been completed. The Court STRIKES 
paragraph 10.2 in its entirety, agreeing with the City that Wood does not have the expertise, does 
not lay a foundation and/or does not have the personal knowledge to state what capital 
improvements have been started/completed in recent years and whether the documents the City 
has provided to the Association were complete. 
7. Paragraph 11. Finally, as to paragraph 11, the City argues that Wood,s commentary 
on Exhibit H is irrelevant and unfounded, and that he particularly does not have the foundation 
9 Wood's affidavit contains two paragraphs numbered IO. In its Motion to Strike, the City has numbered these 
paragraphs I 0.1 and 10.2. For the sake of clariflcation, the Court will follow the City's designations. 
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or expertise to opine whether the projects have been bonded or are intended for expansion of the 
water and sewer systems. The Court STRIKES paragraph 11, except as it is used to enter Exhibit 
H into evidence. The Court agrees that Wood has not laid a foundation for his statements that the 
projects are not bonded and that they are designed to expand the system. The Court is capable of 
drawing its own conclusions from Exhibit H. 
C. Plaintiffs Motion to $'trike Affidavit of David Swindell a$ found in its 
opposition memorandum to Defendant~s Motion ,for :Summary Judginent 
The Association argues that paragraphs 4 through 7 and IO through 16 of David 
Swindell's Affidavit contain statements that lack foundation, constitute legal opinion, are 
conclusory, or are irrelevant, and that the Court should disregard those portions of Swindell's 
affidavit in denying the City's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The City explains that Swindell is the City's Chief Financial Officer and outlines his 
qualifications for the position, including an Economics and Engineering degree from the United 
States Military Academy at West Point, 10 a Master's in Public Administration from Princeton 
University, 11 a ce~ification in research and systems analyst, 12 and a certification as a government 
financial manager earned through the Association of Government Accountants.13 Given 
Swindell's education and his position as CFO with the City, the Court concludes that Swindell is 
qualified to explain the policies and programs regarding the City's implementation of connection 
fees in the last several years. 
The Association has failed to identify what portions and for what reasons it believes 
Swindell's affidavit should be stricken as inadmissible. However, the Court has reviewed the 
16 Deposition of David Swindell., p. 24:12-25:4, attached at Exhibit 7 to Affidavit ofNathan M. Olsen, tiled on 
January 4, 2013. (Swindell Depo) 
11 Id at 25:14-1.S. 
12 Id at26:l-13. 
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noted paragraphs and makes the following rulings. The Motion as to paragraph 4 is DENIED. 
Swindell is explaining the City's view of a franchise fee. While questionably relevant to the 
issues present here, it does offer background infonnation on the City's view. The Motion as to 
paragraph 5 is DENIED for the same reasons concerning an impact fee, except the sentence 
reading: "The connection fee (capacity fee) that is the subject of this litigation is not 
appropriately classified as an impact fee." This sentence is STRIKEN as offering a legal 
conclusion. Paragraph 6 is STRIKEN as lacking foundation. Paragraph 7 is STRIKEN except 
for the first sentence up to the word "shareholders" and the last sentence. Both of those 
sentences identify how and why the City determines a "rate of return;' which is relevant and 
which Swindell is qualified to offer. The remainder of paragraph 7 lacks foundation and offers a 
legal opiniori. The first sentence of paragraph 10 is NOT STRIK.EN. The remainder of 
paragraph IO is STRIKEN as offering legal opinion and argument. The first two sentences of 
paragraph 11 are NOT STRIKEN. The remainder of paragraph 11 is STRIKEN as lacking 
foundation and offering legal opinion and argument. Paragraph 12 is STRIKEN as offering legal 
opinion and argument. Paragraph 13 is NOT STRIKEN, as it offers the City's position on how 
and why the connection fee is calculated. The first seven sentences of paragraph 14 are NOT 
STRIKEN as they offer the City's reasoning for implementing the connection fee. The 
remainder of paragraph 14 (the sentence starting with ''Fairness requires ... ") is STRIKEN as 
lacking foundation and offering a legal opinion. Paragraphs IS and 16 are NOT STRIKEN 
because they offer facts about how the connection fee is collected and used. However, the legal 
opinion offered at the end of paragraph 16, i.e., "It is not an impact fee ... ,, is STRIKEN. 
13 id. at26:IS-19. 
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II. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
A. Preliminary Arguments 
1. Standing-
The City alleges that the Association lacks standing in this case, requiring dismissal, 
because the Association 1) does not allege an "injury in fact" and 2) their asserted harm is a 
generalized grievance shared by all or a large class of citizens.14 
To establish standing a litigant must "allege or demonstrate an injury in fact and a 
substantial likelihood the relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed iajury."15 An injury 
in fact is a showing of a "distinct palpable injury" and a ''fairly traceable causal connection 
between the claimed iajury and the challenged conduct."16 The City argues that because the 
Association itself does not build new constructions and is not, therefore, subject to the 
connection fees, the Association has failed to plead the requisite injury in fact. 
The City also asserts that the Association does not have standing because it has claimed 
ua luum that is a generalized grievance shared by all or a large class of citizens."17 The City 
points to the Association's claim alleging the ''public at large" is entitled to a declaratory ruling 
that the connection fees are statutorily impennissible and also that the connection fees are an 
impennissible tax applicable to all.18 
The Association responds that it has ''associational standing. n Pursuant to Lateral Water 
Users Association v. Harrison, a non-profit association must prove the following to establish 
associational standing: 1) its members would.otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; 
14 See Young v. City of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 44 P .3d 1157 (2002). 
15 Id. at 104; 1159. 
16 Mii~. v. 1(/QhO Power Cc., 116 Idaho 635, 639, 778 P.2d 757, 761 (1989). 
17 ¥01mgv. i:-1010/Ke.tchum at 104; 1159. 
18 $ee1Cornplaim, ,m 34, 4.2 
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.r . 
2) the interests the plaintiffs seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and 3) 
neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individuals in the 
lawsuit.19 
The Builder's Association is a trade association which was created to "foster trade and 
commerce of the residential and commercial housing industry, including providing reliable 
infonnation about the industry, promotion of uniformity and certainty in customs and usages of 
trade and ·commerce, encouraging enlarged and friendly intercourse among those affiliated with 
th , d try ,,20 em us .... 
The Association contends that each of its members have an injury in fact, and therefore, 
would have standing to sue in their own right because each of them are builders that are required 
to pay the City's connection fees when they build new constmctions.21 Next, the Association 
claims it meets the second associational standing requirement because it is clear from the 
Association's mission statement, cited above, that the Association is seeking to protect its 
members from what it believes are impennissible connection fees. Thus, the issue is allegedly 
germane to the Association's purpose to "advance the civic, commercial and industrial interests 
of the industry." Finally, the Association conceded at oral argument that it is not seeking any 
damages and is only seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Therefore, it argues that neither 
the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation cif its members because if the 
Court declares that the connection fees as currently imposed by the City are impermissible and 
issues an order requiring the City to "cease and desist" its current connection fees policies, then 
all of the Association's members will benefit alike. 
19 Beach Lateral Waters Users Association v. Harrison, 142 Idaho 600,603,300 P3d 1138, 1142 (2006). 
2° Complaint, ,i 3. 
21 See Affidavit of Ed QuiM at ,r 4, flied on January 4, 2013. (QuinnAff.) 
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Tiie Court tinds that the Plaintit'f meets au of :the requiteme:hts ofassodational standing~ 
and therefore DENIES the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on standing. 
2. Immunitv 
The City next asserts that it qualifies for immunity from these claims, as a govemment. 
entity, under the "discretionary function'' defense against tort claims per I.C .. § 6-904(1). 
The Court concludes that this immunity defense only applies to claims for money 
damages for tort claim pursuant to l.C. §6-901, et seq.22 The Plaintiff has conceded that it is 
seeking declarative and injunctive relief only, pursuant to LC. §10-1202.23 
Since the Associatioi1 is not seeking monetary damages, the City's immunity 
defenses under the Idaho Torts Claim Act are inapplicable,· The Cou.1: DENIES the 
City's M:otion for Summary Judgment as it relates to tort claim immunity. 
3. Takings CJaim 
As to the Association's unconstiiutional takings claim in Count IV of the Complaint, the 
City asserts that, pursuant to LC. § 6-904A(l), a government entity is immune to any claim 
which arises out of the assessment or collection of any tax or fee. In the prayer of the Complaint, 
paragraph 3, the Association petitions the Court to declare the City's connection fees policies to 
be a violation of the United States Constitution and Idaho Constitution as a taking of private 
property wit.liout just compensation and grant Plaintiff the appropriate equitable and legal 
remedies under U.S.C. 42 § 1983. Presumably, the Association is arguing that the City's 
22 I.C. §6-902 defines a "Claim" as "any written demand to recover money damages from a governmental entity or 
its employee." I.C. §6~903( 1) provides that government entities are liable for money damages arising out of its acts 
or those of its employees. Finally, J.C. §6-904{1) provides that government entities shall not be liable for any claims 
{i.e., for money damages as defined above] arising out of the use of its discretionary function. 
3 In paragraph 8 of its Complaint, the Association seeks "damages" for the copying costs the City assessed to it as 
part of the Association'sFOIA request before the litigation began. However, at oral argument, the _Association 
conceded that it is not seeking monetary damages in connection to any government action regarding the imposition 
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connection fees are both unconstitutional and statutorily impermissible and that the payment of 
such fees in the past have constituted an unlawful taldng of the Association's members' property. 
However, as stated above, the Association has conceded that is not seeking any monetary 
damages. Therefore, the Court finds that without a claim for damages, the Association has failed 
to state a claim upon which relief can be ·granted in Count IV of its Complaint. · Therefore, the 
Court GRANTS the Citfs Motion for Summary Judgment asto Count IV. 
· B. Arguments on the Merits 
The Association seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against the City's current 
connection fee policies, alleging that the collection fees are in violation of Idaho Constitutional 
and statutory law, particularly the Idaho Revenue Bond Act, because: 1) revenue from the 
connection fees are improperly being transferred to and used by the general fund; 2) connection 
fees are improperly being used for capital improvements and expansion of the system; and 3) the 
City's method for calculating the "equity buy-in" is arbitrary and unreasonable. The City seeks 
summary judgment on the Association's Complaint; arguing that there are no genuine issues of 
material fact on these questions. 
The Idaho Supreme Court addressed the statutory legality of sewer and water system 
connection fees, and particularly of an "equity buy-in" system used to calculate connection fees, 
in Loomis v. City of Hailey.24 Pursuant to Loomis and its progeny, in making a detennination 
whether connection fees and an equity buy-in system are statutory permissible, a Court must 
determine two things: 1) whether the revenue collected from connection fees is used for a 
of the connection fees, but that at the conclusion of this litigation, it will seek to recover the copying costs, not as 
damages but as costs of litigation in a motion for reasonable attorney fees and costs. 
24 Loomis v. City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434, 807 P.2d 1272 (1991). 
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pennissible purpose under the Idaho Revenue Bond Act and 2) whether the fees are reasonably 
and not arbitrarily determined. The Court will address each of these issues in tum. 
1. Are the City's Connection Fees Used for a Pennissible Purpose? 
The Loomis Court expounded in detail a mWJicipality's statutory authority to create, 
maintain, and operate public works and to assess fees to the users of such works. Pursuant to its 
proprietary function, municipalities may construct and maintain certain public works. The grant 
of authority for public works is specifically codified in the Idaho Revenue Bond Act, I.C. §50-
1027 et seq. Particularly, I.C. § 50~1028 explains: 
Any city acquiring, constructing, reconstructing, improving, bettering or 
extending any works pursuant to this act, shall manage such works in the most 
efficient manner consistent with sound economy and public advantage, to the end 
that the services of such works shall be furnished at the lowest possible cost. No 
city shall operate any WQrks pdmarHy as a source ofrevenue to the city, but shall 
operate all such works for the use and benefit of those served by such works and 
for the promotion of the welfare and for the improvement of the health, safety, 
comfort and convenience of the inhabitants of the city. [Emphasis added]. 
Pursuant to I.C. § 50-1030(e), cities may issue revenue bonds ''to finance in whole or in 
part, the cost of acquisition, construction, reconstruction, improvement, betterment, or extension 
of any works." Under J.C. § 50-1030(f), municipalities may "prescribe and collect rates, fees, 
tolls, or charges ... for the services, facilities and commodities furnished by such works.,,2s The 
Idaho Supreme Court held, in Loomis, that the "Idaho Revenue Bond Act authorizes the 
collection ofsewer connection fees ... so long as the fees collected pW'Suant to the Idaho Revenue 
Bond Act are allocated and budgeted in conformity with the Act."26 
2s Id 
26 Loomis at 439; 1277. 
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The primary test in determining whether rates and fees are in accordance with the Idaho 
Revenue Bond Act is whether they are "imposed primarily for revenue raising purposes. "27 The 
Loomis Court held that connection fees segregated from the general fund and used for 
"maintenance, depreciation and replacement of system components" were not imposed primarily 
for revenue raising purposes.28 Later, in Viking Construction, Inc. v. Hayden Lake Irrigation 
District, the Supreme Court explained the issue is not whether the funds are kept in a segregated 
account from the general fund but that the funds "were not used for city functions other than the 
sewer and water systems."29 
Additionally, the Loomis Court held that, under I.C. §50-1033, reserves held for 
"expenses of operation, maintenance, replacement and depreciation" of public works could be 
accumulated from the revenue of the imposed fees.30 In City of Chubbuck v. City of Pocatello, 
the Idaho Supreme Court added that an eleven percent ( 11 %) "rate of return" charged by the City 
of Pocatello to the City of Chubbuck for use of Pocatello's sewer treatment facilities was not 
imposed "primarily as a source of revenue" because there was no evidence that the revenue was 
not being used for the purposes prescribed under the Idaho Revenue Bond Act, i.e., for the 
maintenance, depreciation and replacement of system components. 31 
The Association contends that the evidence supports the conclusion that the connection 
fees imposed by the City of Pocatello violate the Idaho Revenue Bond Act because they are 
assessed and used primarily as a source of revenue to the City and as a means to fund capital 
17 Id 
28 Id. at441; 1279. 
29 Viking Construction, Inc. v. Hayden Lake Irrigation District, 149 Idaho I87, 197,233 P.3d 118, 128 (2010) 
(Viking Const.) (Italics in original). 
30 Loomis at 440; 1278. 
31 City ofChubbuckv City of Pocatello, 127 Idaho 198,202, 899 P.2d411, 415 (1994). 
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improvements and expansion to the cWTent system, contrary to the instruction that "the proceeds 
of the connection fee for water and sewer service are dedicated to those systems."32 
a. ls there a genuine issue of fact that · connection · fees are being assessed 
primarib'. as a source of revenue to. the City? 
The Association argues that the City does not dispute that it is transferring funds from the 
water and sewer accounts into the general fund via programs that have been called by various 
names, such as "Return on Equity," "Rate of Return.," "Payment in Lieu of Taxes" (PILOT), and 
"Franchise fee" programs. 
In previous years, programs that transferred money from the water and sewer funds to the 
general fund were called uRetum on Equity," or "Rate of Return." programs. The programs 
returned a profit of 6.5% and, according to Dave Swindell's affidavit, treated the taxpayers as if 
they were shareholders in a private company.33 
In an August 22, 2005 letter to Logan Robinson, City of Pocatello Mayor Roger W. 
Chase explained that that the "'Return on Equity" program assesses a 7% rate of return on each 
utility which would be transferred to the General Fund which the City Council would use as a 
''property tax substitution."34 Mayor Chase emphasized that in comparison, private utilities 
charged as much as 11.5% to 13.5% as a rate of retum.35 The Association alleges that since 
2005 the City has transfe1Ted substantial amounts of the water and sewer funds into the City's 
32 VikingComt .• 149 Idaho at 196,233 P.3d at 127, citing Loomis at440; 1278. 
33 Swindell Atf. 1 7. . 
34 Mayor Chase August 22, 2005 letter to Logan Robison, attached as Exhibit D to Affidavit of Syd Wood, filed on 
January 4, 2013. Also attached as Exhibit 18 to Swindell Aff., which is attached as Exhibit 7 to Olsen Aff. (The 
Jetter from Mayor Chase in both exhibits sits behind David SwindeII's September 29, 2010 Memo.) ("Mayor Chase 
2005 Letter"). · 
JS Id 
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general revenue fund as part of the "Return on Equity" program. The Association maintains that 
$2,848,891 was transferred in 2011 alone, with similar transfers occurring in previous years. 36 
In his affidavit, Swindell explained that in recent years the city has been describing 
transfers from the water and sewer funds to the general fund as a "franchise fee" or as a 
Payment-in-lieu-of-Taxes (PILOT) fee. 37 
In his letter to Logan Robinson, Mayor Chase explained the Payment in Lieu of Taxes 
program is a policy "to have the 'enterprise funds' make a payment irt lieu of taxes to the 
General fund based on the depreciated valuation of their physical plants and last year's city 
property tax levy -rate."38 Mayor Chase described it as similar to the federal government's 
"payment of PILOT to some local communities, and is a method to pay something for their use 
of police, fire and streets" as if they were a private utility.39 
Regardless of what the transfers are called or described, it appears that the City does not 
dispute that it is transferring some water and sewer funds to the General Fund.40 The City argues 
that such transfers are permissible as long as the fee is not designed primarily as a source of 
revenue.41 Specifically, the City argues that it transfers some funds for operational costs and 
asserts this is permitted by J.C. § 50-I033(b) and City of Chubbuck v. City of Pocatello.42 The 
City argues that these transfers cover the utilities' uses of city services such as HR) financial, and 
36 David Swindell September 29, 2010 Memo to City Clerk, attached as Exhibit D to Affidavit of Syd Wood, filed 
on January 4, 2013. Also attached as Exhibit 18 to Swindell Aff., which is attached as Exhibit 7 to Olsen Aff. 
("Swindell Memo"). 
17 Swindell Aff. at 1 8. 
38 Mayor Chase 2005 Letter. 
3
' Id 
40 Swindell Aff. at 19. There is certainly evidence to suggest that this may be in the millions of dollars a year. 
41 Apparently, the City takes the position that any transfer ofless than 50% of the connection fee to the general fund 
is less than a "primary" use of the funds for revenue pwposes. See Swindell Aff., 1 11. 
42 City o/Chubbuck, 127 ldahoat 202, 899 at 415. ("[T]he Revenue Bond Act allows the collection of revenues 
sufficient to cover the costs of operation, maintenance, replacement and depreciation, including creating and 
maintaining reserves for such expenses."). 
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accounting.43 The City contends that I.C. § 50-1032 allows the City to "prescribe and collect 
reasonable rates, fees, tolls or charges for the [public work servicesJ ... such as wiUproduce 
revenue at least sufficient" to pay bonds and provide for operation and maintenance of the works. 
The City also relies on J.C. § 50-1033 which allegedly allows a city to apply revenue to certain 
enumerated costs, and also states that "[u]nless and until full and adequate provision has been 
made for the foregoing purposes, no city shall have the right to transfer the revenue of such 
works ... to its general fund." The City uses these statutes to support its contention that once it has 
used the water and sewer revenue to fulfill all statutory requirements identified by law, then a 
City may do something else with the funds, even transfer them to the general fund for any 
purpose it wishes. 
It is the Court's view that LC. §§ 50-1032 and 50-1033 must be reconciled with the grant 
of authority stated in I.e.§ 50-1028 -that public works "shall be furnished at the lowest possible 
cost" and that "no city shall operate any works primarily as a source of revenue to the city." The 
Idaho Supreme Court, in ruling on similar issues, has made it clear that the issue is not 
necessarily that the funds are segregated from the general fund, but that they are "[n]ot used for 
city functions· other th.an the sewer and water systems" under the Idaho Revenue Bond Act. 44 
This certainly means that the connection fees may be used for "operation, maintenance, 
replacement and depreciation, including creating and maintaining reserves for such expenses." 
Thus, a transfer of even the connection fees from the water and sewer accounts to the general 
fund for purposes of paying the utilities' operational costs is statutorily permissible. However, 
Mayor Chase indicated in his letter to Logan Robinson that for the FY2005 the total 
43 Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 1S, filed on November 13, 2012. 
("Defendant's MSJ Memo"). There is no affidavit suggesting that these are the only way these funds are used. 
44 Viking Const, 149 Idaho at 197;233 P.3d at 128 (2010) (Italics in original). 
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administrative support fee for the utilities was only $169,541.45 This is contrasted with the 
$2,848,891 that was transferred from the utilities to the general fund as part of the return on 
equi~y program for the year 2011, as indicated in David Swindell's September 24, 2010 
memorandum,46 and the intended transfer of $3,496,782 for FY20I3 into the general fund from 
the "franchise fee" and PILOT programs.47 Swindell further indicated, in his September 24, 20 I 0 
memorandum, that the return on equity transfers are "to help fund the activities of the General 
Fund."41!' FinaJly, in a December 26, 2006 letter to Attorney General Lawrence Wasden, then 
Pocatello Mayor Chase explained the City's purpose behind the rate of return as follows: 
Charging a rate of return is commonly used by public utilities and private sector 
companies, and we feel it is a fairer way to generate revenue for the City. As I am 
sure you are well aware, relying on property taxes for revenue will not work in 
Pocatello due to the number of property tax exemptions given by the State. 
Therefore, it has been my practice as Mayor to move our city away from property 
taxes and to a fee based system. The rate of return is an important part of this 
plan.49 
Therefore, the record at this point creates the inference that not all of the funds 
transferred as part of the Return of Equity program are transferred for administrative and 
operational costs related to the utility, nor are they exclusively transferred for ''operation, 
maintenance, replacement and depreciation, including creating and maintaining reserves" of the 
existing water and sewer facilities, but have been used to fund unspecified "activities of the 
General Fund" and to "generate revenue" for the city because "property taxes [the ordinary 
revenue raising method] will not work." Furthermore, the evidence produced thus far, while 
45 Mayor Chase 2005 Letter. 
46 ld 
·
47 Swindell Aff. at ,r 9. 
48 Swindell Memo. 
49 Mayer Roger Chase December 26, 2006 letter to Attorney General Lawrence Wadsen, attached as Exhibit A to 
Nathan Olsen's February 13, 2013 affidavit in support of Supplemental Response to Defendant's Motion for 
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disputed, could support the conclusion that the City's calculation of fees to include a percentage 
of profit, such as would be generated by a private utility, may be in excess of those costs 
contemplated by LC. §50-1033 and may have become a fee imposed ''primarily as a source of 
revenue" for the City prohibited by J.C. §50-1028. While a non-governmental utility company 
may operate with the intent to generate a profit above and beyond costs of operation, the statutes 
and case law referenced above suggest that this is not permitted by a city utility such as the one 
at issue here. There is evidence here that a city that also implements a fee system that 
intentionally generates a profit percentage above and beyond its costs of operation, maintenance, 
and repair of its utility systems, also is operating those systems with the primacy intent to create a 
"source of revenue" for the city which is impermissible under Idaho statutory law. so 
The Court is aware that in City of Chubbuck v. the City of Pocatello the Idaho Supreme 
Court agreed that the City of Pocatello could charge the City of Chubbuck an eleven percent 
(11%) "rate of retum.tt However, there is a difference between charging another entity, such as 
the City of Chubbuck, a rate of return versus charging city residents and utility customers a rate 
of return when the statute granting cities the authority to operate public works provides that the 
city must furbish the services "at the lowest possible cost." Furthennore, and more importantly, 
the Supreme Court emphasized in· City of Pocatello v. City of Chubbuck that the rate of return 
was not imposed 1'primarily as a source of revenue" because there was no evidence that the 
revenue was not being used for purposes proscribed by the Idaho Revenue Bond Act, which, as 
Summary Judgment and in Support of Plaintifrs IRCP 37 Motion for Sanctions, filed February 13, .2013. (Mayor 
Chase 2006 Letter) 
50 The facts of this case are much more complex than Loomis where the City of Hailey put the connection fees in a 
separate account, never transferred any of the funds to the general fund, and could account for all expenditures of 
those funds to purposes allowed by the Idaho Revenue Bond Act. It is the Court's view that the method of 
accounting for the colJection and expenditure of the connection fees by the City in this case strongly suggests that 
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detailed in Loomis and Viking Construction, permits water and sewer revenue to be used for the 
maintenance, depreciation and replacement of system components, but not for future expansion 
of the system or for city functions other than the sewer and water systems. 51 
Therefore, the question of whether private companies charge a rate of return is not 
relevant to this analysis. Neither is whether city users are compensated for the rate of return by 
the fact that they are not charged a franchise fee for use of the public right of way, another 
argument advanced by the City here. The only real question is whether the City is using the 
revenues from the coruiection fees for permissible purposes.·As detailed above, it is the Court's 
view that use of water and sewer funds "for city functions other than the sewer and water 
systems" is not permissible under the Idaho Revenue Bond Act. The Court fmds that the 
Association has raised a genuine issue of material fact about whether the City is impermissibly 
using fees collected from the water and sewer programs. The Association has produced evidence 
showing that the City is transferring water and sewer funds into the . General Fund that may 
substantially exceed the utilities' administrative costs, and are part of a program that the former 
Mayor believed could be implemented to generate revenue for the City in lieu of property 
taxes.52 
these fees are being used for general fund expenditures, a po_ssible conclusion buttressed by the City's argument that 
''primarily" means that the City can use anything Jess thl:in .S-6% of tho eobtiection fees for general fund purposes. 
51 Viking Const, 149 Idaho at 197,233 P.3d at 128. (20.10) (Italics in J>riginaJ}. 
52 The City argues, in it's Surreply, that the letter from Mayer Gha$e 10· the Idalto Attorney General could not be 
used as an admission that the City was improperly using the funds, since the Mayor alone did not have the power to 
bind the City. The Court agrees that Mayor Chase letter to the Attorney General is not conclusive evidence that the 
City implemented the policy proposed and explained by Mayer Chase. However, it is certainly evidence that helps 
Plaintiff survive a motion for summary judgment. Mayor Chase's 2006 Letter, combined with the admissions by 
David Swindell that a substantial amount of money is being transferred from the water and sewer funds to the 
general fund, raises a material question of fact. Furthermore, in its Surreply the City argues that this litigation is 
about the rate ofretum policy that was adopted in 2011, while Mayor Chase wrote his letter to the Attorney General 
in 2006. There is no merit to this argument. The Association has been arguing from the very beginning that this 
litigation is about the City's policies towards the implementation of its connection fees that were initially discussed 
in 2005 and 2006 and implemented for the FY 2007 and have continued to the present time. The Mayor's view of 
this new policy change during the timeframe it was discussed and implemented is relevant to these proceedings. 
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The Association argues that it has produced sufficient evidence to permit the Court to 
rule as a matter of law in its favor. The Court disagrees. ·Even though the Court will be the 
ultimate finder of fact at trial, the Court finds that there exists a genuine issue of material fact 
about whether the City is operating the utilities for the primary purpose of revenue raising as is 
evidenced by the fact that the City is charging a rate of return and transferring a substantial 
amount of money from the water and sewer funds into the general fund. The primary factual 
question remaining is whether the City is using those funds for purposes other than to support the 
existing water and sewer systems. The evidence at this point is insufficient for the Court to rule 
on this issue as a matter of law either way. 
b. Is there a genuine "issue of fact tbat fees are being assessed to fund future 
capital improvements'? 
Plaintiffs also asserts that the City is also impennissibly using the connection fees to 
fund future expansions to the water and sewer systems. Both parties agree that the Idaho case 
law and the Idaho Revenue Bond Act do not permit connection fees to be collected and reserved 
for future expansion or capital improvements of the sewer system. 53 The parties also agree that 
the Idaho Development Impact Fee Act ODIFA) is the means "for planning and financing public 
facilities needed to serve new growth and development. "54 
While not disagreeing with the parties, the Court notes that the Loomis Court specifically 
did not reach the issue of whether, as a matter of law, a capacity or connection fee could be used 
to accumulate reserves to pay for future expansion or capital improvements. 55 The Court has not 
53 See Defendant's MSJ Memo, p. 14; Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion for Swnmary Judgment and 
Motion to Strike, p. 6, filed January 4, 2013. 
54 Idaho Code § 67-8202. 
ss See Loomis at fu 3. ("Since the precise issue of whether fees may be collected for future expansion of a sewer or 
water system is not before us on this appeal, we leave for another day the detennination of that issue."). 
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identified any Idaho case that has reached this exact issue. Loomis does imply that connection 
fees may not be used for future expansion or new construction because such an assessment could 
be- a tax rather than a regulation pursuant to the city's proprietary function. 56 What the Court 
. does conclude, as noted above, is that connection fees may be used for the operation, 
maintenance, replacement. and depreciation of the public works, including a reserve for 
replacement of existing structures, and that revenue from the water and sewer systems must be 
used for water and sewer system purposes. 
As a factual matter, the City argues that there is no genuine issue of material fact that the 
City is using connection fees to fund future expansion. citing the affidavit testimony of David 
-Swindell, where he explains that the City's equity-buy in system that implements connection fees 
is not designed to expand future capacity to the system. 51 The City also cites the December 2006 
Wastewater Rates Report prepared by Red Oak Consulting, where the equity buy-in system is 
explained and where it is emphasized that it "is not the cost to provide new service to the new 
customer, and when new capacity is needed, all customers will bear the cost."58 
Contrarily, the Association argues that connection fees are, in fact, being used to fund 
capital improvement projects, citing the following evidence: 
56 See Loomis at 1278, citing toAsson v. City of Burley, 105 Idaho 432,670 P.2d 839 (1983) C'Comparison of these 
earlier cases reveals one clear distinction between those expenses held to be ordinary and necessary and those held 
not to be: new construction or the purchase of new equipment or facilities as opposed to repair, partial replacement 
or reconditioning of existing facilities"). Also citing to Redman v. City of' Hailey, Blaine County District Court Case 
No. 1 I 855, Memorandum Decision (June 4, 1984) (unreported decision) (district court held that "development fees'' 
collected for future expansion were unconstitutional). 
57 Swindell Aff. at 1 S. 
58 Swindell Aff., Exhibit A, City of Pocatello Wastewater Rates, p. 6-1, uSystem Capacity Fees." The Court believes 
this is the correct cite because the information on the page listed in the Defendant's brief matches what is in this 
exhibit, even though the Defendant refers to it as a June 18, 2010 City of Pocatello Wastewater Utility Financial 
Planning Study. 
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• A power point slide prepared by the City in 2006 that indicates that 
capacity fees are a solution for new growth with the rationalization being 
that "growth pays for growth."59 
• Slides presented to City Council on Service Level Reports that indicate 
plans for future growth to the system. 60 
• Work orders and a "Capital Improvement List'' that the Association 
alleges show that the City is planning, has started, or is finished with fifty 
(50) capital improvement projects in waste management and thirty (30) 
water related capital improvement projects in the last seven years.61 
• A July 28, 2010 Memorandum from David Swindell that indicates that the 
City is bonded for only one water project and four sewer projects. Plaintiff 
asserts this is evidence that only five (5) of the above listed 80 projects are 
bonded, and therefore, revenue to fund the remaining 75 projects must be 
coming from connection fees. 62 
• A May 2003 J~U-B report, prepared for the City of Pocatello, entitled 
Idaho Facilities Plan for the Wastewater Collection System Update, 2002, 
that outlines a 5. 10, 15, and 20 year "Capital Improvement Plan" and 
identifies new developments that will require expansion to the then 
existing system. 63 Plaintiff alleges that these projects have been completed 
or are being completed, and are/were being funded from revenue from the 
capacity fees. No evidence has been offered to support this conclusion. 
• An August 2006 report entitled "Water System Master Plan and 
Development of Water system Model," which also outlines future 
expansion to the system and projects to be 1ackled.64 The Association 
alleges that these projects have been completed or are being completed 
and that they are being paid by the connection fees but they do not offer 
evidence as to the completion or the source of funds. 
• A statement in David Swindell' s deposition indicating that bond payments 
are not made out of the Capital Improvement Fund, but rather, money 
from the water and sewer Operation and Maintenance fund is transferred 
into the debt service fund, which then pays the bond service. 65 
59 Wood Aff. Ex B. 
60 Swindell Dep, Ex 20 attached to Olsen Affidavit, Exhibit 7. 
61 Wood Aft:, Ex. E 
62 Swindell Dep, Exhibit 17 attached to Olson Affidavit, Exhibit 7. 
63 Wood Affidavit, Exhibit F, Executive Summary, Section 3, and Appendix M. 
64 Wood Affidavit, Exhibit H. 
6s Swindell Depo,p. 75: 8-18. 
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I 
Therefore, the Association asserts that there is evidence that capital. improvements are being 
funded by the general water and sewer accounts, which is the revenue from both the co1U1ection 
fees and the monthly user rates. 
The Association is the non-moving party in this proceeding and, as a general rule, the 
Court must construe all facts and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor. However, "[w]hen 
an action will be tried before the court without a jury. the judge is not constrained to draw 
inferences in favor of the party opposing a motion for summary judgment but rather the trial 
judge is free to arrive at the most probable inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted 
evidentiary facts. "66 The evidence before the Court is not in dispute but the arguments are. The 
Court concludes that there is no evidence, nor is there any reasonable inference, to show that the 
City is using revenue from connection fees to fund future expansion of the water and sewer 
systems or to fund impennissibJe capital improvement projects. All the evidence that the 
Association points to simply shows that the City is or has been planning upgrades to its systems. 
However, there is no evidence that the upgrades were ever completed or if they were completed, 
that the projects were funded with revenue collected from the connection fees. There is no 
evidence or reasonable inference that the projects that the Association lists were for actual future 
expansion rather than repairing and updating the current system. Finally, money transferred from 
the water and sewer Operation Maintenance Fund into a fund that pays the debt service is not 
evidence that connection fees are being used to fund future expansion or future capital 
improvement projects. Loomis clearly holds that "rates and charges ... be sufficient to support the 
66 Loomis, at 436, 1274, citing Rillerside Dev. Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 51S, 650 P.2d657 (1982) and Blackmon v, 
Ziifelt, I 08 Idaho 469, 700 P.2d 91 (Ct.App.1985). 
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public works project, including the retirement of bond indebtedness and operating costs."67 In 
short, on this record it appears to the Court that the Plaintiff's assertions are simply that, 
assertions without foundation and based on speculation. 
Therefore, because the Court finds that there is no disputed question of fact on this issue, 
the Court need not make a detennination whether Idaho statutory law permits such use of funds 
for capital.improvements. The Court GRANTS this portion of the City's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, finding that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the City is 
impennissibly using connection fees to fund future expansion and capital improvements to the 
water and sewer systems. 
2. Is there a genuine issue of fact that the fees are unreasonable? 
The City argues that there are no genuine issues of fact that the connection fees are 
unreasonable or arbitrarily imposed because they have hired Wl engineering firm to develop a 
sound equity buy•in system that is not prohibited by law. 
In Schmidt v. Village of Kimberly, 74 Idaho 48, 256 P .2d 515 (1953), the Idaho Supreme 
Court held that rates and charges for public works must be reasonable, holding as follows: 
[R)egulations and charges shaU not be unreasonable, it being specifically 
provided in section 2, § 50-2813, I.C., [now§ 50-1028], that the services are to be 
furnished at the lowest possible cost and that the municipality shall not operate 
the works primarily as a source ofrevenue.68 · 
The Loomis Court held that connection fees do not need to bear a relationship to the actual cost 
of connecting to the system and that the rates and fees imposed by a city will be upheld if they 
67 Loomis at 443, 1281. 
68 Loomis at 441, 1279, citing Schmidt v. Village of Kimberly, 74 Idaho 48,256 P.2d 515 (1953). 
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are "not unreasonable and not arbitrarily imposed" and "produce sufficient revenue ~o support 
the system at the lowest possible cost as required by the Idaho Revenue Bond Act. "69 
In deciding that the equity buy-in methodology of the City of Hailey was a reasonable 
method to impose connection fees, the Supreme Court emphasized in Loomis that the City of 
Hailey had hired "an engineering ±inn to detennine various methods of ratemaking and adopted 
one of those valid methods which it detennined complied with the Act and best met the city's 
needs.H70 
In Viking Const., Inc. v. Hayden Lake Irr. Dist, the Idaho Supreme Court held that there 
was a genuine issue of fact as to whether the connection fees for the Irrigation District were 
reasonable and not arbitrary. The Viking Const Court explained that while Loomis held that an 
equity buy-in system was permissible "it must be based upon some calculation designed to 
detennine the value of that portion of the system that the new user will be utilizing. If there is no 
attempt to calculate in some manner that value, then the connection fee is not an equity buy-in 
regardless of its label." 
The City argues that there is no genuine issue of fact that the capacity fees, which it 
argues employs an equity buy-in system similar to Loomis, are not unreasonable or arbitrarily 
imposed. The City explains that the equity buy-in system that it employs is designed so that a 
new customer buys-in to the system "by making a contribution equal to the amount of equity a 
69 Loomis at 442, 1280. 
70 Loomis at 443; 128 I. "The Ordinance drafted after receiving the engineers' report calculates the connection fee by 
flfSt determining the gross replacement value of the system by using an engineering cost index to detemtine present 
day replacement cost of the system components. Unfunded depreciation and bond principal are then subtracted from 
the gross replacement value to determine the net replacement value of the system for the current year. The final 
connection fee is then ultimately determined by dividing the net system replacement value by the number of users 
the system can support. The new user is ch_arged the value of that portion of the system capacity that the new user 
will utilize at that point in time." 
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similar existing customer has in the system."71 The Wastewater R13.tes Final Report explains that 
the capacity fees are calculated by 1) detennining existing wastewater system equity; 2) 
estimating system capacity; 3) calculating unit equity cost; 4) calculating treatment plant 
capacity fee; and 5) calculating collection system capacity fees. 72 The Wastewater Rates Final 
Report further explains that 11the fees are dependent on the capacity required to serve a customer 
and the unit equity cost of existing facilities expressed as dollars per unit of capacity." The 
justification for an equity buy-in system, as explained above, is that new users pay their 
proportionate share of facility costs incurred to serve them since old users, through rates and 
other assessments have already developed a valuable wastewater system and the new users must 
buy-in to the system by making a contribution equal to the amount of equity a similar existing 
customer has in the system. 73 The Plaintiff has offered no evidence to refute these statements. 
The Loomis Court stated: "The methodology used to determine the value of the system is not 
unreasonable, nor is it unreasonable to charge a new user the value of that portion of the system 
capacity that the new user will utilize at that point in time." In short, if the methodology is 
reasonable the Court will not impose a different view but leaves it to the City's determination. 
The Court finds that there is no issue of genuine fact regarding whether the connection 
fees through fill equity buy-in system have been reasonably imposed. Loomis explained that 
'
1Idaho's statutory scheme does not require a new user to 'buy-in' to the system, nor does it 
prohibit such a program. 0 The City of Pocatello, after hiring an engineering finn that has created 
numerous reports and studies has chosen to develop an. equity buy-in system, where the value of 
that portion of the system that the new user will be utilizing has been calculated and the City has 
71 December 2006 Waste Water Rates Final Report, attached as Exhibit A to Swindell Affidavit, p. 6-1; Swinde11 
Aff. at~ 13. 
72 See Section 6. 
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set its connection fees so that the user buys its proportionate share. There is nothing in this record 
to suggest that this equity buy-in methodology is unreasonable or arbitrary. The Court GRANTS 
the City's motion for sumnuuyjudgment on this issue 
III. Motion for Relief under I.R.C.P. 37(b) 
The Association moves the Court to exclude the City's reliance on any use of evidence 
produced by John A. Gallagher and Red Oak Consulting in any of its claims or defenses, and 
further requests that default judgment be entered against the City pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 37(b) for failure to comply with the Court's July 31, 2012 Order to Compel. The 
Association argues that the City has failed to answer its Request for Production #9, which is a 
request for all of the Red Oak Consulting documents in the City's possession, including 
contracts, communications, and working papers. The Association contends that it needs these 
documents. rather than only the final Red Oak Consulting 2006 and 2010 final reports that the 
City has already provided, so that it can determine the methodology used by the City as it relied 
upon the recommendation from Red Oak Consulting regarding the capacity fee rates. 
The City responds that it has in fact produced all of the Red Oak Consulting documents 
that are actually in the City's possession. The City makes the point that Red Oak Consulting is a 
third-party witness, and as such, the proper method to obtain the working files of Red Oak would 
be by subpoena. The City further argues that the Defendant filed a subpoena. but later withdrew 
it in response to the Plaintiffs Motion to Quash due to the Defendant's alleged failure to comply 
with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 45. 
The Court DENIES the Plaintiff's Rule 37(b) motion for sanctions at this time. Plaintiff 
requests sanctions under I.R.C.P. 37(b)(2), which permits a court to impose sanctions if "a 
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party ... fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery ..•. " The Court finds that the City 
has not directly failed to comply with the Court's July 31, 2012 Order on Motion to Compel, 
where the Court only directly granted Plaintiff's Motion to Compel with regard to Interrogatory 
#6. The present dispute is regarding Request for Production #9. In its Order on Motion to 
Compel, the Court did direct the parties to again meet and confer with regard to Plaintiff's 
discovery requests, but the Court does not identify. actions on the part of the Defendant that 
would merit any sanctions at this point. 
However, the Court treats the Plaintiff's Rule 37(b) request as a Motion to Compel 
production of all working papers of Red Oak Consulting associated with its work on issues 
raised in this case. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 34 requires production of documents "in the 
possession, custody or control of the party upon whom the request is served ... " It is clear that 
Red Oak Consulting's documents were prepared in work done for the City as the client and, 
therefore, all such documents are with the control of the City. In addition, the City has identified 
Red Oak employees as expert witnesses in this case. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4) 
permits the discovery of all supporting documents relied on by an expert witness and "further 
discovery" ordered by the Court. Therefore, because any work done by Red Oak was on behalf 
of the City, and it appears that the City will rely upon the reports and recommendations of Red 
Oak Consulting in its claims and defenses, the Court hereby ORDERS the City to produce all 
documents from Red Oak Consulting sought in Request for Production #9. 
Finally, the Plaintiff renewed its request for sanctions in it.s February 13, 2013 
Supplemental Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of 
Plaintiff's IRCP 37 Motion for Sanctions. As part of that filing, Plaintiff placed into the record 
new evidence that it had obtained through subpoena to the Idaho State Attorney General's office. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDOMENT-32 
Register No.CV -11-5228-0C 
149
The Plaintiff argues that it should not have had to obtain the evidence through a third party 
subpoena, but that the City should have produced documents as a response to the Plaintiff's 
Request for Production # 2, stated as follows: 
Please produce a true and correct copy of all correspondence including but not 
limited to letters and emails, which has been sent or received by you related to the 
facts and circumstances that are the subject matter of litigation. 
The documents included in Plaintiff's newest filings, which it received by way of subpoena to 
the Attorney General's office, include the following: 1) a December 29, 2006 letter from Mayor 
Roger W. Chase to Lawrence G. Wadsen, which was a request for assistance concerning the 
City's rate of return policy; 2) a February 6, 2007 response by the Attorney General's office to 
Mayor Chase's request; 3) an April 9, 2007 reply to the Attorney General's response, written by 
Pocatello City Attorney Dean Tramner; and 4) an April 19, 2007 follow-up to Tramner's reply 
by the Attorney General's Office. 
In response to the Plaintiffs supplemental filing, the City :filed Defendant's Surreply in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that it has been completely responsive to 
Discovery. Regarding the Mayor Chase 2006 Letter, the City contends that it had no relationship 
to the subject matter of the current litigation because the rate of retmn policy that is at issue here 
was adopted in 2011, while Mayor Chase left office in January 2010. Therefore, since the Mayor 
Chase 2006Letter was not relevant, the City argues it was not obligated to produce it pursuant to 
the Association's discovery requests. 
Before the Plaintiff's supplemental filing, the Court only had the Attorney General's 
February 6, 2007 opinion letter as part of the record. The Court has carefully reviewed the above 
named docwnents and finds them entirely relevant to the issues of this case and were there an 
outstanding order compelling the City to further respond to Request for Production #2, sanctions 
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would be imposed here. However, as outlined above, the Court only granted Plaintiff's Motion to 
Compel with respect to interrogatory #6. Therefore Defendant did not directly disobey an order 
to compel and sanctions under Rule 37 are not appropriate. Indeed, the Association had in its 
possession the February 6, 2007 opinion letter from the Attorney General's office, which 
referenced Mayor Chase's December 2006 letter to the Attorney General's office, but the 
Association chose to issue a third party subpoena rather than to work with the City to obtain the 
further emails or file a Motion to Compel concerning this particular correspondence. 
Therefore because the City never directly violated any Court order regarding discovery, 
the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for Rule 37 sanctions. 
CONCLUSION 
Pursuant to the foregoing, the Court GRANTS, in part, and DENIES, in part, the 
Defendant's Motion to Strike the affidavits of Syd Wood and Ed Quinn. The Court GRANTS, in 
part, and DENIES, in part, Plaintiffs Motion to Strike the affidavit of David Swindell. The 
Court GRANTS, in part, and DENIES, in part, the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The Court finds that there exists a.genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the City is 
pennissibly using the funds collecte~ from the water and· sewer systems collection fee, or 
whether it is using them for other purposes. and ·· DENIES the City's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on that issue. The Court finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact about 
whether the City is impennissibly using connection fees to fund future expansion of the water 
and sewer fund or whether the connection fees have been unreasonably and arbitrarily imposed 
through the City's equity buy.in system and GRANTS the City's Motion for Summary Judgment 
on those issues. Lastly, the Court DENIES the Defendanfs Motion for Rule 37(b) sanctions but 
ORDERS the Defendant to more fully respondto RequestfotPioductionNo; 9. 
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IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED March 28, 2013. 
~ . . r&Lr2 kn= 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 15_ day of fXk·v 2013, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document upon each of th~g individuals in the manner 
indicated. · 
Blake G. Hall 
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, PA. 
490 memorial Drive 
P.O. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630 
Nathan M. Olsen 
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN 
485 "E" Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
('5U.S. Mail 
( ) Overnight Delivery 
( ) Hand Deliver 
( ) Facsimile 
(l)U.S.Mail 
( ) Overnight Delivery 
( ) Hand Deliver 
( ) Facsimile 
DATED this 1f.::i__ day of*--· 2013. 
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2013 NOV 15 ftM 9: 24 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
Register No.CV-2011-5228 .. QC 
) 
BUILDING CONTRACTORS, ) 
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ) 
IDAHO, an Idaho non~profit corporation, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
-vs- ) 
) 
) 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho ) 
Municipality, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
) 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO RECONSIDER AND PLAINTIFF'S 
AMENDED MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
This matter is before the Cowt on the City of Pocatello's (Defendant or City) Motion to 
Reconsider the Court's March 28, 2013 Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. The City filed Defendantts Motion for Reconsideration with an 
accompanying memorandum on April 22, 2013. The Plaintiff, Building Contractors Association 
of Southeast Idaho (Plaintiff or Association), filed a Response in Opposition to Defendant's 
Motion for Reconsideration on May 6, 2013. On May 9, 2013, the City filed Defendant's Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration ·and also the Second Affidavit of David 
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K. Swindell. The Court heard oral argument on this matter on May 13, 2013, and took the City's 
Motion to Reconsider under advisement. Subsequently, on May 28, 2013, Plaintiff filed 
Plaintiff's Renewed Motion for Sanctions under I.R.C,P, 37(b) and Motion for Reconsideration. 
Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider was Amended on August 6, 2013. Subsequent responsive 
filings and affidavits were filed, which the Court has also considered. After carefully considering 
the motions, memorandums, and oral arguments of the parties, the Court now issues its 
Memorandum Decision and· Order on the Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration and Plaintiff's 
Amended Motion for Reconsideration. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 1 l(a)(2)(B) provides that "[a] motion for reconsideration 
of any interlocutory orders of the trial court may be made at any time before the entry of final 
judgment but not later than fourteen (14) days after the entry of the final judgment." The 
decision of whether to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration made pursuant to Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 1 l(a)(2)(B) is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. 1 The party 
requesting the motion for reconsideration is permitted to present new facts or law to aid the court 
in its reconsideration but is not required to do so.2 However, if new evidence is presented the 
burden is on the moving party to bring the new evidence to the courts attention. 3 
1 Van v. Portneuf Med. Ctr., 147 Idaho 552,560,212 P.3d 982, 990 (2009). In reviewing whether a trial court 
abused its discretion, this Court applies a three-part test, which asks whether the district court: (l) correctly 
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of that discretion; and (3) reached its 
decision by an exercise of reason. 
2 Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 147 P.3d 100 (Ct. App. 2006). 
3 Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat'/ Bank, 118 Idaho 812,800 P.2d 1026 (1990). 
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DISCUSSION 
I. Procedural History 
Since the Court's initial decision in this case, there have been a substantial number of 
additional submissions to the record. In order to set the basis of the Court's decision on each 
party's respective motion to reconsider, the Court wil1 summarize the most substantial 
developments in the case. 
A. The City's Motion to Reconsider 
In its Motion to Reconsider, the City argues that the Association does not have standing 
on what it asserts is the only issue remaining in this matter, which the City characterizes as 
"whether the City is using those [rate of return fees] or payment in lieu of taxes funds for 
purposes other than to support the existing water and sewer systems."4 The City's position is the 
Association does not have standing on the remaining issue because the rate of return or payment 
in lieu of taxes (PILOT) is paid by every user of the City's water and sewer systems, and 
therefore, is a generalized grievance shared by all taxpayers. Consequently, pursuant to Young v. 
City of Ketchum and Miles v. Idaho Power Co., the City argues that the Association does not 
have standing because it d.oes not have a unique harm.5 The City concedes the Association has 
standing on the other issues raised and addressed in the Court's Memorandrun Decision and 
Order - that no issues of genuine material fact exist as to l) whether the City is impermissibly 
using the connection fees to fund future expansion and capital improvement projects for the 
4 Defendant's Memorandwn in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, p. 2 tiled April 22, 2013. 
s See Youngv. City of Ketchum, 137 ldaho 102, 44 P.3d 1157 (2002) ("But even ifa showing can be made of an 
injury in fact, standing may be denied when the asserted hann is a generalized grievance shared by all or a large 
class of citizens.;;); Miles v. Idaho Power Co., I 16 Idaho 635,637, 778, P.2d 757, 759 (1989} ("a citizen and 
taxpayer may not challenge a governmental enactment where the injury is one suffered by all citizens and taxpayers 
alike."); See also Student loan Fund v. Payette County, 125 Idaho 824, 828, 875 P.2d 236, 240 {Ct. App. 1994) (A 
concerned citizen who seeks to ensure the government abides by the law does not have standing.) 
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water and sewer system; 6 and 2) whether the connection fees collected by the City are 
reasonably imposed. 7 In sum, the City contends that the Association derives standing in this case 
only through the City's assessment and collection of connection fees, but the Association does 
not have a unique injury in fact as to how the City uses funds collected through the rate of return 
or PILOT fees because every taxpayer who uses the City's water and sewer systems pays the rate 
of return and/or PILOT fees. 
B. The Association's Motion and Amended Motion for Reconsideration 
Following the hearing on the City's motion for reconsideration the Association filed its 
own Motion for Reconsideration, which was subsequently amended. Supplemental briefing on 
that motion was provided by the Association on September 30, 2013 .8 This supplemental 
briefing argues, in relevant part, that if the Court finds the City's assessment of the PILOT fee to 
be impermissible, then the Court should also find the City's current user and connection fees 
impermissible. The Association argues this based on the City's reliance on the PILOT fee in 
calculating the necessary user and connection fees. The Association requests that the Court 
invalidate the current rates and require the city to implement a fee rate that is "constitutional and 
pennissible"9 
C. The Court's Memorandum Decision and Or.der 
The Association brought this case seeking declaratory and injunctive relief in reference to 
the City's connection fee policies, arguing that the City's current policies are an unconstitutional 
use of police powers because the fees do not have a proportionate nexus to their regulated use 
6 Id. at p. 28. 
7 Id. at 30. 
6 See Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Plaintifrs Amended Motion for Reconsideration. 
9 Id. at 4. 
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and are also contrary to Idaho statutory and case law because they are.in violation of the Idaho 
Revenue Bond Act, I.C. § 50-1026, et al.10 The Association claimed standing in its Complaint 
because its members pay both connection and user fees. 11 In its Motion to Reconsider, the City 
now distinguishes between the City's assessment and collection of connection and us.er fees and 
the City's collection and use of PILOT/Return on Equity/Rate of Return /franchise fees. 12 In 
support of its Motion to Reconsider, the City suggests that the Court made this same distinction 
in its original Memorandum Decision and Order by :finding that there were no genuine issues of 
material fact concerning whether connection fees were being used for future expansion and 
whether they were arbitrarily imposed, but that an issue of fact remained as to "whether the City 
is using those [rate of return fees] or payment in lieu of taxes funds for purposes other than to 
support the existing water and sewer systems."13 ln support of this distinction, the City has filed 
the Third and Fourth Affidavits of David K. Swindell, explaining that the City has adjusted its 
accounting procedures and, as of March 2013, connection/capacity fees are held separately from 
user fees in separate funds. 14 Mr. Swindell's third affidavit indicates that the entire balance of 
connectionJcapacity fees collected since 2007 are held in these accounts.15 Swindell's fourth 
1° Complaint, p. 9. 
11 Complaint, p. 10, 132. 
12 It appears to the Court that the City does not, in its Motion to Reconsider or in any other memorandum previously 
filed, make a distinction between PILOT, franchise, and return on equity/and rate of return fees. See Defendant's 
Memorandum in Support of motion for Reconsideration, p. 2 (the City characterizes the remaining issue as to 
whether the City is impermissibly using "rate of return fees or payment in lieu of taxes funds"); Id at p.5 ("[T]he 
qty's use offtanchisefees from the water and wastewater systems that are assessed to all individuals who live in 
Pocatello" is the only remaining issue for trial.); Id at p. 6 ("in this case, the rate of return or PILOT fees are taxes 
that are collected from all citizens in Pocatello."); id at p. 7 {"The rate of retum and PILOT fees are designed to 
satisfy the same purposes and are synonymous"). 
13 Defendant's Memorandum In Support ofMotion for Reconsideration, p. 2. 
14 See Third Affidavit of David K. Swindell 4:8. 
15 Id at4:7. 
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Affidavit indicates that the PILOT fee is charged only to the operating funds, and there is no 
relationship between the PILOT fee and the capacity fee fonds. 16 
First, the Court makes clear that, in its original decision, it did not deliberately distinguish 
between connection fees and PILOT/rate of return/return on equity/franchise fees in the way the 
City suggests. Pursuant to the Association's Complaint, the issue before the Court was whether 
the City was implementing its co_nnection fee policy, as part ofits operation of its city owned and 
operated public utilities, contrary to constitutional, statutory, and case law in Idaho. Therefore, as 
stated in its umbrella paragraph relating to the merits of the City's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, the Court explained: 
Pursuant to Loomis, in making a determination whether connection fees and an 
equity buy~in system are statutory permissible, a Court must determine two 
things: 1) whether the revenue collected Ji-om connection fees is used for a 
permissible purpose under the Idaho Revenue Bond Act and 2} whether the fees 
are reasonably and not arbitrarily determined. 17 
This is a two part test.18 The Court found that there was no issue of fact concerning the second 
part of test, but that there was an issue of fact concerning the first part of test, i.e., whether 
revenue collected from connection fees is impermissibly being used "for purposes other than to 
support the existing water and sewer systems." 19 Therefore, since the whole test was whether the 
connectionfees were statutorily permissible, the Court answered the first part of the test in terms 
16 See Fourth Affidavit of David K. Swindell 2:2. 
17 Memorandum Decision and Orderon Defendant's Motion for SwnmaryJudgment, p. 15-16, issued May 28, 2013 
(Memorandum Decision and Order). 
18 The Court in fact, divided the first step of the test into two parts - I) whether revenue from the collection fees was 
impermissibly being used "for plll'J)oses other than to support the existing water and sewer systems"; and 2) whether 
revenue from the connection fees was being impennissibly used to fund future expansion and capital improvements 
of the water and sewer systems. Contrary to the City's Memorandum in Suppoi:t of Motion for Reconsideration at 
page 4, the Court did not explicitly hold that the "connection/capacity fees were appropriately collected by the City 
for repair and replacement of the existing infrastructure." Rather, the Court found that the Association did not meet 
its evidentiary burden to show that the connection fees were being used to fund capital improvement projects. See 
the Court's Memorandum Decision and Order, p. 27·28. 
19 Id. at 23. 
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of whether the revenue collected from connection fees was being used for a statutory purpose, 
rather than whether PILOT/rate of return/return on equity/franchise fees were being used for an 
impermissible purpose. As for any distinction that the City wishes to make· between 
assessment/collection of fees and the use of fees, it is the Court's view that both the revenue 
collected from connection fees and the use of those fees are intertwined in the first part of the 
test. Even if the Court finds, as it did, that the City's_methodology of calculating connection fees 
. is not arbitrary, the City must also pass the first part of the test - that the fees are not being used 
for a statutorily impermissible purpose. If an entity has standing to challenge the second part of 
test, as the City concedes the Association did, a logical conclusion is that they have standing to 
challenge the first part of the test also. Nonetheless, the Court wilJ analyze below whether the 
Association had standing to challenge whether the City was using revenue collected from the 
com1ection fees. through the assessment and use of the PILOT fees, for an impennissible. 
purpose. 
II. Standing 
The City's motion to reconsider has renewed challenges to the Association's standing to 
bring this action. The Court will first analyze the Association's standing to challenge the 
assessment of PILOT fees with respect to connection fees. Then the Court will analyze the 
Association's standing to challenge the assessment of PILOT fees with respect to user fees. 
A. Does the Association have standing to challenge the use of PILOT fees as 
applied to the connection fee? 
After car~fully reviewing the record, which the Court outlines below, the Court finds 
there is substantial evidence to show that the revenue collected from the connection and user 
CV-2011-5228-0C 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
AND PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
Page? 
160
t 
; 
fees20 was comingled and placed into the water and sewer funds accounts, prior to March 2013. 
There does not appear to be any evidence as to how the connection fees and user fees could have 
been or were separately accounted for, prior to March 2013. After the connection and user fees 
were corningled into the water and sewer funds, the evidence supports, and the City concedes, 
that the City then transferred money from the water and sewer funds into the General Fund under 
transfers that have been called by various names - PILOT/rate of return/return on 
equity/franchise fees.21 The City concedes that this PILOT charge is a tax charged to the City's 
water and sewer department as if it was operating as a private utility company. Although the 
City now argues that PILOT fees have never been assessed to the funds containing 
connection/capacity fees, the Court still finds the Association has standing because it is clear that 
money paid by c·onnection fee payers was commingled with user fees, from which money was 
transferred to pay the PILOT fee, prior to March 2013. The issue of whether the PILOT could 
ever be assessed to connection fees remains an issue in this case, which seeks declaratory relief. 
Therefore, the Court finds that the Association has standing to challenge whether the revenue 
coJlected from co1U1ection fees, and then transferred from the water and sewer accounts to the 
General Fund through the use of a PILOT fee, is used for a permissible purpose under the Idaho 
Revenue Bond Act. 
As noted, the record reflects that prior to March 2013 the connection and user fees were 
collectively poured into the water and sewer funds accounts. In his deposition, Swindell 
explained that when the building department collected a connection fee as part of a building 
20 User fees are distinguished from connection fees in that user fees are the monthly fees paid by all customers or 
users of the water and sewer systems. 
21 For purposes of this decision, such programs shall be collectively referred to hereafter as PILOT fees, but 
essentially the City is charging its own water and sewer department a rate of return fee as if the department was a 
private water and sewer entity. 
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permit, .. then those funds and dollars are credited to the water fund or water pollution control 
fund as appropriate."22 Swindell further explained that connection/capacity fees were channeled 
into three funds: I) building permit - designated as Fund 001; 2) water - designated as Fund 
031; and 3) wastewater - designated as Fund 032.23 Swindell also explained that the user fees 
were also poured into the water and wastewater funds named above.24 In his first affidavit 
Swindell stated: ''the capacity/connection fees are collected and segregated into the appropriate 
water and wastewater funds.''25 In the letter to Logan Robinson, Mayor Chase names the "Water, 
Sewer and Sanitation Funds" as the "enterprise funds." Mayor Chase explains they are called the 
"enterprise funds" because the money placed in these funds comes mainly from fees generated 
by each of the three public utility enterprises."26 
Next, money from the above named funds was transfen-ed into the General fund under a 
program that has had various names including, Return on Equity, Rate of Return, PILOT, and 
franchise fees. Swindell and Mayor Chase define these terms as follows: 
• Franchise Fee - "A franchise fee is a fee for use of the public right of way 
imposed on most utilities for operating within the public right of way within the 
City limits. Telephone is exempted by the state constitution. The fee is calculated 
as a percentage of gross revenues. For example, electric has a franchise fee of 1 %; 
natural gas has a franchise fee of 3%; cable has a franchise fee of 5%.27 
22 Deposition of David Swindell., p. 50: 1.12-17, attached at Exhibit 7 to Affidavit of Nathan M. Olsen, filed on 
January 4, 2013. (Swindell Depo). 
23 Swindell Depo., p. 50: 1.18 - p.52: I. 23. Swindell also explains that the wastewater fund is divided further into the 
wastewater collection system and the wastewater treatment plant because the City of Chubbuck has its own 
collection system but uses Pocatello's wastewater treatment plant. 
24 • . Swindell Depo., p. 53: 1.9-18. 
25 Affidavit ofDavid K Swindell in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, 1 J 6, filed on November 13, 2012. 
(Swindell Aff.) 
26 Mayor Chase August 22, 2005 letter to Logan Robison, p. 2, attached as Exhibit D to Affidavit of Syd Wood, 
filed on January 4, 2013. Also attached as Exhibit 18 to Swindell Aff., which is attached as Ex:hibit 7 to Olsen Aff. 
(The letter from Mayor Chase in both exhibits sits behind David Swindell's September 29, 2010 Memo.) ("Mayor 
Chase 2005 Letter"). 
27 Swindell Aff. at 14. 
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• Rate of return -"The "rate of return" policy refers to city-owned public utilities 
(i.e. water, sewer, etc.) making a transfer to the general fund. 28 
• Return on equity - '"In prior years, the city government described the transfer as a 
"rate of return" or "return on equity" as if the taxpayers were the shareholders 
(which they are). Fairness and reasonableness was established by comparing the 
citfs rate of return on the utility equity at a rate of 6.5% compared to the 11.5 to 
13.5% allowed for private companies by the Idaho Utility Commission. The rate 
ofreturn is part of the· budget process and the rates are set each year and approved 
by the City Council. "29 
Mayor Chase described the Return on Equity as follows: "The City Council has 
chosen to make it a City policy to have the "enterprise fundsn pay a rate of return 
on each utility equal to 7% of the equity in each business. By way of comparison, 
private regulated utilities are allowed between 11.5% and 13 .5% rate of return by 
the Idaho Public Utilities commission. This is a policy decision of the City 
Council, but it does compensate the taxpayer for the lack of any franchise fee or 
other payment for use of the public right of way. The money goes to the General 
Fund which the City Council utilizes as a property tax substitution.30 
• PILOT -"For the past two years, the rates have been re-described as a franchise 
fee (% of gross revenues) and a payment-in-lieu of-taxes (PILOT) to make it 
directly comparable to private utilities operating in the commwtity such as 
Intermountain Gas. The PILOT is calculated on the prior year city property tax 
levy rate multiplied by the estimated market value per the most recent financial 
plan prepared by an outside consulting engineer."31 
Mayor Chase described PILOT in his letter to Logan Robinson as follows: "The 
City Council has chosen to make it a City policy to have the "enterprise funds" 
make a payment in lieu of taxes to the General fund based on the depreciated 
valuation of their physical plants and last year's city property tax levy rate. This 
payment is similar to the federal government's payment of PILOT to some local 
communities, and is a method to pay something for their use of police, fire and 
streets.32 
28 Swindell Aff. at ,r 6. 
29 Swindell Aff. at 1 7. 
30 Mayor Chase 2005 Letter, p. 3. 
31 Swindell Aff. ~ 8. 
32 Mayor Cahse 2005 Letter, p. 2. 
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Swindell further explains that the "internal franchise fee" AND "Payment in Lieu of Taxes 
(PILOT)" have replaced the "rate of return" or ''return on equity."33 The franchise fee and 
PILOT are two different transfers that are taken from the water and wastewater funds. 34 Swindell 
explained that ''the combined amounts of FYI 3 franchise fee and PILOT are 13 .8% of planned 
revenue for water and 15.5% for sewer."35 
According to Swinde1l's Fourth Affidavit, the City does not charge a PILOT fee to the 
connection fees, but only to the user fees charged to customers of the systems. What the 
Affidavit does not say is that a PILOT fee has never been charged to connection fees during the 
time that both connection and user fees were comingled. However, prior to that Affidavit, it was 
clear that all coruiection and user fees were poured into the three "enterprise funds." The City 
then had a policy of transferring money from the water and sewer funds into the general fund. 
Therefore, the rate of return/return on equity or the PILOT/franchise fee should not · be 
characterized so much as a fee collected by the water and sewer funds but as a ''transfer" fee 
based on a City policy to transfer water and sewer funds to the general funds.36 In his memo to 
the City Clerk, Swindell explained that for FYll the City planned to transfer $1,585,237 from 
the water fund to the general fund "for a return on equity, to help fund the activities of the 
General Fund."37 Similarly, in FYI I the City planned to transfer $1,263,654 from the Water 
Pollution Control Fund to the "General Fund as a return on equity to help fund the activities of 
33 Swindell Aff. ,r 12. 
34 Swinde11 Aff. ,r 9. 
35 Swindell Aff. ,r 11. 
36 Swindell Aff. ,r 6; Swindell Depo, p. 80: 1.24-p. 81: 1.10 
37 David Swindell September 29, 2010 Memo to City Clerk, attached as Exhibit D to Affidavit of Syd Wood, filed 
on January 4, 2013. Also attached as Exhibit 18 to Swindell Aff., which is attached as Exhibit 7 to Olsen Aff. 
("Swindell Memo"). 
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the General Fund. "38 These transfers did not include additional transfers that were made from the 
water and sewer funds (I) into the General Fund to support the Human Resources Department; 
(2) into the Emergency Repair fund to build reserves for emergency repair of facilities; and (3) 
into the Debt Service Funds, which were each outlined separately from the "return on equity" 
transfer. 
Based on the foregoing, it appears clear to the Court that revenue collected from both 
cormection fees and user fees was being, or could have been, transferred into the General Fund 
-pursuant to the PiLOT fee, charged to the water and sewer department ·as a means of transferring 
cormection and/or user fees to fund general city expenses. Prior to March 2013, there was no 
evidence that it was only the user fees (i.e., the fees that every user of the water and sewer system 
pays), that were used to fund the PILOT transfers from the water and sewer funds to the general 
fund. [t is clear that the colUlection fees (i.e., fees paid only by builders of new construction). and 
user fees were comingled into the water and sewer funds, from which the City transferred the 
PILOT fee into the General Fund. 
David Swindell, in his second affidavit, states that Pocatello residents "pay the monthly 
user rate (which includes a pro rata share of the PILOT fee).,,3~ Additionally, Swindell states, 
"[b ]oth the water and sewer department recover the PILOT fees through the fee charged to all 
users of the water and sewer system."40 However, there was nothing in Swindell's statements in 
this case definitely stating that the PILOT transfers to the general fund were not derived from 
BOTH the user fee AND the connection fee. The Association• s argument that the payers of the 
cormection.fees were paying the brunt of the PILOT fee ''taxes" is bolstered by the evidence that 
3s Id 
39 Second Affidavit of David K. Swindell,, S, filed May 9, 2013. 
40 Id. aq/ 4. 
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when the City chose to implement this policy, that is, go from a property tax system to a fee 
based system to generate revenue for the City, as described in Mayor Chase's 2006 letter to the 
Attorney General, 41 the connection fees rose substantially while the user fees remained relatively 
the same. 42 However, just as the spike in rates of the connection fees and not the user fees is not 
fully definitive that it is the connection fee users only that are paying these "taxes," i.e. PILOT 
fees, the fact that the Court has ruled that there is no question of fact whether the City's 
methodology and calculation of the connection fees are unreasonably or arbitrarily imposed is 
not a definitive determination that it is the only the user fees that were being transferred through 
the PILOT fee taxes. What is clear and undisputed at this point is that revenue collected from the 
connection fees and user fees collectively were transferred to the General Fund, via the PILOT 
fee transfer program, and used to .. help fund the activities of the General Fund." 
Because payment of connection fees is not a generalized grievance but a specific harm 
alleged by the Association and because the revenue from the connection fees was comingled 
with funds used as part of the PILOT fee transfers, the Court finds that the Association has 
standing to challenge whether the use. of any PILOT fee assessments to the connection fees are 
used for a permissible purpose under the Idaho Revenue Bond Act, i.e., whether the City is using 
41 Mayer Roger Chase December 26, 2006 letter to Attorney General Lawrence Wadsen, attached as Exhibit A to 
Nathan Olseri 's February 13, 2013 affidavit in support of Supplemental Response to Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and in Support of Plaintiff's IRCP 37 Motion for Sanctions, filed February 13, 2013. (Mayor 
Chase 2006 Letter). 
42 See Affidavit ofNathan M. Olsen, filed January 4, 2013, Exhibits 1-6. These exhibits are Pocatello City Council 
Resolutions from the years 2005 to 2010 that set the rates for user and connection fees for the upcoming year. In 
Fiscal Year 2006 the connection fee for a 2-inch connection was $887 (Resolution No. 2006-28 attached as Exhibit 
I; Also Resolution 2005-31 attached as Exhibit 4). In Fiscal Year 2007 the same 2-inch connection was assessed 
$7,940 (Resolution No. 2006-28 attached as Exhibit I; Also Resolution No. 2006-35 attached as Exhibit 3). Finally 
in Fiscal Year 20 I I the same 2-inch connection was assessed $8,260 {Resolution No. 20 I Q..29 attached as Exhibit 
6). Jn Comparison, in Fiscal Year 2006 the monthly user fee for a metered, residential, single family in Pocatello 
was $19 .00/mo (Resolution NO. 2005-32, attached as Exhibit 5). Whereas in Fiscal Year 2007 the same user fee for 
a metered, residential, single family was $19.50/mq (Resolution No. 2007-36, attached as Exhibit 6}. With the same 
user fee in Fiscal Year20I I being $21 .50/mo (Resolution No. 2010-30, attached as Exhibit 6). 
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those funds transferred for purposes other than to .. support the existing water and sewer 
systems." 
B. Does the Association have standing to challenge the City's user fee policies? 
The Court has detennined the Association has standing to challenge the PILOT fee 
transfers that may have been applied to connection fees. If the Court finds the Association 
alleged and has standing to challenge the City's user fee policies, then any question related to 
whether the Association must prove that it is only the connection fees rather than the user fees 
that are actually being taxed as part of the PILOT fee transfers becomes irrelevant. If the 
Association has standing to challenge both the City's user fee and connection fee policies, the 
Court would then determine whether the PILOT transfers are impermissible taxes on both the 
connection fees and the user fees, and therefore, whichever source has funded the PILOT 
transfers would become irrelevant. 
Restating, to establish standing a litigant must '~allege or demonstrate an injury in fact 
and a substantial likelihood the relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury. "43 An 
injury in fact is a showing of a "distinct palpable injury" and is a "fairly traceable causal 
connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct."44 
The City asserts, pursuant to Greer v. Lewiston Golf & Country Club and Bopp v. the 
City of Sandpoint, that for even a litigant who can prove an injury in fact "standing may still be 
denied when the asserted hann is a generalized grievance shared by all or a large class of 
citizens." 45 In Greer, the Idaho Supreme Court held that taxpayers and citizens of the city of 
Lewiston did not have standing to bring a declaratory action challenging a city ordinance 
43 Id. at 104; 1159. 
44 Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635,639, 778 P.2d 757, 761 {1989). 
45 Young v. City of Ketchum, l37 Idaho 102, 44 P.3d 1157 (2002). 
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disannexing the Lewiston Golf and Country Club.46 The citizen.plaintiffs claimed that the 
disannextion of the golf course would reduce the revenue the City of Lewiston collected in 
property taxes, and thereby increase the overall taxes of the rest of the citizens of the city.47 The 
Greer Court held that the citizen-plaintiffs did not have standing because they did not have an 
injury peculiar to themselves, but rather the plaintiffs simply alleged_ a generalized grievance 
common to all taxpayers of the city.48 In Bopp v. City of Sandpoint, the Idaho Supreme Court 
likewise found that a plaintiff, a citizen of the city of Sandpoint, ·ctid not have standing to 
challenge a city ordinance vacating a public right-of-way over a bridge because the citizen-
plaintiff did not own property adjacent to the bridge, and therefore, whatever injury he suffered 
was suffered alike by all citizens and taxpayers of the city of Sandpoint.49 The plaintiff had no 
peculiar injury to himself, and therefore, had no standing. so The City alleges that, similar to 
Greer and Bopp, all citizens pay the user fees because aI1 citizens are connected to the City's 
water and sewer systems, and therefore, the Association's members, as users of the water and 
sewer system, do not have a grievance unique from any other citizen. 
In opposition to the City's argument, the Association cites to Miles v. Idaho Power Co. 
and Brewster v. the City of Pocatello.51 In Miles, the Idaho Supreme Court held that plaintiffs 
challenging Idaho statutes codifying an agreement between Idaho Power and the State, which 
subordinated Idaho Power's water rights to thousands of upstream. users, had standing because 
they brought their suit as ratepayers and customers of Idaho Power rather than general 
46 Greer v. Lewiston Golf & Country Club, Inc., 81 Idaho 393,342 P.2d 719 (1959) 
47 Id. 
,is Id. 
49 Bopp v. City o/Sandpoint, l lO Idaho 488, 716 P.2d 1260 (1986). 
SD Id. 
51 Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, (1989); Btewster v. City of Pocatello, 11S Idaho 502, 768 P.2d 765 
(1988). 
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taxpayers. 52 The Miles Court was not concerned with the fact that the ratepayers of Idaho Power 
encompassed a very large class, holding, "when the impact of legislation is not felt by the entire 
populace, but only a select class of citizens, the standing doctrine should not be evoked to usurp 
the right to challenge the alleged denial of constitutional rights in a judicial forum. "53 
The Brewster Court also found that a resident of the City of Pocatello had standing to 
challenge the legality of a "street maintenance fee. "54 In Brewster, the issue was whether the City 
of Pocatello, absent legislation, could "impose a fee on the owners or occupants of property 
which abut public streets."55 The Brewster Court held that Pocatello's imposition of a "street 
fee'' to all owners or occupants of property that abut public streets was an impennissible tax 
because it was a revenue raisin~ measure to fund the maintenance and repair of streets rather 
than a regulatory fee under the city of Pocatello's police power that bore· a reasonable 
relationship to the cost of regulating traffic over Pocatello's streets.56 The Brewster Court 
explained that "a fee is charged for a direct public service rendered to the particular consumer 
_while a tax is a forced contribution by the public at large to meet public needs. "57 
The Court finds the Association's standing as to its members' payment of user fees to be . 
more closely aligned with the facts set forth in Miles and Brewster. Similar to Miles, where the 
Idaho Supreme Court held the plaintiff had standing because he was a ratepayer of Idaho Power, 
a private utility, the Association has standing to challenge the City's user fees policies because 
its members are ratepayers of the City's water and sewer system, a City•owned utility. Similar to 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 642, 778 P.2d at 764. 
54 I IS Idaho 502, 768 P.2d 765. 
ss Id. at 504, 768 P.2d at 767. 
56 Id at 505, 768 P.2d at 768. 
57 Id. 
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a private utility, the City charges monthly rates, i.e., user fees, to those who are customers of the 
system. Consequently, the Association members are not chal1enging the City's user fee policies 
as taxpayers, and the harm they allege is not a generalized grievance common to all taxpayers. 
Only the citizens of Pocatello that connect to the City's water and sewer systems pay user fees. 
and consequently are taxed by the PILOT fee transfer policies. As the City explained in David 
Swindell's second affidavit, those who do not pay the monthly user fees are disconnected from 
the system. Therefore, as users of the water and sewer systems, the Association's members have 
a special or peculiar injury not shared by those who do not pay monthly user fees. Their 
grievance is not just a tangential complaint of a taxpayer whose taxes are going to be raised if a 
golf course is disaruiexed or is disgruntled with the building of a bridge. As explained in Miles, 
the fact that Association's members represent a large class is inconsequential so long as their 
injury is a special and not a generalized grievance. 58 
In Brewster, it also could have been argued, similar to the City's argument here, that an 
or nearly all of the citizens of Pocatello paid tlie "street maintenance fee" because nearly every 
citizen would own or rent property that abutted a public street.59 Nonetheless, the Brewster Court 
held that the plaintiff, as a resident of Pocatello that paid the ~·street maintenance fee," had 
standing to chalJenge the fee.60 Also similar to Brewster, the Court finds below that the City's 
PILOT fee policies transferring revenue from connection and user fees are not regulatory fees 
permissible under the City's police power because it does not bear a reasonable relationship to 
the cost of regulating the water and sewer systems. Rather, this Court has found, similar to 
58 The Court notes here that among the class of citizens who do not pay user fees would be renters of property and 
those who own property that is not connected to the water and sewer systems, such as owners of undeveloped land, 
or perhaps owners of warehouses and the like. 
59 115 ldaho 502, 768 P.2d 765. 
60 Id. 
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Brewster, that the PILOT fee transfers are impermissible taxes because they are used to generate 
revenue to meet the needs of the public at large. Certainly, as the resident in Brewster had 
standing to challenge such a fee, so do the users of the City's water and sewer systems. 
Additionally, the Court finds that the Association, in its Complaint, has properly alleged 
standing and pied for relief on the basis of its members' payment of user fees. In Cowit I of its 
Complaint, the Association seeks a declaration that the City's policies are a violation of the tax 
and police power limitations of the Idaho Constitution. The Association alleged, "[a] real 
controversy exists between the City and Builders Ass'n, including its user fee and connection fee 
paying members."6l An identical assertion of standing is made in Count II, seeking a declaration 
that the City failed to follow bonding procedures. 62 Also in Count II, the Association alleged that 
it "is entitled to a declaration that the City's Connection fee and user fee policy, as it has been 
implemented since at least 2005, and as currently constituted, is in violation of Idaho's 
Constitution and code with regard to the bonding requirements. "63 The Court finds that the above 
allegations in the Association's Complaint were sufficient to put the City on notice that the 
Association was alleging standing on user fees as well as connection fees and was also seeking 
relief from the Citfs user fee policy as well as its connection fee policy. 
Therefore, the Court finds the Association has standing to challenge the City's user fee 
policies, and thus the City's distinction between the user fee funds and connection fees funds 
does not defeat the Association's standing to challenge the permissibility of the PILOT fees. 
61 Complaint at, 32. 
62 Complaint at, 40. 
61 Complaint at , 42.' 
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III. Substantive Arguments 
The Court finds that there are two remaining substantive issues to be addressed in 
response to the parties' motions to reconsider. First. the Court must decide if the assessment of a 
· PILOT fee is impermissible, even in light of the fact that the City's accounting methods have 
changed. If so, the second issue is the appropriate remedy for that impermissible assessment. 
A. Is the PILOT fee permitted? 
The Association, in its Response m Opposition to Defendant's Motion for 
Reconsideration, petitioned the Court to also reconsider granting summary judgment in the 
Association's favor in light of the City's concession that the PILOT and franchise fee transfers 
were taxes. At oral argument the City motioned the Court to strike the Association's cross 
motion for reconsideration, arguing that it was not timely filed. The Court DENIES the City's 
Motion to Strike. 
First, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure l 1(a)(2XB), a motion to reconsider an 
interlocutory order can be filed at any time, so long as it is filed fourteen ( 14) days before the 
Court• s final judgment. Second, the City motioned the Court to reconsider granting it summary 
judgment. Upon a party's request for swnmary judgment, a district court has the authority to 
render summary judgment in favor of any party. moving or non-moving, even if the non-moving 
party has not filed its own motion. 64 "The district court may grant summary judgment to a non-
moving party even if the party has not filed its own motion with the court. A motion for 
summary judgment allows the court to rule on the issues placed before it as a matter of law; the 
64 Sirius LCv. Erickson, 144 Idaho 38, 4()-41, 156 P.3d 539, 541-42 (2007). 
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moving party runs the risk that the court will find against it."65 Additionally, since the May 13th 
hearing, the Association has filed a Motion to Reconsider and an Amended Motion to 
Reconsider. Consequently, the Court will determine whether summary judgment should be 
granted to the Association. 
A significant development since the Court issued its March 28, 2013 Memorandum 
Decision and Order on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is that the City has conceded 
that the PILOT fee transfers are taxes. It is also an undisputed fact that revenue from the 
connection fees and user fees were poured into and comingled into the water and sewer funds, 
from which the P[LOT fee transfers are taken. The Court recognizes that the City now deposits 
connection fees and user fees in different accounts and that the PILOT is only drawn from the 
user fee fund. However, based on the fact that the City has historically comingled the user and 
connection fees into a single account, the Court will also address the permissibility of drawing a 
PILOT from both fees. 
In Loomis v. City of Hailey, the Idaho Supreme Court explained that while "the Idaho 
Constitution permits municipal corporations to impose taxes, such authority is limited by the 
taxing power granted by the legislature."66 The Loomis Court also explained that "municipalities 
may impose fees _pursuant to its '),olice powers', to enact regulations for furtherance of the public 
health, safety or morals," but fees imposed under this "police power" must bear some reasonable 
relationship to the cost of enforcing the regulation. "67 However, pursuant to Idaho Constitution, 
art. 8, §3 and the Idaho Revenue Bond Act, municipalities also have a proprietary function that 
65 F1Aller v. Dave Callister, 150 Idaho 848,851,252 P.3d 1266, 1269 (2011) (quotingHarwoodv. Talbert, 136 ldaho 
672,677, 39 P.3d 612,617 (2001}). 
M Loomis v. City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434,437,807 P2d 1272, 1275 (1991) (citingBrewsterv. City of Pocatello, 
115 Idaho 503, 768 P.2d 766 (1989)). 
61 Id. 
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permits them to charge rates and fees to "construct and maintain certain public works. "68 
Therefore, the Loomis Court explained that when ''rates, fees and charges conform to the 
statutory scheme set forth in the Idaho Revenue Bond Act or are imposed pursuant to a valid 
police power, the charges are not construed as taxes. However, if rates, fees, and charges are 
imposed primarily for revenue raising purposes they are in essence disguised taxes subject to 
legislative approval and authority." 69 
The above law is applicable to both user fees and connection fees charged by the City. 
All '~tes, fees, and charges [must] confonn to the statutory scheme set forth in the Idaho 
Revenue Bond Act" and ''if rates, fees, and charges are imposed primarily for revenue raising 
purposes they are in essence disguised taxes."70 
In an August 22, 2005 letter to Logan Robinson, former City of Pocatello Mayor, Roger 
Chase, described the "Return on Equity" program as a "property tax substitution." Additionally, 
in a December 26, 2006 letter to Attorney General Lawrence Wasden, Mayor Chase explained 
that "charging a rate of return is commonly used by public utilities and private sector companies, 
and we feel is fairer way to generate revenue for the City" because "relying on property taxes for 
revenue will not work in Pocatello due to the number of property tax exemptions given by the 
State," and therefore it has been his "practice as Mayor to move our city away from property 
taxes and to a fee based system." Mayor Chase's statements are consistent with Swindell's 
memo that the return on equity transfers "help to fund the activities of the General Fund." This is 
undisputed evidence that the return on equity or PILOT fee transfers, as they are now called, are 
not fees charged pursuant to the police or proprietary functions of the City of Pocatello, but are 
68 Jd at 437, 807 P.2d at 1276. 
69 Id. . 
,o Id. 
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in fact, "imposed primarily for revenue raising purposes [ and] are in essence disguised taxes." 
Indeed, as stated above, the City has now conceded that the PILOT fee transfers are taxes. The 
PILOT fee transfers/taxes are taken from the water and sewer funds, i.e, the "enterprise funds," 
and as Mayor Chase explained, "money placed in these [enterprise] funds comes mainly from 
fees generated by each of the three public utility enterprises."71 Since the PILOT fees are or have 
been transferred from revenue collected from ''rates, fees, and charges" of the water and sewer 
system, i.e., connection fees and user fees, and are not used for a regulatory purpose nor for 
purposes allowed by the Idaho Revenue Bond Act, the Court finds, as a matter of law, that the 
PILOT fee transfers are impermissible taxes assessed against the user fees, connection fees, or 
both - all of which is contrary to Idaho statutory and case law; 
Language from the Court's earlier order on summary judgment is relevant here: 
[T]here is a difference between charging another entity, such as the City of Chubbuck, a 
rate of return versus charging city residents and utility customers a rate of return when 
the statute granting cities the authority to operate public works provides that the city must 
furbish the services ••at the lowest possible cost." Furthennore, and more importantly, the 
Supreme Court emphasized in City of Pocatello v. City of Chubbuck that the rate of return 
was not imposed "primarily as a source of revenue" because there was no evidence that 
the revenue was not being used for purposes proscribed by the Idaho Revenue Bond Act, 
which, as detailed in Loomis and Viking Construction, permits water and sewer revenue 
to be used for the maintenance, depreciation and replacement of system components, but 
not for future expansion of the system or for city functions other than the sewer and water 
systems.72 
The City takes the position that it is acceptable to treat its City-owned utility as if it was a private 
utility and then charge a "rate of return" to that City~owned utility as a means of transferring 
funds from the water and sewer accounts to the general fund. The Court has and continues to 
disagree. To the extent that PILOT fees have, are, or will be charged to the coMection fees 
71 Mayor Chase 2005 Letter at p. 2. 
72 Memorandum Decision, pp. 22-23. 
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/ 
being accumulated in the water and sewer accounts the Court finds the connection fees are being 
used impermissibly. Additionally, any PILOT fees drawn from user fees are also impermissible 
taxes. 
B. Should the entire user/connection fee collection system be stricken? 
The Association has requested that the Court find the current rates charged by the City 
for user and connection· fees to be unconstitutional and impermissible and to require the City to 
. redo the entire collection system. The Court recognized, in its original decision, that: 
[R]egulations and charges shall not be unreasonable it being specifically provided in 
section 2, § 50-2813, LC., [now§ 50·1028], that the services are to be furnished at the 
lowest possible cost and that the municipality shall not operate the works primarily as a 
source ofrevenue. 73 
Speaking specifically to the issue of connection fees, the Loomis court explained that the 
rates and fees established by a city will be upheld as long as they are "not unreasonable and not 
arbitrarily- imposed" and "produce sufficient revenue to support the system at the lowest possible 
cost as required by the Idaho Revenue Bond Act,"74 The Court elaborated further by explaining 
that "merely because the charge represents something more than the actual cost of the actual 
physical hook~p does not make the connection fee illegal."75 
In its initial decision, the Court analyzed Loomis v. City of Hailey and Viking Const., Inc. 
v. Hayden Lake Irr. Dist., and reached the basic conclusion that "it is not for the courts to 
determine what methodology the city must use in determining its fees, rates &Pd -'!:b.axses "76 
Instead the Loomis court explained that the role of the courts is "limited ... to detennine whether 
73 Memorandum Decision, pp. 28 (quoting Schmidt v. Village of Kimberly, 74 Idaho 48, 256 P.2d 515 (1953)). 
74 . Loomis, at 442,807 P.2d at 1280. 
75 Id. 
76 Id at 443, 807 P.2d at 1281. 
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the fees, rates and charges conform to the statutory requirements, are reasonable, and are not 
arbitrary. "77 
The Association argues that Mr. Hunter's method for calculating rates is more 
appropriate than the method employed by the City in creating the Red Oak report. However, in 
the Court's view Mr. Hunter's statements are more a criticism of the Red Oak method than they 
are a recommended alternative method. More importantly, although the Red Oak report may 
result in higher rates than Mr. Hunter's suggestions, the Court will not dictate to the City ·what 
methodology it should employ in calculating its fees. Instead, the Court is limited to evaluating 
whether the fees are reasonable, not arbitrary, and confonn to the statutory requirements. 78 
Although the Association challenges the Red Oak study, the Court finds that it was a reasonable 
methodology, which was not arbitrary or unreasonable. 
However, as noted above, it is the Court's determination that any fee which includes a 
PILOT component is unreasonable, arbitrary and contrary to statute. To whatever extent the City 
has ca]culated a. PILOT fee into its user and connection fees, that portion of the user and 
connection fees is impermissible. The Court has already detennined that it is impermissible for 
the City to assess the PILOT fee on its own municipal utility companies - here the sewer and 
water department. Thus, any portion ofthe user and/or connection fees that are assessed in order 
to pay the PILOT fee to the City, do not conform to the statutory requirements ofl.C. § 50-1028 
and must be excluded from any fee assessment going forward. 
11 Id. 
18 Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Court notes that in the last hearing the parties were asked whether additional 
discovery was necessary and whether additional evidence would need to be submitted to the 
Court, in a trial,· to decide this case. After consideration of the City's fmal submissions, the 
Association stated that no additional depositions or discovery was needed and that the final 
submission by the Association was its brief. No party has indicated that any further evidence 
would need to be submitted to the Court at a trial in order to render a final decision in this case. 
Therefore, the Court issues the following conclusions, which resolves this case in its entirety. 
The Court finds that the Association has standing to challenge the use of PILOT fees as a 
portion of any connection and user fees, concluding that the Association, whose members pay 
connection and user fees, have a special and peculiar grievance not shared by all taxpayers. The 
Court DENIES the City's Motion to Reconsider the Court's March 28, 2013 Memorandum 
Decision and Order on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, finding that the PILOT fee 
transfers are impermissible taxes on the water and sewer funds which are derived from the 
revenue collected from the connection fees and/or user fees. 
The Court GRANTS the Association's Motion to Reconsider, and GRANTS sununary 
judgment in favor of the Association, in part. The Court finds that the PILOT fee policy 
impennissibly uses revenue collected from the connection and user fees for purposes other than 
for the water and sewer system, in violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond Act, and therefore, is not 
a use of the City's police or proprietary function because it does not bear a reasonable 
relationship to the cost of regulating the water and sewer syste~s. but rather, is a revenue raising 
measure in violation of LC. § 50-1027. 
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Combining this opinion and the Memorandum Decision filed March 28, 2013, the Court 
concludes, as a matter of law, the following: 
1 . The City's connection and user fees are not arbitrary or unreasonably imposed. 
The imposition and collection of the connection and user fees themselves are not 
unconstitutional acts or a violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond Act 
2. There is no evidence that the connection fees are being used by the City to fund 
future capital improvements in violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond Act. 
3. Through the use of the PILOT fee transfer program, or any other transfer program 
with a similar intent, such as a rate of return program or a return on equity program, the Court 
declares that the City is imposing an impennissible tax to the extent that connection and user fees 
are being assessed a PILOT fee for general fund purposes, and such practices must cease and are 
hereby enjoined because they are unconstitutional and a violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond 
Act. This means that connection and user fees must he adjusted to the extent that they include a 
charge for the PILOT fee. In addition, no PILOT fee transfers from any water or sewer account 
to the general fund are permitted. 
However, to the extent that conn~tion and user fees are being transferred from the water 
and sewer accounts to the general fund, through any appropriate process, however named, for the 
purpose of paying expenses related to the operation, maintenance, replacement, and depreciation 
of existing water and sewer systems, including only those general City expenses needed to 
operate the water and sewer departments, such as HR, financial, legal and accounting, such 
transfers are permitted and are not hereby enjoined. 
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Therefore, Judgment is granted to the City, in part, as set forth in paragraphs 1, 2, and the 
last sentence of 3 above, and Judgment is granted to the Association, in paii, set fo11h in the first 
sentence of paragraph 3 above. 
The two decisions now entered in this case resolve all issues in this case. Judgment will 
be entered forthwith as set forth herein. 
IT IS SO ORDERED, 
DATED November 13, 2013. ~ 
District Judge 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
BUILDING CONTRACTORS, 
ASSOICATION OF SOUTHEAST 
IDAHO, an Idaho non-profit corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
Municipality, 
Defendants. 
) 
) CV-2011-5228-0C 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST 
) FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
) 
) 
) 
) 
______________ ) 
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's request for costs and attorney fees. 
Defendant has objected to Plaintiff's request and Plaintiff challenges the objection as not having 
complied with 1.R.C.P. 54(d) and (e). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In any detennination of an award of costs and fees, the threshold question is which party 
prevailed. I:R.C.P. 54(e)(l) states: "In any civil action the court may award reasonable attorney 
fees. which at the discretion of the court may include paralegaJ fees, to the prevailing party or 
parties as defined in Rule 54(d)(l)(B), when provided for by any statute or contract." [Emphasis 
added]. I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B) governs the prevailing party issue: 
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In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs, 
the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or result of 
the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. The trial court 
in its sound discretion may detennine that a party to an action prevailed in part 
and did not prevail in part, and upon so finding may apportion the costs between 
and among the parties in a fair and equitable manner after considering all of the 
issues and claims involved in the action and the resultant judgment or judgments 
obtained. {Emphasis added by this Court.J 
The determination of who is the prevailing party is committed to the sound discretion of the trial 
court. Rockefeller v. Grabow, 139 Idaho 538, 82 P .3d 450 (2003). 
The legaI·basis for an award of costs is I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l). Some costs are awarded to a 
prevailing party as a matter of right and some costs can be awarded in the discretion of the Court. 
Discretionary costs are allowed "upon a showing that said costs were necessary and exceptional 
costs reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of justice be assessed against the adverse 
party." When objections to discretionary costs are made the Court "shall make express findings 
as to why such specific item of discretionary cost should or should not be allowed." Such costs 
may also be disallowed without objection, in the discretion of the Court and upon express 
findings. The determination of whether a cost is "exceptional" involves an evaluation both of the 
cost itself, i.e., whether it is the kind of cost commonly incurred in the type of litigation at issue, 
and whether the case itself is exceptional. City of McCall v. Seubert, 142 Idaho 580, 130 P.3d 
1118 (2006); Hayden Lake Fire Protection Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 109 P.3d 161 (2005); 
Fish v. Smith, 131 Idaho 492, 960 P.2d 175 (1998). 
The award of attorney fees is governed by I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1), which provides that such an 
award is discretionary, to the prevailing party, ''when provided for by any statute or contract." 
Whether to award fees and the amount of the fees awarded are matters of discretion, unless it 
involves a specific determination of a statute which allows for attorney fees. Grover v. 
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Wadsworth, 147 Idaho 60,205 P.3d 1196 (2009); Taylor v. A1aile, 146 Idaho 705, 201 P.3d 1282 
(2009); Contreras v. Rubley, 142 Idaho 573, 130 P.3d 1111 (2006). 
If fees are awarded, the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, must consider the 
factors set forth in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3). Sanders v. Lanliford, 135 Idaho 322, I P.3d 823 
(Ct.App.2000); Boe/ v. Stewart Title Co., 137 Idaho 9, 16, 43 P.3d 768, 775 (2002); Brinkman v. 
Aids Insurance Co., 115 Idaho 346,351, 766 P.2d 1227, 1232 (1988). The district court must, at 
a minimum, provide a record which establishes that the court considered these factors. Building 
Concepts, Ltd, v. Pickering, 114 Idaho 640,645, 759 P.2d 931,936 (Ct.App.1988}. A trial court 
need not specifically address all of the factors contained inI.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) in writing, so long 
as the record clearly indicates that the court considered them all. Brinkman, 115 Idaho at 351, 
766 P.2d at 1232. In addition, a court need not blindly accept those attorney fees requested by a 
party, and may disalJow those fees that were incurred UlUlecessarily or unreasonably. Craft Wall 
of Idaho, Inc. v. Stonebraker, 108 Idaho 704, 706, 701 P.2d 324, 326 (Ct.App.1985). 
FACTS 
This case was brought by the Building Contractors Association against the City of 
Pocatello, alleging multiple challenges to the legality of the City's use of connection and user 
fees regarding the City's sewer and water utilities. The issues in the case were decided on 
summary judgment and through motions to reconsider, by agreement of the parties. 
Plaintiff prevailed on the issue of whether the City could divert a portion of the funds 
collected for connection and user fees for the Water and sewer systems to the City's general fund 
through the means of a PILOT fee. 1 The City prevailed on several issues that were also raised 
throughout this case. First, the City prevailed on the issue of whether it was unreasonable or 
1 Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant's Motion to Reconsider and Plaintiff's Amended Motion for 
Reconsideration, 22-23. 
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arbitrary to charge a connection: fee when new connections were added to the existing system, 
based on an equity buy win system. 2 Second, the City prevailed on the issue of whether the entire 
user and co1U1ection fee systems needed to he thrown out and a new evaluation preformed. 3 
Third, the City prevailed against Plaintiff's argument that the connection fees constituted an 
unconstitutional taking.4 And fourth, the City prevailed on the issue of whether the connection 
fees were being impennissibly used to fund future expansion and capital improvements to the 
sewer and water systems. 5 
ANALYSIS 
The threshold issue in any request for attorney fees and costs is which party prevailed. 
Plaintiff argues it is entitled to attorney fees and costs under J.C.§§ 12-121 and/or 12-117. In 
order to be awarded attorney fees and costs under either section the party seeking the award must 
be the prevailing party. 
Idaho Code § 12- I 21 allows for the award of attorney fees to a prevailing party if the 
court, in its discretion, determine~ that the action was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, 
unreasonably or without foundation. Joyce Livestock Co. v. US., 144 Idaho 1, 156 P.3d 502 
(2007); Tolley v. THL Co., 140 Idaho 253, 92 P.3d 503 (2004). Idaho Code§ 12-117 applies to 
the award of attorney fees and costs where one of the parties is a municipality. See Hehr v. City 
of McCall, 155 Idaho 92,305 P.3d 536 (2013): 
Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any proceeding involving as adverse parties a 
state agency or a political subdivision and a person, the state agency, political subdivision 
or the court hearing the proceeding, including on appeal, shall award the prevailing party 
reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the 
nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. I.C. § 12-117. 
2 Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, 30-31. 
3 Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant's Motion to Reconsider and Plaintiff's Amended Motion for 
Reconsideration, 24. 
4 Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, 15. 
5 Id at 28. 
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Under this statute an award of fees and costs is only appropriate where "'the other party 
acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.'" Ciszek v. Kootenai County Bd Of Com 'rs, 151 
Idaho 123,135,254 P.3d 24, 36 (2011) (quoting Burns Holdings, LLC v. Madison County Bd. Of 
County Com'rs, 147 Idaho 660,664,214 P.3d 646,650 (2009)). 
Plaintiff asserts that it is the prevailing party in this case because the PILOT fee was 
declared to be impermissible. Certainly the Court would agree· that the Plaintiff prevailed in part 
on that issue. Plaintiff also asserts that successfully defending againsrsome claims, as the City. 
has done here, .is an insufficient basis for determining that the City prevailed at all. The Court 
disagrees. None of the cases cited hold for that proposition.6 The standard is a discretionary 
evaluation of the final result in the case. It would be incongruent to suggest that successfully 
defending against many claims cannot be considered in that "result" oriented analysis. 
Plaintiff also asserts that it sought the same result with several alternative theories and 
because it prevailed on one of the theories it should be the prevailing party. Again, the Court 
disagrees. Plaintiff sought multiple types ofrecovery. including asking the Court to eliminate 
the connection fee altogether, to declare that the method used to determine the connection fee 
was unconstitutional, unreasonable and arbitrary, and to declare that the City used fees in an 
inappropriate way through the development of new facilities. The Couit did not grant any of this 
relief. Thus, this was not a case where one result, under alternative theories. was sought. In fact, 
Plaintiff did not receive a significant portion of what it sought. 
While Plaintiff claims that being the prevailing party does not require a "bulls eye," a true 
statement as far as it goes, the fact is that this Court is required to evaluate all the claims brought, 
6 The Court notes that the successful defense against a contract has been held to support a claim for fees. See 
Lawrence v. Jones, 124 Idaho 748, 864 P.2d 194 {Ct.App.1993). However, when a case is successfully defended, 
the party doing so certainly prevails. 
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the relief sought, and the final result, in detennining whether either party prevailed over the 
other. 
At best, the Court concludes that the results of this case are mixed, with both sides 
prevailing in part: The Idaho appellate courts have held that mixed results, including recovery 
of less than the amount sought, can support an award of attorney fees. 7 However, the Court, in 
its discretionary consideration of "the final judgment or result of the action in relation to the 
relief sought by the respective parties," detennines that both parties here "prevailed in part and 
did not prevail in part," and further determines that careful consideration of the outcomes in this 
case leads to the conclusion that no fees or costs should be awarded to either party. 
Although not necessary to the decision, the Court offers the view that even if a 
detennination had been made that the Plaintiff prevailed, no fees would likely have been 
awarded because; based at least in part on the analysis above, it cannot be reasonable said that 
the City defended this case frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation, as required by LC. 
§ 12-121, or that the City acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law as to any of the issues 
raised, as required by I.C. § 12-117. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that neither party prevailed in this action, and that 
an award of costs and fees to either side should not be given. Plaintiff's request for costs and 
fees is DENIED, and Defendant's objection to costs and fees is GRANTED. The Judgment 
previously entered will not be amended. 
7 Bates v. Seldin, 146 Idaho 112; 203 P.3d 702 (2009) (attorney fee award upheld even though prevailing party 
recovered substantially less than the relief sought); Eighteen Mile Ranch, UC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 
141 Idaho 716, 117 P.3d 130 (2005J (award of fees upheld although recovery on counterclaim was less than ten 
percent of amount sought}; Nguyen v. Bui, 146 Idaho 187, 191 P.3d 1107 (Ct.App.2008); Chadderdon v. King, 104 
Idaho 406, 659 P.2d 160 (Ct.App.1983). 
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IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATEDthisLa.ayof .J'~ , 2014. 
~ 
District Judge 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
BUILDING CONTRACTORS, 
A8SOICATION OF SOUTHEAST 
IDAHO, an Idaho non-profit corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
Municipality, 
Defendants. 
) 
.) CV-2011.,5228-0C 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) DECISION ON PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATION 
) FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
) 
) 
) 
) 
______________ ) 
Plaintiff has filed an application for order to show cause, requesting that the Court enter 
an order suspending the assessment and collection of connection fees until the City recalculates 
the connection fees, as it has the user fees. Plaintiff argues that the record contains sufficient 
evidence indicating that the City included the PILOT fee in calculating the necessary connection 
fee it would charge. After reviewing the facts in the record, specifically those cited by Plaintiff, 
the Court concludes that there is insufficient evidence that the PILOT fee was used in calculating 
the connection/capacity fees, and declines to enter the Order to Show Cause. 
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DISCUSSION 
An application for order to show cause must be supported by a verified complaint or 
accompanying affidavit.1 In order to be granted the application must make a prima facie 
showing that there are grounds for the court to issue an order to show cause.2 If the application 
is granted, the court will enter an order requesting the opposing party show cause why the 
requested order should not be granted. 3 
Plaintiff first points to this Court's November 15, 2013 opinion and correctly identifies 
the holding that the City may not charge a PILOT fee on either the user or connection fees. 4 
Additionally, Plaintiff correctly identifies the Red Oak Study as being the method by which the 
coruiection/capacity fees were calculated. 5 
In support of its application, Plaintiff cites extensively to an affidavit from Mr. John 
Gallagher that was filed in this case along with an attached report explaining the method used by 
Red Oak in calculating both the water and wastewater rates as weU as the connection/capacity 
fees.15 This report indicated that PILOT fees were "elements in the City,s utility budgets that are 
funded by revenue from water and wastewater rates.,.7 That same report makes a distinction 
between water and wastewater utility rates and capacity fees.8 All statements in the report 
1 I.R.C.P. 6(c)(2)(A). 2 . . 
Id. 
3 Id. Defendant objects to the Affidavit of Nathan M. Olsen on various grounds, some of which have merit. 
Without reviewing each objection in d~tail and making a detailed finding, the Court simply indicates that to the 
extent some of the information in Mr. Olsen's affidavit is appropriately considered in ruling on this application, the 
Court has done so, as reflected herein. To any other extent, the affidavit has not been considered. 
4 See Affidavit ofNathan M. Olsen in Support of Application for Order to Show Cause, 2 (citing November 15, 
2013, Mem. Dec. p. 20-26). · 
5 See Affidavit of Nathan M. Olsen in Support of Application for Order to Show Cause, 4 (citing Fee Resolutions 
from 2006-2013). 
6 Affidavit of John Gallagher in Support ofMotion for Summary Judgment. 
7 Affidavit of John Gallagher in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex:hibit B. 
8 Id. Since this term has been repeatedly referred to throughout this case as the connection fee, to distinguish it from 
user fees or rates paid by normal utility customers, the Court hereafter refers to this fee as the "connection fee." 
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regarding the PILOT fee indicate that it was used in calculating user rates.9 Nowhere are PILOT 
fees mentioned in the calculation of the connection fees. JO 
A supplemental response was filed by Mr. Gallagher on August 15, 2013, detailing 
further the process used in calculating user rates and connection fees. 11 This supplemental repo11 
makes a very dear distinction between the methods used to calculate user rates and the method 
used to calculate connection fees. 12 The rate study information clearly includes a reliance on 
PILOT fees in calculating the user rates, 13 but the capacity fee section never mentions a PILOT 
fee as part of its calculation of connection fees. 14 
In addition to Mr. Gallagher's reports Plaintiff seems to argue that because the Red Oak 
study evaluated the necessary rates to balance the overall budget, with and without connection 
fees, that the connection fees must necessarily have been calculated with the PILOT charges in 
mind and included. Plaintiff cites to the "Cost of Service" section of the 2006 - 2010 Red Oak 
studies. There it states: "Total Test year revenue requirements consist of$5.6 million in 
operating costs and $4.6 million in capital costs. Revenue adjustments, PILOT and return on 
equity make up the difference bringing the total cost of service for 2013 to $11.9." Additionally, 
Plaintiff cites to the March 10-l I, 2010 ''Memorandum" of John Gallagher, regarding the 
"Financial Planning Work.shop No. I!' The memo states: '"Staff requested Red Oak develop 
financial plans with and without capacity fees so that rate adjustments can be proportionately 
determined.n Finally Plaintiff quotes a note from Red Oak to the City dated January 31, 2010, 
explaining that Red Oak would '"[design] a rated schedule resulting from cash flows with and 
9 Jd. 
JO Id. 
J l John A. Gallagher Response to Plaintiff's Documents Submitted on August 5, 2013. 
12 Compare id at I, with ld at 3. 
J3 See id at 1-2. 
14 See id at 3-5. 
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without capacity fees." 15 
Plaintiff evaluates all this evidence and reaches the conclusion that ''the City's passed 
resolutions indicate that both user and capacity fees were 'adopted' based on the projected •cost 
and revenue' provided by Red Oak. Red Oak developed a 'comprehensive financial' plan that 
incorporated all of the types of water and user fees to fund the City's budget including PILOT."16 
Although the above facts indicate that the water and wastewater utility rates were set after taking 
the connection fee into account, there is nothing in the above cited evidence to indicate that the 
PILOT fee was used to calculate the proper connection fee. To the contrary, the evidence in the 
case indicates that the connection fee was calculated entirely separate from any consideration of 
a PILOT fee. 
Mr. Swindell's fourth affidavit claims that PILOT "has zero relationship to the 
connection capacity fee."17 Plaintiff argues the Court should not give substantial weight to Mr. 
Swindell's fourth affidavit because the claim regarding PILOT fees was made after-the-fact, it is 
conclusory, and it is foundationless. 18 
However, Plaintiff has failed to recognize that the reports submitted by Mr. Gallagher, 
which Plaintiff cite to as evidence of their position, have also clearly distinguished between 
connection fees and water and wastewater user rates. Mr. Gallagher clearly explains that the Red 
Oak studies included the PILOT fee in calculating the necessary user rates to meet budgetary 
requirements. 19 Mr. Gallagher's report is equally as clear that the PILOT fee was not used in 
calculating the connection fee, and that, in fact, budgetary needs were not considered in 
i:; Deposition of Dav.id Swindell, Bates No. 2, Exhibit 36. 
16 Affidavit of Nathan Olsen in Support of Application for Order to Show Cause, p. 5. 
17 Fourth Affidavit of David K. Swindell. 
IS Jd. 
19 See John A. Gallagher Response to Plaintiffs Documents Submitted on August 5, 2013, p. 1-3. 
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calculating the connection fee. 20 Mr. Gallagher's report states: 
The City's capacity fees are based on the system buy-in method. This method is based 
on the concept that existing customers, through rates and other assessments, have 
developed a valuable water and wastewater system. A new customer must "buy-in'~ to 
this system by making a contribution equal to the amount of equity a similar existing 
customer has in the system. 21 
The report goes on to explain that the value of the existing system "is calculated as the 
replacement cost of existing backbone system assets plus the costs of planned capital 
improvements."22 Nowhere in this analysis does the PILOT fee come up. Even if the statements 
made by Mr. Swindell were to be treated with limited weight, as Plaintiff argues they should be, 
the Gallagher report, which Plaintiff relies upon in making its arguments, clearly indicates that 
water and wastewater user rates were calculated differently than connection fees, and that the 
PILOT was considered only in setting the water and wastewater user rates. 
The evidence pointed to by Plaintiff simply does not refute the statement in Mr. 
Swindell's fourth affidavit, that there is no connection between capacity fees and PILOT fees. In 
fact, reviewing the evidence clearly demonstrates that the PILOT was only assessed to the user 
rates. As the City has adjusted the user rates there is no basis for granting Plaintiff's Application 
for Order to Show Cause. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Application for Order to Show 
Cause. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
20 John A. Gallagher Response to Plaintiffs Documents Submitted on August S, 2013, p. 4. 
21 Jd. 
22 Id. 
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Attorneys for Defendant City of Pocatello 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY 
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on 
behalf of itself and all others similarly 
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself 
and all others similarly situated, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
municipality, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2014-1520-0C 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO 
PLAINTIFFS' ORDER TO SHOW 
CAUSE 
COMES NOW Defendant, City of Pocatello, by and through its attorney of record, and 
hereby submits this response to Plaintiffs' Order to Show Cause as follows: 
ARGUMENT 
A. Background From Pocatello Builders Litigation. 
By way of background, it is important for this Court to understand the underlying 
litigation that has resulted in the instant litigation. The instant litigation centers on a previously 
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adjudicated state law case captioned Building Contractors Association of Southeast Idaho v. City 
of Pocatello ("Building Contractors Case"), Bannock County Case No. CV-2011-0005228-0C. 
The Building Contractors Case centered primarily on the legitimacy of the connection/capacity 
fee charged by the City of Pocatello. The Prayer for Relief of the Building Contractors Case 
sought the following: 
1. That the Court declare the City's connection fee policy to 
be a violation of the Idaho State Constitution and Code as an unauthorized 
tax. 
2. That the Court declare the City's connection fee policies to 
be a violation of the Idaho State Constitution and Code in regard to 
bonding requirements. 
3. That the Court declare the City's connection fee policies to 
be a violation of the United States Constitution and Idaho Constitution as a 
talcing of private property without just compensation, for which the 
Plaintiff is entitled to equitable and legal remedies under U.S.C. 42 § 
1983. 
4. That the Plaintiff be provided injunctive relief by cease and 
desist of the enforcement and collection of the City's current connection 
fees. 
5. That the City be required to repeal all prior connection fee 
policies and prepare a new connection fee policy that is valid under Idaho 
and U.S. law, and that the Plaintiff and any other interested member of the 
public have the opportunity to review and provide input in the 
development of such policy. 
6. A declaration by the Court that any proposed fee by the 
City to "fund the costs of growth" be implemented according to the strict 
provisions of the Idaho Development Fee Impact Act. 
7. That a determination be made of the precise amount of 
connection and user fees that have been improperly collected and utilized 
since at least 2005. 
8. That Plaintiff be awarded damages in an amount to be 
determined by the court at trial for overcharging the amount due it for 
search and copying costs of records under Plaintiffs freedom of 
information request. 
(Complaint, p. 13-14). As is clear from the Prayer for Relief, virtually all of the requested relief 
centered on the connection fee. A secondary issue that was raised by the Building Contractors 
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was whether the PILOT fee was constitutional. Very little time and attention in briefing and 
argument was devoted to this issue by either party. 
After extensive briefing on the issue, the Court issued its Memorandum Decision and 
Order on Defendant's Motion to Reconsider and Plaintiff's Amended Motion for 
Reconsideration on November 15, 2013. In that order, the Court specifically concluded that the 
City had prevailed on a number of issues. Specifically, the Court concluded as follows: 
I. The City connection and user fees are not arbitrary or unreasonably imposed. The 
imposition and collection of the connection and user fees themselves are not 
unconstitutional acts or a violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond Act. 
2. There is no evidence that the connection fees are being used by the City to fund future 
capital improvements in violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond Act. 
3. Through the use of the PILOT fee transfer program, or any other transfer program 
with a similar intent, such as a rate of return program or a return on equity program, 
the Court declares that the City is imposing an impermissible tax to the extent that 
connection and user fees are being assessed a PILOT fee for general fund purposes, 
and such practices must cease and are hereby enjoined because they are 
unconstitutional and a violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond Act. This means that 
connection and user fees must be adjusted to the extent that they include a charge 
for the PILOT fee. In addition, no PILOT fee transfers from any water or sewer 
account to the general fund are pemiitted. 
However, to the extent that connection and user fees are being transferred from the 
water and sewer accounts to the general fund, through any appropriate process, 
however named, for the purpose of paying expenses related to the operation, 
maintenance, replacement, and depreciation of existing water and sewer 
systems, including only those general City expenses needed to operate the water and 
sewer departments, such as HR, financial, legal and accounting, such transfers are 
permitted and are not hereby enjoined. 
(Memo Decision and Order On Reconsideration, p. 26 ( emphasis added)). 
The Court summarized its conclusions in a subsequent Order Denying Plaintiff's Request 
for Attorney Fees and Costs. First, the City prevailed on whether it was unreasonable or 
arbitrary to charge a connection fee when new connections were added to the existing system, 
based on an equity buy-in system. (Order Denying Plaintiffs Requests for Attorney Fees and 
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Costs, p. 3-4). Second, the City also prevailed on whether the entire user and connection fee 
systems needed to be thrown out and a new evaluation performed. (Id). Next, the City prevailed 
against the Plaintiff's argument that the connection fees constituted an unconstitutional taking. 
Finally, the City prevailed on the issue of whether the connection fees were being impermissibly 
used to fund future expansion and capital improvements to the sewer and water systems. 
The "Return on Equity" policy, which no longer exists, referred to city-owned public 
utilities (i.e. water, sewer) making a transfer to the general fund. Prior to the Court's holding in 
Building Contractors Association of Southeast Idaho v. City of Pocatello, the City charged the 
city-owned public utilities a fee. The general theory behind the implementation of this fee was 
that these public utilities are businesses operated by the public that could and do operate in other 
communities as for-profit private enterprises. The utilities were treated commensurately with 
privately owned utilities. (Affidavit of Joyce Stroschein ("Stroschein Aff."), 1 4). 
In prior years, the City described the transfer as a "rate of return" or "return on equity" as 
if the taxpayers were the shareholders (which they are). In approximately 2011, the City re-
described the transfer as a Payment-In-Lieu-Of-Taxes ("PILOT"). The phrase "rate of return," 
"return on equity," or "PILOT" are synonymous. This change made the PILOT directly 
comparable to private utilities operating in the community. The PILOT was calculated on the 
prior year city property tax levy rate multiplied by the estimated market value per the most recent 
financial plan prepared by an outside consulting engineer. The rate of return was part of the 
annual budget process and the rates were set each year and approved by the City Council. 
(Stroschein Aff., 1 5). 
The PILOT fee (rate of return) was a payment in lieu of taxes fee charged directly to the 
utility. The fee operated like property taxes assessed to and paid by Idaho Power or 
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Interrnountain Gas (except the PILOT fee does not include County or school district taxes). The 
PILOT fee would most accurately be described as a cost of doing business for both the water and 
sewer departments. Both the water and sewer department recovered the PILOT fees through the 
fee charged to all users of the water and sewer system. (Stroschein Aff., ,r 6). 
The internal franchise fee / Payment in lieu of Taxes (PILOT), as well as the predecessor 
"rate of return" or "return on equity," was designed to be a fair and reasonable tax implemented 
to keep Pocatello resident's water and sewer fees and related taxes lower and still provide the 
necessary water and sewer services.. The City's water and wastewater utility were financially 
self-sufficient with funding for capital and operating requirements derived primarily from rates, 
which included the PILOT fee. (Stroschein Aff., ,r 7). 
Following the Court's decision in Building Contractors, however, the City immediately 
discontinued charging the PILOT fee and therefore each of the Pocatello resident users saw an 
immediate decrease in their water and sewer utility bills. On December 19, 2013, the City 
lowered utility user fees in compliance with the Building Contractors decision. Pocatello 
residents saw an approximately 10% decrease in their monthly water and wastewater bills. 
(Stroschein Aff., ,r 9). 
The focus of the Connection/Capacity fee is on backbone utility infrastructure that serves 
all utility customers with a capacity that was purchased and constructed by ratepayers long ago. 
The connection/capacity fee has nothing to do with taxes. The capacity fee is intended to 
recover a new connector's proportionate share of the City's wastewater and water backbone 
facility costs. A new customer must "buy-in" to the existing system by making a contribution 
equal to the amount of equity a similar existing customer has in the system. The 
connection/capacity fee is not the cost to provide new service to the new customer. Rather, when 
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new capacity is needed, all customers will bear the cost proportionately. The 
connection/capacity fee is not used for future expansion. (Stroschein Aff., 1 I 0). 
The connection/capacity fee is a fee that is a one-time fee charged. to all new connectors 
to a system. The connection/capacity fee was phased in during FY2007 after several years of 
increasing numbers of new connections. This fee is intended to recover a new connector's 
proportionate share of the City's wastewater backbone facility costs. The connection fee is a 
contribution equal to the amount of equity a similar existing customer has in the system. The 
connection fe_e is to offset the cost for existing users whose capacity will be diminished by the 
new users and will, thus, require replacement of existing infrastructure more regularly. 
(Stroschein Aff., 1 11 ). 
The connection /capacity fee is a policy choice adopted by the City upon 
recommendation of a water and wastewater study provided by Red Oak Consulting. The 
connection fee was deemed a fair method of ensuring that new users were providing financial 
support for the use of the existing infrastructure. Capacity fees are irrelevant if there are no new 
connections. They may be immaterial if new connections are infrequent. But when growth is 
more rapid, new connectors can rapidly consume existing capacity; restoring it can cause rates to 
increase for existing ratepayers with no compensation for the capacity that they paid for. 
Industrial users can consume capacity in bulk amounts with little notice. (Stroschein Aff., 1 12). 
Following the Court's decision in Building Contractors, the City made no changes to the 
connection/capacity fee. The City has never charged a PILOT to the connection/capacity fee and 
the two different fees have no relationship. Based on the Building Contractors decision, the 
connection/capacity fee was deemed appropriate and the amount was upheld. Because no 
PILOT has ever been collected from the connection/capacity fee it was not improperly collected. 
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Because the fee was declared constitutional and the amounts were correct, the City's collection 
of the connection/capacity fee should no serve as a source ofrecovery for the PILOT fee. 
(Stroschein Aff., 113). 
The water and wastewater departments have money held in four different fund groups. 
The first fund group is Fund 31 and 32. Funds 31 and 32 are the operating funds. This fund is 
comprised entirely of user fees that are collected by the water and wastewater departments, 
respectively. Funds 31 and 32 would be the only location for PILOT fees charged to the water 
and wastewater departments. The second fund group is Funds 37 and 38. Funds 37 and 38 are 
the connection/capacity fees. This fund is comprised entirely of connection/capacity fees that 
have been collected by the City. At no point has the City ever deposited any PILOT fee into 
Funds 37 or 38, these funds represent the entirety of the connection/capacity funds collected by 
the City since its inception in 2007. The third fund group is Funds 60 and 61. Funds 60 and 61 
are the debt service funds for the water and wastewater dep~ents. The debt service funds are 
reserves that are set aside to meet the annual debt service payments required by the bond 
covenants. At no point has the City ever deposited any PILOT fee into Funds 60 and 61. The 
final group is Funds 73 and 74. Funds 73 and 74 are the construction funds. These funds are 
where all of the proceeds from the bonds are placed for water and wastewater. Money for 
bonded projects will be withdrawn from these funds to pay for approved bonded projects. At no 
point has the City ever deposited any PILOT fee into Funds 73 and 74. (Stroschein Aff., ,r 14). 
Fund 37 holds the connection/capacity fees for the water department. Fund 38 holds the 
connection/capacity fees for the wastewater department ("WPC"). Each of the respective funds 
contains all of the connection/capacity fees gathered between 2007 and current. Fund 37 and 38 
is dedicated to holding only the connection/capacity fees. There are no other funds that are held 
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here, including PILOT fees. (Stroschein Aff., 1 16). 
Consistent with the FY2014 Budget for the City, the City has determined that the 
connection/capacity fees will be used for debt service. As such, the City budgeted approximately 
$725,826.00 for debt service for the water department in FY2014. The City intends to use the 
remaining funds from Fund 3 7 for debt service in FY2015. The City has budgeted 
approximately $1,384,780.00 for debt service for the wastewater department in FY2014. This 
will exhaust nearly all of the funds in Fund 38. Both Fund 37 and 38 have scheduled September 
payments and will execute as budgeted. 
Fund Budget Year to Date Actual Remaining Budget Balance · 
03 7-3000-520.95-03 $725,826.00 $553,831.24 $171,994.76 
038-0000-520.95-03 $1,384,780.00 $237,961.74 $1,146,818.26 
(Stroschein Aff., 1 18). 
At present, the remaining balance will be $171,994.76 for Fund 37 and $1,146,818.26 for 
Fund 38. Using this approach, all of the connection/capacity fees can be accounted for and there 
has been no funds transferred to the general funds from the connection/capacity fees. As of June 
30, 2014, Fund 37 contained $1,057,908.12 and Fund 38 contained $1,285,169.46. These funds 
hold all the case ever received since 2007 for all the capacity fees. The only expenditures are the 
year to date transfers noted above for related debt service. For FY2015, the water department is 
scheduled to draw on their capacity fee cash for debt service substantially as was done in 
FY2014. Because virtually all of the cap~ity funds from Fund 38 will be expended in FY2014, 
the wastewater department will rely on operating funds for debt service transfers. (Stroschein 
Aff., 'if 19). 
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B. The Claimed Source of Recovery Cannot Be Used Because No PILOT Fees Were 
Used To Fund Account 37/38. 
The singular issue currently before the Court in the Show Cause Hearing is whether the 
funds found in Fund 37/38 can be used as a source ofrecovery for claimed indebtedness, which. 
the City adamantly disputes. Mr. Olsen has selectively provided this Court with various rulings 
in the Building Contractors case that do not accurately reflect the underlying rulings and 
conclusions of that Court. As will be described more fully below, Fund 37 and 38 cannot serve 
has an appropriate source for any claimed recovery because they contain no PILOT and are 
being used consistent with Idaho law. While Plaintiffs contend that the connection/capacity fee 
contained a PILOT fee, it is without merit and contrary to the conclusions of the Court in the 
Building Contractors case as well as the affidavit of Joyce Stroschein. Rather, the claims 
asserted in Mr. Olsen's affidavit are neither accurate nor consistent with the Court's rulings in 
the Building Contractors matter. Olsen's contention that City had impennissibly transferred 
monies into Funds 37 and 38 that contained a PILOT is inaccurate. (Olsen Aff., ,,r 3,4,8, and 
10). 
Mr. Olsen knew or should have known based on the underlying litigation that Funds 37 
and 38 never included a PILOT. Mr. Olsen misleads the Court when he suggests that the City 
created Funds 37 and 38 as a "reaction to the court's finding ofliability" in the Building 
Contractors case. (Olsen Aff., 'if 8). This statement is false and contrary to the affidavits and 
holdings submitted in the Building Contractors matter. In an affidavit by Mr. Swindell, the 
fonner City Chief Financial Officer, he stated that Funds 37 and 38 were created in March 2013, 
prior to any final adjudication in the Building Contractors matter, in an effort to "increase 
transparency of how the connection/capacity fees were spent." (3rd Swindell Aff., ,r 8). At the 
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time Fund 37 and 38 had been created, no liability had been assessed. In fact, the Court's 
subsequent rulings confirmed that the creation of Funds 37 and 38 were not problematic and the 
connection fee was constitutional and did not contain the impermissible PILOT fee. As is more 
-fully addressed below, the basis Plaintiffs• Application for Pre-Judgment Writ of Attachment is 
fundamentally flawed and inconsistent with the actual ruling in the underlying matter. 
Ms. Stroschein, as the interim Chief Financial Officer for the City of Pocatello is 
-intimately familiar with all of the taxes and fees collected by the City. Specifically, she testifies 
that the purpose of the connection/capacity fee is intended to recover a new connector's 
proportionate share of the City's wastewater and water backbone facility costs. (Stroschein Aff., 
1 , 10-13 ). This fee was specifically implemented to offset the cost for existing users whose 
capacity will be diminished by the new users and will, thus, require replacement of existing 
infrastructure more regularly. (Id at , 11 ). The capacity fee is not a tax but a one-time fee 
charged to new users tapping into the existing infrastructure. (Id). The Court in Building 
Contractors carefully analyzed the facts and concluded that the connection fee was not 
unreasonable nor was it arbitrarily imposed because it produced sufficient revenut to support the 
system at the lowest possible cost as required by the Idaho Revenue Bond Act. (Memorandum 
Decision on Reconsideration, pp. 23-24). There was no evidence submitted in the Building 
Contractors case to suggest that the connection fee contained a PILOT. In fact, the Court 
concluded that the PILOT was specifically transferred out of the water and sewer funds. 
(Memorandum Decision on Reconsideration, p. 22). Likewise, Ms. Stroschein specifically states 
that the connection/capacity has never included a PILOT. 
Conversely, the PILOT was created as a substitute property tax and was designed to be a 
fair and reasonable tax implemented to keep Pocatello resident's water and sewer fees and 
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related taxes lower and still provide the necessary water and sewer services. (Stroschein Aff., 1 
7). The PILOT is an on-going monthly charge that was recuperated from the user fees, whereas 
the capacity fee was a one-time fee. Thus, the Court's only criticism of the City's com1ection fee 
was if it contained a PILOT. As noted, the com1ection fee has never contained a PILOT and 
therefore the fee was not unconstitutional and cannot serve as the basis of a recovery here 
because the single issue is Plaintifr s attempt to recover PILOT funds. This position was very 
clearly articulated by the Court in Building Contractors, "[t]he City connection and user fees are 
not arbitrary or unreasonably imposed. The imposition and collection of the connection and 
user fees themselves are not unconstitutional acts or a violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond 
Act." (Memorandum Decision on Reconsideration, p. 26). The Court ordered the City to adjust 
the connection and user fees to the extent that they included a PILOT. As attested to by Ms. 
Stroschein, the City had no need to adjust the connection/capacity fee because it never contained 
a PILOT. (Stroschein Aff., 11 8, 13). The user fee was, however, adjusted down by 
approximately 10% to reflect a new user fee that did not include a PILOT. (Id at 1 9). 
Lending further support for a denial of Plaintiffs' request for a writ of attachment on 
Funds 37 and 38 comes from the Decision on Plaintiff's Application/or Order to Show Cause in 
the Building Contractors case. In that Application for Order to Show Cause, the question was 
whether the City should be required to reduce the connection/capacity fee because those fees 
included a PILOT fee. The Court reviewed virtually the same evidence presented by Plaintiffs 
here and concluded that the connection fee did not include a PILOT fee. The Court not only 
relied on the City for this assertion but also concluded that a report from an independent study on 
water and wastewater fees made "clear that the PILOT fee was not used in calculating the 
com1ection fee, and that, in fact, budgetary needs were not considered in calculating the 
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connection fee." (Decision on Shoe Cause Hearing, pp. 4-5). The Building Contractors Court 
unambiguously concluded that "reviewing the evidence clearly demonstrates that the PILOT 
was only assessed to the user rates. As the City has adjusted the user rates there is no basis for 
granting Plaintiffs Application for Order to Show Cause." (Id at p. 5). The question of whether 
Funds 37 and 38 include a PILOT fee has already been definitively addressed in the Building 
Contractors case and supports the conclusion that Funds 37 and 38 should not be subjected to a 
pre-judgment writ of attachment. 
Ultimately, for purposes of the present Show Cause hearing, the Court should deny the 
Plaintiffs' requested relief because they are improperly attempting to freeze the City's assets 
from Funds 37 and 38. As noted, the Plaintiff should be prevented from attempting to tie up the 
City's assets that have no PILOT included in it and have been unequivocally declared to be 
constitutional. Should the Court allow the Plaintiffs to freeze funds 37 and 38 the Court would 
be condoning a collateral attack on issues that have been fully and properly adjudicated by the 
Court. The funds held in Fund 37 and 38 do not, and have never, contain any PILOT and cannot 
be used as a source of recovery. The City has already budgeted a significant amount of the cash 
held in Fund 37 and 38 for the retirement of debt service, including a substantial payment to the 
retirement of debt service in September 2014. Using the connection/capacity fees for the 
retirement of debt is appropriate and consistent with the Building Contractors case wherein it 
held that "connection and user fees must be adjusted to the extent that they include a charge for 
the PILOT fee." In this case, no adjustment was necessary because the connection fee does not 
contain a PILOT. (Stroschein Aff., , 8, 13). Conversely, the user fee was adjusted down by 
approximately 10% because it did contain a PILOT. (Id at , 9). Freezing these assets would be 
an unjust and harsh result given that these Funds do not contain any PILOT. Accordi11:gly, the 
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Court should deny Plaintiffs' request for a prejudgment writ of attachment on Funds 37 and 38. 
The underlying question of whether the City has even engaged in an unconstitutional 
taking of fees dating back to 2007 is highly questionable. There has not even been a showing by 
'·· 
Plaintiff, other than unsubstantiated and conclusory statements, that the City is indebted to the 
Plaintiffs. There is no foundation in the record to support this claim and the City vehemently 
refutes that it engaged in any unconstitutional taking that would subject it to indebtedness to the 
Plaintiffs. Without more, the Plaintiffs' request for a Writ of Attachment must fail until 
indebtedness has been definitively established. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Defendant City of Pocatello requests that the Court deny 
Plaintiffs' request for a Pre-Judgement Writ of Attachment because there has not even been a 
showing of indebtedness and the funds Plaintiffs seek to attach do not contain any of the 
impermissible PILOT fees. The City should not be precluded from using funds that were 
properly collected and used for proper purposes under Idaho law. 
Dated this _:;/!aay of August, 2014. 
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Nathan M. Olsen, Esq. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY 
HIIlL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK_, on 
beh!lif of itself and all others similarly 
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself 
! 
and,all others similarly situated, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
' 
I 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
mu1pcipality. 
' 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV~2014-1520-0C 
ORDER SHORTENING TIME 
. Based upon the Defendant's Motion· to Shorten Time and good cause appearing therefor; 
I 
'IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the time for the hearing required under Idaho Code 
§ 39~6~06 be shortened. and that the. hearing on Defendant's Motion to Quash be held on 
Septelflher 8, 201.4, at 2 :00 p.m. 
' 
I '(( 
DATED this ..L_ day of September, 2014. . 
: c::::&@7·~ 
David C. Nye, District Judge 
I 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
HILL - VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on behalf 
of itself and all others similarly situated, ED 
QUINN, on behalf of himself and all others 
similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
municipality, 
Defendant. 
Case No:CV-2014-0001520-0C 
MINUTE ENTRY 
THE PARTIES came before the Court on the 8th day of September, 2014 for an 
Order to Show Cause Hearing and Motion to Quash Subpoena. Nathan Olson and 
Michael Gaffney appeared in person on behalf of the Plaintiffs. Blake Hall appeared in 
person on behalf of the Defendant. Stephanie Morse was the Court Reporter. 
At the outset, the Court heard oral argument from the parties on Defendant's 
Motion to Quash Subpoena. 
Thereafter, the Court GRANTED Defendant's Motion to Quash Subpoena. The 
Court then vacated the hearing on the Order to Show Cause to allow Plaintiffs' counsel to 
serve a subpoena on Mr. Swindell and reset the hearing on the Order to Show Cause. 
The Court also will inquire of Judge Stephen Dunn as to whether he would be 
Case No.: CV-2014-0001520-0C 
MINUTE ENTRY 
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willing to have this case transferred to him since he had the underlying case. The parties 
will have until Friday (September 12, 2014) to let the Court know if they would object to 
this transfer. 
DATED this 
1·~ Cf day of September, 2014. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the Jf)-,h day of September, 2014, I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document upon each of the following individuals in the 
manner indicated. · 
Michael D. Gaffney 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY, PA 
2105 Coronado St 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495 
Nathan M. Olsen 
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN 
485 E Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Blake G. Hall 
HALL ANGELL STARNES, LLP 
1075 Utah Ave, Ste 150 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Case No.: CV-2014-0001520-0C 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Page 2 of 2 
D U.S. Mail 
D E-Mail: gaffney@beardstclair.com 
~and Deliver 
ax: (208) 529-9732 
0U.S.Mail 
D E-Mail: nolsen@pmholaw.com 
~and Deliver 
ax: (208) 524-3391 
D U.S. Mail 
DE-Mail: bgh@hasattorneys.com ij Hand Deliver 
Fax: (208) 621-3008 
Deput I 
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BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ. 
SAM L. ANGELL, ESQ. 
NATHAN R. STARNES, ESQ. 
HALL ANGELL STARNES, LLP 
1075 S Utah Avenue, Suite 150 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Telephone (208) 522-3003 
Fax (208) 621-3008 
ISBNo.'s 2434, 7012 & 7484 
bgh@hasattomeys.com 
sla@hasattomeys.com 
nrs@hasattomeys.com 
Attorneys for Defendant City of Pocatello 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY 
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on 
behalf of itself and all others similarly 
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself 
and all others similarly situated, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
municipality, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2014-1520-0C 
ORDER QUASHING SUBPOENA 
This matter came before the Court on September 8, 2014 on Defendant's Motion to 
Quash the Subpoena issued to David Swindell. The Court, having reviewed the pleadings and 
having heard argument from the parties, hereby quashes the subpoena to David Swindell. The 
Court's ruling is as follows: 
The subpoena of David Swindell is quashed whether issued in an individual capacity or 
in an official capacity. In the event the subpoena was served upon Mr. Swindell in his individual 
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capacity, counsel for the City of Pocatello does not have authority to accept the subpoena on Mr. 
Swindell' s behalf and therefore, the subpoena must be quashed. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
45(e)(2) requires personal service on the named individual. Personal service on Mr. Swindell 
never occurred. Therefore, the Court finds the subpoena on Mr. Swindell in his individual 
capacity is defective and therefore quashed. 
In the event the subpoena was served upon Mr. Swindell in his official capacity, Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 45( e)(2) permits service of a subpoena on counsel of a party to an action. 
Mr. Swindell is no longer employed by the City of Pocatello and lives in another state; therefore, 
counsel for the City of Pocatello does not have authority to accept the subpoena on Mr. 
Swindell' s behalf, nor does it have the ability to produce Mr. Swindell. Therefore, the subpoena 
of David Swindell is quashed. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
-1.,C 
DATED this ..f!_ day of September, 2014. 
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..,..L.hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following 
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Michael D. Gaffney, Esq. 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Fax: 529-9732 
Nathan M. Olsen, Esq. 
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN 
485 "E" Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Fax: 524-3391 
Blake G. Hall, Esq. 
HALL ANGELL STARNES, LLP 
1075 S Utah Avenue, Suite 150 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Fax: 621-3008 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
HILL - VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on behalf 
of itself and all others similarly situated, ED 
QUINN, on behalf of himself and all others 
similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
municipality, 
Defendant. 
Based on the agreement by the parties, 
Case No:CV-2014-0001520-0C 
ORDER TRANSFERRING CASE 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this matter be transferred to the Honorable Stephen 
S. Dunn for complete resolution. 
DATED this 16~ day of October, 2014. 
Case No.: CV-2014-0001520-0C 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 11'1 day of October, 2014, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing docume~n each of the following individuals in the 
manner indicated. 
Michael D. Gaffney 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY, PA 
2105 Coronado St 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495 
Nathan M. Olsen 
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN 
485 E Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Blake G. Hall 
HALL ANGELL STARNES, LLP 
1075 Utah Ave, Ste 150 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
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ORDER TRANSFERRING CASE 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
Register#CV-2014-01520-0C 
HILL-VU MOBILE HOM PARK, on behalf of ) 
itself and all others similarly situated, ED QUINN, ) 
on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
-vs- ) 
) 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho municipality, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
ORDER FOR SUBMISSION 
OF INFORMATION FOR 
SCHEDULING ORDER 
This matter has now been transferred to Judge Stephen S. Dunn for resolution. 
The trial dates previously scheduled conflict with Judge Dunn's calendar. 
Therefore, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that within fourteen (14) 
days of the date of this Order: 
A) The parties, through their counsel ( or the parties themselves if self-represented), shall CONFER 
and REACH AGREEMENT on each of the issues listed below. PLAINTIFF'S counsel ( or 
Plaintiff, if self-represented) shall submit to the Court the AGREED RESPONSE to each issue 
listed below. 
B) Issues on which the parties must reach an agreement and submit a response: 
(1) Whether motions to add new parties or otherwise amend the pleadings are expected. 
Case No. CV-2014-01520-0C 
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(2) Whether an unusual amount of time is needed for trial preparation and/or discovery. 
(3) The number of trial days required for trial. 
( 4) Whether there are any other matters the parties agree would be. helpful to a determination of 
the case that should be brought to the attention of the Court prior to entering a Scheduling 
Order, and what those matters are. 
(5) TWO (2) TRIAL DATES, that comply with the requirements listed below. The trial 
date for the case will be the earliest date submitted by agreement of the parties. The reason the 
Court asks for two trial dates is so that a backup trial date is available and calendared in the 
event the first trial date has to be continued by Motion to and Order of the Court. In the event 
an Order continuing the trial setting becomes necessary, the additional trial dates avoids the 
need to vacate the trial setting for up to a year. Thus, the parties should plan to try the case on 
the first date submitted. Therefore, do not submit less than the TWO trial dates. 
• The two dates must be AGREED to by the parties and must identify the specific day upon 
which the trial will begin. 
• Each date submitted must be a TUESDAY. [If the Monday of that week is a holiday, the 
date submitted must be a WEDNESDAY]. 
• Do not submit trial dates for the third week of any month as that is the Court's criminal 
trial week. 
• The first agreed trial date must be a specific day no less than six (6) months and no more 
than twelve (12) months from the date of this Order. 
• The second agreed trial date must be a specific day no /es$ than twelve (12) months and no 
more than fifteen (15) months from the date of this Order. 
Case No. CV-2014-01520-0C 
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• If the parties agree that Wlusual factors may justify a trial setting schedule which varies in 
any way from the requirements of this Order, the parties may submit those factors in the 
AGREED RESPONSE and the Court will give serious ·consideration to those factors in 
setting the trial date. But the parties must still submit two agreed trial dates that comply 
with this Order. 
C) Upon receipt of the AGREED RESPONSE the Court will issue a scheduling Order setting the 
matter for trial on the agreed dates with deadlines for discovery, disclosure of witnesses, etc. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if the parties do not file the AGREED RESPONSE 
Ordered herein, within the fourteen (14) days of the date of this ORDER, the Court will set this 
matter for trial on dates available to the Court and will not approve stipulations to modify the trial 
dates set. The submissions requested in the order are deemed by the Court to constitute the 
scheduling conference required by IRCP 16(a). However, if either party wishes a more formal 
scheduling conference please contact the Court's clerk and one will be scheduled. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED "'J¥k.: /l )f:)1,/ . 
s~-
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the \ · day of Cxc . 2014, I 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document upon each ofthe following individuals 
in the manner indicated. 
Michael D. Gaffney 
Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Nathan M. Olsen 
Petersen Moss Hall & Olsen 
485 "E'' Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Blake G. Hall 
Sam L. Angell 
Hall Angell Starnes 
1075 S Utah Ave., Ste 150 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Case No. CV-2014-01520-0C 
(./U.S. Mail 
( ) Overnight Delivery 
( ) Hand Deliver 
( ) Facsimile 
(/U.S. Mail 
( ) Overnight Delivery 
( ) Hand Deliver 
( ) Facsimile 
&,U.S. Mail 
( ) Overnight Delivery 
( ) Hand Deliver 
( ) Facsimile 
Deputy Clerk 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT m·• i 9 Ptl 2: 0$ 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF B 
Register #CV-2014-01520-0C 
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on ) 
behalf of itself and all others similarly ) 
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself ) 
and all others similariy situated, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) ORDER SETTING JURY TRIAL 
-vs- ) 
) 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho ) 
municipality, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
(1) TRIAL DATE. This matter is set for JURY TRIAL on the 4th day of AUGUST, 2015, 
AT THE HOUR OF 9:00 A.M., in Courtroom 301, Bannock County Courthouse, Pocatello, 
Idaho. The Court also sets a backup trial date on the 5th day of January, 2016, at the hour of9:00 
a.m. The backup trial date will only be used in the event a continuance of the trial date first listed is 
necessary. A continuance of the trial date shall occur only upon written Motion or Stipulated 
Motion to the Court which clearly states the reasons for the requested continuance and which 
includes an acknowledgment and agreement signed by each party that certifies that the Motion to 
Continue has been discussed with and agreed to by each party. All deadlines listed below shall 
apply to the trial setting first listed above. An Order continuing the trial date to the backup trial date 
will not alter the deadlines set forth in this Order, except for good cause shown. 
(2) PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE. Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16(b), trial counsel for the parties (or the 
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parties if they are self-represented) are ORDERED to meet and/or confer for the purpose of 
preparing a joint Pre-Trial Stipulation, which shall be submitted to the Court at least 21 days prior 
to Trial, and shall include: 
(A) A statement that all exhibits to be offered at trial have been provided to all other 
parties and attaching an Exhibit List of all exhibits to be offered at trial by both parties. 
The Exhibit List shall indicate: 1) by whom the exhibit is being offered, 2) a brief 
description of the exhibit, 3) whether the parties have stipulated to its admission, and if 
not, 4) the legal grounds for any objection. If any exhibit includes a summary of other 
documents, such as medical expense records, to be offered pursuant to I.R.E. 1006, the 
summary shall be attached to the Stipulation. 
(B) A statement whether depositions or any discovery responses will be offered in lieu 
of live testimony, and a list of what will actually be offered, the manner in which such 
evidence will be presented, and the legal grounds for any objection to any such offer. 
(C) A list of the names and addresses of all witnesses which each party intends to call 
to testif-J at trial, including anticipated rebuttal or impeachment witnesses. Expert 
witnesses shall be identified as such. The Stipulation should also identify whether any 
witness' testimony-will be objected to in its entirety and the legal grounds therefore. 
(D) A brief non-argumentative summary of the factual nature of the case. The purpose 
of the summary is to provide an overview of the case for the jury and is to be included 
in pre-proof instructions to the jury, unless found inappropriate by the Court. 
(E) A statement that counsel have, in good faith, discussed settlement unsuccessfully 
and/or completed mediation unsuccessfully, if mediation was ordered by the Court. 
(F) A statement that all pre-trial discovery procedures under I.RC.P. 26 to 37 have 
been complied \\1th and all discovery responses supplemented as required by the rules 
to reflect facts known to the date of the Stipulation. 
(G) A statement of all issues of fact and law which remain to be litigated, listing which 
party has the burden of proof as to each issue. 
(H) A list of any stipulated admissions of fact, which will avoid unnecessary proof. 
(I) A list of any orders requested by the parties which will expedite the trial. 
(J) A statement as to whether counsel require more than 30 minutes per party for voir 
dire or opening statement and, if so, an explanation of the reason more time is needed. 
These submissions will be deemed by the Court to constitute the final pre-trial conference 
required by IRCP 16(b). However, if either party wishes a more formal pre-trial conference 
the same should be requested in writing at least 60 days prior to trial and one will be 
scheduled. 
(3) MOTIONS TO ADD NEW PARTIES OR AMEND PLEADINGS shall be filed no later 
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than 60 days after the date of this Order. 
(4) DISCOVERY must be served and completely responded to at least 60 days prior to trial. 
This includes supplementation of discoveiy responses required by I.R.C.P. 26( e ), unless good cause 
is shown for late supplementation. Discovery requests must be responded to in a timely way as 
required by the I.R.C.P. The deadlines contained in this Order cannot be used as a basis or reason 
for failing to timely respond to or supplement properly served discovery, including requests for 
disclosure of witnesses and/or trial exhibits. Discovery disputes will not be heard by the Court 
without the written certification required by I.R.C.P. 37(a)(2). 
(S) WITNESS DISCLOSURE. Except as previously disclosed in responses to discovery 
requests, Plaintiff shall disclose all fact and expert witnesses no later than 140 days before trial. 
Defendants shall disclose their fact and expert witnesses no later than 1 OS days before trial. 
Rebuttal witnesses shall be disclosed no later than 70 days before trial. Expert witnesses shall be 
disclosed in the manner and with the specificity required by I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i). Any objection 
to the I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i) expert witness disclosure must be filed within 45 days of the 
disclosure or is deemed waived. Witnesses not disclosed in responses to discoveiy and/or as 
required herein will be excluded at trial, unless allowed by the Court in the interest of justice. 
(6) MOTIONS. DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS, and responses thereto, shall comply in all 
respects with 1.R.C.P. 56 and be filed no later than 90 days before trial. ALL OTHER 
MOTIONS, including any Motion in Limine, shall be filed and heard by the Court no later than 30 
days before trial. The original of all Motions and supporting submissions shall be filed with the 
clerk of the cowt. However, fil!£ (1) duplicate Judge's Copy of all Motions, and any opposition 
thereto, together with supporting memorandum, affidavits and documents, shall be 
submitted directly to the Court's chambers in Bannock County. · All the duplicate copies 
, 
must be stamped "Judge's Copy" to avoid confusion with the original pleading. All other 
pleadings, notices, etc., should be filed with the Clerk without copies to the Court,s chambers. 
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(7) STIPULATED MODIFICATIONS. The parties may stipulate to the modification of the 
discovery, witness disclosure and motion deadlines stated herein only upon submission of a 
· stipulation to the Court and a Court Order modifying the deadlines. No order modifying deadlines 
will be granted if it would result in a delay in the trial date, without a formal motion to vacate the 
trial, and good cause shm~. 
(8) TRI~ BRIEF~. Trial briefs are encouraged but not required. If submitted, trial briefs 
should address substantive factual, legal and/or evidentiary issues the parties believe are likely to 
arise during the trial, with appropriate citation to authority. Any trial brief should be exchanged 
between the parties and submitted to the clerk of the court, and a duplicate Judge's Copy shall be 
submitted to the Court's chambers in Bannock County, no later than 10 days prior to trial. 
(9) PRE-MARKED EXHIBITS, AND AN EXHIBIT LIST IN THE FORM ATTACHED 
HERETO, shall be exchanged between the parties and filed with the Court no later than 10 days 
prior to trial. Each party shall also lodge with the Court at chambers a duplicate completed exhibit 
list plus one complete, duplicate marked set of that party's proposed exhibits for the Court's use 
during the trial. Unless otherwise ordered, Plaintiff shall identify exhibits beginning with the 
number "1" and the Defendant shall identify exhibits beginning with the letter "A.'' 
(10) JURY INSTRUCTIONS. Proposed jury instructions and verdict forms requested by any 
party shall be prepared in conformity with I.RC.P. 5i(a), except that they shall be filed with the 
Court and exchanged between the parties at least 7 days prior to trial. Except for good cause 
shown, proposed jury instructions should conform to the pattern Idaho Jury Instructions (IDJI) 
approved by the Idaho Supreme Court. In addition to submitting written proposed instructions that 
comply with Rule Sl(a), the parties shall also submit both a clean version and a version with cited 
authority by e-mail to the Court's Clerk, in Word format, at least 7 days prior to trial. Certain 
"stock" instructions need not be submitted. These will typically include IDJI 1.00, 1.01, 1.03, 
1.03.1, 1.05, 1.09, 1.11, 1.13/1.13.l, 1.15.l, 1.17, 1.20.1, and 1.24.1. It is requested that the parties 
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agree on the basic instruction giving the jury a short, plain statement of the claims, per IDJI 1.07. 
(11) MEDIATION. Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16(k)(4), the parties are ORDERED to mediate this 
matter, and the mediation shall comply with I.R.C.P. 16(k). Mediation must be held no later than 
45 days prior to trial. 
(12) TRIAL PROCEDURES. A total of four trial days have been reserved for this trial. If the 
parties believe that more trial days will be required, the parties are ORDERED to notify the Court 
of this request no less than 60 days prior to trial. On the first day of trial, counsel shall report to the 
Court's chambers at 8:30 a.m. for a brief status conference. Unless otherwise ordered, or as 
modified during trial as necessary, trial days will begin at 9:00 am. and close at or about 5:00 p.m., 
with a one hour break for lunch. 
(13) HE,&R{NGS QR CO!iFERENCES WITH THE COURT. All meetings, conferences, 
and/or hearings with the Court shall be scheduled in advance with the Court's Clerk by calling 208-
236-7250. No hearing shall be noticed without contacting the Clerk. 
(14) AL'fE~ATE_~IlJ!!GES. Notice is hereby given, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 40(d)(l)(G), that an 
alternate judge may be assigned to pre:side over the trial of this case, if the current presiding judge is 
unavailable. The list of potential alternate judges is: 1) Honorable David C. Nye; 2) Honorable 
Robert C. Naftz; 3) Honorable Mitchell W. Brown; 4) Honorable Peter D. McDennott; 5) 
Honorable \Villiam H. \VoodJand; 6) Honorable Richard T. St. Clair. If the I.R.C.P. 40(d)(l) 
disqualification has not previously been exercised, failure to disqualify, without cause, any one of 
these alternate judges within ten ( I 0) days of the date of this Order shall constitute a waiver of such 
right. 
DATED this 19th day of December, 2014. -
s~ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the \Cf day of ~ • 2014, I 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document upon each of the following individuals 
in the manner indicated. 
Michael D. Gaffney 
Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA 
2105 Coronado St. 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Nathan M. Olsen 
Petersen Moss Hall & Olsen 
485 ''E" Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Blake G. Hall 
Sam L. Angell 
Hall AngelJ Starnes 
1075 S Utah Ave., Ste 150 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
DATED this \9 day of C:::::Cc 
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Deputy Clerk 
(,/U.S. Mail 
( ) Overnight Delivery 
( ) Hand Deliver 
( ) Facsimile 
(.{ U.S. Mail 
( ) Overnight Delivery 
( ) Hand Deliver 
( ) Facsimile 
(_,{ U.S. Mail 
( ) Overnight Delivery 
( ) Hand Deliver 
( ) Facsimile 
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Michael D. Gaffney 
Beard St. Clair Oafthey PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Telephone: (208) 523~5171 
Fax: (208) 529~9732 
ISBN: 3558 
Nathan M. Olsen 
Petersen Moss Hall & Olsen 
485 "E .. Street, Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Telephone: (208) 5234650 
Fax: (208) 524-3391 
ISBN: 7373 · 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
9F THE STAT'.E OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY 
HILL-VU MOBILE HO:ME PARK. on behalf 
of itself and all others similarly situated, ED 
QUINN. on behalf of himself and all others 
similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs. 
vs. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
municipality, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Bonneville ) 
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I, Logan Robinson, do solemnly swear ( or affirm) that the testimony given in this sworn 
statement is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, that it is made on my personal 
knowledge, and 1hat I would so testify in open court if called upon to do so. 
1. I am the mac.ager and owner "Hill· Vu Mobile Home Park" - one of the plaintiffs in this 
action. 
2. Each yeax the Defendant, City of Pocatello (City). passes a resolution setting monthly 
water, wastewater and sanita:ry rates for users of the system (User Fees). An example of such 
resolution, Resolution 2010-30, is attached as :Exhibit A. 
3. User Fees collected by the City of Pocatello were dep0sited into three separate accoUnts 
for water, wastewater and sanitation. 
4. According to public record provided by the City in its discovery responses (attached as 
Exhibit B) , from FY 2007 through FY 2014. the City transferred from the water. sewer and 
sanitation fund $28,329,230.41 under·the guise of'(PILOT "and "Return on Equity" programs. 
In case CV·20I 1-5228-0C, the Idaho Sixth Judicial Court held in a November 15, 2013, 
Memorandum pecision and Order that these programs were an unconstitutional disguised tax. 
3. Since 2007, as a resident and owner of several rental units. I have had to pay substantial 
amounts of"User Fees" as set by City Resolution. A significantp0rtion of these fees were 
improperly transferred to the general fund and improperly taken and used as a disguised tax. 
4. To my knowledge, any person owning property in the City serviced by water, sewer and 
sanitation has had to pay User Fees as set forth by City Resolution. 
AFFIDAVIT OF LOGAN ROBINSON -Page 2 
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5. According to public records provided by the City in discovery, there are on average over 
16,000 ''accounts'' for User Fees in the City. (Exhibit B) As is the case with me, up until 
December of 2013, a substantial amount of these User Fees paid by users of the system were 
improperly transferred from the water. sewer and sanitation funds to the City's general :fund and 
improperly taken and used as a disguised tax.. 
DATED this _L day of F&-IJ,.,,,,,., . . 2015. 
(SEAL) 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I ani a duly lkiensed attomey in the State ofidaho, with my office i11 
Idaho Falls, Idaho, and that on the~ day of F:1?.bru.o..r:'{, 2015 I served a true and COITect 
copy of the foregoing document on the persons listed below by first class mail. with the cottect 
postage thereon, or by causing the same to be delivered in accordance with ~ule 5(b). I.R.C.P. 
Persons Served: 
Blake G. Hall, Esq. 
HALL ANOELL & STARNES, LLP 
1075 S. Utah Ave., Ste. 1SO 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
FAX: (208) 621-3008 
EM.AIL: bm@hruiattorneya,.oom 
•,, 
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RESOLUTION NO. 2010- 30 
A RESOLUTION OF TI-IB CITY OF POCATELLO, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF 
IDAHO, REVISJNG SANITARY SEWER.RATES, SYSTEM CAPACITY FEES, 
EXCESSIVE STRENGTH CHARGES, AND OTHER SPECIAL CHARGES PREVIOUSLY 
SET BY RESOLUTION NO. 2009-33; PROVIDING FOR SUCH RATES AND FEES TO 
BE EFFECTIVE OCTOBER 1, 2010, THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30,2011. 
WHEREAS, Pocatello Municipal Code Section 13.16.180 authorizes sanitary 
sewer rates and plant capacity :fees to be set from time to time by Resolution; and, 
~REAS. the City Council retained the engineering firm of Red Oak 
Consulthig to prepare a rate study to project revenues and costs for 2011 -2015 and to 
recommend necessary sanitary sewer rates thereafter; and 
WHEREAS, the City Council has detennined that fees and charges for the 
sanitary sewer system as previously set by Resolution No: 2009~33 should be revised for 
Fiscal Year 2011 in accordance with that study; 
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE MAYOR AND 
COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF POCATELLO THAT SEWER RATES Al\iD FEES FOR 
FISCAL 2011 SHALL BB AS FOLLOWS: 
NORMAL STRENGTH RATES 
Metered facilities 
Residential, single family 
Residential multi-family, commercial, 
and all others 
Monthly service oharge, p~ bill 
Volume charge pe.r 1,000 gals. 
Non"meterecl facilities 
Inside City 
$21.50/mo. 
$3.30 
$2.93 
Outside City 
$25.75/mo, 
$3.95. 
_$3.52 
All users will be billed a flat monthly charge based on tl1e average annual consumption of 
the most comparable metered use at the rates listed above. Billings formulti .. family residential and 
commercial uses without summer lines will be a flat monthly rate throughout the year derived by 
averaging the gallonage charges, as set herein, for water use during the months ofNovembei· through 
April of the previous year. 
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CHUBBUCK MUNICIPAL SANITARY SEWER SYSTEM 
Monthly service charge, per biU $3.30 
Vohune charge, per 1,000 gals. $2.93 South of!w86 
Volume charge, per 1,000 gals. $2.25 North ofiw86 
INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES (abnormal strengths or volumes, multiple meters, meters larger 
than 211 or BODs and/or total suspended solids greater than 200 ppm) 
Monthly service charge~ pel' bill 
Volume charge, per 1,000 gals 
BOD charges, per pound 
Total kteldahl nitrogen (TKN). per lb. 
Suspended solids, per lb. 
Total phosphol'Us (P), per lb. 
Fats, oils, grease1 per lb. 
Domestic Septage Disposal 
Volume charge, per gallon 
SYSTEM CAPACITY FEES 
ResidentiaVComme1·cial Users 
T1·eatment Plant 
3/4 11 water connection 
111 water connection 
1 · 11211 water connection 
2" water connection 
Collection System 
3/411 water connection 
111 water connection 
1 1/2" water connection 
211 water connection 
$3.30 
$1.79 
$0.184 
$1.2685 (on amounts greater 
than 35 mg/1) 
$0.2548 
$5.5461 (on amounts greater 
than 7mg/1) 
$0.10 ~':i amounts greater 
100 mg/1) 
$0.0739 
·$1,110.00 
Sl,110,00 
$2,220.00 
$3,550.00 
$1,170.00 
$1,170.00 
$2,340.00 
$3,740.00 
Large Industrfal User Capacity Fee (abnonnal strengths or volumes, multiple meters, 
meters larger than 211 or BODs or total suspended solids greater than 200 ppm., or TKN greater 
than 3 5 mg/1, or phosphorus gteater than 7 mg/1 
Volume 
BOD 
TSS 
TKN 
Phosphorus 
Collection system 
RESOLUTION ·2· 
$0.07/gpd. 
$322.86/lb/day 
$415.00/lb/day 
$1,805.30/lb/day 
$3,736.33/lb/day 
$5.84/gpd 
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BE ITFURTHBR RESOLVED 1HAT fees apply to O\lm.ers or occupants of land, 
buildings, or premises requirjng sap.itary services, which ru.-e either connected to the sanitary sewer 
system or would be required to be connected to said system pursuant to Municipal Code § 13. I 6. 080, 
BE lT FURTHER RESOLVED THAT persons who qualify for BaIU1ook County's 
Circuit Breaker Exemption List, and own and occupy a single-family residence, shall receive a 30% 
reduction on that portion of their utility bill listed as 11Sewer11 or "Sanitru:y Sewer." Upon receipt of the 
Circuit Breaker Exemption List from Bannock County, the City Ut~ty Billing Department shall make 
the reduction, which shall remain in effect so long as the applicant meets the requirements set forth 
herein. 
BE 1T FURTHER RESOL VBD THAT the above fees and rates, shall be 
effective from October 1, 2010, through September 30, 2011. 
RESOLVED this Jg 'lb. day of August, 2010. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, a municipal 
corporation ofldaho . 
;}?P7. 
BRIAN C. BLjili,Mayor 
AITEST: 
RESOLUTION 
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Date PILOT Transfers Return of Equity Transfers Total Transfers by FY 
FY 2006 $ 477,272.00 $ 3,544,000.00 $ 4,021,272.00 
FY 2007 $ 477,272,00 $ 3,544,000.44 $ 4,021,272.44 . 
FV2008 $ 479,053.00 $ 3,349,079.00 $ 3,828,132.00 
FY2009 $ 493,424.00 $ 3,349,079.00 $ 3,842,503.00 
FV2010 $ 493,424.00 $ 3,349,079.00 $ 3,842,503.00 
FV2011 $ 493,424.00 $ 3,349,079.00 $ 3,842,503.00 
FY2012 $ 2,458,812.00 $ $ 2,458,812.00 
FV2013 $ 2,265,330.00 $ $ 2,265,330.00 
FY2014 $ 206,903.99 $ $ 206,903.99 
~To.i.~)i\::~;::t? :·?F~{S : :,,:(· :;::,·.-),:,-1;a44;914,99 :.:·:$ =·.:;·::.·(.:;~-.;..::·,:· '::·'.;~.:20;.ils4;316;44 .;;2$ :;.;t,,,·,:.:, i:k2s;a29,2)~A3 _.= 
Check Total $ 28,329,231.43 
Transfers Since 2011° $ 8,773,548.99 
E)(HIBIT B 
Prepared by Joyce Stroschein 9/22/14 Page 1 
CITY OF POCATELLO 000001 
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MEMORANDUM FOR: City Clede 
FROM: David Swh1dell, Chief Financial Office!' ~ ~/ 
SUBJECT: BCASEI Question #9 (water & sewer users) 
DATE: Ju1y30,2010 
1. FOR INFORMATION. 
2. Purpose. To provide response to BCASEI Question #9 (watel' & sewer users) 
3. Discussion. 
a. Question, BCASEI question# 9 is: "number of water and sewer users h1 the system 
for each of the last seven years.1' 
b. Answer: 
1) Report attached. Utility billing produced records for each month billing cycle per the 
attached report. 
2) Abbreviations: 
CB= Circuit Breaker. Residential accounts entitled to 30% reduction by virtue of being 
on the county's "circuit breaker,, property tax reduction program for low income households. 
CM ::; Commercial accounts 
IN= Industrial accounts 
MU= Multi-U1ut accounts 
SF= Sing!~ Family'accotmts 
SWSF = Sewer, Single Family 
SWUM= Sev-.ier, unmetered ( customers charged for sewer connection even though not· 
connected, by vittue of being close enough to a sewer line and voluntarily electing not to co1111ect 
(usually waiting tmtil their septic system reach.es end of useful life, then tliey connect vs. 
1·ebuilding the septic)). 
· WQ = Winter Quarter ( conu11ercial sewer accounts that are charged by sewer volume, 
which in tum is estimated based on winter water use) 
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WATER/SEWER CONNECTIONS 
Water Services Waste-Water 
Class Codes Connections 
Billing Period CB CM IN MU §I Total Consumption SWSF SWUM WO Total 
August2002 608 1,198 8 1,545 12.196 15,555-r 644,769,000 12,227 83 2,670 14,980 0 September 2002 598 1,202 8 1,543 12,274 15,625 583,972,000 12,262 83 2,669 15,014 I 
Oct:ober 2002 593 1,200 8 1,541 12.211 15,553 365,265,000 12,230 83 2,675 14,988 
November 2002 584 1~05 8 1,549 12,040 15,386 237,042,000 12,201 82 2,667 14,950 
December 2002* 462 929 8 1,115 8,962 11,476 124,122,000 10,050 44 1,989 '12,083 
January 2003 625 1,194 8 1,800 11,889 15,842 333,272,000 12,149 76 2,673 14,8!>"8 
February 2003 622 1,198 8 1,550 11,884 15,262 155,778,000 11,932 74 · . 2,681 14,687 · 
March2003 619 1,207 8 1,562 11,937 15,333 195,355,000 12,217 77 2,546 14,840 
Apri12003 617 1,212 8 1,564 11,983 15,384 195,117,000 12,,263 79 2,705 15,047 
May2003 611 1,215 8 1,564 12,167 15,565 200,061,000 12,276 79 2,719 15,074 
June2003 606 1,218 8 1,566 12,200 15,598 454.186.000 12,283 78 2,717 15,078 
July2003 603 1,228 8 1,569 12,297 15,705 646,796,000 12,,339 79 2,728 15,146 
August2003 595 1,219 8 1,567 12.271 15,660 ..,. 708,891,000 12,340 79 2,722 15,141 
Sept-ember 2003 594 1,224 8 1,575 12,380 15,781 555,779,000 12,392 78 2,729 15,199 
October 2003 592 1,219 8 1,571 12,323 15,713 395,132,000 12,346 76 2,716 15,138 
November 2003 584 1,212 8 1,571 12,191 15,566 287~450,000 12,348 77 2,720 15,145 
December 2003 580 1,199 8 1.570 12,057 15,414 150,469,000 12,221 76 2,551 14,848 r~ f 
' ~ 
Januazy2004 649 1.209 8 1,576 11,999 15,441 154,939,000 12,330 74 2,720 15,124 
February 2004 648 1,211 8 1,578 12,032 15,477 144,389,000 12,331 74 2,724 . 15,129 
March 2004** (;i42 1,208 8 1,553 12,003 15,414 152,558,000 9,926 71 1,810 11,807 
April 2004**"' 
May2004 637 1,221 8 1,585 12,283 15,734 329,505,000 12,410 15 2,742 15,227 
June2004 633 1,211 8 1,573 12,335 15,760 366,454,000 12,440 75 2.728 15,243 
July2004 630 1,220 8 1,578 12,385 15,821 499,209,000 12,458 75 - 2,735 15,268 
August 2004 625 1,230 8 1,574 12,389 15,826·""547,3~6.000 12,509 76 2,751. 15,336 
September 2004 *** 
.1 
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Water Semces Waste-Water 
Class Codes Connections . 
Billing Period CB CM IN lY.IU SF Total Consumption SWSF SVVUM WO Total 
October 2004* 487 960 8 1,148 9,310 11,913 290,618,000 9,618 41 2,054 11,713 
November 2004 627 1,210 8 1,599 12,434 15,878 210,018,000 12,641 75 2,747 15,463 
December 2004 612 1,206 8 1,596 12,337 15,759 137,058,000 12,633 70 2,757 15,460 
January 2005 666 1,202 8 1,599 12,301 15,776 131,025,000 12,329 66 2,565 14,960 () 
February 2005 665 1,203 8 1,597 12,253 15,726 132,759,000 12,627 61 2,649 15,337 
March2005 662 1,212 8 t599 12,267 15,748 184,819,000 12,633 61 2,753 15,447 
April2005 663 1,197 8 1,594 12,368 15,830 184,597,000 12,697 61 2,742 15,500 
May2005 661 1,218 8 1,605 12,490 15,982 173,967,000 12,719 61 2,767 15,547 
June 2005 656 1,225 8 1,593 12,580 16,062 244,353,000 12,730 61 2,766 15,557 
July2005 655 1,227 8 1,606 12,650 16,146 492,639,000 12,777 63 2,768 15,608 
August2005 646 1,228 8 1,602 12,695 16,179 '610,729,000 12,789 63 2,773 15,625 
September 2005 640 1,238 8 1,627 12,764 16,277 556,329,000 12,801 62 2,785 15,648 
October 2005 637 1,236 8 1,608 12,734 16,223 369,946,000 12,801 61 2,780 15,642 
November2005 629 1,232 8 1,609 12,574 16,052 201,485,000 12,789 61 2,784 15,634 
December 2005 624 1,231 8 1,619 12,493 15,975 155,381,000 12,799 61 2,785 15,645 
January 2006* 450 829 8 1,348 9,478 12,113 102,123,000 9,609 38 2,156 11,803 
February 2006 675 1,216 8 1,618 12,383 15,900 143,208,000 12,791 61 2,784 15,636 
March2006 675 1,221 8 1,619 12,422 15,945 185,551,000 12,770 61 2,776 15,607 
April 2006 672 1,226 8 1,622 12,468 15,996 197,155,000 12,835 62 2,783 15,680 
/~ 
May2006 670 1,230 8 1,622 12,644 16,174 192,956,000 12,867 63 2,782 15,712 
June2006 665 1,243 8 1,630 12,787 16,,333 436,075,000 12,906 63 2,795 15,764 ~0 
July2006* 441 854 8 1,357 9,802 12,462 413,987,000 9,716 39 2,187 11,942 . 
August2006 656 1,266 8 1,638 12,908 16,476 / 609,620,000 12,968 63 2,816 15,847 
September 2006 653 1,276 8 1,641 12,945 16,523 597,762,000 12,969 61 2,831 15,861 
October 2006 645 1,268 8 1,647 12,861 16,429 345,204,000 12,966 60 2,824 15,850 
November 2006* 427 854 8 1,370 9,728 12,387 137,388,000 9,751 37 2,183 11,971 
December 2006 633 1,257 8 1,640 12,659 16,197 138,893,000 12,953 57 2,824 15,834 
2 
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Water Services Waste-Watel."' 
CJass Codes Connections 
Billing Period CB ~ 1N MU SF Total Consumption SWSF SWDM WO Total 
Januacy 2007 -702 l,241 8 1,643 12,574 16,168 159,126,000 12,910 56 2,812 15,778 
February 2007 701 1,251 8 1,647 12,530 16,137 140,242,000 12,881 57 2,825 15,763 
March2007 699 1,257 8 1,657 12,525 16,146 164,546,000 12,971 . 57 2,849 15,877 
April2007 695 1,277 8 1,653 12,694 16,327 190,215,000 12,951 58 2,844 15,853 ~ 
May2007 696 1,282 8 1,661 12,868 16,515 230,924,000 13,022 58 2,858 15,.938 \~J 
June2007 688 1,282 8 1,669 12,976 16,623 457,242,000 13,068 57 2,863 15,988 
July2007 686 1,289 8 1,673 13,029 16,685 594,794,000 13,088 58 2,875 16,021 
August2007 683 1,291 8 1,675 13,075 16,732 . .,.. 633,565,000 13,116 51 2,877 16,050 
September 2007 679 1,297 8 1,684 13,111 16,779 522,373,000 13,142 58 2,888 · 16,088 
October 2007 616 1,295 8 1,685 13,000 16,664 341,965,000 13,106 58 2,882 16,046 
November 2007 675 1,283 8 1,687 12,912 16,565 192,224,000 13,116 56 2,889 16,061 
December 2007 664 1,056 8 I,591 12,516 15,835 129,461,000 13,099 56 2,884 16,039 
January 2008 713 1,277 8 1,691 12,768 16,457 158,282,000 13,114 56 2,894 16,064 
February 2008 711 1,269 8 1,687 12,719 16,394 168,880,000 13,091 57 2,883 16,031 
March2008 . 710 1,276 8 1,692 12,786 16,472 170,374,000 13,134 57 2,876 16,067 
April2008 709 1,287 8 1,687 12,822 16,513 183,928,000 13,166 51 2,900 16,123 
May2008 707 1,303 8 1,694 12,988 16,700 205,794,000 13,193 59 2,912 16,164 
June2008 706 1,309 8 1,695 13,100 16,818 331,836,000 13,.217 59 2,909 16,185 
July2008 704 1,318 8 1,701 13,150 16,881 518,138,000 l~,259 59 2,869 16,187 
August2008 700 1,323 8 1,694 13,143 16,868 ,1 688,525~000 13,302 59 2,922 16,283 _,...,:-1.,~ 
September 2008 696 1,322 8 1,689 13,213 16,928 625,955,000 13,304 58 2,920 16,282 
{ 
\ 
.._.,; 
October 2008 689 1,318 8 1,697 13,103 16,815 439,202,000 13,286 58 2,923 16,267 
November 2008* 435 880 8 880 9,965 12,698 157,911,000 9,996 36 2,256 12,288 
December 2008 665 1,296 8 1,695 12,867 16,531 150.631,000 13,232 58 2,927 16,217 
January 2009* 544 1,137 8 1.310 8,821 11,820 123,856,000 9,082 55 2,367 11,504 
February 2009 708 1,285 8 1,704 12,910 16,615 150,455,000 13,284 57 2,899 16,240 
March2009 706 1,302 8 1,704' 12,919 16,639 152,599,000 13,275 57 2,933 16,265 
April2009 704 1,301 8 1,706 12,910 16,629 172,725,000 13,286 57 2,934 16,277 
May2009 704 . 1,317 8 1,702 13,095 16,826 188,865,000 13,334 59 2,935. 16,328 
3 
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Water Services Waste-Water 
· Class Codes Connections 
Billing Period CB CM IN MU SF Total Consumption SWSF SWUM WO To!!!! 
June2009 699 I.324 8 1,704 13,198 16,933 327,410,000 13,340 58 2,940 16,338 
July2009 693 1,330 8 1,703 13,215 16,949 317,684,000 13,365 59 2,942 16,366 
August2009 690 1,332 8 1,702 13,232 16,964 ~ 557,391,000 13,391 58 2,941 16,390 
September 2009 689 1,330 8 1,699 13,285 17,011 510,497,000 13,403 59 2,953 16,415 
October 2009 680 1,327 8 1,701 13,201 16,917 375,767,000 13,351 58 2,939 16,348 r) r ··'· 
November 2009 673 1,321 8 1,697 13,065 16,764 170,573,000 13,366 58 2,935 16,359 \~~o:,.:1~·r 
December 2009 * 546 858 8 1,116 10,432 12,960 114,190,000 10,703 55 1,925 12,683 
January2010 725 1,301 8 1,686 12,897 16,617 154,006,000 13,334 58 2,918 16,310 
February 2010 724 1,299 8 1,689 12,877 16,597 · 144,745,000 13,320 58 2,920 16,29a 
March2010 718 1,303 8 1,689 12,901 16,619 149,281,000 13,328 58 2,920 16,306 
April2010 717 1,297 8 1,690 12,951 16,663 172,273,000 13,370 58 2,916 16344 
May2010 715 1,316 8 1,694 13,115 16,848 190,170,000 13,384 59 2,923 16,366 
June20IO 713 1,317 8 1,696 13,204 16,938 246,730,000 13,396 59 2,926 16,381 
*No data for one Cycle 
**No billing data for Cycle 2; incomplete billing data for Cycle 4 
***No data for two or more Cycles 
r""""' 
,,~ 
4 
···--·-· ······---·--··-.. ·--- --·-··-··--------···-·-···- ., .. ---·--·~-----. ·······--·--------·-·-·-~·--····---·------
242
Cit:y of Pocatello Connection & Capaci'ty Fee History 
FY 
Line Decription Detail 2003 
· 031-3000-338.10-00 WATER PUBLIC WORKS CONNECTIONS 68,212.75 
031-300H-338.15-00 · WATER PUBLIC WORKS CAPACITY FEE 59,829.00 
032-3000-338.10--00 WPC PUBLIC WORKS CONNECTIONS 
032-3000-338.1!$-00 WPC PUBLIC WORKS CAPACITY FEE 4,188.70 
032-3000-338.16-00 WPC PUBLIC WORKS COLLECTION SYSTEM CAPACITY FEE 
032-3000-338.17-00 WPC PUBLIC WORKS TREATMENT PU\NT CAP FEE 
* Revised capacity fees introduced 3/4-year@ 75% rate; not a full FY 
** YTD as of May 31, 2010 
Note: City fiscal year runs 1 Oct·- 30 Sep 
Ci'ty of Pocatello Building Permit Fee History 
FY 
2003 
001-0000-312.20-00 PUBLIC SAFETY BUILDING PERMITS 458,909.87 
001-0500-312.20-00 PUBLIC SAFETY BUILDING PERMITS 
964-0000-312.20-00 PUBLIC SAFETY BU!LOlNG PERMITS 
Note 1) Building Permits FY03~FY07 accounted for in General Fund 001-0000 
Note 2) Building Permits FY08-FY10 accounted for in General Fund, Building Division 001-0500 
Note 3) 2% of Building Penn it revenue dedicated to Fund 964 Building Abatement Fund beginning in FY06 
** YTD as of May 31, 2010 
Note: City fiscal year runs 1 Oct - 30 Sep 
fY FY 
2004 2005 
89,196.33 105,050.44 
68,434.00 86,632.00 
5,517.78 
FY FY 
2004 2005 
553,270.19 725,299.34 
·-----------.---·-··-· --- - ··-·-·---···-----·--···-·----·-.. ·----
,c, 
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FY FY FY 
2006 2007* 2008 
145,420.38 118,632.70 148,627.61 
109,840.00 266,259.43 320,867.49 
19,105.00 
56,280.00 80,687.SO 
1;1.2,455.15 178,236.00 
FY FY FY 
2006 2007 2008 
982,310.98 849,458.12 
19,660.14 17,392.69 
1,342,815.36 
27,801.75 
FY FY 
2009 2010YTD** 
92,992.03 31,760.52 
354,666.44 127,412.00 
3,060.00 
74,753.00 31,052.00 
130,150.00 106,720.00 
FY FY 
2009 2010\'TD** 
1,273,443.91 171,927.93 
26,058.36 4,786.54 
FY03-FVlO· YTD 
Grand Totals 
799,892.76 
1,393,940.36 
31,871.48 
242,772.50 
527,561.15 
FY03-FY10 YTO 
Grand Totals 
3,569,248.50 
2,788,187,20 
95,699.48 
,,-.,,,,, iu 
/~. 
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City of Pocatello Capacity Fee History (since current structure adopted January 2007) 
Line 
031-3000-338.15-00 
Decription 
WATER PUBLIC WORKS 
032-3000-338.16-00 WPC PUBLIC WORKS 
Detail 
CAPACITY FEE 
FY 
2007* 
266,259.43 
COLLECTION SYSTEM CAPACITY FEE 56,280.00 
FY FY FY 
2008 2009 2010YTD** 
320,867.49 354,666.44 122,212.00 
80,687.50 75,753.00 30,362.00 
032-3000-338.17-00 WPC PUBLIC WORKS 195,321.00 130,150.00 91,760.00 TREATMENT PLANT CAP FEE __ 1_12....;.,4_s_s_.s_o _ __,:  ____ __, ____ _ 
* Capacity fees introduced 3/4-year@ 75% rate; not a full FY 
** YTD as of May 15, 2010 
Note: City fiscal year runs 1 Oct - 30 Sep 
. ·--··-------------.-~,- ... -····-··-------- ·----- ---··-----~--
Totals by FY 434,994.93 596,875.99 560,569.44 244,334.00 
---~-·--·--···-·-··--·---·-·----------~--·-···"-···--------------~--·--····· ·-··· .. , .... , ... ·-----·· . . 
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FY07-FY10 YTD 
Grand Totals 
1,064,005.36 
243,082.50 
1,3071:087 .86 
2,614,175.72 
>t-
0 
/r""'7'l~ 
"i. 
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City of Pocatello Capacity Fee History (since current structure adopted January 2007) 
Line -
031-3000-338.15-00 
032-3000-338.16-00 
032-3000-338.17-00 
Decription 
WATER PUBLIC WORKS 
WPC PUBLIC WORKS 
WPC PUBLIC WORKS 
FY 
Detail 2007* 
CAPACITY FEE - 266,259.43 
COLLECTION SYSTEM CAPACllY FEE 56,280.00 
FY 
2008 
320,867.49 
80,687.50 
195,321.00 
FY Ff 
2009 2010YTO** 
354,666.44 122,212.00 
75,753.00 30,362.00 
TREATMENT PLANT CAP FEE 112,455.50 
------------------------
130,150.00 91,760.00 
* Capacity fees introduced 3/4-year@ 75% rate; not a full FY 
** YTD as of May 15, 2010 
Note: City fiscal year runs 1 Oct - 30 Sep 
To ta Is by FY 434,994.93 596,875.99 560,569.44 244,334.00 
C) 
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Michael D. Gaffney, ISB No: 3558 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
Telephone: (208) 523-5171 
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732 
Email: ga:ffney_@beardstclair.com 
Nathan M. Olsen, ISB No. 7373 
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN 
485 "E" Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Telephone: (208) 523-4650 
Facsimile: (208) 524-3391 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
0 
DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
BANNOCK COUNTY IDAHO 
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on 
behalf of itself and all others similarly 
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself 
and all others similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
municipality, 
Defendant. 
Case No.: CV-2014-1520-0C 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF CLASS CERTIFICATION 
Plaintiffs through counsel of record provide the following Memorandum in 
Support of Class Certification. This memorandum is supported by the pleadings and the 
affidavits of Ed Quinn and Logan Robinson contemporaneously filed herewith. 
Additionally, this motion is supported by the -applicable findings of fact and law 
contained in its November 15, 2013, "Memorandum Decision" in State of Idaho, Sixth 
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Judicial District Court for Bannock Case No. CV-2011-5228-0C, (2011 Decision) of 
which this Court may take judicial notice. 
FACTS 
I. Procedural Background 
1. Each year the Defendant, City of Pocatello (City), passes a resolution setting 
water and sewer connection fees or "System Capacity Fees" (Capacity Fees) which are 
paid along with permit fees for new construction. (Ed Quinn Aff. rr 2.) This yearly 
resolution also sets monthly water, wastewater and sanitary rates for users of the system 
(User Fees). (Logan RobinsonAff. rr 2.)(2011 Dec. p. 13) Capacity Fees and User Fees 
haye been deposited in unsegregated accounts for water, sewer and sanitation 
respectively. (Id. rr 3.) In March of 2013, the City established a separate account to 
deposit the Capacity Fees (for water and sewer respectively). (2011 Decision p. 
12)(QuinnAff. rr 3.) 
2. Around 2005, the City initiated a policy with regard to the Capacity and User 
Fees titled under various names, including "Return on Equity," "Rate of Return," 
"Franchise Fee," and "Payment in Lieu of Taxes" hereafter collectively referred to as 
"PILOT." (Idaho Dec. pp. 21-22.) 
3. In late 2006, then City Mayor Chase requested an opinion from the Attorney 
General for the State ofldaho (IAG) on the legality of the PILOT policy. (Id. p. 13) In an 
opinion dated February 6, 2007, the IAG told the City that the policy did not comply with 
law, setting forth the statutes and case law supporting such opinion. (Id.) The City 
disregarded the opinion and continued with the PILOT policy. (Id. generally) 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF CLASS CERTIFICATION -
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4. The Building Contractors Association of Southeast Idaho (BCASEI) filed an 
action in the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State of Idaho in and for 
Bannock County (Case No. CV-2011-5228-0C) (Idaho Case) challenging the legality of 
the City's Capacity Fee and User Fee policies, and seeking declaratory and injunctive 
relief. (Id.) 
5. In a November 15, 2013, Memorandum Decision and Order the Idaho Court held 
that the City's PILOT programs, or any other program with a similar intent are 
unconstitutional and a violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond Act. (Id. pp,,25-36) 
7. According to public record, from FY 2007 through FY 2014, the City transferred 
from the water, sewer and sanitation fund $28,329,230.41 under the guise of "PILOT 
"and "Return on Equity" programs. (Quinn, Robinson Aff. II 4, Ex. B.) 
II. Class A - Capacity Fee Payers. 
1. Since 2007, as a builder, plaintiff Ed Quinn (Quinn) has had to pay Capacity Fees 
for new construction in the City as set by City Resolution. (Quinn Aff. II 2) Up until at 
least March of 2013, these fees were improperly transferred to the general fund and 
improperly taken and used as a disguised tax. (See infra Facts Sec. I.) 
2. Any person obtaining a building permit for new construction has to pay Capacity 
Fees as set forth by City Resolution. (Quinn Aff. rr 4.) 
3. According to a table found in the City's "Comprehensive Annual Financial 
Report" for FY 2013, there were 1,374 permits obtained for new construction from 2007 
through 2013. (Id. II 5, Ex. C.) As is the case with Quinn, up until March of 2013, the 
Capacity Fees paid by these other builders were transferred from the water and sewer to 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF CLASS CERTIFICATION -
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the City's general fund and improperly taken and used as a disguised tax. (See infra Facts 
Sec.I.) 
III. Class B WN User Fee Payers 
1. Since 2007, as a resident and owner of several rental units, plaintiff Hill-Vu 
Mobile Home P.ark (Hill Vu) has had to pay substantial amounts of"User Fees" as set by 
City Resolution. (See infra Facts Sec. I.) A significant portion of these fees were 
improperly transferred to the general fund and improperly taken and used as a disguised 
tax. (Id.) 
2. Any person owning property in the City serviced by water, sewer and sanitation 
has had to pay User Fees as set forth by City Resolution. (Robinson Aff. rr 4) 
3. According to public records, there are on average over 16,000 "accounts" for User 
Fees in the City. (Id. Ex. B) As is the case with Hill-Vu, up until December of 2013, a 
substantial amount of these User Fees paid by users of the system were improperly 
transferred from the water, sewer and sanitation funds to the City's general fund and 
improperly taken and used as a disguised tax. (See infra Facts Sec. I.) 
ARGUMENT 
I. LEGAL STANDARDS GOVERNING CLASS CERTIFICATION 
a. Rule 23's General Requirements for Class Certification 
.There are few Idaho state law cases interpreting Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 23. 
Those few cases are addressed herein; however, Idaho's rule is congruent with the 
federal rule pertaining to class action lawsuits. The Idaho Supreme Court has written 
that when asked to interpret a state rule, if the rule's federal counterpart is identical it 
will "look to rulings on the scope of the federal rule for additional in interpreting the 
Idaho rule. Compton v. Compton, 101 Idaho 328,334,612 P.2d 1175, 1181 (1980)." 
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Martin v. Hoblit, 987 P .2d 284, 288 n.3 (Idaho 1999). Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
23(a) is substantively identical to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a).1 
Under Rule 23 there is also an implied requirement that membership in each 
Class is ascertainable based on objective criteria. -In the Ninth Circuit, it is enough that 
the class definition provides a description of the product purchased and the dates of 
purchase. Werdebaugh v. Blue Diamond Growers, No. 12-CV-2724-LHK, 2014 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 71575, at *28-29 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2014) (citing McCrary v. The 
Elations Co., LLC, No. 13-00242, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8443, at *25 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 
13, 2014)) and Guido v. L 'Orea!, USA, Inc., No. CV 11-1067, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
94031, at *53 (C.D. Cal. July l, 2013). 
The party seeking class certification bears the burden of proving, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that each of Rule 23's requirements is satisfied. 
Armstrong, 298 F.R.D. at 485 (quoting Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551: "Rule 23 grants 
courts no license to engage in free-ranging merits inquiries at the certification stage."). 
See also Amgen v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184; 1194-95 (2013). 
Instead, " [ m ]erits questions may be considered to the extent - but only to the extent -
that they are relevant to determining whether the Rule 23 prerequisites for class 
certification are satisfied." Id at 1195. 
b. Plaintiffs' Claims Satisfy Rule 23's Policy Considerations 
Courts frequently consider the policy considerations underlying Rule 23 when 
determining whether a proposed class meets the Rule's requirements. Amchem Prods, 
1 There is a wording difference in the rules that does not affect the substantive meaning of the rules. The 
Idaho Rule provides that one or more member of a class may sue or be sued on "behalf of all only if ... " 
whereas the federal rule states that one or more member of a class may sue or be sued on "behalf of all 
members only if. ; .. " The inclusion of the word "members" is a wording difference that has no 
substantive impact on whether the rules are materially identical. 
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Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591,617 (1997). The Supreme Court has clarified: "[t]he 
policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that 
small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action 
prosecuting his or her rights." Id (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 
344 (7th Cir. 1997)). "[W]hen what is small is not the aggregate but the individual claim, 
[] that's the type of case in which class action treatment is most needful .... A class 
action, like litigation in general, has a deterrent as well as a compensatory objective." 
Hughes v. Kore of Ind Enter., Inc., 731 F.3d 672,677 (7th Cir. 2013) (Posner, J.). Class 
actions serve the important function of permitting plaintiffs to vindicate the rights of 
individuals and pursue small claims that would be infeasible to pursue individually. 
Deposit. Guar. Nat'! Bankv. Roper, 445 U.S. 326,338 (1980). 
Moreover, class actions play a particularly important role in the enforcement of 
the antitrust laws. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330,344 (1979); Hawaii v. 
Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251,266 (1972). Class actions "permit the plaintiffs 
to pool claims which would be uneconomical to litigate individually" and ensure that 
plaintiffs have a right to redress wrongs that would otherwise "have no realistic day in 
court if a class action were not available." Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 
809 (1985); see also Amchem, 521 U.S. at 617. 
Lastly, class certification will reduce the risk of inconsistent adjudications while 
saving "the resources of both the courts and the parties by permitting an issue potentially 
affecting every [class member] to be litigated in an economical fashion." Gen. Tel. Co. 
of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 155 (1982)(citing Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 
U.S. 682, 701 (1979)). 
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Plaintiffs' motion satisfies the requirements and policy considerations underlying 
Rule 23 and the Proposed Classes should be certified. 
II. THE PROPOSED CLASSES SATISFY THE RULE 23(A) 
REQUIREMENTS 
"Under Rule 23 (a), the Plaintiffs must show that: (1) the class is so numerous that 
joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to 
the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims 
or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately 
protect the interests of the class." K. w· v. Armstrong, 298 F.R.D. 479,485 (D. Idaho 
2014) (Winmill, J.); see also United Steel, Paper & Forestry v. ConocoPhillips, 593 F.3d 
802, 806 (9th Cir. 2010). "These four requirements of Rule 23(a) are designed to 'ensure 
that the named plaintiffs are appropriate representatives of the class whose claims they 
wish to litigate."' Armstrong, 298 F.R.D. at 485 (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 
131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011)). 
In many respects, this case is similar to a recent US Court of Federal Claims 
decision Starr International Company, Inc. v. US and American International Group, 
Inc., No. 11-779C, March 11, 2014. This decision provides a concise statement of the 
prerequisites under Rule 23 for class certification that should be very helpful to the Court 
as it reviews this issue, and a complete copy of the opinion is therefore attached and 
incorporated herein for the Court's convenience. 
The Court of Claims in Starr International Company, Inc. certified two classes 
consisting of two types of stockholders of American International Group (AIG). Id. pp. 
3-4. The first class identified as the ''Credit Agreement Class" consisted of those who 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF CLASS CERTIFICATION -
7 
254
("')'· ·:!_ 
·.~.} 
held AIG stock before September 16, 2008, (with certain exclusions.) Id. The second 
class identified as the "Stock Split Class" consisted ofthose·who held AIG common 
stock on June 30, 2009 (with certain exclusions.) Id. The essence of the Plaintiffs' 
claims were that ( 1) the "imposition" of a "Credit Agreement" on September 22, 2008 by 
which the Government obtained a 79.9% equity in AIG and (2) "the reverse stock split 
on June 30, 2009 by which shareholders were denied a separate vote, the Goverrunent 
effected a taking or ·illegal exaction of the property of shareholders in violation of the 
Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution." Id. p. 2. 
The Court then conducted an analysis of each of the Rule 23(a) criteria, i.e. 
numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy, and superiority, to detennine that class 
action certification was appropriate for each of the two classes.2 With regard to 
"commonality" the Court held that "here, the claims of the members within each putative 
class are based on the same exact government· action, either the Credit Agreement or the 
reverse stock split" therefore resulting in a "unifying nexus" of the claims. Id. p. 4. The 
Court held Plaintiffs claim consisted of the same "factual and legal predicates, and 
therefore "share(d) the same characteristics as the claim" of the respective classes," 
meeting the "typicality" requirement. Id. pp. 6-7. The Court also held that the adequacy 
requirement was met finding that the "class members do not have interests that are 
antagonistic to one another." Id. p. 7. The Court indicated that the class members were 
"aligned because all plaintiffs would assert the same legal claim, a taking in 
contravention of the Fifth Amendment, arising out of the same government actions." Id. 
p. 7. Of further note, the Court rejected the defendants claim that there was "conflict" 
2 "The "numerosity" requirement was not challenged by the defendants. 
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because of variations in the potential benefits to the respective class members, holding 
that "the mere fact that some members within one class may stand to benefit more from 
their shareholdings in another class does not create a conflict within the individual 
classes." Id. p. 8. Finality with regard to the "superiority" requirement, pursuant to Rule 
23(b)(3), the Court weighed "any potential problems with the manageability or fairness 
of a class action against the benefits to the system and the individual members likely to 
be derived from maintain such an action." Id. p. 8. The Court held that the "cost/benefit 
analysis tips decidedly in factor of class certification" in that it "will achieve economies · 
of scale in time, effort and expense." Id. p. 8. 
This Court really need look no further than the analysis and authority provided in 
Starr International to grant certification in this case. As in Starr International, this case 
involves two classes, i.e. connection fee and user fee payers, that were both affected by 
the same governmental action, the use of fees out for the so-called impermissible PILOT 
program. Both classes have the same legal claim, that such action constitutes a taking in 
contravention of the Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution. Their interests are 
aligned, notwithstanding the fact that some user or connection fee payers would benefit 
more than others (i.e. depending on how large of a fee they paid.) Finally, a class 
certification in this case would be a much more "superior'' or efficient manner in which 
to pursue these claims - in that it would prevent the numerous potential litigants in the 
case from having to obtain counsel and inundate the system with hundreds if not 
thousands of separate lawsuits. 
Nevertheless, a detailed analysis and authority for each one of Rule 23 criteria as 
applied to the facts in this case is provided below. 
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a. Class Members are Sufficiently Numerous 
Rule 23(a)(l) requires that the Proposed Classes be "so numerous thatjoinder of 
all members is impractical."3 Here, the class could consist of no less than 1,374 
individual connection fee payers (representing the number of permits obtained from 2007 
through2012), and no less than 16,000 user payers during that same period. Under the 
circumstances, numerosity is presumed and Plaintiffs do not expect Defendants to contest 
thatjoinder of hundreds of plaintiffs would be impracticable.4 "The difficulty in joining 
as few as 40 class members should raise the presumption that joinder is impracticable, 
and the plaintiff whose class is that large or larger should meet the test of Rule 23(a)(l) 
on that fact alone." Rafus v. Aspen Realty, Inc., 236 F.R.D. 652, 655 (D. Idaho 2006) 
("Bafus"), quoting 1 Newberg on Class Actions,§ 3:5 (4th Ed. 2004). 
The implied requirement of ascertainability is also satisfied because the Class is 
objectively defined and its members are readily identifiable from Defendants' own 
records. See CRT, 2013 WL 5391159 at *2 (noting that a "class definition must also be 
precise, objective, and presently ascertainable, meaning that it must be administratively 
feasible for the court to determine whether an individual is a member of the class"); Ries 
v. Arizona Beverages USA LLC, 287 F.R.D. 523, 535-36 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
Plaintiffs easily meet the numerosity requirement for class certification. 
3 This standard only requires a showing that joinder of all claims would be difficult or inconvenient, not 
impossible. Arnone v. Aveiro, 226 F.R.D. 677, 683 (D. Haw. 2005); see also 7 A Charles Alan Wright & 
Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure§ 1762 (3d ed. 2005) ("'[I]mpracticable' does not mean 
'impossible.' The representatives only need to show that it is extremely difficult or inconvenient to join 
all the members of the class."'). 
4 "[N]umerosity is presumed where the plaintiff class contains forty or more members." Redwen v. Sino 
Clean Energy, Inc., No. CV 11-3936, 2013 U.S. Dist LEXIS 100275, at *11 (C.D. Cal. July 9, 2013); 
see also Arnone, 226 F.R.D. at 684 (Generally, a class satisfies numerosity if it is likely to exceed forty 
members); Breeden v. Benchmark Lending Grp., Inc., 229 F.R.D. 623, 628-29 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (internal 
citations omitted) ("a survey ofrepresentative cases indicates that, generally speaking, classes consisting 
of more than 75 members usually satisfy the numerosity requirement of Rule 23 ( a)( I)."). 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF CLASS CERTIFICATION -
10 
257
0 () 
b. Common questions of law and fact exist in each class 
Rule 23(a)(2) requires that there are questions oflaw or fact common to the 
Proposed Classes, and, for purposes of this Rule, "even a single question will do." 
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2556 (internal punctuation omitted); Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor 
Co., 666 F.3d 581,589 (9th Cir. 2012) ("commonality only requires a single significant 
question of law or fact."). "A class action satisfies the commonality requirement when 
it has 'the capacity ... to generate common answers' to common questions of law or 
fact that are 'apt to drive the resolution of the litigation."' Armstrong, 298 F.R.D. at 486 
(quoting Mazza, 666 F.3d at 588). This "common contention, moreover, must be of 
such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution - which means that determination 
of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the 
claims in one stroke." Dukes, 131 S.Ct. at 2551. Commonality requires the 
identification of a common contention, one "of such a nature that it is capable of 
classwide resolution - which means that determination of its truth or falsity will 
resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke." 
Wal- Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011) "A class action 
satisfies the commonality requirement when it has "'the capacity . . . to generate 
common answers to common questions oflaw or fact that are 'apt to drive the 
resolution of the litigation."' K. W. ex rel. D. W. v. Armstrong, 298 F.R.D. 479,486 (D. 
Idaho 2014), quoting Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 666 F.3d 581,588 (9th Cir. 
2012). "[W]hether class members could actually prevail on the merits of their claims" 
is not a proper inquiry in determining the preliminary question ''whether common 
questions exist." Stockwell v. City and County of San Francisco, 749 F.3d 1107, 1111 
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(9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 983, n.8 (9th 
Cir. 2011)). 
In this case, the common questions of law and fact for each of the Proposed 
Classes that will be determined on a class wide basis include but is not limited to: 
Whether user and connection fees (respectively) transferred to the general fund 
under the improper and illegal "PILOT" programs constitute a taking for which the fee 
payers are entitled compensation. 
At summary judgment and trial, Plaintiffs will demonstrate that in fact user and 
connection fees collected and comingled into the same account were impermissibly 
transferred into the general revenue account as a disguised tax. Plaintiffs will further 
demonstrate that under Idaho precedent, these disguised taxes do constitute an improper 
talcing of property under the Idaho and US Constitution and/or constitute unjust 
enrichment for which the Plaintiffs are entitled compensation. All of the Plaintiffs (in 
the respective classes) will share the same factual and legal bases. "Commonality is 
satisfied by 'the existence of shared legal issues with divergent factual predicates' or a 
'common core of salient facts coupled with disparate legal remedies within the class."' 
Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d at 1011, 1019-20 (9th Cir. 1998). 
Furthermore, "variation among class members in their motivation for purchasing 
the product, the factual circumstances behind their purchase, or the price that they paid 
does not defeat the relatively 'minimal' showing required to establish commonality." 
Ries v. Arizona Beverages USA LLC, 287 F.R.D. 523, 537 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (citing 
Hanlon, F.3d at 1020). Accordingly, "[w]here the circumstances of each particular 
class member vary but retain a common core of factual or legal issues with the rest of 
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the class, commonality exists." Evon v. Law Offices of Sidney Mickell, 688 F.3d 1015, 
1029 (9th Cir. 2012) ( quotation marks and citation omitted). See also Parsons v. Ryan, 
754 F.3d 657,675 (9th Cir. 2014). Thus, even though class members may have paid 
different amounts for the user and connection fees does not in itself defeat class 
certification. 
Accordingly, the Proposed Classes satisfy Rule 23(a)(2)'s commonality 
requirement. 
c. Plaintiffs have claims typical of the classes 
Rule 23(a)(3) requires that "the claims or defenses of the representative parties" 
be "typical of the claims or defenses of the class." The test of typicality is "whether 
other members have the same or similar injury, whether the action is based on conduct 
which is not unique to the named plaintiffs, and whether other class members· have been 
injured by the same course of conduct." Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 685 (9th Cir. 
2014), quoting Hanan v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir.1992). 
"Under the rule's permissive standards, representative claims are 'typical' if they are 
reasonably coextensive with those of absent class members; they need not be 
substantially identical." Id., quoting Hanl.on, 150 F.3d at 1020; see also KW. ex rel. 
D. W., 298 F.R.D. at 487. 
'"Typicality refers to the nature of the claim ... of the class representative, and 
not to the specific facts from which it arose or the relief sought."' Ellis, 657 F.3d at 984. 
"Some degree of individuality is to be expected in all cases, but that specificity does not 
necessarily defeat typicality." Cifuentes v. Red Robin Int'!, No. C-11-5635-EMC, 2012 
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WL 693930, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Lozano v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., 504 F.3d 718, 734 (9th Cir. 2007). 
Furthermore, plaintiffs' claims are "typical" even if they are not "identical." 
Armstrong, 298 F.R.D. at 487; Thomas & Thomas Rodmakers, Inc. v. Newport 
Adhesives & Composites Inc., 209 F.R.D. 159, 164 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (Differences as to 
"the various products purchased and the ... amount of damage sustained by individual 
plaintiffs do not negate a finding of typicality, provided the cause of action arises from 
a common wrong.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). See also In re 
TFT-LCD I, 267 F.R.D. at 593-94. 
As outlined in their respective affidavits, each named class representative was 
typical of their respective class, i.e. Ed Quinn as a developer and "connection fee" 
payer, and Logan Robinson as a user fee payer. Further, each of these individuals 
suffered injury, an improper taking of their property as a result of the Defendant's 
conduct. 
Thus, both named class representatives and unnamed dass members allege a 
common course of unlawful conduct by Defendant directed at all class members arising 
from the same legal conspiracy, and based on the identical legal theories. Typicality is 
satisfied if the class representative's claims arise from the same course of conduct and 
are based on the same legal theory as the other class members' claims." Shoshone-
Bannock Tribes of the Fort Hall Reservation v. Norton, No. CV-02-009, 2005 WL 
2387595, at *2 (D. Idaho Sept. 28, 2005). Accordingly, Rule 23(a)(3)'s typicality 
requirement is met. 
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d. Plaintiffs and Counsel will adequately represent the class. 
Rule 23(a)(4) requires a detennination that the class representative "fairly and 
adequately protect the interests of the class." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). "To determine 
whether the representation meets this standard, we ask two questions: (1) do the 
representative plaintiffs and their counsel have any conflicts of interest with other class 
members; and (2) will the representative plaintiffs and their counsel prosecute the 
action vigorously on behalf of the class?" Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 957 (9th 
Cir. 2003). 
To satisfy the first requirement "a class representative must not be antagonistic 
or have conflicts of interest with other potential class members." Farms v. Calcot, Ltd., 
No. CV-F-07- 0464, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93548, at *12 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2010) 
(citingAmchem, 521 U.S. at 626). If only one of each of the Proposed Classes' 
representatives is adequate, the adequacy of representation is met. Rodriguez v. West 
Publ'g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 961 (9th Cir. 2009) ("'[T]he adequacy-of-representation 
requirement is satisfied as long as one of the class representatives is an adequate class 
representative."') ( quoting Local Joint Executive Bd. of Culinary/Bartender Trust Fund 
v. Las Vegas Sands, Inc., 244 F.3d 1152, 1162 n.2 (9th Cir. 
2001)); see also 1A Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure§ 
1765, at 326 (2005) ("[I]fthere is more than one named representative, it is not 
necessary that all the representatives meet the Rule 23(a)(4) standard; as long as one of 
the representatives is adequate, the requirement will be met."). 
_ In this case, the Proposed Classes consist of connection fee and user fee payers 
like the Plaintiffs, who were damaged as a consequence of Defendants' wrongful 
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conduct. Plaintiffs are all similarly situated and there is no conflict between the 
interests of the Proposed Classes and the Plaintiffs. See In re Tableware Antitrust 
Litig., 241 F.R.D. 644,649 (N.D. Cal. 2007) ("[m]embers of the class were allegedly 
overcharged for tableware and have a mutual and coterminous interest in establishing 
defendants' liability and recovering damages."). 
Under the requirements of Rule 23(a)( 4), a class representative must have some 
commitment to the case and therefore some minimal knowledge of the case. See, e.g., 
Local Joint Executive Bd. of Culinary/Bartender Trust Fund v. Las Vegas Sands, Inc., 
244 F.3d 1152, 
1162 (9th Cir. 2001) (A plaintiff must "understand [her] duties and [be] 
currently willing and able to perform them. The Rule does not require more."). 
However, this is not a high bar. Id Each class representative has more than adequately 
represented the interests of the class throughout the course of this litigation, having 
conferred with counsel, produced documentation, and propounded discovery. In re 
TFT-LCD I, 267 F.R.D. at 595 (Adequacy established where ''the plaintiffs have 
searched for products and documents, provided answers to written discovery, given 
deposition testimony, and followed the progress of this litigation through 
communication with counsel, and have demonstrated their ability to serve as class 
representatives."); Garciav. Gordon Trucking, Inc., No. 1:10-CV-0324, 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 160052, at *13-14 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2012) (Court found adequacy of 
representation requirement of Rule 23(a)(4) met by four named plaintiffs who acted 
vigorously to prosecute action "by providing information and documentation, 
responding to written discovery requests ... , and by providing deposition testimony."). 
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See also In re Micron Techs. Sec. Litig., 247 F.R.D. 627,632 (D. Idaho 2007) (class 
representatives adequate where they showed understanding of the litigation and 
received updates about the case.) The class representatives meet the adequacy standard 
under Rule 23(a)(4). 
The second component of Rule 23(a)(4) addresses the adequacy of counsel. "In 
addition, class counsel must be qualified, experienced, and generally able to conduct the 
class action litigation." Farms, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93548, at *12 (citingAmchem, 
521 U.S. 626). "The competency of counsel is relevant to whether the class 
representative and her counsel will vigorously prosecute the action." Nguyen v. Baxter 
Healthcare Corp., 275 F.R.D. 596, 602 
(C.D. Cal. 2011). Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g) provides guidance on the appointment 
and adequacy of class co·unsel. Farms, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93548, at* 12. "In 
determining adequacy of proposed class counsel, a court must consider (i) the work 
counsel has done in identifying or investigating potential claims in the action; (ii) 
counsel's experience in handling class actions, other complex litigation, and the types 
of claims asserted in the action; (iii) counsel's knowledge of the applicable law; and (iv) 
the resources that counsel will co~it to representing the class."' Marilley v. Bonham, 
No. C-11-02418, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33678, at *23-24 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2012) 
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(l)(A)). In addition, the Court may consider "any other 
matter pertinent to counsel's ability to fairly and adequately represent the interests of 
the class." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(l)(C)(ii); see also In re Cree Inc. Sec. Litig., 219 
F.R.D. 369,373 (M.D.N.C. 2003) (designating a firm as lead counsel after finding that 
the firm had "extensive experience" with the particular area of litigation ( class actions) 
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and that "the firm ha[ d] sufficient resources to prosecute this action in a thorough and 
expeditious manner."). 
Here Plaintiffs are represented by two attorneys, from two distinguished firms, 
each bringing a particular skill set and/or knowledge of the issue to the table. Mr. Olsen 
of Petersen Moss Hall & Olsen is particularly familiar with the facts and issues of this 
case, having represented the Plaintiff Building Contractors of Southeast Idaho in the 2011 
Idaho Case. Mr. Gaffney, of Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA, provides his substantial and 
experience. Mr. Gaffney has for the past thirty years acted as lead counsel on over 
hundred civil matters that have gone to trial in both state and federal court. He also has 
experience in class action suits. He is currently acting as co-lead counsel representing 
Potandon Produce L.L. C., one of twenty five defendants named in Case 4: 1 O-md-02186-
BL W In Re: Fresh and ·Process Potatoes Antitrust Litigation pending in the U.S. District 
Court for Idaho. This case is the largest agricultural antitrust class action filed in the 
State ofldaho and one of the largest filed nationally. The case also comprises two 
plaintiffs' classes of potato purchasers nationwide and one opt-out plaintiff. Beard St. 
Clair Gaffney PA consists of eighteen attorneys, is one_ of the largest Idaho based firms, 
and has a wealth of experience and resources from which the Plaintiffs can draw from to 
support the classes. 
As such, Plaintiffs' counsel have satisfied the elements of Rule 23(g) and have 
clearly "done substantial work in identifying and pursuing Plaintiffs' claims, and ha[ve] 
demonstrated knowledge of the applicable law and ability to commit sufficient 
resources to represent the class." Marilley, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33678, at *23-24. 
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III. THE PROPOSED CLASS SASTISFIES THE REQUIREMENTS OF 
RULE23(b) 
Plaintiffs must additionally demonstrate that this action can be maintained under 
only one of the subsections of Rule 23(b). Id As to theifproposed Injunction Class, 
Plaintiffs must demonstrate satisfaction of Rule 23(b)(2)'s general applicability 
requirement to obtain injunctive or declaratory relief. Rule 23(b )(2) requires that the 
putative injunctive relief is generally applicable and "appropriate respecting the class as a 
whole." Fed. R. Civ. P 23(b)(2). As to their proposed Monetary Relief Classes, 
Plaintiffs must meet predominance and superiority requirements under Rule 23(b)(3). 
Rule 23(b)(3) "requires that (i) common questions oflaw or fact predominate 
(predominance), and (ii) the class action is the superior method for adjudication 
(superiority)." Id 
Here, at the very least, a class action in this case involve common questions of law 
or fact and would be· a far more superior method for adjudication of such claims, 
therefore qualifying under Rule 23(b )(3). Without a class action, the Court faces the 
possibility of hundreds if not thousands of individual lawsuits filed by connection 
and/or fee payers respectively. This would not only be unnecessarily costly to the 
potential plaintiffs, each of which would have to retain counsel and pay filing fees, but 
it would also inundate the legal system. Such a massive burden on the potential 
plaintiffs and the courts is avoided by the pursuit of this class action. 
IV. THE COURT SHOULD APPOINT CLASS COUNSEL 
As noted supra, Plaintiffs have been ably represented by counsel who have 
devoted considerable time and resources to prosecuting this action vigorously since its 
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inception. The firms have overseen the briefing and argument of motions. They are 
prepared to serve, d should be appointed, as counsel to the Classes. 
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I, Ed Quinn, do· solemnly swear ( or affinn) that the testimony given in this sworn 
statement is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, that it is made on my personal 
knowledge, and that I would so testify in open court if called upon to do so. 
1. I am one of the plaintiffs in this action. 
2. Each year the Defendant, City of Pocatello (City), passes a resolution setting water and 
sewer connection fees or "System Capacity Fees" which are paid along with pennit fees for new 
construction. An example of such resolution, Resolution 2010-30, is attached as Exhibit A. 
3. Up until March of 2013, System Capacity Fees collected by the City of Pocatello were 
deposited into two separate accounts for water and wastewater. 
4: According to public record provided by the City in its discovery responses (attached as 
Exhibit B) , from FY 2007 through FY 2014, the City transferred from the water, sewer and 
sanitation fund $28,329,230.41 under the guise of"PILOT .. and "Return on Equity" programs. 
In case CV-2011-5228-0C, the Idaho Sixth Judicial Court held in a November 15, 2013, 
Memorandum. Decision and Order that these programs were an unconstitutional-disguised tax. 
3. Since 2007, as a builder, I have had to pay Capacity Fees for new construction in the City 
as set by City Resolution.. These fees were improperly transferred to the general fund and 
improperly taken and used as a disguised tax. 
4. To myknowledge, any person obtaining a building permit for new construction has had 
to pay Capacity Fees as set forth by City Resolution. 
5. According to a table found in the City's "Comprehensive Annual Financial Report" for 
FY 2013, there were 1,374 pennits obtained for new construction from 2007 through 2013 
AFFIDAVIT OF ED QUINN.-Page 2 
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{attadl1;:d as Exhibit C). As is the case with me, up until March of 20131 the Capacity Fees paid 
by these other builders were transfelTed ftom the water and sewer to the City's geJ;J.eml fund and 
improperly taken tmd used as a disguised tax. 
DATED this .J.~ day ofFebrum:y, 201S. 
SUBSCR1BED AND SWORN to be:tbre me this /sf'~y of February, 2015. 
Notary Public fot.Si,,te,~;, Jdaho 
Residing at: -roe"'"" I , 
My Commis-sion~&-pln!-. -,-: ,?..,_/-,...,T,"""Z-U@_....,.....,__ 
AFFIDAVIT OF ED Qt.milN - Page 3 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
· - I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State ofldaho, with my office in 
Idaho Falls, Idaho, and that on the J3c1ay of February, 2014 I served ~ true and correct copy·of the 
foregoing document on the persons listed below by first class mail, with the correct postage 
thereon, or by causing the same to be delivered in accordance with Rule S(b ), I.R.C.P. 
Persons Served: 
Blake G. Hall, Esq. 
HALL ANGELL& STARNES, LLP 
1075 S. Utah Ave., Ste. 150 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
FAX: (208) 621-3008 
EMAIL: bgh@hasattomeys.com 
AFFIDAVIT OF ED QUINN - Page 4 
Method of Service: 
( 0m,ail ( ) hand ( ) fax ( ) email 
271
( '·) ::_ 
,.,_ .. .t.-
·a 
RESOLUTION NO. 2010- 30 
A RESOLUTION OF THE CITY OF POCATELLO, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF 
IDAHO, REVISING SANITARY SEWER RATES, SYSTEM CAPACITY FEES, . 
EXCESSIVE STRENGTH CHARGES, AND OTHER SPECIAL CHARGES PREVIOUSLY 
SET BY RESOLUTION NO. 2009-33; PR0V1DING FOR SUCH RATES AND FEES ·TO 
BB EFFECTIVE OCTOBER l, 2010, THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30~ 2011. · 
WHEREAS, Pocatello Municipal Code Section 13.16.180 autholizes sanitary 
sewer rates and plant capacity fees to be set from time to time by Resolution; and, 
. ~· 
'WHEREAS, the City Council l'etained the engineering firm of Red Oak 
Consultlngto prepare a rate study tq project revenues and costs for2011-2015 and to 
recommend necessary sanitary sewer rates thereafter; and 
WHEREAS, the City Council has determined that fees and charges for the 
sanitary sewer system as previously set by Resolution No. 2009-33 should be revised fo1· 
Fiscal Year 2011 in- accordance with that study; 
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE MAYOR AND 
COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF POCATELLO THAT SEWER RATES AND FEES FOR 
FISCAL 2011 SHALL BE AS FOLLOWS: 
NORMAL STRENGTH RATES 
Metered facilities 
Residential, single family 
Inside City 
$21.50/mo. 
Outs1de City 
$2S.7S/mo. 
Residential multi-family> commercial, 
and all others 
Monthly service charge, per bill 
Volume charge per 1,000 gals. 
Non .. metered facilities 
$3.30 
$2.93 
$3.95 
$3.52 
All users will be billed a flat monthly charge based on the average annual consumption of 
the most comparable metered use at the rates listed above. Billings for multi~family residential and 
commercial uses with01.1t summer lines will ,be a flat monthly ra~e throughout the year der~ved by 
averaging the gallonage charges, as set herem, for water use durmg the months of November through 
April of the previous year. 
EX~\Bll A .. 
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CHUBBUCK MUNICIPAL SANITARY SE}YJR SYSTEM 
Monthly service charge, per bill $3.30 
Volume charge, per 1,000 gals. $2.93 South ofl--86 
Volume charge, per 1,000 gals. $2.25 North oflw86 
INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES..(abnormal strengths or volumes, multiple meters, meters larger 
than 211 or BODs and/or total suspended solids greater than 200 ppm) 
Monthly service charge, per bill 
Volume charge, per 1,000 gals 
BOD chaJ:ges, per pound 
Total kteldabl nitrogen (TKN), per lb. 
Suspended solids, per lb. 
Total phospho1t1s (P), per lb. 
Fats, oils, grease, per lb. 
Domestic Septage Disposal· 
Volume charge, per gallon 
SYSTElv.l CAPACITY FEES 
ResidentiaJ/Commercial Users 
Treatment Plant 
3/411 water connection 
111 water coIU1ection 
1 ·11211 water connection 
211 water connection 
Collection System 
3/411 water connection 
111 water connection 
11/2" water connection 
211 water connection 
$3.30 
$1.79 
$0.184 
$1.2685 (on amounts greater 
than 3 5 mg/1) · 
$0.2548 
$5.5461 (on amounts gt·eater 
than 7 mg/1) 
$0.10 (on amounts greater 
than 100 mg/1) 
$0.0739 
$1,110.00 
$1,110.00 
$21220.00 
$:3.550.00 
$1,170 .. 00 
$1,170.00 
$2,340.00 
$3.740.00 
Large Industrial User Capacity Fee (abnormal strengths or volumes, multiple meters~ 
meters larger than 211 or B0Ds or total suspended solids greater than 200 ppm, or TKN greater 
than 35 mg/1, or phosphorus greater than 7 mg/1 
Volume 
BOD 
TSS 
TKN 
Phosphorus 
Collection system 
l'tBSOLUTION -2-
$0.07/gpd 
$322.86/lb/day 
$415.00/lb/day 
$1,805.30/lb/day 
$3, 736.33/lb/day 
$S.84/gpd 
l_ 
j 
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BB IT FURTHER RESOLVED THAT fees apply to owners or occupants of land, 
, buildings, or premises requiring sanitary services, which are either connected to the sanitary sewer 
system or would be required to be connected to said, system pursuant to Municipal Code § 13 .16.0~0. 
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED 1HAT persons wllo qualify for Bannock County's 
Circuit Breaker Exemption List, and own and occupy a single-family residence, shall receive a 30% 
reduction on that portion of their utility bill listed as 11SeweJ:11 or 0 Sanitary Sewer.11 Upon receipt of the 
-· Circuit Breaker Exemption List from Bannock County, the City Utility Billing Department shall make 
the reduction, which shall remain in effect so long as the applicant meets the requirements set forth 
herein." 
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED THAT the above fees and rates, shall be 
effective from October 1, 2010, through September 30, 2011. 
ATIEST: 
RESOLUTION 
RESOLVED. this [<341 day of August, 2010. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, a municipal 
corporation of Idaho 
BRIAN C. BLAD, Mayor 
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Oate PILOT Transfers Return of Equity Transfers Total Transfers by FY 
FY 2006 $ 477,272.00 $ 3,544,000.00 $ 4,021,272.00 
FY i007 $ 477,272.00 $ 3,544,000.44 $ 4,021,272.44 
FY2008 $ 479,053.00 $ 3,349,079.00 $ 3,828,132.00 
FY2009 $ 493,424.00 ·s 3,349,079.00 $ 3,842,503.00 
FY2010 s 493,424.00 $ 3,349,079.00 s 3,842,503.00 
FY2011 $ 493,424.00 $ 3,349,079.00 $ 3,842,503.00 
FY2012 $ 2,458,812.00 s $ 2,458,812.00 
FY-2013 $ 2,265,330.00 $ $ 2,265,330.00 
FY2014 $ 206,903.99 $ $ 206,903.99 
ef 9t~.i~\//·.,,\ ::,-: \{:$ -:-:- :;-. }):,~i7,a44;9i4.99 -;\$ :; ;,.; ::-. ·--·; :·;.:··r:;,?;.:::,zo,4s4;316A4-·/$ :·/.' ;.:·.,;:, :-:::,~2s,-ai9,2131.43 :. ' 
CheckTotal $ 28,329,231.43 
Transfers Since 2011 ,$ 8,773,548.99 
EXHIBl'T B 
Prepared by Joyce Stroscheln 9/22/14 Page 1 
CITY OF POCATELLO 000001 
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-CITY OF POCATELLO, IDAHO 
COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT 
WITH AUDITED GOVERNMENT WIDE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
.. 
FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 2013 · 
!XHIBIT C 
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CITYOF POCATaLO 
OP&AATIONSlNDICATORS BY FUNCTION 
Soplo..,.,o,;rl;I, :!013 
;i!Q04 :alll5 2008 2007 :woe .too& 2010 ____ 2011 ··- ·- 21112 -- 20,3 
AJ!tl'O~ FllNCTIOlllo 
Tonninlll • .,.. (,,quo111 foot) 33,000 33,GOC) 28,000 28,0QQ 28,000 28,0DO -~ A0,525 40,525 -10.525 
AIIPOII o""' (•C!04) 3,500 3,600 3.215 a.21s S,215 3.215 S.215 S,2lS 3,2'1S ll,364 
Airl)Orlolovatian(la<llj "'-448 4,44& 4.449 
··-
4,449 4.449 4,449 4,14!) M-49 4,452 
Nwn'blrof run,....,.. 2 2 z 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
R-V~""" 9Jl60 9,060 9,oo) 9.060 9',QBD 312'1 w!dlh 1SO' 9,048 9,QflO 9,1)60 9,060 9,D60 
17/34wldUI 100' 1.0•0 7,146 7,146 7,145 7.146 7,146 7,146 7,146 7,146 7.150 
N!i-.of al,plaN,lla- 75 75 75 75 7S 75 7S 75 7S 75 
Numborofllxod il<lsoope,ou,,.. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 , 1 
ANIMAi. CONTROL: 
Ml!DsPo...Ued 41,783 49,34e 49,187 48,760 M,864 42,746 41Jl26 -43.958 "6,,480 45,142 
0 Anlmai.i,,,pc,ulldod 4.442 44 4.188 4.114 4,448 4)110 3,976 4,146 :S,787 3,547 AnllTilllad!oi,-d o! 2.~ 2,* 2,1145 ·zm 2,443 2,330 2,151 2,300 ,,ees 2,025 Anlmalo adoplOd 847 1165 HQ 1141 1.,i, ,.,so 1.01!4 1,116 1,133 1.235 Anlmal&daim,,d 908 
-
885 845 788 no 6~ 664 eos 690 
c11a11o ...... ucc1 828 1~ 1,267 1,133 1.10~ 1,12$ 991 191 en 883 
eom,lain111 l~-tiglllG<I uas 5.076 $,071 5.020 5,300 6,390 S.173 s.osa 4,923 4Jl76 
VClunlilorH<ll;II'$ 2,834 S.000 4,453 
GENERAL GOlll!RNMENT: 
Cl'n' ISSlll!O Pl!IVdl11le 
1..2-'l'l>wiiUlo(lll'.•Now 174 199 256 251 112 .87 77 42 44 S9 
Resklallllol Pemk~ Dwd11np-Alior 124 139 116 108 1211 114 101 101 104 66 
Non-Rosldonllol Bull~• Now 150 175 165 179 19!: 147 109 S6 6 13 
. N0i>-R•llldenUlll B~-Al1er 98 83 gs l!8 es 107 83 63 53 !Iii 
Com. Gllllor& Sldow,il~ 255 260 2IIS 270 20S 182 157 118 13'4 138 
Domo1lol\ 25 1S 14 19 13 10 23 14 11 • 
-
1$1 813 774 838 671 513 513 S18 4ll6 505 
... -rc.,i 55$ 6113 $72 698 U11 $'15 601 496 467 628 
Plumbln9 1.QS:t 1,149 1,193 1,241 834 e84 S28 ~ 4&7 493 
Roof .. 22 ~ 21 S1 36 51 39 65 38 
Sign 131 1S8 121 134 91 74 75 75 ·K 9$ 
OIJNlrpormlis ioauot:t 222 318 245 238 162 116 127 ~ 325 m 
~I """""g ~rmlla losuod 3,m 3.975 a,886 4.079 3.255 2.!;85 2.545 2.345 2,259 2.2114 
TOTAL CITYINS,'>ECTIONSo 9.910 11,163 10.1199 12,698 10,269 8,221 7,TIS s;n;o li.883 5,367 
i'l!RMITVALUATIONS: 
1-:!fllmlly~-Now '$ 19.,C1~7 $ 22,206,144 S 28,8711Jl18 $ 27.519,152 $ 12.5115.371 S 8,191.Q43 $ 7,8114,898 $ 5.G25.C95 $ 4.SSUOS S 6.514,318 
R.aoldonU,,IF•ll>lli,DwoUlngs•Allor 1,36:J.Q21 2,308,842 1.562,984 1,123'"4 1.9611.585 2,218,775 1,54s.347 1.760,8l!6 ·1.Bll1,963 1,221)Jl3S 
Non-ffaold<onUol Buldlno•· Now a., .. .m 2B,979,9Cl0 36.661,105 2/IJT,771,751) 33,019,911 1,2ti3,D08 8,548,COIJ 148.334,632 9.292,048 13.799.l!1D 
Non-l'looldanllol Buldlngs. /IIIM 7,416.894 4,984,080 13,92:4, 195 11,18:1,1-1& S.433,653 101.274,395 4,4a2,894 10.582,338 9,841,338 6,269,507 
-
2Z171/69 2,716.447 4.7$4.a;'a:i 5 • .tCl0,1164 11781),685 11,747,941 1.271.577 37,0BS,294 2.873,11911 2.891>,a97 
Moelmnleol 1,751,105 1,807,Q84 3,5,72.,w 4,651,054 3,951,553 14.414.577 1.137.160 3.770.65< 2.aoa,on 2,393,l!IIS () P!Umlllng 1,189.1144 1,349,544 2.:942,965 1.1114.734 2.376.1131 IZ1"18.074 465.625 1.476,083 1.159.1177 1.4113,294 Olhnr p,e,rmllS, i;suod l:!4Jl2!i S37.1.29 . 7A000 17U66 47,550 B01l?ll 7,!!D9 47,l!!!!! Total bl.llld"11! ~- valuoloo $ 41,7112,771 $ 64.tl69,1BO $. 91.7153.324 $ 3411.IY.iG.30% $ 76.D28.i;&9 $ 15\sas,3119 $ 25,063,641 $ 208.lleli,552 $ 32.555,2111 $ M,S:,.258 
FIRE SERVICES 
N:umbor-aJ'.staUans 5 5 6 s 6 5 s s 5 s 
Firc-fnddonms. 141 141 149 1l!B 134 108 1411 1a1 127 U7 
'°=•& eM$Rosr,o,,_ 1,883 2,200 2.261) 2.258 2.-12'1 4,917 4Jj14 5..356 5,275 5,645 
"""''doo<•cana'-:,pUis oncllncl- 118 
""' 
102 108 104 111 104 103 123 127 
Gcod lnlool-PvbllcSO<vleoc..lls 141 156 212 269 21"1 
-
4S9 4SS 062: 434 
lwp-.SOvoo,Wos-&Spoolot-""' 12 13 16 16 12 69 10 1$ 12 117 
Folsa Afarm& 183 225 214 240 26! 219 254 30S :286 327 
l.,a$A11lfl;~J:5. $ 989Jl8$ s ~.eos $ 928,91:i s 316.710 $ 1,2fiU01 $ 1,780.{IOD S 1.576,776 $ 1.1162,150 S 9,Ba0,155 s 741.100 
E!uslosl ... pons. hour cl lho 11,Jfibuliool myof wook Hf'Mlfnllay 1-l!!'MIF~ 2-3PM/Frid:ly 5.6PMIFrldoy 6-llPMIMSF ,4.S,"M!Frid:ly -.,111,ay 45PM/Frld;iy 4--SPMIFddoy 6-ll?MIFl'ldoy 
-·c,,,i:, 4,261 ~.611 4,762 4.717 •,909 S,17a $,195 5,750 6,$72 6,1111' 
P.Jge 1l'3 
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CJ 
Michael D. Gaffney, ISB No. 3558 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls; Idaho 83404 
Telephone: (208) 523-5171 
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732 
Email: gaffney@beardstclair.com 
Nathan M. Olsen, ISB No. 7373 
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN 
485 "E" Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Telephone: (208) 523-4650 
Facsimile: (208) 524-3391 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
C) 
.. -~·. 
10: 11 
DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
BANNOCK COUNTY IDAHO 
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on 
behalf of itself and all others similarly 
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself 
and all others similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
municipality, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
County of Bonneville ) 
Case No.: CV-2014-1520-0C 
AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL D. 
GAFFNEY 
I, Michael D. Gaffney, having been duly sworn on oath, depose and state: 
1. I am co-counsel for Plaintiffs in the above entitled case. 
AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL D. GAFFNEY - 1 
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2. For the past twenty-eight years I have acted as lead counsel on over ninety 
civil matters that have gone to trial in both state and federal court. 
3. I have substantial experience in class action litigation as I am currently acting 
as co-lead counsel representing Potandon Produce L.L.C., one of twenty five defendants 
named in Case 4:10-md-02186-BLW In Re: Fresh and Process Potatoes Antitrust 
Litigation pending in the U.S. District Court for Idaho. To my knowledge, the case is the 
largest agricultural antitrust class action filed in the State of Idaho and one of the largest 
filed nationally. The case currently comprises two plaintiffs' classes of potato purchasers 
nationwide and one opt-out plaintiff. 
4. My biography/experience, as published on the website of Beard St. Clair 
Gaffney, PA is attached as Exhibit A. 
5. I am a senior partner for Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA. This firm consists of 
eighteen attorneys, is one of the largest Idaho based firms, and has a wealth of experience 
and resources from which the Plaintiffs can draw from to support the classes in this case. 
Attached as Exhibit B is a written description of the overall practice areas, history and 
AFFIDAVIT OF :MICHAEL D. GAFFNEY - 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify I am a licensed attorney in the state ofldaho and on February~ 2015, I 
served a true and correct copy of the AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL D. GAFFNEY on the 
following by the method of delivery designated below: 
Blake G. Hall . ~.S. Mail IQ Hand-delivered I!) Facsimile 
Sam L. Angell 
Hall Angell Starnes 
1075 S. UtahAvenue, Ste 150 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Fax: (208) 621-3008 
Bannock County Courthouse 
624 E. Center 
Pocatello, ID 83201 
Fax: 20 236- 13 
Nathan M. Olsen 
Of Petersen Moss Hall & Olsen 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
~.S.Mail Q Hand-delivered D "- Facsimile 
AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL D. GAFFNEY - 3 
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Michael D. Gaffney 
gaffney@beardstclair.com 
T: (208) 557-5203 
F: (208) 529-9732 
Michael Gaffney is one of the most accomplished trial and appellate lawyers in Idaho. 
Representing both plaintiffs and defendants, he has obtained some of the largest verdicts 
and settlements in the state on behalf of plaintiffs and defended individuals, companies 
and government agencies in some of the most difficult defenses in the state and 
surrounding region. Mike has appeared in lawsuits throughout the country representing 
Idaho clients. He has handled virtually every type of lawsuit, from simple evictions to 
national class actions, in virtually every area of the law, from personal injury to 
complicated business lawsuits. 
Mike currently focuses on business litigation, including IP, unfair competition, non-
competition agreements, trade secrets and business torts. He also has extensive 
experience in agribusiness, crop loss, LLC dissolution, minority oppression cases, 
antitrust and securities, medical and legal malpractice, physician licensure and 
privileges, and real estate and construction litigation. 
Mike is an approved mediator for state and federal litigation and has completed the 
American Health Lawyer's Association Dispute Resolution Services training. He is a 
published member of the Idaho Law Review and was recently listed for the seventh 
consecutive year in the 2014 Mountain States Super Lawyers in the area of Business 
Litigation. 
Mike grew up in the Dakotas and served as a U.S. Peace Corps Volunteer from 1974-
1976 in southern Africa. He and his wife Julie are avid golfers, skiers, and dog lovers. 
-·-i-· PREEMINENT" •=~~ 2013 
Michael D. Gaffney 
• 
LIPE M!MIER 
Mll.UON OOUAII AIM:lc:Ans f'oauM 
. 'nle"lop Tlill ~ In~"' 
Associations 
Idaho, Wyoming and Oregon State and Federal Bars 
U.S. Court of Appeals for 9th and 10th Circuits 
Million Dollar Advocates Forum 
American Health Lawyers Association 
Idaho Supreme Court Evidence Rules Advisory Committee 
Mountain States Super Lawyers, 2008- 2014 
(Business Litigation) 
City Club ofldaho Falls 
Idaho Falls Rotary 
Idaho Trial Lawyers Association 
Idaho Falls Citizen Review Committee: Planning & Building (2014) 
I 
Practice Areas 
Business Litigation 
Constrnction 
Intellectual Property 
Medical Malpractice 
Trademark & Copyright 
Litigation 
Education 
University of Idaho College of 
Law 
Juris Doctor 1986 
University of Colorado 
Psych. Certification 1980 
University of South Dakota 
MA 1978 
Regis College 
BS 1974 
Employment 
Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA 
- 1995 to Present 
Quane, Smith, Howard & Hull 
- 1986-1995 
EXHIBIT 
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IDAHO FALl...S: (208) 523-5171 REXBURG: (208) 359-5885 DRIGGS: (208) 557-5211 
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[1 
CIiek for Review 
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Q 
Our Practice 
Beard St. Clair has grown to become one of the more prominent law 
ftrms in Idaho. Over the past four decades, we have established our 
reputation by providing unmatched quality legal services in a timely 
manner. We successfully walk each client-through the legal process 
· adding our experience and expertise along the way. 
We sel'Ve as yotll' strntegic partner. ltis through our experience of 
advising so many businesses and individuals that we have gained an 
exceptional understanding of your needs and expectations and are 
uniquely poised to provide the most" responsive, efficient, and effective 
legal solutions available. 
Business -
Our business lawyers combine'practical experience in the business world 
with expertise in legal matters affecting all aspects of business opllfations, 
from entity selection and formation througb termination and wind up. We 
simplify the law while protecting your business interests, enabling your 
plans, and resolving your conflicts. We emphasize businesses need for 
clear guidance, staying within budget, and facilitating deal making. We 
are numbers oriented and have the ability to deal with complex business 
and financial issues, complex controversies, and complex regulations. 
Real Estate 
We represent developers, investors, lenders, buyers, and sellers involved 
in the acquisition, development, financing, sale, and leasing of real estate. 
We are experienced in the use of the condominium forms of ownership 
and, ii1 particular, office condominiums. We regularly represent clients in 
taxation of real estate arid zoning issues. We frequently assist in planning 
the structure of and negotiating complex real estate transactiODS, as well 
as handling the legal analysis and documentation. 
Litigation 
Litigation can occur in virtually every area of the law, including business 
settings. While many hold themselves out as "trial attorneys," our 
Litigation Team brings you experience with real trial time and a 
demonstrated ability to litigate complex disputes all the way to verdict 
and appeal, if necessary. We approach cases with a team orientation so 
that the right attorneya are always current_ on issues and case status. We 
have the ability to communicate effectively, maintain professional 
relationships with opposing counsel in order to facilitate the best 
resolution, and access to state-of-the-art research databases. 
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f.··' } E"st~te Planning '·, 
We create plans that enable you to control your property, take care of 
yourself and your loved ones, and transfer your property in the way you 
want, all at reasonable costs. These plans minimize disputes and 
perpetuate positive ideals while meeting goals. We believe you should 
review your goals, plans, and objectives regularly with counseling-
oriented advisors, and learn how to administer yow· affairs in the most 
cost effective way. We encourage you to explore all planning options, 
avoid ineffective shortcuts and make informed decisions about who will 
manage your assets upon disability or death. We believe all steps in the 
estate planning process are important and are committed to maintaining 
high levels of education and training. · 
Beard St. Clair has received an AV rating from Martindale-Hubbell 
which indicates very high to preeminent legal ability and very high 
ethical standards as established by confidential opinions from other 
industry members. · 
History and Experience 
Beard St. Clair has a firm history dating back to the l 960's. Members of 
the firm have gone on to be a member of the US House of 
Representatives, an Idaho State District Judge, an Idaho Supreme Court 
Justice, a United States Magistrate Judge, and a Senator in the Idaho 
legislature. 
The film has an active litigation practice in federal and state courts and 
handles several jury trials per year. 
We represent major insurance caniers, banks, manufacturers, high-
technology companies, multi-level sales organizations, and members of 
the health care industry. The firm also represents individual clients in a 
wide-range of legal planning and problem resolution. 
Members of the firm participate in various professional associations and 
civic and charitable organizations. The following are representative: 
Idaho State Bar; Idaho Trial Lawyers Association; Wealth Counsel; 
American Health Lawyers Association; Rotary; Idaho Community. 
Foundation; and Eastern Idaho Technical College Foundation. 
IDAHO FALLS: {208) 523-5171 REXBURG: (208) 359-
5885 DRIGGS: (208) 557-5211 
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BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ. 
SAM L. ANGELL, ESQ. 
NATHAN R. STARNES, ESQ. 
HALL ANGELL STARNES, LLP 
1075 S Utah Avenue, Suite 150 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Telephone (208) 522-3003 
Fax (208) 621-3008 
!SB No. 's 2434, 7012 & 7484 
bgh@hasattomeys.com 
sla@hasattomeys.com 
nrs@hasattomeys.com 
Attorneys for Defendant City of Pocatello 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY 
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on 
behalf of itself and all others similarly 
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself 
and all others similarly situated, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
municipality, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2014-1520-0C 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW Defendant, CITY OF POCATELLO, by and through counsel of record, 
HALL ANGELL STARNES, LLP, and hereby moves the Court pursuant to Rule 56, IR.CP for 
summary judgment on all claims asserted in Plaintiff's Complaint. This motion is based upon 
the record, pleadings, memorandum in support and affidavit in support filed herewith. 
Dated this _/.l_ day of March, 2015. 
AL~ 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FORSUMMARV JUDGMENT -1 
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CERTIFICA,.TE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following 
this /,j day of March, 2015, by the method indicated below: 
• 
Michael D. Gaffney, Esq. 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Fax: 529-9732 
Nathan M. Olsen, Esq. 
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN 
485 "E" Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Fax: 524~3391 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT• 2 
[)6 Mailing 
[ 1 Hand Delivery 
[ ] Fax 
[ J Overnight Mail 
[)(} Mailing 
[-] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Fax [ 1 Overnight Mail 
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BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ. 
SAM L. ANGELL, ESQ. 
NATHAN R. STARNES, ESQ. 
HALL ANGELL STARNES, LLP 
1075 S Utah Avenue, Suite 150 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Telephone (208) 522-3003 
Fax (208) 621-3008 
!SB No. 's 2434, 7012 & 7484 
bgh@hasattomeys.com 
sla@hasattomeys.com 
nrs@hasattomeys.com 
Attorneys for Defendant City of Pocatello 
C) 
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1:LERK OF THE COURT 
2015 MAR 16 AM 10: 20 
BY~.-
OEPUTY CLERK 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDIC,IAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY 
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on 
behalf of itself and all others similarly 
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself 
and all others similarly situated, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
municipality, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2014;_1520-0C 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on the 13th day of April, 2015, at 2:00 p.m., of said day, 
or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard in the above court, Defendant will call up for 
hearing its Motion for Summary Judgment before the Honorable Stephen S. Dunn. 
Dated this .,LJ_ day of March, 2015. 
NOTICE OF HEARING -1 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following 
this _LJ___ day of March, 2015, by the method indicated below: 
Michael D. Gaffney, Esq. 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Fax: 529-9732 
Nathan M. Olsen, Esq. 
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN 
485 "E" Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Fax: 524-3391 
NOTICE OF HEARING· 2 
P(] Mailing 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[~Mailing [ J Hand Delivery 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
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BLAKE 0. HALL, ESQ. 
SAM L. ANGELL, ESQ. 
NA1llAN'lt1 STARNES, ESQ, 
HA;tt, ,ANGELL STARNES, LLP 
107$ "S Utah Avenu~, Suite 1.50 
Idaho Falls,, Idaho 83402 
Telephone (208) 522-3003 
F~ (2()3) ·Q21-JOOS 
ISJJ No. 's 2434, 7012 & 7484 
bgh.@hasattomeys.com 
;sla@hasattorneys.com 
nrs@hasattomeys,com 
Attomt,ys for Defendant City of Pocatello 
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BY __ _ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR :BANNOCK COUNTY 
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on 
'behalfof itself imd all others similarly 
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself 
and all others similarly situated, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
municipality, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
; ss. 
County of Bannock ) 
C~e No. CV-201-4-1520-0C 
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A. 
STR.OSCHEIN 
Joyce A, Stroschein; being first duly swom, deposes and $tatc,s as follows: 
1. That I am over the age of eighteen (18) and am co~petent to testify in this matter. I 
make this affidavit based on Il)y own personal knowledge unless otherwise indicated. This 
affidavit is made under the penalty of perjury. 
S.EC:0ND AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A. STROSCHEIN • 1 
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2. I am the current Chief Financial Officer ("CFO") and Treasurer for the City of Pocatello. 
I have served in the finance department·ofthe City since October 2001, including City Controller 
from 2006-2008 and the Finance Mantiger fr9m 2008-2014. I am knowledgeable regarding the 
financial affairs of the City and its adoption of policies related to the Payment-In-Lieu-Of-Taxes 
('°PILOT") .component of the user fees, return on equity, and the capacity/co_nnection fees. 
I have served as the CFO of the City since August 2014. I am intimately familiar with the 
financial affairs of the City and its adoption of policies related to the Payment-In-Lieu--Of-Taxes 
("PILOT';) fee, return on equity, and the Cap~city/Connection fees. 
3. On or about August 29, 2014, !submitted an affidavit in this matter addressing the fact 
that the capacity fees have never had a PILOT component included in that fee. I in,corporate 
herein by reference my prior affidavit. As I ·stated in my prior affidavit, only the user fees for 
sanitation, water, and water pollution control contained a PILOT component. 
4. It would be a fallacy to sµggest that the payment of the PILOT component in the user fee 
did not result in substantial compensation and benefit to the user fee payer. To the contrary, the 
user fee payers received significant benefits in the fo1111 of Cify services. The PILOT ccunponent 
was subsequently transferred to the General Fund to help fund City departments and services. 
S. One of the primary benefits received as a result of the PILOT transfer is the City was able 
to operate more efficiently ~d use a single department to service other departments. The Water, 
Sewer, and Wastewater Sanitation Funds are called "enterprise funds." This means that the water 
department, sewer department, and sanitation departments are funded from user fees. That is, the 
monthly use:;r fee provides the financial support for these three departments. In order to increase 
efficiency and decrease costs, the City allows the water, sewer, and sanitation departments to use 
numerous city services rather than require each department to maintain separate services for each 
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A, STROSCHEIN-2 
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department. That is, the water, sewer, and sanitation departments do not, for examvle, maintain 
in-house legal, finance, planning & development, human resources, police, and fire. Although 
the City charges all departments except some grant funded departments pay an administrative-
support fee, the fee does not cover the total cost of services for Legal, Finance, Non-
departmental , and Human ResQurce Services btn was intended to help support these activities. 
The PILOT transfer provided the monetary support for all General Fund services. So rather than 
unnecessarily increase the cost and run the City in an inefficient manner, these services are, 
provided to the enterprise departments. Had the water, sewer, and sanitation departments 
maintained legal, finance, hwnan resources in-house, there would be an increase in user fees. 
For instance, in fiscal year 2013, the City refinanced the 3 Water Pollution Control Facility 
loans. This effectively saved $1,708,303 m premium savings. 1bis task was accomplished by 
the skills provided in the Finance , Legal, and Mayor '3.Ild Council departments. The efficie:ncy 
of the City is a significant benefitthat was received through the payment of the PILOT transfer. 
6. During Fiscal Years 2006.:2014 PILOT transfers were made from the Sanitation, Water, 
and Water Pollution Cl;mtrol Funds to the General Fund. The General Fund reports on aetivity 
for Mayor and City Council, Finance, City Hall, Building Permits and Licenses, Planning and 
Development, Public Engineering, Geographi~ Infonnation Systems,, Human Resources, Non-
Departmental, Economic Development, Legal, Police, Fire, Animal Control, Parks, Parks 
Administration and Zoo. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a detailed analysis of how these monies 
were used during Fiscal Years 2006-2014. 
7. During Fiscal Years 2006-2011 PILOT transfers ranged from $3,821,970 to $4,015,110. 
This revenue amount represented 13.2% to 16.1 % of total general fund expenditures. As noted 
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A, STROSCHEIN-3 
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above, the PILOT transfer paid for, in part, for the legal, finance, human resource, etc. services 
provided by the City to the water, sewer, and sanitation departments. 
8. During Fiscal Years 2012.,2013 PILOT transfers ranged from $2,258;983 to $2,452,465. 
This revenue amount represented 7.2% to 8.2% of total General Fund expenditures. As with 
Fiscal Years 2006~201 l, the PILOT transfer was used to provide various City services to the 
water, sewer, and sanitation departments. 
9. In 2014 only one PILOT transfer was made in October of 2013 in the amount of 
$206,904 to the General Fund. The remaining budgeted transfers were cancelled as a result of 
the Building Con;tractor Association lawsuit. The declaration that the PILOT was impermissible 
created a major budget shortfall for the General Fund in Fiscal Year 2014. At the time the 
PILOT was declared impermissible, the City was not able to raise taxes to obtain the revenues 
needed to complete the budgeted expenditures. 
10. Shortly after the PILOT transfer was discontinued pursuant to the Building Contractors 
lawsuit, the City Council mandated that all General Fund departments conduct a 2% budget 
holdback resultins in reduced program expenditures. Further, the City Council mandated that 
$1,65'.3,310 in General Fund Reserves ~ expended to make up for the PILOT transfer shortfall. 
This effectively used all General Fund Reserves. Ultimately, the net impact of the PILOT 
transfer belll.g disccmtinued was a reduction in City services of approximately $616,286. Thus, as 
a direct result of the PILOT being discontinued, patrons of the City saw a general decrease in the 
services provided by the City in llpproximately $616,286. 
11. In Fiscal Year 2015, the City Council has decided to absorb the loss of PILOT transfers 
by increasing property taxes. The City had $2,696,886 in allowable additional taxes; $257,972 
for new construction, 3% allowable increase of $738,692, and $1,700,222 in foregone taxes. The 
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A. STROSCHEIN .4 
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City took $2,499,545 of the allowable additional taxes, leaving $197,341 as future foregone 
tax.es. Ultitnately, the only way the City can operate the City a.t the same levels it was prior to the 
2013 Building Contractors case is to increase property taxes. Conversely, should the City no 
increase the tax.es to offset the loss of the PlLOT transfer, City services will inevitably be 
reduced. 
12. In sum, the payn1~nt of the PlLOT eomponent of the user fee did not result in a windfall 
for the City, nor did those monies sit idly in the City's bank account. Rather, all <>f tbe PILOT 
fund transfers were completely exhausted each year to pay for the City services described above. 
Likewise, the user fee payers received a substantial benefit in a lower 1.1ser fee because the water, 
sewer, and sanitation departments were able to operate mote efficiently and avoided redundant 
service, such as legal, financial, human resources, etc. 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SA YETH NAUGHT. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO, before me the undersigned, a Notary Public in and 
for said State, this l~'bday ofMarch, 2015. 
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A. STROSCHEIN -5 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following 
this __p_ day of March, 2015, by the method indicated below: 
Michael D. G.affney, Esq. 
BE.A&P ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, lD 83404 
Fax: 529-9732 
Nathan M. Olsen, Esq. 
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN 
485 "E" Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Fax: 524-3391 
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General Fund FY2014 . 
$ Effect of $ Effect of Potential 
%of Total Budgeted Reduced Reduction in 
Budgeted Budgeted PILOT PILOT Program 
Dept./Division Description Expenditures Expenditures Transfer Transfer Expenditures 
0100 Mayor & City Council 772,084 2% 59,162 4,943 54,220 
0200 Finance 851,735 3% 65,266 5,453 59,813 
0300 City Hall 347,974 1% 26,664 2,228 24,436 
0500 Building 564,332 2% 43,243 3,613 39,630 
0600 Planning & Development 1,032,628 3% 79,127 6,611 72,516 
0601 Public Engineering 633,915 2% 48,575 4,058 44,517 
0602 Geographic Info Systems 153,186 0% 11,738 981 10,757. 
0700 Human Resources 561,762 2% 43,046 3,596 39,450 
0800 Non-Departmental 1,413,518 4% 108,314 9,049 99,264 
0801 Economic Development 75,000 0% 5,747 480 5,267 
0900 Legal Department 784,544 2% 60,117 5,023 55,095 
1000 Police 13,090,763 41% 1,003,105 83,806 919,298 
1100 Fire 8,095,956 25% 620,368 51,830 568,538 
1200 Animal Control 955,339 3% 73,205 6,116 67,089 
1301 Parks, Admin, Zoo 2,986,201 9% 228,823 19,117 209,706 
Total 32,318,937 100% * 2,476,500 206,904 2,269,596 
*The total budgeted PILOT Transfer of $2,482,847 was discontinued in November 2013 as a result of a court determination. 
So only $206,904 was transferred for the year. 
The total revenue budgeted for the-General Fund was $32,168,937. The PILOT Transfer was 7.7% of that revenue. 
The reduced PILOT Transfer resulted in a 7.1% revenue deficit. City Council authorized to spend $1,653,310 of reserves. 
The total expenditures budgeted for the General Fund were $32,318,937. The PILOT Transfer was 7. 7% of those expenditures. 
The reduced PILOT Transfer resulted in a 7% deficit to expenditures. City Council mandated 2% budget holdback to program 
expenditures to make up the shortfall. 
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General Fund FY2013 
%of Total $ Effect of 
Budgeted Budgeted PILOT 
Dept./Division Description Expenditures Expenditures Transfer 
0100 Mayor & City Council 624,070 2% 45,055 
0200 Finance 787,068 3% 56,823 
0300 City Hall 358,748 1% 25,900 
0500 Building 639,526 2% 46,171 
0600 Planning & Development 981,306 3% 70,846 
0601 Public Engineering 620,821 2% 44,821 
0602 Geographic Info Systems 153,988 0% 11,117 
0700 Human Resources 504,092 2% 36,393 
0800 Non-Departmental 1,552,914 5% 112,114 
0801 Economic Development 75,000 0% 5,415 
0900 Legal Department 773,648 2% 55,854 
1000 Police 12,725,701 41% 918,742 
1100 Fire 7,642,498 24% 551,756 
1200 Animal Control 937,379 3% 67,675 
1301 Parks, Admin, Zoo 2,912,922 9% 210,301 
Total 31,289,681 100% * 2,258,983 
*The total PILOT Transfer of $2,265,330 has been reduced by funds 050 ($3,703) and 052 ($2,644) 
leaving only the utility funds. 
The total revenue budgeted for the General Fund was $31,289,681. The PILOT Transfer is 7.2% of that revenue. 
The total expenditures budgeted for the General Fund were $31,289,681. The PILOT Transfer is 7.2% of those expenditures. 
""•'"•••"•••••••-• •-•• --•••••-•••••-••• ••-•••••• •••••••-•-••••--••-••----•-•ft•o••••,M '''•'•-••••••••-•--••-••-••••••••••••••••••••• •, ••••• ••••••••----------.~~-~··~,~~~----·-----·----·-··---·•-••• 
--- -~--····· ·.· -·-··-------·-------------·--------····-·· .. 
C) 
t--.. 1 
-.~JI 
297
General Fund FY2012 
%of Total $ Effect of 
Budgeted Budgeted PILOT 
Dept./Division Description Expenditures Expenditures · Transfer 
0100 Mayor & City Council 611,969 2% 49,909 
0200 Finance 690,744 2% 56,334 
0300 City Hall 407,106 1% 33,202 
0500 Building 689,634 2% - 56,243 
0600 Planning & Development 952,282 3% 77,664 
0601 Public Engineering 635,450 2% 51,824 
0602 Geographic Info Systems 150,495 1% 12,274 
0700 Human Resources 481,689 2% 39,284 
0800 Non-Departmental 1,557,682 5% 127,037 
0801 Economic Development 75,000 0% 6,117 
0900 Legal Department 697,248 2% 56,864 
1000 Police 12,044,549 40% 982,296 
1100 Fire 7,391,718 25% 602,833 
1200 Animal Control 875,330 3% 71,388 
1301 Parks, Admin, Zoo 2,810,331 9% 229,197 
Total 30,071,227 100% * 2,452,465 
*The total PILOT Transfer of $2,458,812 has been reduced by funds 050 ($3,703} and 052 ($2,644) 
leaving only the utility funds. 
The total revenue budgeted for the General Fund was $30,071,227. The PILOT Transfer is 8.2% of that revenue. 
The total expenditures budgeted for the General Fund were $30,071,227. The PILOT Transfer is 8.2% of those expenditures. 
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General Fund FY2011 
$ Effect of 
%of Total PILOT& 
Budgeted Budgeted ROE 
Dept./Division Description Expenditures Expenditures Transfers 
0100 Mayor & City Council 681,401 2% 89,610 
0200 Finance 664,686 2% 87,412 
0300 City Hall 620,628 2% 81,618 
0500 Building 620,657 2% 81,622 
0600 Planning & Development 896,248 3% 117,865 
0601 Public Engineering 736,691 3% 96,881 
0602 Geographic Info Systems 144,695 0% 19,029 
0700 Human Resources 458,650 2% 60,317 
0800 Non-Departmental 1,507,166 5% 198,206 
0801 Economic· Development 75,000 0% 9,863 
0900 Legal Department 706,992 2% 92,976 
1000 Police 11,576,816 40% 1,522,455 
1100 Fire 7,146,571 24% 939,838 
1200 Animal Control 810,977 3% 106,651 
1301 Parks, Admin, Zoo 2,523,129 9% 331,814 
Total 29,170,307 100%, * 3,836,156 
*The total PILOT & ROE (Return of Equity) Transfers of $3,836,156 have been reduced by funds 050 ($3,703) 
and 052 ($2,644) leaving only the utility funds. 
The total revenue budgeted for the General Fund was $29,170,307. The PILOT & ROE Transfers are 13.2% of that revenue. 
The total expenditures budgeted for the General Fund were $29,170,307. The PILOT & ROE Transfers are 13.2% of those 
expenditures. 
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General Fund FY2010 
Dept./Division 
0100 
0200 
0300 
0402 
0500 
0600 
0601 
0602 
0700 
0800 
0801 
0900 
1000 
1100 
1200 
1301 
Description 
Mayor & City Council 
Finance 
City Hall 
City Clerk 
Building 
Planning & Development 
Public Engineering 
Geographic Info Systems 
Human Resources 
Non-Departmental 
Economic Development 
Legal Department 
Police 
Fire 
Animal Control 
Parks, Admin, Zoo 
Total 
Budgeted 
%of Total 
Budgeted 
Expenditures Expenditures 
663,058 2% 
643,056 2% 
676,216 2% 
67,822 0% 
704,969 2% 
611,950 2% 
1,114,323 4% 
140,838 0% 
404,660 1% 
1,577,773 5% 
125,000 0% 
687,225 2% 
11,212,746 39% 
7,021;373 
777,870 
2,360,018 
24% 
3% 
8% 
100% * 
$ Effect of 
PILOT& 
ROE 
Transfers 
88,353 
85,688 
90,107 
9,037 
93,938 
81,543 
148,485 
18,767 
53,921 
210,240 
16,656 
91,574 
1,494,112 
935,607 
103,652 
314,475 
3,836,156 
*The total PILOT & ROE (Return of Equity) Transfers of $3,836,156 have been reduced by funds 050 ($3,703) 
and 052 ($2,644) leaving only the utility funds. 
The total revenue budgeted for the General Fund was $28,788,897. The PILOT & ROE Transfers are 13.3% of that revenue. 
The total expenditures budgeted for the General Fund were $28,788,897. The PILOT & ROE Transfers are 13.3% of those 
expenditures. 
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General Fund FY2009 
$ Effect of 
%ofTotal PILOT& 
Budgeted Budgeted ROE 
Dept./Division Description Expenditures Expenditures Transfers 
0100 Mayor & City· Council 654,117 2% 86,024 
0200 Finance 639,320 2% 84,078 
0300 City Hall 677,385 2% 89,084 
0402 City Clerk 7,359 0% 968 
0500 Building 690,338 2% 90,787 
0600 Planning & Development 603,415 2% 79,356 
0601 Public Engineering 1,189,532 4% 156,437 
0602 Geographic Info Systems 146,370 1% 19,249 
0700 Human Resources 407,558 1% 53,598 
0800 Non-Departmental 1,577,917 5% 207,514 
0801 Economic Development 99,000 0% 13,020 
0900 Legal Department 686,765 2% 90,317 
1000 Police 11,472,844 39% 1,508,806 
1100 Fire 7,135,156 24% 938,352 
1200 Animal Control 772,494 3% 101,592 
1301 Parks, Admin, Zoo 2,410,262 8% 316,976 
Total 29,169,832 100% * 3,836,156 
*The total PILOT & ROE (Return of Equity) Transfers of $3,836,156 have been reduced by funds 050 ($3,703} 
and 052 ($2,644) leaving only the utility funds. 
The total revenue budgeted for the General Fund was $29,100,276. The PILOT & ROE Transfers are 13.2% of that revenue. 
The total expenditures budgeted for the General Fund were $29,169,832. The PlLOT & ROE Transfers are 13.2% of those 
expenditures. 
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General Fund FY2008 
$ Effect of 
% of Total PILOT & 
Budgeted Budgeted ROE 
Dept./Division Description Expenditures Expenditures Transfers 
0100 Mayor & City Council 646,089 2% 87,925 
0200 Finance 607,206 2% 82,634 
0300 City Hall 656,301 2% 89,315 
0402 City Clerk 63,389 0% 8,627 
0500 Building 484,600 2% 65,948 
0600 Planning & Development 698,922 2% 95,115 
0601 Public Engineering 1,106,906 4% 150,637 
0602 Geographic Info Systems 150,297 1% 20,454 
0700 Human Resources 382,413 1% 52,042 
0800 Non-Departmental 1,575,905 6% 214,463 
0900 Legal Department 661,662 2% 90,045 
1000 Police 10,905,355 39% 1,484,094 
1100 Fire 6,797,098 24% 925,007 
1200 Animal Control 792,542 3% 107,856 
1301 Parks, Admin, Zoo 2,555,757 9% 347,809 
Total 28,084,442 100% * 3,821,970 
*The total PILOT & ROE (Return of Equity) Transfers of $3,821,970 have been reduced by funds 050 {$3,595) 
and 052 ($2,567) leaving only the utility funds. 
The total revenue budgeted for the General Fund was $28,084,442. The PILOT & ROE Transfers are 13.6% of that revenue. 
The total expenditures budgeted for the General Fund were $28,084,442. The PILOT & ROE Transfers are 13.6% of those 
expenditures. 
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General Fund -FY2007 -
%of Total $ Effect of 
Budgeted Budgeted PILOT& ROE 
Dept./Division Description Expenditures Expenditures Transfers 
0100 Mayor & City Council 565,070 2% 86,861 
0200 Finance 515,381 2% 79,223 
0300 City Hall 640,672 2% 98,482 
0402 City Clerk 58,172 0% 8,942 
0500 Building 416,196 2% 63,977 
0600 Planning & Development 665,015 3% 102,224 
0601 Public Engineering 996,358 4% 153,158 
0602 Geographic Info Systems 128,500 0% 19,753 
0700 Human Resources 361,218 1% 55,525 
0800 Non-Departmental 1,527,309 6% 234,774 
0900 Legal Department 635,847 2% 97,741 
1000 Police 10,107,897 39% 1,553,759 
1100 Fire 6,394,463 24% 982,940 
1200 Animal Control 724,348 3% 111,345 
1301 Parks, Admin, Zoo 2,383,637 9% 366,406 
Total 26,120,083 100% * 4,015,110.44 
*The total PILOT & ROE (Return of Equity) Transfers of $825,510.44 have been reduced by funds 050 ($3,595) 
and 052 ($2,_567) leaving only the utility funds. 
The total revenue budgeted for the General Fund was $26,120,083. The PILOT & ROE Transfers are 15.4% of that revenue. 
The total expenditures budgeted for the General Fund were $26,120,083. The PILOT & ROE Transfers are 15.4% of those 
expenditures. 
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General Fund FY2006 
$ Effect of 
%of Total PILOT & 
Budgeted Budgeted ROE 
Dept./Division Description Expenditures Expenditures Transfers 
0100 Mayor & City Council 552,327 2% 88,989 
0200 Finance 449,494 2% 72,421 
0300 City Hall 637,680 3% 102,741 
0402 City Clerk 45,790 0% 7,378 
0500 Building 465,682 2% 75,029 
0600 Planning & Development 525,137 2% 84,608 
0601 Public Engineering 1,075,887 4% 173,343 
0602 Geographic Info Systems 143,346 1% 23,095 
0700 Human Resources 323,843 1% 52,177 
0800 Non-Departmental 1,458,790 6% 235,035 
0900 Legal Department 634,737 3% 102,267 
1000 Police 9,680,416 39% 1,559,677 
1100 Fire 6,046,413 24% 974,178 
1200 Animal Control 688,146 3% 110,872 
1301 Parks, Admin, Zoo 2,192,813 9% 353,299 
Total 24,920,501 100% * 4,015,110 
*The total PILOT & ROE (Return of Equity) Transfers of $4,015,110 have been reduced by funds 050 {$3,595) 
and 052 ($2,567) leaving only the utility funds. 
The total revenue budgeted for the General Fund was $24,920,501. The PILOT & ROE Transfers are 16.1% of that revenue. 
The total expenditures budgeted for the General Fund were $24,920,501. The PILOT & ROE Transfers are 16.1% of those 
expenditures. 
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SAM L. ANGELL, ESQ; 
NATHAN R. STARNES, ESQ. 
HALL ANGELL STARNES, LLP 
1075 S Utah Avenue, Suite 150 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Telephone (208) 522-3003 
Fax (208) 621-3008 
!SB No. 's 2434, 7012 & 7484 
bgh@hasattomeys.com 
sla@hasattomeys.com 
nrs@hasattomeys.com 
Attorneys for Defendant City of Pocatello 
/ _../J 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY 
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on 
behalf of itself and all others similarly 
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself 
and all others similarly situated, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
municipality, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2014-1520-0C 
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW Defendant, City of Pocatello, by and through its attorney of record, and 
hereby submits this Memorandum in Support Motion for Summary Judgment as follows: 
INTRODUCTION 
Before the Court is Defendant City of Pocatello's Motion for Summary Judgment. The 
City seeks dismissal of each claim alleged by Plaintiffs. Because Plaintiffs have sought 
certification of this matter as a class action, Defendant seeks to have each claim dismissed 
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because there is no legal or factual basis for the claims to proceed. First, any claims associated 
with the connection fee containing a PILOT component are misplaced. As the City repeatedly 
stated in the underlying litigation that is a precursor to this lawsuit, Building Contractors v. Cit:y 
of Pocatello, the connection/capacity fee has never included a.PILOT component. The PILOT 
component has only been included in the user fee that was paid by utility customers through their 
monthly water and sewer bill. Because the City has never charged a PILOT component in the 
connection fee, dismissal of any and all claims associated with the connection/capacity fee is 
warranted. 
Next, there has never been an unconstitutional taking resulting from the PILOT 
component. Generally, the collection of a tax is not considered a valid Fifth Amendment takings 
claim and therefore there is no recognized property interest in a tax. Furthermore, there is no 
evidence that the collection of tax did not result in just compensation for the utility customers. In 
fact, the evidence demonstrates that each utility customer in the City of Pocatello received a 
substantial benefit in the form of city services provided. In the aftermath of the Building 
Contractors case, the City was required to cut all services within the City by 2% and withdraw 
approximately $1,000,000.00 from its reserve account to offset the loss of the PILOT 
component. This resulted in services being maintained but the general fund incurred a negative 
balance that will be recovered through increased property taxes on land owners within the City. 
Third, summary judgment on the takings claim is rendered moot because the Court 
concluded in the Building Contractors case that the decision related to the collection of the 
PILOT fee was prospective not retroactive. Because the findings in the Building Contractors 
case were prospective in application only, and the City immediately ceased collection of the 
PILOT, there is not viable cause of action for an unconstitutional taking. Once the PILOT had 
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been declared improper, the only way there may be a viable claim is if the City continued to 
collect the PILOT, which it did not. Accordingly, there is no viable takings clahn and summary 
judgment is appropriate. 
Finally, the City is hnmune from all state law claims associated with the collection of a 
tax pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-904A. Pursuant to § 6-904A the City is immune for any state law 
claims that arise out of the collection of a tax or fee absent a showing that the City acted with 
malice or criminal intent and with reckless, willful and wanton conduct, which cannot be proven. 
In this case, Plaintiff alleges two fees, the capacity and user fee, contained an improper PILOT 
component and that the City improperly received a benefit from the Plaintiffs. As previously 
stated, there was never a PILOT component to the City's capacity fee. Furthermore, there is no 
evidence that the City acted with malice or criminal intent and with reckless, willful and wanton 
conduct in the collection of the PILOT fee. Accordingly, smnmary judgment on all state law 
claims is warranted. 
FACTUAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACT 
Defendant recognizes this Court is very familiar with the underlying litigation that 
resulted in the instant lawsuit. As such, Defendant provides.a summary of the factual history in 
this matter. 
The instant litigation centers on a previously adjudicated state law case captioned 
Building Contractors Association of Southeast Idaho v. City of Pocatello ("Building Contractors 
Case"), Bannock County Case No. CV-2011-0005228-0C. The Building Contractors Case 
centered primarily on the legitimacy of the connection/capacity fee charged by the City of 
Pocatello. A secondary issue that was raised by the Building Contractors was whether the PILOT 
fee was constitutional. 
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After extensive briefing on the issue, the Court issued its Memorandum Decision and 
Order on Defendant's Motion to Reconsider and Plaintiff's Amended Motion for 
Reconsideration on November 15, 2013. In that order, the Court specifically concluded that the 
City had prevailed on a number of issues. Specifically, the Court concluded as follows: 
1. 
2.' 
3. 
The City connection and user fees are not arbitrary or unreasonably imposed. The 
imposition and collection of the connection and user fees themselves are not 
unconstitutional acts or a violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond Act. 
There is no evidence that the connection fees are being used by the City to fund future 
capital improvements in violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond Act. 
Through the use of the PILOT_ fee transfer program, or any other transfer program 
with a similar intent, such as a rate of return program or a return on equity program, 
the Court declares that the City is imposing an impermissible tax to the extent that 
connection and user fees are being assessed a PILOT fee for general fund purposes, 
and such practices must cease and are hereby enjoined because they are 
unconstitutional and a violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond Act. This means that 
connection and user fees must be adiusted to the extent that they include a charge 
for the PILOT fee. In addition, no PILOT fee transfers from any water or sewer · 
account to the general fund are pennitted. 
However, to the extent that connection and user fees are being transferred from the 
water and sewer accounts to the general fund, through any appropriate process, 
however named, for the purpose of paying expenses related to the operation, 
maintenance, replacement, and depreciation of existing water and sewer 
systems, including only those general City expenses needed to operate the water and 
sewer departments, such as HR, financial, legal and accounting, such transfers are 
permitted and are not hereby enioined. 
(Memo Decision and Order On Reconsideration, p. 26 (emphasis added)). 
Consistent with the factual history articulated by the Building Contractors Court, in 
approximately 2011, the City re-described the transfer from the enterprise funds as a Payment-
fu-Lieu-Of-Taxes ("PILOT"). The PILOT component of the user fee was calculated on the prior 
year city property tax levy rate multiplied by the estimated market value per the most recent 
financial plan prepared by an outside consulting engineer. The rate ofretum was part of the 
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annual budget process and the rates were set each year and approved by the City Council. 
(Stroschein Aff., ,r S previously filed with the Court). 
Initially, the PILOT, as well as the predecessor "rate of return" or ''return on equity," 
were designed to be a fair and reasonable tax implemented to keep Pocatello resident's water and 
sewer fees and related taxes lower and still provide the necessary water and sewer services. The 
City's water and wastewater utility were financially self-sufficient with funding for capital and 
operating requirements derived from user fees, which included the PILOT component. 
(Stroschein Aff., ,r 7). 
Following the Court's decision in Building Contractors, the City immediately 
discontinued charging the PILOT fee and therefore each of the Pocatello resident users saw an 
immediate decrease in their water and sewer utility bills. On December 19, 2013, the City 
lowered utility user fees in compliance with the Building Contractors decision. Pocatello 
residents saw an approximately 10% decrease in their monthly water and wastewater bills. 
(Stroschein Aff., ,r 9). 
Following the Court's decision in Building Contractors, the City made no changes to the 
connection/capacity_fee. The City has never charged a PILOT to the connection/capacity fe;e and 
the two different fees have no relationship. Based on the Building Contractors decision, the 
connection/capacity fee was deemed appropriate and the amount was upheld. Because no 
PILOT has ever been collected from the connection/capacity fee it was not improperly collected. 
Because the fee was declared constitutional and the amounts were correct, the City's collection 
of the connection/capacity fee should no serve as a source of recovery for the PILOT fee. 
(Stroschein Aff., ,r 13). 
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At the conclusion of the Building Contractors case, the Plaintiff, represented by the same 
counsel, initiated this litigation seeking to have the Court award damages based on three claims 
(1) unconstitutional talcing under both the Idaho Constitution and the United States Constitution; 
(2) state law unjust enrichment, and (3) state law equitable estoppel and/or equitable tolling. 
ARGUMENT 
A. No Connection Fees Were Improperly Comingled With The General Funds And 
There Was No PILOT Component To-The Connection Fees. 
Plaintiffs seek recovery and claim a taldng based on the City's collection of the 
Connection/Capacity Fees. As this Court is aware, the collection of the Connection Fee was fully 
and completely analyzed by this Court in the Building Contractors case. Specifically, the Court 
concluded that the amount of the Connection Fee was appropriate and that it was not improperly 
collected. During the pendency of that litigation, the City created two new accounts, Funds 37 
and 38 and placed all of the monies collected for Connection Fees in these two accounts. The 
money in Funds 37 and 3 8 were never spent prior to the resolution of the Building Contractors 
case. With respect to the Connection and User Fees, this Court concluded as follows: 
4. 
5. 
6. 
The City connection and user fees are not arbitrary or unreasonably imposed. The 
imposition and collection of the connection and user fees themselves are not 
unconstitutional acts or a violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond Act. 
There is no evidence that the connection fees are being used by the City to fund future 
capital improvements in violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond Act. 
Through the use of the PILOT fee transfer program, or any other transfer program 
with a similar intent, such as a rate of return program or a return on equity program, 
the Court declares that the City is imposing an impennissible tax to the extent that 
connection and user fees are being assessed a PILOT fee for general fund purposes, 
and such practices must cease and are hereby enjoined because they are 
unconstitutional and a violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond Act. This means that 
connection and user fees must be adiusted to the extent that they include a charge 
for the PILOT fee. In addition, no PILOT fee transfers from any water or sewer 
account .to the general fund are pennitted. 
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However, to the extent that connection and user fees are being transferred from the 
water and sewer accounts to the general fund, through any appropriate process, 
however named, for the purpose of paying expenses related to the operation, 
maintenance, replacement, and depreciation of existing water and sewer 
systems, including only those general City expenses needed. to operate the water and 
sewer departments, such as HR, financial, legal and accounting, such transfers are 
permitted and are not hereby enioined. 
(Memo Decision and Order On Reconsideration, p. 26 (emphasis added)). 
While Plaintiffs contend that the connection/capacity fee contained a PILOT fee, it is 
without merit and contrary to the conclusions of this Court in the Building Contractors case (see 
generally February 3, 2014 Decision on Plaintiff's Application for Order to Show Cause) as well 
as the first affidavit of Joyce Stroschein. Ms. Stroschein, as the Chief Financial Officer for the 
City of Pocatello is intimately familiar with all of the taxes and fees collected by the City. 
Specifically, she testifies that the purpose of the connection/capacity fee is intended to recover a 
new connector's proportionate share of the City's wastewater and water backbone facility costs. 
(Stroschein Aff., ,r,r 10-13). This Court, in Building Contractors, carefully analyzed the facts and 
concluded that the connection fee was not unreasonable nor was it arbitrarily imposed because it 
produced sufficient revenue to support the system at the lowest possible cost as required by the 
Idaho Revenue Bond Act. (Memorandum Decision on Reconsideration, pp. 23-24). There was 
no evidence submitted in the Building Contractors case to suggest that the connection fee 
contained a PILOT. In fact, the Court concluded that the PILOT was specifically transferred out 
of the water and sewer funds. (Memorandum Decision on Reconsideration, p. 22 and Decision 
on Plaintiff's Application for Order to Show Cause). Likewise, Ms. Stroschein specifically 
states that the connection/capacity has never included a PILOT. 
There is no, nor will there ever be, any evidence to support an argument that the 
Connection/Capacity Fee contained a PILOT component The undisputable evidence from the 
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City is that the Connection Fee never has, nor will in the future, contained a PILOT component. 
The PILOT component has nothing to do with the purpose of a connection fee as discussed 
above. Accordingly, there is no viability to the claim that the City engaged in any 
unconstitutional taking related to the connection/capacity fee. Accordingly, the Court should 
dismiss any claims associated with connection/capacity fee. 
B. There Was No Unconstitutional Taking. 
Plaintiffs argue that the imposition of the PILOT component of the User Fees a taking 
under both the Fifth Amendment and the Idaho Constitution. As is discussed more fully below, 
the takings claim under the Idaho Constitution fails pursuant to the Idaho Tort Claims Act. 
Moreover, the analysis for either a federal or state takings claim would be identical. The Takings 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees that private property shall not be taken for public use 
without just compensation. See U.S. Const. amend. V. A Fifth Amendment takings claim 
requires a two-step analysis. First, Plaintiffs must establish that it possesses a compensable 
property interest. See, e.g.,Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014, 112 
S.Ct. 2886, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992); Kaiser Aetna v. U.S., 444 U.S. 164, 179-180, 100 S.Ct. 
383, 62 L.Ed.2d 332 (1979). Plaintiffs must then show that the City took that private property 
interest for public use without just compensation. See Short v. U.S., 50 F.3d 994, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 
1995). 
1. The PILOT component of the User Fee Is Not A Compensable Property 
Interest. 
Plaintiffs contend that the PILOT component of the user fee that was collected by the 
City is a property interested protected under the Fifth Amendment. This contention is misplaced. 
Generally, taxation is not considered to be a taking because the monies paid are not a 
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recognizable protected property interest. See, e.g., United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 
53, 110 S.Ct. 387, 107 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989) (holding that a deduction ofa tribunal user fee from a 
settlement award is not a taking); Commercial Builders v. Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872,876 (9th 
Cir. 1991) (holding that a purely financial exaction does not constitute a taking); Coleman v. 
C.LR., 791 F.2d 68, 70 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that taxes are not takings, unless the Govenunent 
tries to "achieve through special taxes what the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment forbids 
if done directly."); Atlas Corp. v. United States, 895 F.2d 745, 756 (Fed.Cir. 1990) ("Requiring 
money to be spent is not a taking of property"); Commonwealth Edison Co. ·v. United States, 46 
Fed. CL 29, 40 (2000) ("Requiring money to be spent is not a taking of property"); Branch v. 
United States, 69 F.3d 1571, 1576 (Fed.Cir. 1995) (rejecting the argmnent that a federal statute 
constituted a taking, "because the property allegedly taken was money"). In describing why a 
takings analysis does not fit an assessment of money, the Federal Circuit, in Branch v. United 
States, 69 F.3d 1571 (Fed.Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 810, 117 S.Ct. 55, 136 L.Ed.2d 18 
(1996), stressed: 
Id. at 1575-76. 
To be sure, analyzing the assessment under the principles of takings law is 
awkward. If a particular govennnent action is deemed a taking, it means 
that the govenunent may engage in the action but must pay for it.. .. But 
because the property allegedly taken in this case was money that leads to 
the curious conclusion that the government may take the bank's money as 
long as it pays the money back. 
As is made clear by numerous federal cases addressing the collection of a tax as being a 
constitutional taking, Plaintiffs' claim of a constitutional taking fails. In this case, the PILOT 
component of the user fee was a tax collected by the City. This Court held that the PILOT 
component was an unconstitutional tax and that its collection was inappropriate and must cease. 
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The City complied with this edict and immediately after the Court's order ceased the collection 
of this tax, which was a component of the water and sewer user fees. Because this case centers 
on the collection of a tax, the guidance from other jurisdictions on whether the collection of a tax 
can even be a talcing is persuasive and confirms there is no valid 5th Amendment claim and 
summary judgment is appropriate. 
2. The PILOT Component Of The User Fee Was Not Used By The City 
Without Just Compensation. 
Even if the Court were to conclude that a property interest did exist, the PILOT 
component of the User Fee was not used by the City without "just compensation." In fact, the 
opposite conclusion results given the significant benefits that were provided to the entire City 
population equally through the use of the PILOT component. 
Specifically, there is no factual basis to conclude that the PILOT transfer did _not provide 
just compensation to the user fee payers. Consistent with the testimony of Joyce Stroschein, the 
user fee payers received significant benefits in the form of City services. (2nd Stroschein Aff., ,r 
4). One of the primary benefits received as a result of the PILOT transfer is the City was able to 
operate more efficiently and use a single department to service other departments. Because the 
Water, Sewer, and Wastewater Sanitation Funds are funded through user fees, those user fees 
_ provide the financial support necessary to operate these three departments. (2nd Stroschein Aff., ,r 
5). In order to increase efficiency and decrease costs, the City allows the water, sewer, and 
sanitation departments to use numerous city services rather than require each department to 
maintain separate services for each department. (Id.). That is, the water, sewer. and sanitation 
departments do not, for example, maintain in-house legal, finance, accounting, planning & 
development, human resources, etc. (Id.). 
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The efficiency of the City is a significant benefit derived because the enterprise 
departments are able leverage the talent and diversity of skills within the City. The combined 
services within the City are vital to the water, sewer, and sanitation departments operation. Each 
of these departments would be unable to operate at the same cost if the department were forced 
to hire its own legal counsel, CPA' s, human resource directors, etc. Thus, rather than 
unnecessarily increase the cost to run each department, these services are provided to the 
enterprise departments. The tangible benefit provided to the water, sewer, and sanitation 
departments through the use of combined services for legal, finance, human resources etc. result 
in a decrease in user fees. (Id.). Ms. Stroschein provided an example of the benefit users received 
though the PILOT transfer, "in fiscal year 2013, the City refinanced the three Water Pollution 
Control Facility loans, effectively saving $1,708,303 in premium savings. (Id.). These savings 
were made possible through the skills provided in the Finance, legal, and Mayor and Council 
departments. (Id.). Thus, the task of saving nearly $2 million in premiums was made possible 
through the efficiencies of the City not duplicating services. 
The efficiency of the City is a significant benefit that was received through the payment 
of the PILOT transfer. (Id.). Moreover, operation of these departments in this fashion is 
appropriate and consistent with the Court's ·findings in the Building Contractors case: 
... to the extent that connection and user fees are being transferred from the water 
and sewer accounts to the general fund, through any appropriate process, however 
named, for the purpose of paying expenses related to the operation, maintenance, 
replacement, and depreciation of existing water and sewer systems, including 
only those general City expenses needed to operate the water and sewer 
departments, such as HR, financial, legal and accounting, such transfers are 
permitted and are not hereby enjoined. 
(Memo Decision and Order On Reconsideration, p. 26 (emphasis added)). In this case, the use of 
the PILOT transfers for these purposes were appropriate and an example of the significant 
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benefit and compensation provided by the City to user fee payers. 
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During Fiscal Years 2006-2014 PILOT transfers were made from the Sanitation, Water, 
and Water Pollution Control Funds to the General Fund. (2nd Stroschein Aff., ,r 6). The General 
Fund reports on activity for Mayor and City Council, Finance, City Hall, Building Permits and 
Licenses, Planning and Development, Public Engineering, Geographic Information Systems, 
Human Resources, Non-Departmental, Economic Development, Legal, Police, Fire, Animal 
Control, Parks, Parks Admini.stration and Zoo. (2nd Stroschein Aff., ,r 6; Ex. A}. In addition to the 
significant benefits provided through efficiently overlapping services in the water, sewer and 
sanitation departments, additional benefits and services were provided to general City services. 
Proof of the just compensation provided to user fee payers is evident in the aftermath of 
the Building Contractors case. In 2014 only one PILOT transfer was made in October of 2013 in 
the amount of $206,904 to the General Fund. (2nd Stroschein Aff., ,r 9). The remaining budgeted 
transfers were cancelled as a result of the Building Contractor Association lawsuit. (Id.). The 
declaration that the PILOT was impermissible created a major budget shortfall for the General 
Fund in Fiscal Year 2014. (Id.). At the.time the PILOT was declared impermissible, the City was 
not able to raise taxes to obtain the revenues needed to complete the budgeted expenditures. (Id.). 
Shortly after the PILOT transfer was discontinued, the City Council mandated that all General 
Fund departments conduct a 2% budget holdback resulting in reduced program expenditures. (2nd 
Stroschein Aff., ,r 10). Further, the City Council mandated that $1,000,000 in General Fund 
Reserves be expended to make up for the PILOT transfer shortfall. (Id.). Ultimately, the net 
impact of the PILOT transfer being discontinued was a reduction in City services of 
approximately $1,269,896. (Id.). Thus, as a direct result of the PILOT being discontinued, 
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patrons of the City saw a general decrease in the services provided by the City in approximately 
$1,269,896. (Id.). 
In Fiscal Year 2015, the City Council decided to absorb the loss of PILOT transfers by 
increasing property taxes. (2nd Stroschein Aff., ,r 11 ). The City had $2,696,886 in allowable 
additional taxes; $257,972 for new construction, 3 % allowable increase of $738,692, and 
$1,700,222 in foregone taxes. (Id.). The City took $2,499,545 of the allowable additional tax.es, 
leaving $197,341 as future foregone tax.es. (Id.). Ultimately, the only way the City could operate 
the City at the same levels it was prior to the 2013 Building Contractors case is to increase 
property taxes. Conversely, should the City decline increase property tax.es to offset the loss of 
the PILOT transfer, City services will inevitably be reduced dramatically. (Id.). 
To argue that the PILOT transfer did not provide just compensation to the user fee payers 
is disingenuous. The PILOT transfer did hot result in a windfall for the City, nor did the PILOT 
transfers sit idly in the City's bank account. (2nd Stroschein Aff., ,r 12). All of the PILOT 
transfers were completely exhausted each year to pay for the City services described above. (Id.). 
Ultimately, the user fee payers received just compensation in the form of lower user fee because 
the water, sewer, and sanitation departments were able to operate more efficiently and avoided 
redundant service, such as legal, financial, accounting, human resources, etc. (Id.). Because just 
compensation was provided in the form of lower user fees and improved City services there is no 
viable unconstitutional takings claim and summary judgment is appropriate. 
C. There Is No Evidence The Court's Ruling In Building Contractors v. City of 
Pocatello Was Retroactive. 
Plaintiffs rely heavily on the findings and conclusions of this. Court in the Building 
Contractors litigation. With respect to the PILOT component of the User Fees, this Court 
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concluded as follows: 
1. The City connection and user fees are not arbitrary or unreasonably imposed. The 
imposition and collection of the connection and user fees themselves are not 
unconstitutional acts or a violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond Act. 
2. There is no evidence that the connection fees are being used by the City to fund future 
capital improvements in violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond Act. 
3. Through the use of the PILOT fee transfer program, or any other transfer program 
with a similar intent, such as a rate of return program or a return on equity program, 
the Court declares that the City is imposing an impermissible tax to the extent that · 
connection and user fees are being assessed a PILOT fee for general fund purposes, 
and such practices must cease and are hereby enjoined because they are 
unconstitutional and a violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond Act. This means that 
connection and user fees must be adiusted to the extent that they include a charge 
for the PILOT fee. In addition, no PILOT fee transfers from any water or sewer 
account to the general fund are pennitted. 
However, to the extent that connection and user fees are being transferred from the 
water and sewer accounts to the general fund, through any appropriate process, 
however named, for the purpose of paying expenses related to the operation, 
maintenance, replacement, and depreciation of existing water and sewer 
systems, including only those general City expenses needed to operate the water and 
sewer departments, such as HR, financial, legal and accounting, such transfers are 
permitted and are not hereby enioined. 
(Nov. 15, 2013 Memo Decision and Order On Reconsideration, p. 26 (emphasis added)). The 
Court fmmd fault with the City's collection of the PILOT component of the user fee and enjoined 
future collection of the PILOT. 
The numerous decisions and orders in the Building Contractors case make no mention 
that the invalidation of the PILOT would be applied retroactively. Rather, the Court held that the 
conclusions and orders would be prospective only. In the November 13, 2013 Memorandum 
Decision and Order on Defendant's Motion to Reconsider and Plaintiff's Amended Motion/or 
Reconsideration, this Court analyzed the permissibility of the PILOT component of a fee. The 
Court concluded first that the PILOT component of the fee did not comply with the statutory 
requirement of Idaho Code § 50-1028. However, the Court went on to hold that the application 
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of the holding was prospective rather than retroactive, "[t]hus, any portion of the user and/or 
connection fees that are assessed in order to pay the PILOT fee to the City, do not conform to the 
statutory requirements ofI.C. § 50-1028 and must be excluded from any fee assessment going 
forward." (Nov. 13, 2013 Decision, p. 24 (emphasis added)). Inasmuch as the Court's decision 
was prospective only, the instant matter is rendered moot because the City immediately complied 
with this Court's directive and ceased collection of the PILOT. Following the Court's decision in 
Building Contractors, however, the City immediately discontinued charging the PILOT fee and 
therefore each of the Pocatello resident users saw an immediate decrease in their water and sewer 
utility bills. On December 19, 2013, the City lowered utility user fees in compliance with the 
Building Contractors decision. Pocatello residents saw an approximately 10% decrease in their 
monthly water and wastewater bills. (Stroschein Aff., ,r 9). 
hnportantly, whether there was an unconstitutional talcing from the PILOT component 
and/or the connection fee was previously addressed in the Building Contractors litigation. This 
Court will recall that an unconstitutional takings claim was advanced in that litigation and given 
the inability to present any evidence on that issue, summary judgment on that claim was granted. 
In the Building Contractors case, the Complaint alleged the City's connection fee policies and 
user fees constituted a violation of the United States Constitution and Idaho Constitution as a 
talcing of private property without just compensation and asked the Court to grant Plaintiff 
appropriate equitable and legal remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Plaintiff failed to present 
evidence to support this claim and summary judgment was granted. (28 March 2013 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 14-15). 
This finding was reiterated by the Court in the January 10, 2014 Order Denying Plaintiff's 
Request for Attorney Fees and Costs, "the City prevailed against Plaintiff's argument that the 
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connection fees constituted an unconstitutional taking." (January 10, 2014 Orde~_Denying 
Plaintiff's Request/or Attorney Fees and Costs, p. 4). 
Moreover, there has never been any pronouncement from the Idaho Supreme Court that 
the PILOT component of the user fee, or its equivalent, is unconstitutional. The present case 
seeks to recover damages associated with a tax that was declared unconstitutional months before 
the same attorney handling the prior lawsuit initiated this lawsuit. Retroactive application to past 
and pending cases, even to the case in which the decision was announced is not mandatory and is 
left to the sound discretion of the court. BHA Investments Inc. v. City a/Boise, 141 Idaho 168 
173, 108 P.3d 315,320 (2004). When considering whether to apply a case retroactively, the 
Court should weigh three factors: (1) the purpose of the decision; (2) the reliance on the prior 
law; and (3) the effect upon the administration of justice if the decision is applied retroactively. 
Id. (citing Thompson v. Hagan, 96 Idaho 19,523 P.2d 1365 (1974)). The Court should balance 
the first factor against the second and third factor to determine whether to limit retroactive 
application of the decision. Id. (citing Jones v. Watson, 98 Idaho 606,570 P.2d 284 (1977)). 
In this case, the purpose of the initial Building Contractors case was, inter alia, to 
determine, as a matter of first impression, whether the City of Pocatello had improperly included 
a PILOT component into the user fee. The PILOT component was then transferred to the general 
fund to fund the activities of the City. When the City initiated the PILOT component, it did so in 
reliance on City of Chubbuck v. City of Pocatello, 127 Idaho 198, 899 P .2d 411 (1995). In the 
City of Chubbuck case, the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that a rate of return on allocated 
cost of service may be charged because the Revenue Bond Act permits the collection of 
revenues. The City acted consistent with this prior precedent related to the appropriate use of a 
rate of return in City o/Chubbuckv. City of Pocatello, 127 Idaho 198,899 P.2d 411 (1995). 
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Ultimately, this Court disagreed with the City's interpretation of City of Chubbuck, 
distinguishing the present case from City of Chubbuck on the basis that the City of Chubbuck 
only permitted rate of returns to be charged to another entity and not city residents or utility 
customers. 
The Court's conclusion was a matter of first impression in Idaho and not clearly 
articulated in City of Chubbuck. Prior to the Building Contractors case, the City believed it was 
in compliance with City of Chubbuck This is evidenced by Mr. Swindell's affidavits, wherein he 
identified and set forth the underlying rationale and analysis behind the PILOT fee. (1 81 Swindell 
Aff., iMf 6-12). The City reviewed applicable law and attempted to create a fee structure that it 
believed complied with existing law. While this Court ultimately disagreed with the PILOT 
fee's use, the fact that the City was attempting to create a legitimate and legal fee structure that 
complied with existing law, despite there being no governing precedent on the subject. The City 
relied on existing law, which further favors a conclusion that Building Contractors was not to be 
retroactively applied. 
Finally, the administration of justice will not be served should the Court apply the 
Building Contractors case retroactively and allow Plaintiffs' to recover the previously expended 
PILOT component of the user fee. The fees that were collected have long since been exhausted 
in the operation of the City. The PILOT fee was transferred to the general fund and fully 
expended. Generally speaking, if the PILOT were not collected, city services would have been 
cut. If this matter is permitted to retroactively apply Building Contractors each property owner 
within the City will be adversely affected because they will be required to bear an increased 
property tax. Thus, while a renter who paid the user fees for water and sewer would receive some 
benefit, each of the property owners within the City who paid user fees for water and sewer 
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would be adversely affected. Moreover, the application of the how much ofa recovery each 
utility customer would be entitled to is a difficult and tim(rconsuming question. That is, the 
PILOT fee would be different for residential versus commercial users. Users who used more 
water would have paid higher PILOT fees. Ultimately, there would be a significant increase in 
the number of cases resulting from the detennination regarding the Building Contractors 
retroactivity. To retroactively apply the Building Contractors case would thwart the 
administration of justice because the City would be forced to expend significant financial and 
human resources (likely in the form of a receiver appointed by the Court to analyze each user 
within the City) to determine the amount of PILOT component would be returned to each user. 
Furthermore, each property owner within the City would be forced to shoulder a large increase in 
their property taxes to sustain a damage award given the PILOT component was exhausted by 
the City for its annual operation. 
Ultimately, there is no legal or factual support for a conclusion that the Building 
Contractors case should be applied retroactively. Because the Court did not find that the 
Building Contractors case was rel;roactive, the Court should dismiss this lawsuit with prejudice 
because the City immediately ceased collection of the PILOT component of the user fee in the 
aftermath of the Building Contractors matter. 
D. The City Is Immune From State Law Claims Associated With The Collection Of 
Taxes. 
Plaintiffs make three state law claims that arise out of the collection of a tax: (1) 
unconstitutional taldng under the Idaho Constitution, (2) unjust enriclnnent, and (3) equitable 
· estoppel and/or equitable tolling. The City is immune from these claims pursuant to Idaho Code 
§ 6-904A. Idaho provides that a governmental entity can be immune from certain tortious 
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conduct. In order to determine whether immunity under the Idaho Tort Claims Act is applicable, 
the Court must determine: 
... whether tort recovery is allowed under the laws ofldaho; and, 
if so, whether an exception to liability found in the tort claims act 
shields the alleged misconduct from liability; and, if no exception 
applies, whether the merits of the claim as presented for 
consideration on the motion for summary judgment entitle the 
moving party to dismissal. 
Harris v. State Dep't of Health & Welfare, 123 Idaho 295, 298 n. 1, 847 P .2d 1156, 1159 n. 1 
(1992). A governmental entity is subject to liability for money damages arising out of certain 
conduct and those of its employees acting within the course and scope of their employment to the 
extent a private party would be liable, pursuant to Idaho Code Section 6-903. However, a 
governmental entity may qualify for immunity under one of the exceptions to government 
liability provided in the Tort Claims Act. For the immunity to be applicable, the conduct must 
fall within the definition of a "claim" within the meaning of the Act The word "claim" as used 
in § 6-904A must be interpreted in accordance with the definition of the ITCA § 6-902, which 
provides that "claim'' 
... means any written demand to recover money damages from a 
governmental entity or its employee which any person is legally 
entitled to recover under this act as compensation for the negligent 
or otherwise wrongful act or omission of a governmental entity or 
its employee when acting within the course or scope of his 
employment. 
LC. § 6-902(7). The term "claim," as used in the ITCA, describes claims for damages arising 
from a wrongful act or omission. In alleging the three state law claims resulting from an alleged 
tax, Plaintiff has alleged wrongful conduct that could subject a governmental entity to liability 
and they seek recovery of money damages. 
A review of the exceptions to liability reveals that Idaho Code § 6-904A(l) provides 
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inununity that is applicable here. Section 6-904A states in relevant part as follows: 
A. govern.mental entity and its employees while acting within the 
course and scope of their employment and without malice or 
criminal intent and without reckless, willful and wanton conduct as 
defined in section 6-904C, Idaho Code, shall not be liable for any 
claim which: 
1. Arises out of the assessment or collecdon of any tax or fee. 
I.C. § 6-904A(l) (emphasis added). Here, Plaintiff contends that the collection of a "tax or fee" 
was inappropriate and seeks damages as a result of the tax. Pursuant to § 6-904A the City is 
inunune for any state law claims that arise out of the collection of a tax or fee. 
In this case, Plaintiff alleges two fees, the capacity and user fee, contained an improper 
PILOT component and that the City improperly received a benefit from the Plaintiffs. As is 
discussed more fully above, there was never a PILOT component in the capacity fee so there 
could never have been an unjust enrichment. However, it cannot be disputed that the state law 
taking, unjust emichment and equitable estoppel/equitable tolling claims all fail because the City 
is inunune. The PILOT component of the User Fee was a tax collected exclusively as part of the 
User Fees. Following the Court's decision in Building Contractors, however, the City 
immediately discontinued charging the PILOT fee, resulting in each of the Pocatello resident 
users seeing an immediate decrease in their water and sewer utility bills. On December 19, 
2013, the City lowered utility user fees in compliance with the Building Contractors decision. 
Pocatello residents saw an approximately 10% decrease in their monthly water and wastewater 
bills. (Stroschein Aff., ,r 9). 
Furthermore, there is no evidence that the City acted with malice or criminal intent and 
with reckless, willful and wanton conduct in the collection of the PILOT fee. Rather, it is clear 
that the City believed that it had the authority to collect the PILOT fee pursuant to City of 
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Chubbuckv. City of Pocatello, 127 Idaho 198,899 P.2d 411 {1995). In other words, and as 
discussed above, there was a good faith belief by the City that it was permitted to collect the fee. 
Accordingly, there is no basis for the state law unconstitutional taking, unjust enrichment or the 
equitable estoppel/equitable tolling claims and summary judgment on each of these state law 
claims is warranted. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Defendant City of Pocatello respectfully requests that this Court 
grant its Motion for Summary Judgment on all claims and dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint with 
prejudice. 
Dated this .l'J_ day of March, 2015. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following 
this -l.3- day of March, 2015, by the method indicated below: 
Michael D. Gaffney, Esq. 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Fax: 529-9732 
Nathan M. Olsen, Esq. 
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN 
485 "E" Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Fax: 524-3391 
b<]" Mailing _ [ '1 Hand Delivery 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
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[ ] Overnight Mail 
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485 "E" Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Telephone: (208) 523-4650 
Facsimile: (208) 524-3391 
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DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
BANNOCK COUNTY IDAHO 
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on 
behalf of itself and all others similarly 
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself 
and all others similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
municipality, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
County of Bonneville ) 
Case No.: CV-2014-1520-0C 
AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL D. 
GAFFNEY 
I, Michael D. Gaffney. having been duly sworn on oat~ depose and state; 
1. I am co-counsel for Plaintiffs in the above-entitled case. 
2. I am competent to testify and do so through personal knowledge. 
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3. Plaintiffs are requesting, at minimum, additional time to prepare their response 
to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment orto continue the hearing set for April 13, 
2015 to May I8, 2015. 
4. The schedules of Plaintiffs' counsel have been such that there has not been 
adequate time to prepare briefing and affidavits. Co..cotn1sel for Plaintiffs, Nathan Olsen, 
had a family trip to California planned many weeks in advance of receiving the summary 
judgment motion for the week of March 21-28, 2015. 
5. I have been occupied with nwnerous post-trial motions and pre-appellate 
preparations related to ajury trial I recently completed in Blaine County, Idaho on 
February 27, 2015. 
6. Additionally, Plaintiffs' coW1se1 has not had adequate time to prepare for and 
take the deposition of Joyce A. Stroschein, the City of Pocatello Chief Financial Officer. 
Ms. Stroschein's affidavit submitted in support of Defendant's summary judgme_nt 
motion contains nine summary spreadsheets to 'Which additional discovery is needed to 
adequately respond to the dispositive motion. 
7. Mr. Olsen has been in contact with defense counsel, Nathan Starnes to request 
additional time to respond to the motion for summary judgment. Mr. Starnes indicated to 
Mr. Olsen that it was his preference to have both the summary judgment and the 
Plaintiffs, motion for class certification heard on the same day. 
8. My assistant has been in contact with Karla, Judge Dunn's clerk to find a 
mutually workable date for the hearings. The date that appears to be mutually available 
is May· 18, 2015, however, at this point I am awaiting confinnation from Mr. Starnes that 
this date is acceptable for hearing both pending motions. 
AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL D. GAFFNEY - 2 
8/11 
........ _ 
328
09:34:28 03-27-2015 
c:) 
Michael 
thisq,7c{~} ofMarch, 2015. 
I 
I 
Public for Idaho 
g at: / do.lid r;;tts; ID . 
My Commission Expires: CJ-·//- ;fd:10 
(SEAL) 1,\\\\UIIIJlll111J 
~''l,cA w, .. ,, .. ~ 
§' ~.;1 ••••••••••• (.~ ~ $'~ •••• • ••• 0~ 
*"'S ... • . ...,_~ 
s _.. o---ARy· .. ,,~ 
.c:- ... \.\ •• '• ~ 
.:: Ill • .. ~ . . . -
i i ! ! 
- . C . = I \ PLJBL\ l ii ~ ... ..·· s ~ •,, ,,• AS 
""- .a.:•, ··~~-
,~o,;;;.••u•••· '* 
ii''+,;..,~ c: OF \0 i.'''" v,,,,,,,,mnn'\''i 
AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL D. GAFFNEY - 3 
9 /11 
329
2085299732 
. ' 
plaintiffs' response to the summary judgment motion and to attempt to find a workable 
alternative date to meet the needs of defense counsel. Plaintiffs further submit that there 
is no prejudice to the defendant under the court's cUITent scheduling order that would be 
caused by moving the hearing date to May 18, 2015. 
The plaintiffs respectfully request that the court either move the hearing date to 
May 18, 2015 or alternatively allow the plaintiffs until April 6, 2015 to file a responsive 
brief: affidavits and deposition excerpts. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify I am a licensed attorney in the state ofidaho and on March 27, 2015, I 
served a true and correct copy of the MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME AND 
TO CONTINUE HEARING, I.R.C.P. 56(c) on the following by the method of delivery 
designated below: 
Blake G. Hall 
Nathan R. Starnes 
Hall Angell Stames 
1075 S. Utah Avenue, Ste 150 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Fax: (208) 621M3008 
Bannock County Courthouse 
624 E. Center , 
Pocatello, ID 2 
Fax: (208) 2 013., 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY 
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK; on behalf 
of itself and all others similarly situated, ED 
QUINN, on behalf of himself and all others 
similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
municipality, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Bonneville ) 
Case No. CV-2014-1520-0C 
AFFIDAVIT OF NAT~ M. OLSEN IN 
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
CITY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
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I, Nathan M. Olsen, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that the testimony given in this sworn 
statement is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing· but the truth, that it is made on my personal 
knowledge, and that I would so testify in open court if called upon to do so. 
1. I am co-counsel representing the Plaintiffs in this matter. 
2. I am also the attorney that represented the plaintiff, Building Contractors 
Association of Southeast Idaho (Builders Association), in the District Court of the Sixth Judicial 
District in and for the State of Idaho in Bannoc~ County, Case No. CV-2011-5228-0C (Building 
Contractors' case). 
3. Exhibit A attached is a true and correct copy of this Court's Memorandum 
Decision and Order on City's Motion to Reconsider and Plaintiffs' Amended Motion for 
Reconsideration entered in the Building Contractors' case on November 15, 2013. 
4. Exhibit B attached is a true and correct copy of a public document prepared and 
submitted by the City of Pocatello in response to the Plaintiffs' written discovery req1J.ests which 
from the total amount of PILOT and Return of Equity Fees collected and used by the City since 
FY 2006, the total amount being $28,329,231.43. 
5. Exhibit C attached are true and correct portions of the deposition testimony and 
exhibits of David Swindell taken on December 14, 2012. 
6. Exhibit D attached is a true and correct copy of the affidavit and report of David 
L. Hunter submitted to the Court in the Building Contractors' case on May 24, 2013. Mr. 
Hunter has also been disclosed as an expert for the plaintiffs in this case. 
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7. At no point during the Building Contractors' case did the City ever disclose Joyce 
A. Stroschein as a person with knowledge or authority on issues pursuant to that case, including 
the policies, budgeting, expenditures and collections regarding PILOT fees. 
DATED this 1st day of April, 2015. 
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I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed a 'mey n the State ofldaho, with my office in 
. 
Idaho Falls, Idaho, and that on the_/_ day of , 2015 I served atrue and correct 
copy of the foregoing document on the persons listed below by first class mail, with the correct 
postage thereon, or by causing the same to be delivered in accordance with Rule 5(b ), I.R.C.P. 
Persons Served: 
Blake G. Hall, Esq. 
HALL ANGELL & STARNES, LLP . 
1075 S. Utah Ave., Ste. 150. 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
FAX: {208) 621-3008 
EMAIL: bgb@hasattorneys.com 
Mfilhoz 
( ) man. . hand (, fax ( ) email 
AFFIDAVIT OF NATHAN M. OLSEN IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
CITY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT· 4 
335
C) () . . 
'-.i_. __ ,,. 
-EXHIBIT "A" 
r 
336
,, 
0 I""\ \ 1 ·• .• __ •. .Y 
. flL~J) 
BANNOCK CBUN n·· 
rL!:FH\ Of TH£ cou1n 
2013NOV 15 AM 9: 2~ 
BY----~·---·----lJf PtffY G[EIU( · 
IN THE DISTlUCT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
. STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
Register No.Cy ~201 l-5228~oc _ 
BUILDING CONTRACTORS, 
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST 
IDAHO, an Idaho_ non-pmfit corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
CITY OF POCATELLO) ~n Idaho 
Municipality, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
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) 
) 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND . 
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO RECONSIDER AND PL/\lNTIFF'S 
MiIBNDED MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDER:A TION 
This matter is before the Court on the Gity of PocateUo,s (Defendant or City) Motion to 
Reconsider the Court,s March· 281 2013 Memorandum Decision and Orde1· on Defendant's 
Motion fo1· Summary Judgment. The City filed Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration with on 
accompanying me~orandum on April 22, 2013. The Plaintiff, Building Contractors Association 
of Southeast Idaho (Plaintiff 01· Association),_ filed a Response in Opposition to Defendant's 
Motion fol' Reconsideration on May 61 2013. On May 9, 20i3, the City filed Defendant's Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Motion fol' Reconsideration ·aud also the Second Affidavit of David 
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K. Swindell. The Court heard 01·al argmnent ot1 this matter on May 13, 2013, and took the Citts 
, Motion to Reconsider under adviseme11t. Subsequently, on May 28, 2013, Plaintiff filed 
Plaintiffs Renewed Motion for Sanctions under I.R.C.P, 37(b) and Motion for Reconsideration. 
Plaintiff's Motioi1 to ~econside~· was Amended on August 6J 2013. Subsequent responsive 
filings and affidavits were filed) which the Comt has also considered. After carefully considering 
the motions, memo!'andums, and oral arguments of the parties; the Court now issues its 
Memorandum Decision and Order on the Defendant's Motlon for Reconsideration and Plaintiff's 
Amended Motion for Reconsideration. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
' 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 1 l{a)(2)(B) provides that H[a] motion for reconsideration 
of any interlocutory orders of the trial comt may be made at m1y time before the entry of final 
judgment but not later than fomteen (14) days after the entry of the fi11al judgme11t,11 The 
decision of whethe1· to grnnt 01· deny a motion fol' reconslde1-ation made pt1rsuantto Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedul'e l l(a)(2)(B) is left to the sollnd discretion of the· trial coul't,1 . The party 
requesting the motion fol' reconsideration is permitted to present riew facts or law to aid the co111·t 
in its 1·econsideration but is not required to do so.2 However, if new evidence is presented the 
burden is on the moving party to bring the n~v evidence to the courts attention., . 
1 11011 v. Porfneil[Med. Ctr., 147 Idaho 552, S60, 212 P.3d 982, 990 {2009). In reviewing whether a trial court 
abused its discretion, this Court applies a three~part test, which asks whethe.r the disll'ict court: (1) correctly . 
perceived the issue as one of discl'etlon; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of that discretion; and (3) reached its 
decision by an e.xercise of reason. · . 
:i. Joh11so11 v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 4681 147 P.3d 100 (Ct. App. 2006). . 
3 Coem· d'Alene Mining Co. l', First Nat'/ Bank, 118 Idaho 812, 800 P.2d 1021i (1990). 
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DISCUSSION 
I. Pl'oceduml History 
Since the Court's initial decision in thl~ case, there have been a substantial number of 
additional submissions to the record. In Ol'det· to set the basis of the Court's decision on each 
pmiy' s respective motion to reconsider, the Cout1 will summadze the most substantial 
developments ht the case: 
A. The City's Motion to Reconsider 
In_ its Motion to Reconsider, the City argues that the Association does not _have standing 
. . 
on what it asserts is the only issue remaining in this matter, which the City chat·act~rizes as 
11whethel' the City is using those [rate of return fees] or payment in lieu of taxes funds for 
purposes otl1er than to support the existing water au~ sewel' systems.114 The Citt s position is the 
Association does not have standing on th.e remaining issue because the rate of return 01· payment 
in lieu of taxes (PILOT) is paid by every usel' of the Cityts water and sewet· systems, and· 
therefore, is a generalized gl'ievauce shared by all taxpayers. Conseq\iently, pul'suant to "ro11ng v. 
City of Ketchum and Miles v. Id~ho Power Co., the City argues that the Association does not 
have standing because it does not have a unique ham1.5 The City concedes the Association has 
standing on the othe1· issues raised and addressed in the Court's Memorandum Decision and 
Order - that no issues of genuine material fact exist as to 1) whether the City is impermissibly 
using the connection fees to fund future expansion and capital improven1ent projects for the 
. . 
4 Defendant's Memorandum Jn Support of Motion forlleco11sideration1 p. 2 tlled April 22, 2013, · 
s See Youilgv. qtJ of Ketclmn,, 137 Idaho 102, 44 P.3d IJS7 (2002) r•But evcn.ifashowlng~an be made ofan. 
Injury_ In fact, standing may be, dented lVh11n the as.setted J1cmri is ?-SCneralizedgrlevance share.d by all or a large 
eh1ss of citizens."); Miles v. ldallo Power Co., 116 Idaho 6351 637, 778, P.2d 157, 159 (1989) ("a citizen and 
tax.payer may not challenge a governmentafenactment wliere the injmy Is one suffered by all citlze11s and taxpayers 
alike.''); See also S111denl Lo«11 Funrf v. Payeue Col/Illy, l2S Idaho 824, 828, 87S P.2d 236,240 (Ct, App. 1994) (A 
concerned c1tb:en who seeks to ensure the government abides by the Jaw does not have standing,) 
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watel' and sewer system; 6 and 2) whethet· the connection fees collected by the City al'e 
reasonably imposed. 7 In sum, the City contends that the Association derives standing in this case: 
only through the Citis assessmet~t and collection of connection fees, but the Association does 
not have a unique injul'y i.n fact as to how the City uses funds collected through the rate of return 
01· PILOT fees because every taxpayer who uses the City's water and s_ewer systems pays the rate 
of retum and/or PILOT fees. 
B. TJte Association's Motion and Amended Motion for Reconsideration 
Following the headng on the City's motion for reconsideration the Association fl.led its 
own Motion fol' Reconsiderationt which was subsequently amended. Supplemental bdefiug on 
'·, 
that motion was provided by the A.'3sociation on September 30J 2013.3 This supplemental 
briefing argues) in relevant paii, that if the ~otirt finds the City's assessment of the PILOT fee to 
be impenn"issiblet the11 the Comt shoilld also find the City's current user and connection fees 
impermissible. The Association argues this based on the Cityts reliance on the PILOT fee in 
calculating the riecess-ary user and connection fee~. The Association requests that the Court 
invalidate the cm·1·ent rates and require the city to implement a fee rate that is '1constitutional and . 
permissible119 
C. The Com·t's Memo1·andum Decision and 01·der 
The Association brought this case seeking declaratQry and h\f unctlve relief in reference to 
the Clty's connection fee policies, arguing that the City's cmrent policies are an unconstitu~iollal 
use of police powers because the fees do not have a proportionate nexus to tbefr regulated use 
G Id. at p. 28, 
7 -Id. at 30. 
: See. Supplemental Memorandum in Support o!Plaintifrs Amended Motion for Reoonsideratio11. 
Id. at 4, 
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. and are also contrary to Idaho stah1tory and case law because they are in violation of the Idaho 
Revenue Bond Act, I.C. § 50-1026, et at.10 The Association claimed standing in its Complaint 
be~ause its members pay both. connection and usei· fees. 11 In its Motion to Rec~nsidel', the City 
now distinguishes between the City's assess,izent and collection of connecUon and user fees and 
the City's collection and use of PILOT/Retum on Equity/Rate of .Return /franchise Jees. 12 In 
support of its Motion to Reconsidel', the City suggests that the Court made this same distinction 
in its original Memoi·andum Decisio11 and Order by finding that there were no genuine issues of 
material fact con?eming whether connection fees were being used for fut\1re expansion and 
whether they were arbitrarily imposed, but that an issue of fact remained as to "wllethe1· the· City . 
is using those [rate of return fees] or payment in lieu of laxes fimds for purposes other than to 
support the ex.isting watet· n~d sew!r systems>'13 In support oftltis distinction, the City has filed 
the Third and Fourth Affidavits of David K. Swindell, explaining that the City has adj1.1sted its 
accounting procedures and, as of March 20 l_ 3, coru1ection/capacity fees are held separately from 
user fees in separate funds. 14 Mi·. Swindell's third affidavit indicates that the entire balance of 
co1mection/oapacity fees collected sin~e 2007 nre held in these acco1.mts. 15 Swindelfts fourth 
1° Complaint, p. 9, 
11 Complaint, p. 10, 132. 
12 U appears to tile Court that the City does not, Jn its Motion to Reconsider or in any other memorandum previously 
flied, make n distinction between P1LOTi franchise, and return on eqltlty/ru1d rate ofl'eturn fee3, See Defendant's 
Memorandun1 In Support of motion for Reconsi~eration, p. 2 {the City clu1raclerlzes !Ito remaining issue as to 
wbe!her the City is impermissibly using 11rate of return fees or paymellt in lieu of taxes funds"): Id nt p.S ("[T]he 
Cityts use ofji'at1cJ1/sefees from the water and wastewater systems that are messed to alt individuals who live in 
Pocatello" is the only remaining issue .for ttJal.); Id. at p. <, {"in this case, the rate of return or PILOT fees are taxes 
that are collected from all citizens in Poeatello.11); Id. at p. 7 eTlic rate of return and PILOT fees are designed lo 
satisfy the same purposes and are sy110,1ymous11). • 
13 Defendant's Memorandtun In Support of Motion for Reconsideration, p. 2. 
u See Third Affidavit of David K. Swindell 4:8. 
15 Jd at 4:7. 
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Affidavit indicates that the PJLOT fee is charged only to the opernting fonds, and there is no 
relationship between the PJLOT fee and the capaclty fee ftmds. 16 
First, the Court makes cleal' that, in its original decision, it did not deliberately distinguish 
between com1ection fees and PILOT/rate of ret1milreturu on equity/franchise fe~s in_ the way the 
City suggests. Pursuant to 1he AssociationJs Complaint, the issue before the Coint was whether 
the City was implementing its co_1mectlonfee policy, as palt of its operation of its city owned and 
operated public utilities, contl'ary to constittttionnl, statutory, and case law in Idaho. Therefore, as 
stated in its umbrella paragraph relating to the medts of the City's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, the Comt ex.plained: 
Pursttant to Loomis, in making a determination whether conneal/on fee.fl and an 
equity buy-in system are stallltory permissible, a Court 1m1st determine two 
things: 1) whethe1: the revenue collected from connection fees is used for a 
permissible purpose under the Idaho Revenue Bond Act and 2) whethel' the fees 
at·e reasonably and not arbitrnrily determined. 17 
This is a two part test.18 The Court found that there was no issue of fact ci;mcerning the second 
part of test, but that there was ai1 issue of fact conceming the first part of test, i.e., whether 
revenue collected from connection fees is imperniissibly being \lsed Hfor p\ltposes other than to 
support the existing wate~ an~ sewe1· systenis."19 Therefore, since the whole test was whether the . 
connectlonfees were statutodly pel'missible, the Court answered the first prot of the test in tern1s 
16 See Fourth Affidavit of David K. Swhtdell 2:2. 
17 Memorandum Decision and Order on Det'endant'& Motlon fur Summary Judgment, p. IS-16, issued May 28, 2013 
iMemorandum Decision and Order). .. 
· 
8 The Court in fuct, dlvlded t!te first step of 1110 test into two parts -1) wb.etl1cr r~vormc frorn the collection fees was 
impermlssibly beittg used "for purposes other than to support the existing water and sower systems"; and 2) whether 
revenue from the connection fees was being lmtlermissibly used to fund f\1ture expnnslon and capital Improvements 
of the waler and sewer systems. Contrary to the City's Memorandum In Support ofMotion for Reconsideration at 
page 4J lhe Court did not explicitly hold tllat the 0 connectlon/capacity fees were appropriately collected by the City 
for repair and replacement of the existing infrastructure." Rather, the Court fon11d that the Association did not meet 
its evldentiary burden to show that the connection fees were being used 10 fund capilat lmp1·ovement projects. See 
the Court's Memorandum Decision and Otder, p. 27~28, 
19 !d. at 23, 
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of whethe1· the revenue collected fi'Oln connection fees was being used for a statutm·y pmpose, 
rather than whethel' P1LOT/rate of retum/reti.m1 on eqnlty/fhmchi~e fees were being 1.1sed for an 
impetmissible pur1,ose. As for any distinction that the City wishes to make between 
assessment/co1Iectiou of fees mtd the use of fees, it is the Court's view that both the revenue _ 
collected from connection fees and the use of those fees are intertwined in the first part of the 
'" test. Even if the Court finds, a..~ it did, tliat the City's methodology of calculating connection fees 
is not mbitrm·y, the City must also pass the first part of the test - that the fees are not being i1sed 
for a statutorily impem1issible purpose. If an entity has standing to challenge the seco11d pal't of 
test, as the City concedes the Association did; a logical conclusion. is t11at they have standing to 
challenge the first pait of tho test also. Nonetheless, the Court will analyze below whethet· the 
Association bad ~tanding to challenge whether the City was using revenue collected from the 
connection fees, thl'Ough the assessment and use of U1e PILOT fees, for ijn impem1issible 
purpose. 
II. Standing 
_ The City's motion to reconsidet· has xenewed challenges to the Association's standing to 
bring this action. The <:oul't will first ~nalyze the Association's standing to e:hallenge the 
assesstne11t of PILOT fees with l'espect to co1mection fees. Then the Com't will analyze t!1e 
Association's standing to challenge the assessment of PILOT fees with respect to user fees. 
A, Does tlte Association have stamljug to challenge the use of ~!LOT fees as 
applied to the connection fee? 
After car~fuUy reviewing the recol'd, wh.ich the Court.outlines below, the Court finds 
there is substantial evidence to show that the 1·eveime collected from the co1111ection and ·user 
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fees20 was comingled and placed into the water and sewer ftmds accounts, p1fo1· to March 2013. 
The,:e does not appear to be any evidence as to how the .connection fees and user fees could have . 
been or we1·e separately accounted for, prior ~o March 2013. After the connection and user fees 
were comingled into the watel' and sewer funds, the evidence supports~ and_ the City concedesj 
that the City the11 transfen·ed money from the wa1el' and sewer funds into the General Fu11d under 
transfel'S that have been called· by val'ious names ~ PILOT/rate of return/return on. 
equity/franchise fees.21 The City concedes that this PILOT charge is a tax chiwged to the City's 
water and sewer depa1·tme11t as if it was operating as a. pl'ivate utility company. Although the 
City now al'g\1es that PILOT fees have never been assessed to the funds containing 
connectlon/capacity fees) the Comt still finds the Association ha.~ standing because it is elem· that 
money p~id by connection fee pnyel's was commingled with use1· fees, fl·om which money was 
transferred to pay 1he PILOT fee, prior to March 2013. The issue of whethe1· the PILOT could 
evel' be assessed to co1111ection fees 1·einains an issue in this cas6> which seeks declaratory relief. 
Therefore, the Court finds that the Association has standing to challenge whether the l'evenue 
collected from connection fees1 and then transferred from the water and .sewer accounts to the 
General Fund through the use of a PILOT fee, is t1sed for a pemtissible PU1'POSe unde1· the Idaho 
Revenue Bond Act. 
As noted, the record reflects that prior to March 2013 the connection and usei- fees were 
collectlvely poured into the wate1· and sewer funds accounts. I11 h!s depositton1 Swindell 
explained that when the building department collected a connection fee as pat·t of a building 
20 User fees are distinguished from co1mectlo11 fees in that user tees are the monthly fees paid by all customers or 
usot·s of111e water and sewer systems, · 
11 For pm·poses of this decision, such programs shall bo collectively referred to hereafter as PILOT fees, bu_t 
essentially the City is charging its own wnte1· aitd sewer department a rate oft-etum fee as if the department was a 
privat~ water and sewer entity. 
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permit, '·then those f\mds and dollars are credited to the wate1· fund or water pollution control 
ii.mg as appropriate/'22 Swindell ful'ther e."<plained that eoru1ection/capacity fees wel'e cha1u1ele_~ 
Into tluee fonds: 1) building permit - designated as Fund 001; 2) watel' - designated as F,md 
031; and 3) w~stewatel' - designated as Fund 032.23 SwindeH also explained that the uset· fees 
wel'e also poured into the water and wastewater funds named above.2'' Ill bis fil'st affidavit 
Swindell stated: "the c::apacity/connecti~n fees are collected and segregated into the appl'opriate 
water and wastewater funds.'125 In the letter to Logan Robinson, Mayor Chase names the 11Water.t 
Sewe1· a11d Sanitation Funds'> as the "enterprise ftmds.,. Mayor Chase explains they are called the 
"enterprise funds,, because the nione~ p~aced in these funds comes mainly from fees generated 
by each or the three public utility enterprises, ,,26 
Next, money from the above named funds was 1l'ansferred into the Genet-al fond under a 
program that has had various names including, Return on Equity, Rate of Return, PILOT, and 
franchise fees. Swindell and Mayor Chase define these terms as follows: 
• Franchise Fee - c,A franchise fee is a fee for use of the public right of way 
imposed on most utilities for operating within the p\tblic 1ight of way within the 
City limits. Telephone is exempted by the state constitution. The fee is calculated 
as a percentage of gross revenues. For example, el~tric has a .franchise fee of l %; 
natural gas Juts a franchise fee of 3%; cable has a franchise fee of 5%.21 
21 Deposition of David Swindell •• p. 50: l.12°17, 1\ttached at E:xhibft7 to Affidavit ofNathau M. Olsen, filed on 
January 4, 2013. (Swindell Depo). 
v Swlndell Depo., p. SO: 1.18-p,52: I. 23. Swlndell also explains that the wastewater fund is divided further Into the 
wastewater collectlon system and the wnstewntertreatment plant because tl1e.City. of Chubbuck hns its own 
· collection system but uses Pocatello1s wastewater treatment plant. · 
14 Swindell Depo., p. 53: 1.9-18. · . 
~s Affidavit ofDavid K Swindell in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, 1 16, filed on November 13, 2012. 
{Swindell Aff.) · . · 
• 
6 Mayor Chase August 221 2005 letter to Logan Robison, p. 2, nUached as Exhibit D to Affidavit of Syd Wood, 
filed on Jamiary 4, 2013. Also attached ns 8;d1ibit 18 lo Swindell Aff.1 which is attached as ExhllJit 7 to Olsen Aft 
(The letter from Mayor Chase In botlt exhibits sits behi11d Dnvld Swindell's September 29, 20 l O Memo.) ("Mayor. 
Chase 200S Letter"), 
27 Swhtdell Aft. at 'i 4. 
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• R~te of return -"The "t·ate of return" pollcy refers to city-owned Jmblic utilities 
(i.e. water, sewer, etc.) making a transfer to the general fimd.28 
• Retllrn on em1ity - '~In prior years, the city government described the transfel' as a 
111·ate of returu0 or "return on equity'' as if the taxpayers were the shareholders 
(wI1ich they are), Fairness and reasonableness was established by comparing the 
city's rate :of return on the utility equity at a rate of 6.5% compared to the 11.5 to 
13.5% allowed fo1· private companies by the Idaho Utility Commission. The 1·ate 
of retum is part of the budget process and the rates are set each year and appl'oved 
by the City CotJncil. "29 
Mayor Chase described the Return on Equity as follows: ~'The City Council has 
chosen to make it a City policy to have the ''enterprise fundsu pay a rate of return 
on each utility equal to 7% of the equity in each business. By way of comparison, 
private reglilated utiHties are allowed between 11.5% and 13.5% rate of re tum by 
the Idaho Public UtiHties commission. This is a policy decision of the City 
Council, but It does compensate the ~axpayer for the lack of any franchise fee 01· 
other payment for use of the public right of way. The money goes to the General 
Fund which the City Council utilizes as a property tax substitution.30 
• PILOT -''For the past two years, the rates have been re·desoribed as a franchise 
fee(% of gross revenues) and a paymentMin•lieu of-taxes (PILOT) to make it 
directly comparable to private utilities operating in the community such as 
Intermou11tain Oas. The PILOT ls calculated on the prior year city properly tax 
levy 1:ate .multipli~d by the estimated market value per the most recent financial 
plan pl'epal'ed by an outside consulting engineer. ,m . 
Mayoi· Chase described PILOT in his letter to Logan Robinson as follows: "The 
City ·council has chosen to make it a City policy to have the "entel'prise ftmds" 
make a payment in. lieu of taKes to the Genernl fund based on the depreciated 
valuation of theil' physical plants and last year's city property tax levy rate. This 
payment is simila1· to the federal ·gove1'nment1s payment of PILOT to some local 
coni,muuities, and is a method to pay something for their use of police, fil'e and 
streeta.32 . 
2
' Swindell Aff. at f 6. 
· 
29 Swindell Aff.11t f7. 
30 Mnyor Chase.2005 Letter, p. 3. 
31 Swindell Aft 18, 
32 Mayor Cahse2005 Letter, p. 2. 
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Swindell further explains that the "internal franchise fee,, AND "P!iyme~t in Lieu of Taxes 
(PII:.OTY, have replaced the 11mte of return" or ''return on equity!'33 The fra;1ch.ise fee and 
PILOT are two differen.t transfers that a1·e taken from the water and wnstewatel' fuuds.34 Swindell 
exp]ained that 11the combined amounts of FY13 franchise fee a11d PILOT are 13.8% of planned 
revenue for wate1· and 15.5% for sewei·."15 
According to Swi11dell 1s Fom1h Affidavit_. the City does not charge a PILOT fee to the 
connection fees, but only to the user fees charged to customel's of the systems. What the 
Affidavit does not say is that nPILOT fee 11:as never bee-n charged to connection fees during the 
time that both connection and user fees were comingled. However, prior to that Affida-vit) ~t was 
clear that all connec!lon nnd user fees were poured into the three cc enterprise i\mds.11 The City 
thel'I. had a policy of tnmsferring money from .the water nnd sewer fonds into the genet'al fond. 
Therefol'e) tlto rate of return/return on equity or the PILOT/franchise fee should 11ot be 
cl~at·actel'ized so much as a fee collected by the wate1· and sewel· funds but as a i~transfer" fee 
. . 
based on a City policy to transfer watel' and sewer funds to the general funds.36 In bis memo to 
the City Clerk, Swh1dell explained that for FYl 1 the City plam1ed to transfer $1,585,237 from 
the wate1· fund to the general fund "fo1• a return on equity, to help fund th~ activities of the 
Ge11erar Fund."37 Similarly, in FYl 1 the City pla1med to transfer $1,263,654 from the Water 
PollutiQll Contt·o! Fund to the e1oeneral Fund as a return on equhy to help fund the activities of 
33 Swindell Aff. f 12. 
34 Swi11dell Aff. ~ 9. 
35 Swindell Aff.11 l. · 
36 Swindell Aff. j 6; SwindellDepo, p. 80: l.24-p. 8I: I.IO 
37 David Swindell September 29, 2010 Memo to City Clerk, attached as Exhibit D to Affidavit of Syd Wood, filed 
on January 4; 2013. Also attached as Exhibit 18 to Swindell Aff., which Is attached as Exhibit 7 to Olsen Aff. 
C'Swindell Memo"). . 
CV-201 l-5228-0C 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
AND PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
Page 11 · 
347
() If'")',,. (_) 
the General Fund.1133 These transfers did not include additional tmusfers that were made from the 
wate1· and sewe1· funds (1) into the Geneml Fund to Sllj)port the Human Resources Depal'iment; 
(2) into the Emergency Repair fund to build reserves for emergency repair of facilities; and (3) 
into the Debt Service Funds, which were each outlined separately from the ":retum on equity" 
tmnsfet·. 
Based on the foregoing, it appears cleat· to the Court that revenue collected froin both 
connection fees and user fees was being, or could have been, transferred into the General Fund 
pllL'suant to the PILOT fee) charged to the water a11d sewei· department as a means of transferring 
connection and/or ·use1· fees to fund gene1·al city expenses. Prior to March 2013, there was 110 
evidence that it was only the uset· fees (i.e., the fees that eve,y user of the wate1· and sewer system 
pays), that wei·e used to fund the PILOT transfers from. the water and sewer funds to the general 
fm1d. It is cleat' that the connection fees (i.e., fees paid only by builders of new constmction) and 
user fees wel'e comingled into the watet' and sewer funds, from which the City tra11sfel'l'ed .the 
PILOT fee into the Genernl Fund. 
David Swindell, it~ his second affidavit, states that Pocatello residents ~'pay the monthly 
use~· i-ate (which includes a pro 1·ata share of the PILOT fee).,iJ~ Additi~ally, SwindeU states) 
'1[b]oth·the water and sewer depal'tment recover the PILOT fees through the fee charged to all 
users of the waler and sewer system.'~40 However, there was nothing in SwindelPs statements in 
this case de.finitely stating that the PI~OT transfers to the ge11e1-al fond were not derived from 
BOTH. the use!' fee AND the connection fee. The Association's argument that the payers of the . 
-cotmection fees wel'e paying th.e brunt of the PILOT fee "taxes" is bolst~red by the evidence that. 
la Id. 
39 Second Affidavit o!Davld K.Swi11dell115, filed May9, 20 l3. 
·IO Id at 14, 
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when the City chose to implement this policy, that is, go from n property tax system to a fee 
· ~ased system to generate revenue fol' the City, as described in Mayol' Chase's 2006 letter to 1he 
· Attomey Gen.er~l,41 the comtection fees rose substantially while the usei· fees l'emaine.d relatively 
the same.42 Howevcr,just a.s the spike in mtes of the c:oru1ectio11 fees and not tne user fees is not 
fully definitive that it is the connection fee users only that al'e paying these 11ta:<:es," i.e. PILOT 
fees, the fact that the Court has ruled that 1hel'e is no question of fact whether the City's 
·methodology and calculation of the co~ection fees are \weasonably' 01· arbitrarily imposed is 
not a definitive determination that it is the only the user fees that were being transferred through 
the PILOT fee taxes. What is clear and 1..mdisputed at this point is that revenue collected from the 
cormection fees and user fees collectively were transfened to the General Fund, vla the PILOT 
fee transfel' prowam, and used to 'ihelp fund the activities of the General Fund.n_ 
Because payment of co1mectton fees is not a genernlized grievance but n specific harm 
' . 
alleged by the Association .and because the 1-evenue from the connectio11 fees was comingled 
with funds used as part of the PILOT fee transfel's, the Court finds that the Association has 
standing to challenge whether the use of any PILOT fee assessments to the coru1ectio11 fees are 
t1sed for a permissible purpose under the Idaho Revenue Bond Act, i.e., whether the City is using 
. . 
~t Mayer Roger Chase Dcccmbel' 26, 2006 letter to Attorney General Lawrence Wadsen, attached as Exhibit A to 
Nnthan Olsen's February 13, 2013 affidavit in support of Supplemental Response to Defcndnnl's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and in Support of Plaintiff's IRCP 37 Motion for Snn0tio11s, filed February 13, 2013. {Mayor 
Chase 2006 Leiter). . · · 
"
1 See Affidavit ofNathat1 M. Olsen,. filed January 4, 2013, Exhibits 1·6. These exhibits are Pocatello Cjty Council 
Resolutions from the years 2005 to 20 l O that set the rates for usel' and conueclion fees for the upcoming yeai·. lt1 · 
Fiscal Year 2006 the comtectlon fee for a '2.·lnch co1mectio11 was $887 (Resomtion No. 2006-28 attached as Exltlbit 
1; Also Resolution 2005-31 attached as E.·d1.lbit 4). In Flscal Year 2007 the same 2-lnch coru1eetion was assessed 
$7,940 (Resolution No. 2006-28 attached as Exhibit l; Also Resolution No. 2006-3S·attached as Exhibit 3). Finally 
in Fiscal Year 20 l I lbesmne 2·htoh connectiou ,ws assessed $8,260 (Resolution No.2010-29 attached as Exhibit . 
6). ln Comparison~ In Fiscal Year 2006 the monthly user fee for a metered, reslde11tlal, single lhmily In Pocatello 
was $19.00/mo (Resolution NO. '200S-32, attached as Exhibit S). Whereas In Fis<:al Year 2007 n1e same user fee for 
a metered, residential, single family was $19,50/mo (Resolution No. 2007-36, attached as B:dllbit 6), With the same 
user fee in Fiscal Year2011 be.ing$21.SO/mo (Resolution No. 2010·30, attached as Bxhiblt6), 
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those funds transferred for pmposes othex than to ••support the existing water and sewer 
systems." 
B. Does the Association have standing to cllalle11gc tlie CUis uae1· fee policies?· 
The Court has detem1ined the Association lias standing t? challenge the PILOT fee 
transfers that may have been applied to cotlnection fees. If the Com·t finds the Association 
alleged and has standing to cballeuge the City's user fee policies, then any question 1·elnted to 
whether the Association must prove that it is only the connection fees rather than the usel' fees 
that are actually being ta:{ed as part of the PILOT fee transfers becomes irrelevant. If the 
Association has standing to challenge both the City's user fee a11d connection fee policies, the 
CouL1 wmdd then determine whethel' the PILOT transfers are impel'missible tax.es on both the 
connection fees and the user fees~ and thel'efore. whichever sou1'C~ has funded the PILOT 
transfers wol.lld become irrelevant. 
Rest1:1,ting, to establish standin_g a litigant must nallege or demonstrate an inj1.u1 in fact 
and a substantial likelihood the relief 1-equested will prevent or redress the claimed htj\.tty/.43 An 
i1tju1·y in fact is a showing of a "distinct palpable injury" arid is a lifairly traceable causal 
coµnection between the clalmed injury a11d the challenged conduot."44 
The City asserts, pursuant to Greer v. Le1viston Golf & Country Club an9, Bopp v. the 
City of Sandpoint, that for even a litigant who can pl'ove an i1tjUL')' in fact 11standh1g may still be 
denied when the ass'?11ed hal'm is a generalized grievance shat·ed by all or a lat·ge class of 
citizens/' 45 In G1'ee1·, the Idaho Supreme Cou11 held U1at ta:<payers and citizens of the city of 
Lewiston did not have standing to bring a declaratory actio11 challenging a city ordinance 
43 Id. at l 04; 1 lS9. -
44 la-Jiles v. Idaho Powe,· C()., l 16 Idaho 6:lS, 6391 778 P.2d 7S7, 761 {1989). 
45 Ymmg v. City of Ketclmm, 137 Idaho 102, 44 P.3d 1157 (2002). 
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dismmexing the Lewiston Golf and Country Ch.ib.46 The citizen-plaintiffs claimed that the 
disaMextion of the golf coul'Se would !'educe the revenue the City of Lewiston collected in 
property taxes1 and thereby increase the overall taxes of the rest of the cltizens of the city.'" The 
Greer Court held that the citizen-plaintiffs. did not bave standing because they did not have an 
htjmy pec1.1liar to themselves, but l'ather the plaintiffs simply alleged a generalized grievance 
common to all taxpayers of the city.4~ In Bopp v. Cit)' of Sandpoint, the Idaho Supreme Cou1t 
likewise fou11d that a pluintiff) a citizen of the city of Sandpoint> did not have standing to 
challenge a city ordiim11ce vacating a p1ibHc right-of-way over a bridge beca\1se the citizen-
plaintiff did not own property adjacent to the bridge,. and therefore, whatever injury he s1.1ffered 
was suffel'ed alike by all citizens nnd taxpayers of the city of Sandpoint.49 The plaititiff had 110 
peculiar injury to himself, aud therefore, had no standing.so _The City alleges that, similar to 
. Greer and Bopp1 all citize11s pay the use! fees ~ecause all citizens a1·e coru1ected to the City's 
watcl' and sewe1· systems, and the1·efme, the Associatio11•s members, as users of the water and 
sewer system, d~ not have a gl'ievance unique from any o~er citizen. 
In opposition to the City's argument1 the Association cites to .Miles v. Idaho Power Co. 
and Brewster v. the City of Pocatel!o.51 In Miles, the Id~ho Sl1preme Court held that plaintiffs 
challenging Idaho statutes codifying an agreement betwee11 Idaho Power and the State, w~ich 
subordinated Idaho Power's water rights to thousands of upstream users, had standing be~ause 
they hl'ought. theil' suit as ,·ate.payers and custome1's of Idaho Power 1~~e1· than genel'al 
46 GreeJ' v. Lewiston Golf & Co1mJ1y Clt1b, Inc., 81 ldaho 393,342 P.2d 719 (19S9} 
41 Jd. . 
48 Id. 
4' Bopp v. CJty o/Sa11dpolt1t, 110 ldabo 488, 716 P.2d 1260 (1986). 
'
0 id. 
si Miles v. ldnllo Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, (1989); Bre111ste1· v. City of Pocatello, l 1S Idaho S021 768 P.2d 765 
(1988). 
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taxpayers.s2 The ivliles Com1 was not concerned wlth the fact that the ratepayers of Idaho Power 
encompassed a ~ery large class, holding, "when the impact of legislation is ·not felt by the entire 
populace, but only a select class of citizens, the standing doctl'ine should not be evoked to usurp 
the l'ight to challenge the alleged de11ial of constitutional rights in a judicial fo1·um. "53 
The Bre1vsler Comt also found that a resident of th~ City of Pocatello had standing to 
challenge the legality of a ccstreet maintenance fee. nS4 In Brewster, the issue was whethel' the City 
of Pocatello, absent legislation, could uimpose a fee on the ·owners or occupants of property 
which abut public stl'eets.''55 The Brewster Coi.Jrt held that Pocatello's imposltion of a "street 
fee'' to all owners or occupants of p1'operty that abut p~blic streets was an impermissib_le tax 
because it was a revenue raising measure 10 fund the maintenance aud repair of streets rather 
thm1 a l'egu!atory fee undel' the city of Pocatello1~ police power that bore a reasonable 
relationship to the cost .of reg\llatit1g traffic over Pocatello's streets.56 · The Bl'e\rster Court 
explained that "a fee is charged fo1· a direct public service rendered to the pru.1icular consumer 
wJ1ile a tax is a forced coutdbution by the public at large to meet public needs.''57 
The Com·t finds the.Association,s standing as to its members1 payment of user fees to be 
more closely aligne.d with th.e facts set forth in lvliles and &•ewster. Similar to Miles, where the 
Idaho Supreme Court held the plaintiff had standing because he was a ratepaye1· ofldaho Powel', 
a pl'ivate utilltyt the Association has standlng to challenge the Citfs user fees policies becat1se 
its 111e.mbe1"s are 1'atepayers of the City's water and sewer system} a. City-owned utility, Similar to 
$2 Jd. 
$J Id. at 6421 778 P.2d at 764. 
54 115 Idaho 502, 768 P.2d 765. 
"Id atS04. 768P.2dat767, 
j 6 Jd at sos~ 768P.'2dat768: 
57 Id. 
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a private utility, the City charges monthly rates, i.e., user fees, to those who are custome1·s of the 
system. Consequently, the Association members are 11ot challenging the Citts use1· fee policies 
as faxpayers, and the harm they allege is not n generalized grievance common to all taxpayel'S, 
. . 
Only the citizens of Pocatello that connect to the City's water and sewer.systems pay user fees, 
and co11seque11tly are taxed by the PILOT fee transfer policies. As the City explained in David 
Swindell's second affidavit, those who do not pay the mol1thly user fees nre disconnected from 
the system. The1·efore, as users of the watet· and sewer systems, the Association)s members have 
a special or peculiar injUl'y not shared by those who do not pay monthly \tset· fees. Theil' 
gl'ievance Is not just a tangential complaint of a taxpayer whose truces are going to be raised if a 
' . . 
golf course is disannexed or is disgruntled with the building of a bridge. As explained in 1'1/liles, 
the fact that Association's members rep1·esen,t a large class is inconsequential so long as their 
injury is a special and not a generalized grievance.-ss 
In Brewster. it also could have been argued, similar to the City's argument he1·e, tl1at all 
or nearly all of the citizens of Pocatello paid the "street mainte11ance fee,, because nearly every 
citizen would own or rent prope1iy that abutted a pi1bUc street.s9 Nonetheless, the BJ'ewsre,· Cou11 
held that the plaintiff, as a resident of Pocatello that paid the· "street maintenance fee," had 
standing to challenge the fee.60 Also similar to Brew:rte,-. the Court finds below that the City>s 
Plf:,OT fee policies trnnsferdng 1·evenu~ frotn connection and user fees are not regulatory fees 
permissible under the City's police power because it does not beat· a reasonable relationship to 
the cost of regulating the wate1· and sewer systems. Rather, this Cotu1 has found, sitnilar to 
s3 The Court notes here that among the class of citizi:ns who do not pay user fees would bo renters of property and 
those who own property that is not connected to the water and sewer systems, such as O\Vltera of undeveloped land; 
or perhaps ow11ers of warehouses and the like. 
59 11 s Idaho S02, 768 P.2d 165. 
60 Id. 
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Brewster. that the PILOT fee transfers are impermissible taxes because they aL-e ttsed to generate 
l'evenue to meet the. needs of the public at large, Certainly, as the resident in Brewster had 
standing to challenge such a fee, so do the users of the City's wa.ter and sewer systems. 
Additionally1 the Coul't finds that the Association, in its Complaint, has properly alleged 
standing and pied fol' 1'elief on the basis of its members' payment of user fees. In Count I of its 
Complaint1 the Association seeks a declamtion that tbe Citts policies are a violation of the tax 
and police pow~l' limitations of the Idaho· Constitution. The Association alleged, 11[a] real 
controve1·sy exists between the City and Builders Ass'n, including its user fee and connection fee 
paying membets.1161 An identical assertion of standing is made in Count IL ·seeking a declaration 
that the City failed to follow bonding pl'ocedures.62 Also in Count II, the Association alleged that 
it His entitled to a declaration tha1 thf? Ciiy's Connection fee and ttser fee policy, as it has been 
implemented since at least 2005, and as ctu·rently constituted, is in violation of Idaho1s 
Constitution a11d code with l'egard to the bonding req~irements.n63 The Court fillds that the above 
allegations in the Association's Complaint were sufficient to pl1t the City on notice th~t the 
Association was ~lleging standing on. user fees as well as connection fees and was also seeking 
relief from the City's user fee policy as well as its connection fee policy. 
Therefore, the Court·finds the Association has standing to challenge the City's user fee 
policies, and thus the Citfs distinction between the user fee fonds and connection fees funds 
does not defeat the Association's standing to challenge the permissibility of the PILOT.fees. 
61 Complaint at, 32. 
62 Complaint at 140. 
63 Complaint at f 42.' 
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1II, Substantive Arguments 
The Court finds that there are two remaining substantive issues to be addl'essed in 
. . 
response to the parties' motions to reconsider. First, U1e·Comt must decide if the assessment of a 
. . 
PILOT fee is impel'missiblc, even in l~ght of the fact that the City's accounting methods have 
changed. If so, the second Issue Is the approp1•iate remeqy for that impermissible assessment, 
A. Is the PILOT fee pei·mitted? 
The Association, in its Response i11 Opposition to Defendant's Motion for 
Reconsideration, petitioned the Court to also reconsider granting summary judgme11t ill. the 
Association's· favor in light of the City's concession that the PILOT and .franchise fee transfers 
were taxes. At ornl argument the City motioned the Couit to strike the Association's cross 
motion for reconsideration, ~rguing that it was not t~mely filed. The Comt DENIES the City's 
Motion to Strike. 
Ffrst1 p'lu'Suant to Idaho Rule of _Civil Procedure 1 l(a)(2)(B), a motion to reco11sider an 
interlocutory order can be filed at any time, so long as it is filed fourteen (14) days before the 
Court1s final judgment. Second, the City motioned the Court to reconsider granting it summary 
judgment. Upon a pa1'ty's request for summary j1.,dgment, a district coutt has the authority to 
render summary judgment· ht favor of any pruty, moving· or non-moving1 even if the no11-1noving 
party has ·not filed its own motion.64 1<The district comt may grant summary judgment to a non-
moving party even if the party has not filed its own motion with the court. A motion fol' . 
s1.1mma1-y judgment allows the court to rule on the issues placed before it as a matter of law; the 
&1 Slrh1s LC. v. Erickso11, 144 Idaho 38, 4o-41, 1So P.3d S39, 541-42 (2007), 
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moving patty l'UllS the risk that the com1 wlll find against it.1,6S Additionally, slnce the May 13th 
l1earing, tbe Associatio11 has filed a Motion to Reconsider and an Amended Motion to 
Rec~nsider. Consequently, the Court will determine w~ether summary judgment should be 
granted to the Association. 
A significant development since the Court issued its Miwch 28, 2013 Memorandl1m. 
. . . 
Decision and Ordel' on Defendant Is Motion for Summai.-y Judgment is that the City has conceded 
that the PILOT fee transfe1·s are taxes. It is also an undisputed fact that revenue from the 
connection fees and use1· fees were poured into and comingled into the water and sewer funds, 
from which the PILOT fee transfers are taken. The Court recognizes that the City now deposits 
connection fees and ·user fees in different accounts and that the PILOT is only drawn from the 
use1· ftie fui1d. How~ver, bnsed on the fact that the City has hislorical.ly comingled the use1· and 
connection fees into a single account, the Coul't wm also address the permissibility of drawing a 
PILOT from both fees. 
In Loomis v. City of Hailey, the Idaho Supreme Com1 explained that while nthe Idaho 
Constitution permits municipal corporations to impose taxes, such authority is limited by the 
taxing power granted by the legislatul'e,,,66 The Loomis Court also explained that "municipalities 
may impose fees _purs1.1ant to its "police powers', to enact regulations for fbrtherance of the public 
health, safety or morals.U but fees imposed under this "police power" must bear some l'easonable. 
relationship to the cost of enfol'cing tbe regulatfon,,,67 However1 pursua11t to Idaho Constitution, 
ai·t. 8, §3 ond the Idaho Reve11ue Bond Act, munteipalities also bave a proprietaey function that 
tis Fuller v. Dave Callis1e1•, l 50 Idaho 8481 85 I, '2S2 P.3d 1266, 1269 (2011) (quoting Hal'woodv. Talbel'/, 136 ldaho 
672,677, 39 P,3d612, 617 (2001)), · . 
66 Loomls-v. City of Halley, 119 ldaha 434, 4371 807 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1991) (citing8rews1e1•11. City of Pacalel/01 
11S ldalio 503, 768 P.2d 766 {1989)). 
67 Id. . . 
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pel'mits them to charge rates and fees to 1'construct and maintain certain public works.1168 
Therefore, the Loomi.r Court explained that when '1rat~s, fees and chai:ges ca11fo1·m to the 
statutory schetrte set f01th in the Idaho Revenue Bond Act or are imposed purs1.1a11t to a valid 
police power, the charges are not construed as taxes. However, if rntes, fees, and charges at'e 
imposed pl'imal'ily for revenue raising purposes they are in essence disguised taxes subject to 
legislative approval and authol'lty.1169 
The ~bove law is applicable to both l.lSer fees and connection fees charged by the _City. 
All urates, fees) and chai·ges [must} conform to the statutory scheme set _forth in the Idaho 
Revenue Bond Act,, and '1if rates> fees, and charges al'e imposed prlmadly for revenue raising 
purposes they are in essence disgujsed taxes.1170 
In an. Aitgust 22, 2005 letter to Logan Robinson1 fo1me1· City of Pocatello May01•, Roger 
Chase, described the ·~Return on Equity" program as a '1property tax substitution/' Additionally, 
inn December 26, 2qo6 letter to Attomey General Lawrence Wasden, Mayor Chase explained 
that 11charging a rate of return is commonly used by public utilities and private sector companies, 
and we feel is fail'er way to generate revenue for the City" because 41relying on property taxes for 
revenue will not work in. Pocatell~ due to the numbet· of property tax exemptions given by the 
Statet. and therefore it has been his 11practice as Mayor to move our city away from property 
tax.es and to a fee based system/' Mayor Chase1s statements are consistent with Swindell's 
men10 that the return on equity transfers c'help to ftmd the activities of the G~neral Fund.» This is 
U11disputed evidence that the return on equity 01· PILOT fee transfe_rs, as they are now called, are 
not fees charged pursuant to the police or propl'ietarr ftuictions of the City of Pocatello, but are 
,s l<l. at 437, 807 P.2d at 1276. 
~
9 ld. 
10 Id. 
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iu fact> (!imposed primarily for revenue raising purposes [andJ are in ·esse1tce disguised tnxes/1 
Indeed, as stated above, the City has now co11ceded th&t the PILOT fee tl'ansfers are taxes. The 
PILOT fee transfers/taxes are taken from the wate1· and sewet· funds, Le, the "enterprise fundsJ ,, 
and as Mayor Chase explained, ~imoney placed in these [enterprise] fund$ com.es mainly from 
fees generated by each of the thl·ee public. utility enterpl'ises.u71 Since the PILOT fees are or have 
been transferred from revenue collected from "ratest fees, and charges" of th.e water aud sewer 
system, i.e., connectio11 fees and user fees, and are not used for a regulato1y purpose nor fo1· 
pt111)oses allowed by the Idaho Revenue Bond Act, the Cmu't finds, as a matfe1· of law~ that the 
PILOT fee transfers al'e impermissible taxes assessed against the user fees, connection fees, 01· 
both - all ofwhlch is contrary to Idaho statutory and case Jaw. 
Language from the Court's earlier order on summary judgment is relevant here: 
[T]here is a diffel'ence betwee11 charging another entityt suclt as the City of Chubbuck, a 
rate of return versus charging city residents and utility customers a rate of .return when 
· , the statute granting cities the authority to operate public WOL'ks provides that the city must 
furbish the services (lat t~e lowest possible cost." Furthenn.ore, and mol'e importantly, the 
Supreme Court emphasized in City of Pocatello v. Ci/)' of Chubbuck that the rate of 1·etut·11 
was not imposed ~fprimarily as a source of revenue,, because there was no evidence 1hat 
the revenue was not being 1.1sed for pm·poses pl·oscribed by the Idaho Revenue Bond Act, 
which, as detailed in Loomis and Viking Construction, pennits \valet· and sewe1· revenue 
· to be used for the maintenance, depi:e~iation and replacement of ~yste111 components, but 
. not for future expa11sion of the system or for city functions other thaii the sewel' a11d water 
systems. 72 · . 
The City takes the position that i1 is acceptable-to.treat Its Clty-owned utility as if it was a private 
utility and . then charge a "rate of return" to that City-owned utility as a means of transfel'dng 
- fhnds from the water and sewer ·accounts to· the general fond, The Coul't has and continues to 
disagree, To the extent that PILOT fees havef are, or will be charged to the connection fees 
· 
11 Mayor Chase 200S Letter at p. 2. 
12 Memorandum Decision, pp. 22-23. 
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being accumulated in the water and sewel' accounts the Court finds the connection fees are being 
used impermissibly. Additionall.y, any PILOT fees drawn from user fees are also impermissible 
ta:<es. 
D, Should the entire user/com1ectio1l fee collection system be stricken? 
The Association has requested that the Court find the curl'ent rntes charged by the City 
for user and connection fees to be unconstitutional and impermfasible and to require the City to 
redo the entire collection system. the Court l'ecognized, in its original decision, that: 
[R]egulations and charges shaU uot be unreasonable it being specifically provided in 
section 2, ~ 50-2813, I.C., [uow § S071028], that the services are to be furnished ·at the 
lowest possible cost and that the municipality shall not operate the works primarily as a 
source ofrevenue.13 . · . 
Speaking speolfically to the issue of connection fees, the Loomis cou1t explained that the 
mtes and fees established b;Y a city will be upheld as long as they are "not unreasonable and not 
arbitral'ily imposed" and 11produce sufficient reven\le to suppoli the system at the lowest possible 
· cost as required by the Idaho Revenue Bond Act.,,74 The Court elaborated furthel' by explaining 
that '"merely because the charge represents something more than the actual cost of the actual 
physical hookup does not make the comiection fee illegal.''75 
In its initial decision, the Court analyzed Loomis v. City of Hailey and Viking Const.> Inc. 
v. Hayden Lake h'J'. Dist., a~d reached the basic conclusion that "it is not for the courts to 
determine what me1hodology the city must use in determining its fe~s, rates· and charges."16 
lilstead the Loomis· court explained that-the role of the courfs is "limited .•• to dete1·mine whether 
73 Memorandum Decision, pp. 28 (quoting Schmidt v. Vil/age of Kimberly, 14 Idaho 48, 2S6·P.2d SIS (1953}), 
14 Loomis, at 4421 807 P.2d ftt 1280. 
1$ ld. 
14 Jd. at 443, 801 P.2d at l:281. 
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the fees~ rates and charges conform to the statutory_ requirements, are l'easonable, and t\t'e uot 
arbiti·m·y, n77 
The Association m·gues that Mr. Hunter's· method for calculating. rates· is' more 
appropl'iate than the method employed by the City in creating tl1e Red Ouk report. H~wever, in 
the Court's view M1·. Hunter•s statements are more a criticism of the Red Oak method than they 
al'e a recommended alternative method. More importantly, although the Red Oak report may 
result in higher rates than Mr. Hunter's suggestions, the Court will not dictate to the City what 
methodology it should employ in calc:mlating its fees. Instead, the Coul't is limited t~ evaltmti11g 
~vhether the .fees are reasonablei n~t arbitrary) and conform to the statutory 1·equil'ements?8 
Although the Association challenges ~he Red Oak study, the Court finds tbat it was a reasonable 
methodology, which was not arbitrary or unreasonable. 
Howeve1·, as noted above, it is the _Cotn·t1s determination that any fee which includes a 
PILOT component is unl'easonable, al'bi1rm·y and contrary to statute. '.f o whatever ex.tent the City 
has calculated· a. PILOT fee into its user and connection fees, that po1tion of the user and 
connection fees is impermissible. The Co\lrt has already detennined that it is impermissible for 
the City to assess the PILOT fee on its own municipal utility comp~nies - here th~ sewer a11d 
water department. Thus,_ any po1·tion of the user and/or connection fees that are assessed in 01·det· 
to pay the PILOT fee to the City, do not confonn to the statutory requirements ofI.C. § 50-1028 
aud must be excluded ft·om any fee assessment goiiJ.g forwa1·d. 
n id. 
78 id. 
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CONCLUSION. 
~ \ ) 
~ ............. ~ 
The Court notes that in the Jast headng the parties were asked whether additional 
discove1·y was necessm·y and whether additional evidence would need to be submitted to th~ 
Com't, in a trial; to decide this case. After· consideration of tile City's final submissions, the 
Association stated that no additional depositions or discovery was needed and that the final 
submission by the Association was its bdef. No party has indicated that any further evidence 
would need to be submitted to the Cout't at a tdal in order to render a f mal decision in this case. 
Therefow, the Court issues the foI1owi11g conclusions, which resolves this case in its entirety. 
The Court finds that the Association has standing to challenge the use of PILOT fees as a 
portion of any coru1ectlon and user fees, concluding that the Association, whose membets ~ay 
co11nectio11 and user fees, have a special and peculiar grievance net shared by all taxpayers •. The 
Cowt DENIES the Cityls Motion to Reconsider the Coures March 28, 2013 Mentorandum 
Decision and Order on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, finding that the PILOT fee· 
transfers ai·e impermissible taxes on the wate1· and sewer f\mds which are derived from the 
revemie collected from the connection fees and/or uset· fees. 
The Court GRANTS the Association,s Motion to Reconsider, and GRANTS summary 
judgment in favor of the Association. in pal1. The Court finds thnt the PILOT fee policy 
imperm~ssibly ·llses revenue collected from the connection and 11ser fees for pmposes other than 
for the water and sewer system, in violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond Aot, and thei·efore, is not 
a t1se of the Cit,Ss police or proprietary function because it does not bear a reasonable 
relatio11ship to the cost of reglllating the water and sewer systems, but rather, is a revenl1e raising 
measure in violation ofl.C. § 50-1027. 
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Combinh1g this opfoion and the Memorandum Decision filed Mal'c)t 28, 2013, the Court 
concludes, as a matter of law, the following: 
1. The City's connection and user fees are not arbitrary or tmrea1:>on11bly .imposed. 
The imposition az1d collection of the connection and . user fees themselves · ore not 
unconstitutional acts or a violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond Act. 
2. There is no evidence that the connection fees are being used by the City to fond 
futtll'e capital improvements in violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond Act. 
3. Through the use of the PILOT fee transfe.i· progmm1 or any other transfer prog1'am 
with a similar intent, such as a rnte of retttrJ:1 program or a retum on equity program, the Co\lrt 
declares that the City is imposing an impermissible tax to the exten~ that com1ection and user fees 
are being assessed a PILOT fee for ge11eral fi.md purposes, and ·such practices must.cease and are 
hereby enjoined because they are unconstitutional and a violatio~ of the I~aho Revenue Bond 
Act. This means that coMection and user fees must be adJusted to the extent that they include a 
cluu·ge for the PILOT fee, In addition, no PILOT fee tl'ansfers from any water or sewer account 
to the gene!'al fund aJe permitted. 
However, to the extent that conn~ction and user fees are being tra11sferred from the water 
and sewer accounts to the general fundJ through any appropriate process, howeve1· named, for the 
purpose of paying expenses related to the operation, m~nt~nanceJ 1·eplacement, and depreciation 
of existing water and sewer sys~emss including only those general City e.xpenses needed to 
operate the water .and sewer depm·tments, such as HR, financial, legal and accol.lnting, such 
transfel's are pe1·mitted and· are not hereby enjoined. 
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Therefore) Judgment is granted to the City, in pmt:.as set fotih in paragraphs 1, 2, and the 
last sentence of 3 above, and Judgme11t is granted to the Asf!ocintion, in pal"t, set forth in the first 
aente_nce ofpa1'.agl'aph 3 above, 
The two decisions now entered in this case resolve alt issues in this case. Judgrne11t will 
be entered forth,vith as set forth hel'ein. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED Novenibei· 13, 2013 . 
. ~ 
District Judge · 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the lf5 day of. \JGN , 2013, 1 sel'ved a trne and. 
correct copy of the foregoing document upon each of the following individuals in the manne1· 
indicated. 
BlakeG. HuU 
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, P.A. 
490 Meinodal_Drive 
P.O. Box 51630 
Idaho Palls, Idaho 83405~1630 
Nathan M. Olsen · . 
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN 
485 "E" Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
. .. (.i) U.S. Mail . 
( ) Overnight Delivery 
.( )Ha.nd Deliver 
( ) Facsimile 
(/)~.s. Mail 
( ) Overn[ght Delivery 
( ) Hand Delive.r 
( ) Facsimile 
· DATED this JS_ day of fx\{ . 2013. 
CV ~2011-5228-0C 
., 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTIONTO RECONSIDER 
AND PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
Page28 
364
() 
EXHIBIT "B" 
365
() (j 
Date PILOT Transfers Return of Equity Transfers Total Transfers by FY 
FY2006 $ 477,272.00 $ 3,544,000.00 $ 4,021,272.00 
f'y 2007 $ 477,272.00 $ 3,544,000.44 $ 4,021,272.44 
FY 2008 $ 479,053.00' $ 3,349,079.00 $ 3,828,132.00 
FY2009 $ 493,424.00 $ 3,349,079.00 $ 3,842,503.00 
FY2010 $ 493,424.00 $ 3,349,079.00 $ 3,842,503.00 
FY2011 $ 493,424.00 $ 3,349,079.00 . $ 3,842,so~.oo 
FY2012 $ 2,458,812.00 $ $ 2,458,812.00 
FY2013 $ 2,265,330.00 $ $ 2,265,330.00 
FY2014 $ 206,903.99 $ $ 206,903.99 
~tA~~)i;~}i\\J:;,~;~/;;;\rs.·?\;;)f\r)).Wt;9.t4;99://$?t:i'U.0~'~':?'.'1=i"1~!::\2o)is4;31s:¥1~·~f'.!$.:<{·ff:,f~.s;$~.9.~ta+i'4,f:f · 
Check Total · $ 28,329,231.43 · 
Transfers Since 2011 $ 8,773,548.99 
Prepared by Joyce Stroscheln 9/22/14 Page 1 
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1 indicating the revenue in FY2012 in the water pollution 
2 control fund for tl1e collection system capacity fee, the 
3 receipts for that year were $68,617. 
4 And then finally I have a run that I did this 
s morning, the capacity fee in the water system for the 
s year is $119,990. I thought you would be interested to 
7 know what the last year's revenue was in these three 
s accounts. 
9 Q. Thank you very much. 
10 A. This next sheet, I'll just go through these, 
11 these are. Exhibit X and Exhibit Y, which is from the 
12 FY13 fee resolution passed by.the city council in August 
13 of 2012, effective 1 October -2012, that lists the system 
14 capacity fees for both the water deparbnent and th~ 
15 w_ater pollution control department ¢at are effective in 
16 the current fiscal year. 
11 MR. OLSEN: I would like'to mark these account 
1s balance inquiries and these 2013 department fees as an 
10 exhibit. · 
20 . MR. HALL: Why don't \~e make a copy of those 
21 so I can have a copy, you can hive a c;opy, and ,~e can 
22 mark a copy as an exhibit. What we could do is I will 
23 see if we can't get somebody here to make us copies 
24 while you are continuing the deposition and when they 
25 come hack, we can be more confidently prepared to 
Page 11 
1 discuss them. · 
2 MR. OLSEN: I would like if possible to mark . 
3 them as an exhibit now just so the record is dear on 
4 what we are referring to. 
s MR. HALL: That's fine, I don't care. 
s MR. OLSEN: So we can mark them as exhibits 
7 and then have them copied. I want to have a clear 
s record. 
B MR. HALL: Sure. 
10 MR. OLSEN: So we will mark these as Exhibits 
11 Nos. 2 and 3, 
12 (Deposition Exhibit Nos. 2 and 3 marked 
13 for identification.) 
14 -(Discussion off the record.) 
15 MR. OLSEN: Let's go back on the record. 
lij Q. (By Mr. Olsen.) We are going to move through 
17 the remainder of the documents that were brought to 
18 today's deposition. One appears to be a service level 
19 report entitled FYll Inputs and Outputs. 
20 Now, Mr. Swindell, is this a public document? 
21 A. It is. 
22 Q. Can I have a co@mitment that I will get a copy 
23 of this? 
24 A. You can have that one. I have another one for 
25 you out in the hallway. It's published on the Internet. · 
Page 1~ 
1 Q. Next I have a Pocatello Comprehensive Annual 
2 Financial Report For Fiscal Year Ended September 30, 
3 2011. 
4 A. That's a public document and it is also 
5 available on the Internet. 
s Q. May I keep this document? 
7 A. You may. 
s Q. Then the next document here is an FY2013 
. ·s budget book. Is this also a public document? 
10 A. It is available to the public. It ls not 
11 published on the Internet. It's a working document 
12 primarily for city staff. But you can have that copy. 
13 Q. · Thank you. Next I have a Wastewatf!r Utility 
14 Financial Planning Study dated June 18, 2010. Now, I 
1s believe this has been-provided before in discovery. 
16 A. I believe so. 
17 Q. So I won't ask for another copy of that. Next 
lB we have a Water Utility Financial Planning Study, and I 
19 believe this has also been provided. 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. A_nd then we haYe a December 2006 wastewater 
22 rates, prepared by Red Oak Consulting, final report and 
23 that's been provided before in discovery? 
24 A. Yes. 
25 Q. And then we have the final report water· rates 
Page 13 
1 again prepared by Red Oak Consulting, December of 2006, 
2 and that's been provided in discovery? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. T~en we have a December of 2002 Po~atello, 
5 Idaho Water Rates that was prepared it looks like by a 
s firm called Black & Veatch, V-E-A-T-C-H, and I don't 
7 believe that this has been provided for in clisco".ery. 
B May ~ keep this copy? 
9 A; You may not, you can make a copy. it's my only 
10 copy. 
11 Q. Can I have a commitment that you will make a 
12 copy of this? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. All well as the following document is 
15 Pocatello, Idaho, Wastewater Rates dated December of 
16 2002. 
11 A. I do believe you got both of those. 
18 Q. I'm not positive, but just to be safe I would 
19 like a copy of these. 
20 A. We will make you a copy. 
21 Q. Thank you. l will set them aside for 
22 reference at this point. 
23 Then I have also a Table WVl'l. City of 
24. Pocatello, I~aho, Wastewater Utility Capital Improvement 
25 Fund Cash Flow Analysis dated 9/15/200~. it's six pages. 
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1 I would like to go ahead and mark this as an exhibit an~ 1 data on there, where would Mr. Gallagher ha)•e gotten. the 
,. 
2 get a copy of this. z data to put together this analysis? 
3 · A. If you like. I don't know what it is. It was 3 A. 1 can't speculate. He is a consultant. He 
,i just Inserted in the book. 4 uses his own systems for making the best estimates for a 
.. 
~ i 
5 MR. H}\LL: We pulled it out of one of those 5 financial plan. That would obviously include the prior 
6 books so it needs to go back into the book. We'll make 6 year records of the city, and he had access to those as 
7 a copy of that book for you, and you would get a copy of 1 a consultant normally does in all of these financial 
s · that document as well. 8 plans. 
!l MR. OLSEN: Well, it's a separate sheet, 9 Q. Would·you be qualifl.ed to lriterpret some of 
10 separate group of papers. I would rather just make it 10 the lines on this analysis? 
11 its own exhibit, so .let's go ahead and mark this as 11 A. I'll try. 
12 Exhibit No. 4. 12 Q. The first line of that indicates that there is 
13 {Deposition Exhibit No. 4 marked for 13 a beginning balance. Do you kn~w what that might be in 
14 identification.) 14 reference to? 
15 A. I have·no idea what that is. 15 A Well, when he created these tables: he divided 
16 (Discussion off t!ie record.) 1a the assets of the utility into a couple offunds that 
17 MR. OLSEN: If we could hand the witness what 17 were useful for him and this is his capital Improvement 
18 has been marked as Exhibit No. 4. 18 fund. And he said if you started with 4,731,000 and 
19 Q·. (By Mr. Olsen.) Let me ask you fust, Mr. 19 had these sources into it and had these expenses, here 
2D Swindell, this was brought with you today. Prior to 20 ls kind of how the fund would operate over the next, 
2l this moment have you seen this document before? 21 what, five years. 
22 . A. · I'm sure I have seen it ~efore years ago. 22 Q. So the document is created in 2005 so these ._: 
23 It's dated 2005. It was just an insert into the 23 are' estimates for --
24 financial plans that I gave you. I really don't know 24 A. Right, this is all a projection, draft for 
25 what·it is or why it was in there, whether these are 25 discussion purposes only, and it has a time date on Jt 
Page 1S Page 17 
1 corrected tables, obsolete tables. It says Draft-For l of 9/15/2005, 10:31 a.m. 
2 Discussion Purpose Only. I presume they were working 2 Q. So as we look down the line numbers, 2 would 
3 papers associated with the development of one of the 3 be, again, estimated transfers to operating fund ftom 
4 financial plans. 4 '0~ through 2010; correct?· 
5 Q. Would this have been a document created by the 5 A. Yes. 
6 City of Pocatello? 6 Q .. What is he referring to by indicating 
7 MR. .HA.LL: If you know. 7 operating fund? 
8 A. Actually I do know and it was not created by 8 A. That's what he divided the utility fund into, 
9 the- City of Pocatello. This was created by our 9 is one fund that would pay for operating and how are we 
10 consultant, John.Gallagher working for either Black & 10 going to pay for the capital ·improvements of the 
II Veatch or Red Oak Consulting. 11 wasteV'trater utility. 
12 Q. Do you know in particular who would have 12 Q. So operating fund would be separate from the 
13 created this document over at either Black & Veatch or .13 capital improvements. 
14 Red Oak Consulting? 14 A. In his analysis. 
15 A. John Gallagher. 15 Q. And grants and contributions, any idea what 
16 Q. Is Black & Veatch associated with Red Oak 16 that would be in referenc,e to? 
17 Consulting? 17 . A. I don't; I don't think he did either since 
18 A. No. But it's the same consultant. 13 they are all zero. 
19 Q. Same consultant, okay. Was John Gallagher 19 Q. That would be the same case with the bond 
20 part of Black & Veatch at one time? 20 proceeds, state loan proceeds? 
21 A. Correct. 21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. And then he moved over to Red Oak Consulting? 2Z Q. Let's go to Interest income. What would that 
23 A. Correct. 23 be in reference to? Again, referring to Line 6 on the 
2i! Q. So as we look at this document it indicates Z4 first page of Exhibit No. 4. 
25 it's a capital improvement fund cash flow analysis. The 25 A Pooled interest income owed to the wastewater 
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1 Q. And It appears that there are 35 lines here 
2 and they ali represent various types of operation and 
3 maintenance expenses? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q, That are projected. 
6 A; Projected. And that's also true in the nei1 
7 fewpages. 
a Q. So ifwe look at Page 5, we are continuing-· 
9 A. That's operations and maintenance for the lift 
10 station (?perations and operations and maintenance for 
11 the sludge reuse operation, And the lasf page is 
12 operations and maintenance expense for the laboratory 
13 and pretreatment division. The total ls 3,4{2,000. Do 
14 you see that? 
1s Q. Yes. 
Page 24 
1 have budgeted for parks, got it. 
2 Q. Thankyou, Mr. Swindi,11. 
3 1 am going to ask you a little bit about your . 
4 backgro~nd. Where were you born? 
s A. I was born in Kearney, Nebraska. 
6 Q. Were you raised· in Nebraska? 
1 A. No. 
8 Q. Where were you raised? 
9 A. Riverton, Wyoming. 
10 Q. Where did you graduate from high school? 
11 A. Riverton, Wyoming. 
12 -Q. And I am assuming you have an edncation beyond 
13 high school. Where did you go to school? 
14 A. I am a graduate of the United States Military 
15 Academy at West Point, New York. 
1a A. That links back, should link back to this . lli Q. Did you serve some time in the military? 
11 schedule on Line 14 on Table WW3, what is the operation 
18 and maintenance expense for the utility. That's Just · 
19 the detail that feeds that line. 
20 Q: I see. So it's Line 14 on Page 3 of this 
21 document that's breaking down in fairly specific detail 
22 the operation and maintenance, ihe projected operation 
23 and maintenance expenses, 
24 A &-actly. . 
· 25 Q. And there Is a total of 92 lines t.'1ere. If we 
Page 23 
1 turn back to the front of this exhibit, Page 1 of 
z Exhibit No. 4, it appears then this is a table created 
3 just for the wastewater utility. 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. Presumably would Mr. Gallagher ~ave also 
s prepared a similar document for the water? 
7 • A. He did. They are indicated in the books that 
B youhave. 
9 Q. They would be somewhere in the books. 
10 A This is just a separate sheet that was 
11 inserted in there. 1 really don't know why it was 
12 there. It looks like it was a draft for discussion 
13 purposes at 10:31 a.m. on the 15th of September 2005. 
14 Q. Understood. There was a tablet·-
15 A. . That's just my portfolio. I just brought it 
16 in so I wouldn't drop all that stuff. 
11 Q. Is there anything in there? 
18 A, Blank sheet (indicating), last month's cash 
19 report, last month's payroll and material claims, budget 
20 execution report, stuff I always keep with me, always 
21 goes with me. I brought my wallet, do you want to look 
22 at that? These documents are all public, by the way, 
23 this is on the Internet, that's on the Internet, so is 
24 ·that one {indicating). It's just the normal stuff that 
25 I keep with me in case the mayor asks me how much we 
i7 A. I did. 
a Q. ~fow many years? 
19 A. 22 years and three months. 
20 Q. When did you graduate from West Point? 
21 A. July 6, 1979 -:· correction, June 6, 1979. 
22 Q. What degree did you earn there? 
23 A. Bachelor of science. 
24 Q. [11 what? 
25 A. No major; no majors were offered. 
l Q. And then how many ·-
z A: The curriculum I should note is basically 
3 engineering. I did my conce!lt:ration in economics and 
4 engineering. 
5 Q.- You mentioned you served in the military after 
6 that? 
7 A. Idid. 
8 Q. Forhowlong? 
9 A. 22 years and three months. 
10 Q. And have you obtained any additional degrees 
11 since your West Point? 
1Z A. Ihave. 
13 Q. In what? 
14 A. I have a master's in public administration 
15 from Princeton University. 
16 Q. When did you earn that? 
17 A. In June of1988. 
18 Q. Whatelse? 
19 A. I am a graduate of the United States Army 
20 Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, 
21 Kansas. 
22 Q. When did yon earn that degree? 
23 A. June of 1992. 
24 Q. After that have you earned any other degrees 
25 or cectificates? 
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1 A. I am a certified operations research and l and so on and so forth. 
2 Q. I am assuming if someone were to try to z systems analyst, United States Army at Fort Lee, 
3 _Yirginia. Thai was actually earned in 1987. 3 contact the association, they would have a curriculum •• 
4 Q. Can you say that again, a certified ·- 4 A Yes, there is a study manual for each one o.f 
5 A. Operations research and systems analyst. 5 those, it's about three inches thick for each. 
6 Q. Can you tell me more abqut what --
7 A. it's a three-month school, we called it ranger 
8 school for mathematiciaps. 
6 · Q. Let's talk about your employment. I think you . 
7 mentioned •· I know you mentioned t11at you were in the 
a army for 22 years --
9 Q. So what do you learn as part of that . . s A. 22 years and three months. 
Jo three-month program? 10 Q. That was a full-time occupation for you? 
11 A. It was an army ~ourse designed to prepare 11 A. Yes. 
12 analysts on· the anny staff to use various mathematical 
13 techniques to analyze operational problems. 
lZ Q. So that would have been from '79 through about 
13 '91. '92? 
14 Q. Anyother-- 14 A. 2001. 
15 A. I am a certified government financial manager. 1s Q. Sorry. 
1s Q. When did you earn that and where? Hi A: I retired in 2001 and assumed duty here as the 
11 A. It's from the Association of Government 
18 Accountants and I believe I completed my examinations in 
19 2004. 
20 Q, Any other certificates or degrees? 
21 A. Those are the big ones. 
22 Q. What would be the small ones? 
23 A. Graduate of the U.S. Army Basic Field 
24 · Artillery Officers Course, Fort Sill, 01..-Jahoma. United 
25 States Army Field Artillery Aavanced Officers Course at 
Page 27 
1 Fort Sill, Oklahoma. The United States Army Tack Fire 
17 chief financial officer in August of that year. 
111 Q. Let me ask you, then, what is your cturent 
19 position now? 
20 . A. I am the chieff'lnancial officer of the City 
21 of Pocatello. 
22 Q. You mentioned that's the position that you 
2J have held --
24 A. Since August of 2001. 
25 Q. It hasn't changed during that period? 
Page 29-
1 A. -No. 
2 Operations Officer Course at Fott Sill, Oklahoma. 2 Q. Letmejust double check. Any other ' · 
3 Q. Before you go any further, do all of these you 3 employment besides the military and now working fo·r the 
4 are about to provide me relate to some type of army 4 City of Pocatello? 
s training? s A. No. 
6 A. Generally, yes. s Q. Do you do any consulting? 
1 Q. Back to this government management certificate 7 A. I am a member of the PortneufMedical Center 
a that you obtained in 2004, can you tell me a little bit 8 Joint Venture Board. 
9 more about what that involved? 9 Q. Tell me about that. · 
10 A. It's a certification program offered by the 1 o A. It's an unpaid position. I serve on the board 
11 Association of Government Accountants. I ~tood for il of directors of the hospital. 
12 three exams, .one in Ogden, one down in Salt Lake City, 12 Q. So who hired you when you went to work for the 
13 one in Boise, each about four hours in length, covering 13 City of Pocatello? I know the city did, but who was 
14 three broad topics. 14 the~-
15- Q. · Which are? 15 A. This posltlon was recommended hy Mayor 
16 A. · One is -· the first set of exams deals with 16 Anderson and was approved in a public vote by the city 
11 governmantal budgeting and the theory of public 11 council. It's an appointment by the council. 
18 enterprises. Pretty similar to the content of any NPA 18 Q. Is it an at wm posltion or are you under 
19 course. 19 contract? 
20 The second one was a course •• it was a test 20 A. It's an at will position with the provisions 
21 and examination on governmental accounting. 21 that are common to appointed officers in the State of 
22 Q. And the third? 22 Idaho. I was appointed by the council. I can only be 
23 A. And the third was a col.U'se on operations · 23 removed by the council. 
24 research and systems analysis. Utilizing mathematics to 24 Q. So it's at the will of the council. 
25 analyze real world problems and statistlcal techniques 25 A. Right. 
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David K. Swindell 12/14/20,12 
i:'age 34 l?age 36' 
1 sure what you are referring to. 
2 Q, Well, for instance, do you have operating 
3 instructions for each of these? 
4 A. We have our internal ·control documents. 
s Q. Can you tell me a little more about what those 
6 are? 
1 A. Those are the documents that establish how 
a bills are paid and how money is disbursed and what 
9 reports are issued and when they are issued. 
10 · Q. Do you have formal procedures in place for how 
11 these divisions report to you? 
12 A. That's part.of the human resources division of 
13 the city in terms of annual performance reviews. people 
14 on probation, those things, we foll~w the same st~dard 
1s procedures. They are really not procedures established 
16 by the financial department, they are procedures 
11 followed by the financial department ju~t as they are in 
18 other ~Hy departments. 
Ill Q. Well, let me be a little more specific. Do 
20 yciu have any procedw-es for instance in how the 
21 treasurer's office reports to you of their activities? 
22 A. We have certain established reports that are 
23 required to be put out on a timely basis, the cash 
24 report for the city and there are certain reports that 
25 the treasury has ·to provide to accounting to make sure 
Page 3S 
1 that the checkbook balances. 
2 Q. How often are those 'reports generated? 
3 A. Monthly. 
,r Q. They are required to report to you monthly? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. Let's turn to Page 2 ofExhibit No. 5. I'll 
7 represent to you, :Mr. Swindell, that this is another 
8 document'we pulled off the web for the water department. 
9 It talks about the mission of the water department. 
10 What I want to direct your attention to is there is a 
11 paragraph, the flfst paragraph where it starts with 
12 every year the city departments, do you see where I'm 
13 at? 
14. A Yes. 
15 Q. They are required to present a performance 
16 report, service level report, and actually these service 
17 levelreports, are they the same thing that you provided 
18 tome--
19 A What you have got there is a summary of those 
20 reports. The actual report delivered by the water 
21 department every year is a little mare expansive than 
22 that, there are more slides. That's a digest version 
23 (indicating) so you can have it in one aggregation: 
24 If you want the slides, they are also 
25 available on the Internet as well as the video. And as 
1 you can see from the picture there, I am usually there 
2 for that. That's my mug (indicating). And I can't read 
3 the other mug,.whether that was Justin or not. He is 
4 our water superintendent. That's kind of the digest 
5 version of those briefings. I can find the water 
G department for you, it's under the environmental health 
1 section. · 
s Q. Maybe if you could·· 
9 A. It just summarizes kind of what the water 
10 department does during the year, 
u Q. So this serviq, level report that you --
12 A. This (indicating) is the latest version. 
13 MR. OLSEN: The witness has handed me the 
14 service level report referenced earlier, FYll 
1s P.age SS-32. 
16 Q. Is this service report for all of the 
11 departmei:its in the city? 
1s A. Yes, all the departments that have any 
19 employees in them. 
20 Q, And so there would be more specific reports 
21 coming from each of the departments,:this is a digest of 
22. those. 
23 A. Correct .. 
24 Q. And are the specific reports available on the 
· 25 web? 
l?age 37 
1 A. They are. 
2 Q. And just on the City of Pocatello's site? 
3 A. Yes. In fact on this sheet that you provided 
4 me (indicating), if you were to click on that one you 
s would get the slides -
6 MR.HALL: Let the record reflect that the 
7 -witness is pointing to Page 2 of Exhibit No. 5. Under 
s the paragraph counseljust quoted there is a little 
s camera icon that says service level video report and 
10 below that a service level pelf repor.t and those are the 
11. items be just pointed to. 
12 A So you get the slides that he used and you get 
13 to watch the video. 
14 Q. The video report, that's the report--
IS A. That's his verbal presentation and he talks 
t 6 you through the slides. 
17 Q. Thank you, that's helpful. Then let's go back 
1s to that paragraph and there is a new sentence there on 
19 Page 2 of Exhibit No. 5, it says, "Under the supervision 
20. of the chief financial officer, the departments discuss 
21 their mission, financial inputs, workload outputs, 
22 measure of efficiency and eff ~ctiveness . . . results 
23 and issues and concerns for the future," so --
24 MR HALL: YOU left out the portion that 
25 was in parentheses. 
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David K. Swindell 12/14/2012 
1 Q. Yes, "(including comparisons to other cities 
z and industry noons), results in their issues and 
3 concerns for the future.'' And I am assuming this 
4 happens: 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. Tell me the procedures for how this occurs. 
7 A. Well, I'm not sure wh~t exactly you are 
Page 38 
8 looking for. I'll glve you as much detail as I can and 
9 you tell me what you wan~ •• -
10 Q. Let me break it down, it was too vague of a 
11 question, I'm sorry. 
12 When does the chief of the water department -
13 what is his name again? 
14 A. Justin Armstrong is the current water 
1s superint~mdent. 
16 Q_. · When does Mr. Armstrong came to you to discuss 
11 these items mentioned there? 
1 B A. The development of each year's service level 
19 report typically begins in December. We have the final 
20 numbers usually from the previous fiscal year wilich 
21 ended 30 September. You don't really get final numbers 
22 until November because you have October payables, that 
23 stuff that you bought in September but didn't get the 
24 bill for·until October, and so on and so forth. 
25 Q. What is your fiscal year? 
Page 39 
1 A. · Our fiscal year starts 1 October and ends 30 
z September. 
3 Q. You start meeting with Mr. Armstrong and this 
4 is in regard to the se1Vice level reports •• 
s . A. Right. What we do is I do a data pull going 
6 back five years and lt also has the next _budgeted year, 
1 because now the budget for FY, the next fiscal year was 
s adopted the previous August. So we have all of those 
9 numbers, and we provide those numbers to the 
10 departments. 
11 For example, this year ljust got the·· we do 
12 this by groups. I have divided the city into service 
13 level groups. The water and sewer department are part 
14 of the environmental health group. Yesterday we did our 
15 first grouping, we completed the financial extractions 
16 for the parks department;Iibrary, other cultural, 
11 recreational, educational activities. And I will 
18 provide those to the departments over the next couple of 
19 weeks so they will see what their numbers finally turn 
20 out to _be, and give them their tasking to develop their 
21 service level reports. 
22 The departments will normally give me a draft 
23 in late January and we will go over the draft. Usually 
24 the modifications to that draft usually involve making· 
25 it shorter and more concise, a little better for TV, a 
1 little ·- and in some cases a little more -- trying to 
2 put the numbers into context. 
3 I also provide, by that time I usually have 
4 the report from the International City Managers 
5 Association which gives us some comp arables and we work 
6 those. Into the briefings. Then we establish a briefing 
7 schedule. The council nonnally receives these briefings 
8 in a series of three study sessions typically Jn March. 
9 We will begin at 9:00 a.m. and ·go until 2:00 p.m. with a 
10 break for lWlch. 
11 Some of those sessions wlll lnvolve physical 
12 tours. Last year for example they did tour part of the 
13 water department. In the prior year they went.out to 
H the wastewater plant. We had a couple of council 
15 mem.bers who had never been there. 
16 And we ~omplete those brlefmgs, and we get 
17 those done prlor to the departments building their 
18 budgets. The concept there is before we talk about what 
19 you need for next year, let'.s review what you have done 
zo with last year's money and what your issues and concerns 
21 are. 
22 Q. So you deal with last year's money and then at 
23 some point you meet with them about budgeting the 
24 upcoming year. 
25 A. Right.. 
1 Q. In that regard, let's mark Exhibit No. 6 . 
2 (Deposition Exhibit No. 6 marked for 
· 3 identification.) 
4 Q. This Exhibit No. 6, Mr. Swindell, I willjust 
s represent to you is somethi.ng that we obtained in 
Page. U 
6 discovery from the city water deparbnent, actually from 
7 Mr. Armstrong, and it's a spread sheet with project 
8 numbers and project names. Our understanding is •• we 
9 inspected these records over at the water department •• 
10 and just tell me if I am wrong, ls that this ls a . 
11 typical sheet that Mr. Armstrong reviews with you as the 
iz CFO when they are working on putting their budget 
13 together for the following year; is that an acctu"ate 
14 assessment? · 
15 A. I don't know. It's an internal document that 
1s he created. 
17 Q. So I guess I should ask you, have you seen 
18 this document before? 
19 A. I don't recall I .ha.ve. 
20 Q. Well, then, when you sit down with Mr. 
21 Armstrong to go over budgeting for the upcoming year, do 
22 you go over specific projects with him that the water 
23 department wants to complete? 
24 A The big ones, not every project, though. 
25 Q. So when Mr. Armstrong is helping you put your 
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Page 42 Page 44 
1 budget together, do you ask him for an itemization of 1 Q. You schedule it Do you sit down with them 
2: the things that you would need to go to the city 2 before they go to the council to 1eview what they are 
3 council, for instance, to have that budget approved for 3 going to present to the council? 
4 the water department? · 4 A. In most cases but not all. It depends on what 
5 A. Right. He is going to make his own entries 5 the issues are. 
6 into the computer and they are reviewed by the council 6 Q. So they are making their presentation, you are 
7 once they are pul in, with the detail that's ·contained 7 there to help supervise, and then the next step is that 
8 in-that big green book that you have got. 8 you said there is another session after that? What 
9 Q. You mentioned you are the point man to go to· 9 happens in between the two sessions, the initial 
10 the council to get the budget approved; is that correct? 10 presentation of the budget and the next session? 
11 A. I have overall lead for that project. 11 A. I'm not sure I understand the question. Let 
12 Q. So before you go to the council to ask for 12 me try to explain the sequence. 
13 budget approval, do you review ~ll ~f their 13 We have a service level briefing a~d a 
14. recommendations made by each of the dep9!fments7 14 process. Departments then build their budgets, they put 
15 · MR HALL: I am going to object to the extent 15 them into the computer. We analyze them in finance and 
16 you are assuming that none of the department folks 16 then we help the departments prepare a budget briefing. 
17 appeared before the council on their own budgets. 17 We go to the council and explain what we really want for 
18 MR. OLSEN: That's not what I'm asking. I am 18 the next fiscal year and what it will take to do that. 
19 -asking what his. involvement in that process is. 19 And then the third step is the council starts 
20 MR. HALL: Why don't you restate your 20 to make declsiol'!-~· because what will" typically happe~ ls 
21 question, then, so we can understand it. 21 is once we exceed what the cowicil is willing to pay for 
22 A. Let me describe it as best I can. The 22 in taxes and fees, certain things will have to be scaled 
23 departments put In their budget request and that ls done 23 back. Th~ council sometimes has their own priority -· 
24 after they have provided their.service level hriefmg to 24 and mostly this doesn't impact util!.ties, but it can. 
25 the council. 25 Mostly it's in the tax supported funds where there is 
l?age: 43 Page 45 
1 And in the utilities case, it's also done with 1 morejudgment involved about service llfe--
z a fair amount of fidelity to the five-year financial 2 Q. So essentially it's a legislative process. 
3 plans that you have been provided with. Those arejust 3 A. Exactly. "f'.hen they generally make those 
4 plans, deviation is to be expected but still that's. your 4 decisions in June. We try to have a budget that's 
5 touchstone, because that's the projec~on on the rates. 5 workable for public notlflcation and publication by mid 
6 The council then reviews each budget request s July, antl then we go through a public hearing process 
7 and we go through a budget briefing with each 7 and then the council -- that public hearh1g is usually 
·s department. I prepare some of the slides for that, and 8 held on the third Thursday of August. And then we allow 
. 9 it discusses the major capital projects, for example, 9 two more weeks for more.cards and letters to come in --
IO for the water department that are proposed for the next 10 Q. You have your public input going on. 
11 fiscal year. And then the superintendent and I will 11 A. And the council is scheduled to adopt the 
12 brief th~t to the city council in another televised 12 budget and the fee i:esolutions, which for the utilities 
13 session. So we are there together. 13 are one of the more important things, at the second 
14 The city doesn't _have a budgeting ·process that l4 Thursday in August. 
15 exists just in my office or in the mayor's office where 15 · Q. And so wben·do these budgets typically get 
lfi we line out things and put things in, it's all done in a 16 approved?" 
17 committee of the whole with the council. 17 A~ Typically they are approved at the secona 
18 Q. (By Mr. Olsen.) Ijustwant to get the order 18 Thursday in August to take effect on 1 October. 
19 of things and break that down. 19 Q. So back on Exhibit No. 5, we have spent some 
20 A Okay. 20 time going .through the water department on this third 
21 Q. So you are indicating that the departments go 21 page there having to do with the wastewater; do you see 
22 directly to the council and present their proposed 22 that? Let me see the exhibit. 
23 budget. 23 A. I might have two copies of the water --
24 A. Under my supervision, I schedule the briefings 24 MR. HALL: That's what I have, too. 
25 and I am there with them. 25 A. Bµt there is an equivalent page for the 
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1 wastewater department. l the accounting activity in an account labeled 520, which 
2 Q. So itlooks like Ijust printed the same ~ne 2 is transfers. 
3 twice. But there would be a similar procedure for the 3 Q. So if I am understanding this correctly, the 
4 wastewater. 4 software and then I guess essentially the process used 
5 A. Right. 5 by the city. they break down the budget categories into 
6 Q. I tliink you might have told me, who is the 8 funds and they number those funds like in this case it's 
7 manager of the wastewater? 7 Fund 31? 
8 A. Jon Herrick is the superintendent. And just 8 A. Correct. 
9 to clarify, in case I misspeak or speak in code that you 9 Q. And that's further broke down into accounts as 
10 don't understand, when we talk wastewater, we mean 10 a part of that fund? 
11 sewer, as most citizens would understand it And then 11 A. Right 
12 the city financial system, that is called the water lZ Q. You handed me earlier this FY2013 budget book 
13 pollution control fuijd, 13 and I also brought with me the FY2010 --
14 Q. Understood. 14 , A. Luckyyou. 
15 A. And we sometimes abbreviate that WPC, but it's 15 Q. Exciting reading. But I presume that these 
16 au sewer. 16 reports are generated off this accounting system?" 
17 Q. I want to talk to you a little more about yo~ 17 A. Yes. In fact these reports you just handed me 
18 finance procedures, particularly the tracking offunds, 18 in Exhibit No. 7 are just e,,.'tractions out cif those 
19 accounting procedures, and I think we might have already 19 books. 
20 discussed that, but let me get into some more detail on 20 Q. Right, the one I handed you would be an 
21 that. How do you as the CFO track funds that come in 21 extraction out ofthe·FY20l0 budget book? 
22 and out of the city? 22 A. Right. 
23 A. We have a general management budgeting and 23 Q. Let's break this down a little further and 
24 accounting system, it's a computer software system. 24 talk about what happens when a developer comes in and· 
25 Q. What's the name of that software? 25 pays a building permit fee, a connectton fee. Describe 
Page 47 l?age 49 
I A. The software is from a company calied HTE 1 to me the process for haw that's collected and then 
2 SW1Gard. They are a well known software provider in the z where that goes. 
3 public sector. And it has various modules to it and the 3 A. Toe payment.will be made at the window at the 
4 city has purchased a number of those modules, including 4 building department typically when they take out their 
5 the accounting module, which we affectionally refer to .5 building permit or within six months, I think they have 
6 as GMBA. which stands for general management budgeting. 6 six months to pay.· And then those fund:; that are 
7 and accounting. 7 collected that evening, there is a -· the building 
8 Q. So everything gets inputted into this -· 8 department I\UlS their OWJI ledger and they have another 
fl A. That's the ~ity's general ledger. 9 roCJdule of the same computer program and that's where the 
10 Q; And from that you generate reports? 10 payment is !l,ctually recorded. We call that a ·subsidiary 
11 A. Yes. 11 ledger. It works the same way as the utility billing 
12. Q. Let's tµrn then to the neA1 exhibit that I 12 module. 
13 have before you, we Vlrfll call this No. 7. 13 When you and I pay our water bill, for. 
H (Deposition Exhibit No. 7 marked for 14 example, utility billing can say that the Swindell 
15 identificatlon.) 15 family paid today and they paid $46.06 and then they 
16 Q. I ,vould represent to you this is material that · 16 will upload that summary data, how much money was going 
17 the association obtained In a public information request 17 to ,vater, sewer for the day, and In what categories. 
18 and we will go over that in more detail later, but let 13 And then that is uploaded into fhe general ledger. 
19 me ask you first, do~s this document look familiar to 19 So I can tell you from tl'!e city's general 
20 you? 20 ledger how much money we collected from a utility 
21 A. It's a report out of the GMBA accounting 21 · customer that day and for the month and so on. But I 
22 program. This one is just a data extraction for fiscal 22 can't tell you which families paid. For that level of 
23 year 2010 asking the computer to detail the expenditures 23 detail you need to go to utility billing and say when · 
24 in a select set o( accounts, This set of accounts is 24 did Svl'indell pay his utility bill and they have the 
25 Fund 31, which is the water fund, and it's asking for 25 customer detai1. 
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1 So the building department works the same way. 1 shared with Chubbuck. 
2 They have a subsidiary ledger, they credit the builder 2 A. Correct. 
3 by paying the capacity fee on the specific address. And 3 Q. Now, you mentioned earlier that the softwar~ 
4 then they make up the deposit, they bring the deposit to 4 breaks these dmvn into fund numbers. Can you tell me 
5 finance, and then we-· the subsidiary ledger uploads to 5 the fund number for the building permit? 
6 the general ledger and we say, hmmm, there should be X 6 A. That is Fund 1, Department Division 0500. 
7 dollars in the deposit today, does it marry up, does 7 Q. And I can fmd that In the budget book? 
8 treasury meet accounting and agree with it, do you 8 A.. Yes. So the fund is 001: the department is 
9 balance in that regard, and we then take the money to 9 OS: and the division is· 00, so it's 001-0500. 
LO the bank and we credit the appropriate line items in the IO Q. So then can you recall, this isn't a memory 
i1 appropriate funds for the dollars that are receipted. 11 test but I can look it up, b!!t if you can recall, what 
12 In the building department's case, you will 12 is the fund number for water? 
13 typically have a building permit line that gets credited 13' A. That is Fund 31, 031. 
14 to the building department and If they credited, they 14 Q. And then what is the fund number for 
15 collected a capacity fee foi water or wastewater, then ' 15 wastewater? 
16 those funds and dollars are credited to the water fund 16 A. The wastewater fund is Fund 32, 032. °It's a 
17 or water pollution control. fund as appropriate. 17 three digit number. 
18 Q. So the permit, tell me if I am right, is 18 Q. 031 and 032. 
19 broken down into three lines, one is the building permit 19 A. Right. 
20 itself·- 20 Q. And is there like a fund number for collection 
21 A. Right, that would be typical; 21 . system and wastewater or is that dealt with in the 
22 Q. And then the second one would be the water and 22 account level? You mentioned earlier that there were 
23 then the third one would.be the wastewater. Z3 accounts underneath the fund. 
24 A. Rlght. Wastewater typically has actually two . Z4 A. Yes, there are departments and divisions 
ZS components because we have divided the capacity fee for ZS within the wastewater fund, and Jon has departments and 
Page Sl Page. S3. 
I wastewater into two parts. 1 dh/isions for administration, for lift stations, for 
z Q. And those two components are? z sludge reuse -
3 A. The first one is the collection system, and 3 Q. What I am talking about, again, is we arejust 
4 the second one is the wastewater treatment' plant. The 4 talking about input$, We will get to outputs in a 
5 reason for. that complication is because we share the 5 minute. 
6 wastewater treatment plant with the City of Chubbuck and 6 A. The input is not dedicated by division. The 
7 therefore when they have a connection, Chubbuck. collects 7 revenue comes In and there is no department division for 
·g the treatment plant capacity fee for us and then remits s that, it just goes to tbe fund. 
9 that monthly to the city with an accounting 9 Q. And it is my understanding that there of 
10 docwnentation as to what addresses and so on. But they 10 course ar~ these user fees that are charged for · 
11 have their own collection system of lift stations and 11 wastewater and also for water. Do the user fees for 
12 backbone sewer pipes and we don't have anything to do 12 water also go into 031? 
13 with that. 13 A. Water goes to Fund 31, correct. 
14 MR. HALL: We have been going for about an 14 Q. And the wastewater user fees -· and these are 
15 hour and a half, so let's take a break. 15 paid by the pa~ons to the system; right? . 
16 (Recess taken from 10:50 to 11:00 a.m.) 16 A. Yes. 
17 MR. OLSEN: Back on the record. 17 Q. And that goes to 032? 
18 Q. Let me just continue down this track, Mr. 18 A. Correct. 
19 Swindell, with regard to, we were talking about the 19 MR. OLSEN: Let's get the next exhibit out, I 
2D inputs, the connection or capacity fees, and yoi.tju~t 20 guess we are on No. 8. 
21 mentioned that you do a separate llne for wastewater 21 (Deposition Exhibit No. 8 marked for 
22 because you share that with the City of Chubbuck? 22 · identification.) 
23 A. Correct, it's split into two components. 23 · Q. · I'll represent to you that this is another 
24 Q. And the collection system is solely the City 24 document obtained through the public request from the 
25 of Pocatello, there is no collection system that's 25 association entitled Cash Handling Procedures. Is this 
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that have been Ms. Johnson? 
I 
I I request, tasks t~e.department to provide the 
2 A. Yes, that's her job as the city clerk, ta have 2 information, the department provides the info:cmation, 
3 overall lead on the. project with all the rest of the 3 prepares the response, the clerk logs it out. But this 
4 city staff in support. 4 is Just what I gave to the city clerk to give to Ms. 
5 Q. So when It came to the finance department, you 5 Thompson to iµiswer her request. 
6 handled that aspect of it? 6 Q. And so just briefly if we go over this, and we 
7 A. Correct. 1 have gotten this to some extent during today's 
8 Q. And, as you mentioned, there were some s deposition --
9 requests that were specific to the departments. What 9 MR. HALL: Counsel, before you start with . 
10 i.J)volvement did you have or oversight did you have with LO that, this particular document makes reference to a 
11 regard·to the departments ln complying with this Ll number of attachments and what you had marked does not 
12 request? 12 include any of those attaclunents. 
13 A. Generally just as it related to their 13 MR. OLSEN: ~hat's where I am going. 
14 financial data. There were ofuei' requests for 14 Q. Ifwe look down to, as your counsel mentioned, 
15 engineering documents and plans and contract documents; 15 D on Question 1, there is reference to four pdf files 
lfl and generally those resided either L, the departments or 18 that are the transactionjournals for the four 
17 with engineering. 17 funds FY03 through '09 and then there is four items 
18 Q. Go to the last page of this exhibit and just. 18 listed there and the page numbers. Are you there? 
19 rip out that last page, that's a fax to me from somebody 19 A. Yes. 
20 in the association. 20 Q. Do you recall providing those documents as 
2.1 MR. HALL: It's already been marked and it's 21 attached.to this letter? 
22 part of the exhibit and I am not going to consent to it . 22 A. Yes. They were on a computer disk. Jerry 
23 being modified. 23 Higgins did the computer extraction and these were just 
l 24 MR. OLSEN: Really? Z4 lists of every expense transaction in those funds for 
25 MR. HALL: Yes. i5 those years. 
Page ~3 Page 65 
' 
l MR. OLSEN: It's fairly innocuous but -- 1 . Q. And let me just back up. On B it refers to 
2 MR. HALL: It probably is innocuous but it's 2 attached spread sheets. Do you recall providing a 
3 already -been marked as part of the exhibit that you put 3 spread sheet that had the total amount of fees collected 
4 into evidence and I am not going to consent to having it 4 in the last seven years? 
5 withdrawn. 5 A. Yes. And I believe that refers to the 
.6 MR. OLSEN: Honestly, okay. · 6 capacity fees. 
7 A. I agree it's innocuous. Please give me a call 7 Q. Yes. And then in C there is a spread sheet 
8 to discuss. Sure. 8 referenced with regard tq funds that were d~posited in 
9 Q. -All right Let's go to the next-- 9 the city's main bank account at Wells Fargo Bank. Do 
10 A. But I've got a sharp attorney. 10 you rec~ll providing those documents? 
11 Q. Let's go to the next exhibit here, that will 11 A. Yes. 
12 be No, 10. 12 Q. And then on E there is an item there, formal 
13 ' (Deposition ExhibitNo. 10 marked for 13 or informal memoranda or communications providing 
14 identification.) 14. . instruction or guidance. Do you recall providing those? 
15 Q. This is a two-page letter, it appears to be 15 A. Yes, the budget book. 
16 signed by you and I just want to verify that first 16 Q. These have to do ,vith communications .. 
17 A. Yes, that's my signature .. 17 A. F? 
18 Q. Now, it doesn't appear that there is a date on 18 Q. I am sorry, we are on E. Take a look at E. 
19 this letter, unless I am missing something here. But it 19 Do you recall providing cop1es of communications, 
20 appears to be, and tell me if I am wrong, a letter that 20 informal communications and memoranda •• 
21 you wrote to the Building Contractor Association, this 21 A. What I provided was as on Page 2, my answer 
22 Randi Thompson. 22 was the document guiding all the funds of the city is 
23 A. Right. This.material and response was 23 the budget and then I provided the budget book the same 
24 provided to the city clerk. She should have dated it 24 one you have for FYlO. 
25 because the process is, again, the clerk gets the 2.5. Q. And then if we turn to G on this, the second 
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Page 18 (Pages 66-69) 
David K. Swindell 12/14/2012 
Page 66 Page 68 
1 page, it refers to I think the acronym is a CAFR, 1 A. Yes. 
2 Comprehensive Annual Financial Report, and do you recall 2 Q. And did you prepare thls document? 
3 providing those reports? Again, this ls, as I recall, a 3 A. I did.· 
4- part of a disk. 4 Q. And thete is nothing after that, although if 
5 A. Yes. 5 we look down where it says answer, that is wlth regard 
6 Q. Tell me a little bit more about what a CAFR 6 to the service level reports and are those the same 
1 is. 7 things that we have been discussing earlier today? 
B A. !"will refer to the document that I gave you 8 A. No, that's our annual financial report. 
9 when we started this deposition, which I believe is that 9 That's the CAFR, that's one of the documents that were 
10 one right there (indicating), And I am not sure how you 10 discussed today, but thaf s not the service level 
11 marked that one, which exhibit. 11 report. That's the Comprehensive Annual Financial 
12 Q. I haven't marked it. 12 Report (indicating). In other ,vords, not that one, that 
13 A. That's the most current Comprehensive Annual 13 one (indicating). 
14 Financial Report for the city, that's as of Sept~mber 14 Q. If we· look down where it says information 
15 30, 2011. We are obviously right now working on the one 15 regarding maintenance and operations on this memorandum 
16 that ends 30 September 2012. And I provided your 18 that you prepared --
17 association with hard copies of a couple versions and 17 A. I'm not sure we are on the same •• 
18 the other versipns on disk in pdf format The annual 18 MR. HALL: What document are you on, what page 
19 report serves the same purpose of any annual report you 19 are you on? 
io might get from any major corporation, such as .General 20 Q. It should say - . 
21 Motors or General Electric. 21 A. BCASEI Question No. 8, Federal Stimulus 
zz Q, So on Subcategory H referencing contracts for zz Documents •• 
23 external reports in 2006 and 2010, are these in 23 · Q. No, we are out of order here. 
24 reference to the Red Oak Consulting reports? 24 MR. HALL: The one that's been marked as 
25 A. Yes. 25 Exhibit No. l ~. is the one that Mr. Swinde~ just made 
Page ~'I ·Page 6'9 
1 Q, Let's go to the next document. 1 reference to. 
2 (Deposit1011 Exhibit No. 11 marked for z Q. {ByMr. Olsen.) All I wanted to ·do wis verify 
3 identification.} 3 with you that you prepared this memorandum and that the 
4 Q. I just want to verify two things with you on 4 sheets behind it are sometb.lng that you prepared as 
5 this document. I will represent to you that this was 5 attachments .ro that memorandum. 
6 part of the response on the public information request. 6 A. Yes, my memorandum, extractions from our 
1 But first it's an indication it's a memorandum for the 1 Comprehensive Annual Financial Report and federal grant 
8 city clerk and it's from David Swindell, Chief Financial 8 summaries e_xtracted from the federal government website 
9 Officer. Is that your signature next to that? 9 for.the stimulus grants. 
10 A. Yes. 10 MR. OLSEN: Let's mark the next one Exhibit 
11 Q. Did you prepare this document? 11 No.13. 
12 A. I did. 17. (Deposition Exhibit No." 13 marked for 
- 13 Q. And if you could look briefly at the pages· 13 identification.) 
14 following this document, let me know if those documents 14 Q. Okay, I'll just confirm with you, memorandum 
15 were generated by you and as a part of this memorandum 15 prepared and signed by you m response to the public 
16 or as attachments to this memorandum. 16 records request? 
17 A. Yes. 17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. J.,et's go to the next exhibit. 18 Q. And now I'll go back to my previous question 
10 (Deposition Exhibit No. 12 marked for l!l on the answer where it says B, it says information · 
20 identification.) 20 regarding maintenance and operations, we are referring 
21 Q. This is another memorandum that was provided 21 to service level reports and that's what we were 
22 as part of the response to our public r(!corcls request 22 discussing earlier? 
23 and I would again ask you the same question, is that 23 A. Correct. 
24 your signature where it ~ays from David Swindell, Chief 24 MR. OLSEN: Let's go ahead and mark No. 14. 
25 Financial Officer? 25 (Deposition Exhibit No. 14. marked for 
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Page 19 (Pages 70-73) 
David K. Swindell 12/14/2012 
Page 70 
1 identification.) 
2 Q. This looks like it's another similar 
3 memoqmdwn, it says BCASCI Question No. 57 
-'I A. Correct. This was to answer questions about 
5 expenditures and operations within the city's building 
6 department. 
7 . Q. And that's your signature there? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. Under the From category. 
10 A. Right. 
ll Q. Move to the next. 
12 (Deposition Exhibit No. 15 marked for 
13 identification.) 
14 Q .. I have handed you another memorandum, subject 
15 line BCASEI Question No: 9. Is that your slgnature as 
16 well on the From line? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. And you prepared this document? 
19 A. I oversaw preparation of this document. I 
20 tasked ~ to my utility billing director who did the 
21 data extractions and then we reviewed it together and I 
22 signed it -out. 
23 Q. So ifwe look at the following pages where it 
24 says Water/Sewer Connections, is this the attachment 
25 that breaks 1;1.own those connections? 
Page 71 
1 A. I believe it is. 
2 :t-.ffi. OLSEN: Let's mark the next as Exhibit 
3 No. 16. 
4 . {Deposition Exhibit No. 16 was marked for 
s identification.) 
a. A. Just so you know, some of that infocmation you 
7 got from me at the beginning are just more recent 
s updates to the ,$ame figures. 
g Q. Which I am glad you brought, so I appreciate 
10 you thinking ahead for me. 
11 A. This spread sheet goes out to FYlO and what I 
iz gave you was FY12. 
13 Q. So we would probably need FYll, I suppose. 
14 A. I can get it for you, if you want. 
15 Q .. This docwnent is a little "different in that H · 
16 indicates it's from Joyce Moore. Do you )glow who Joyce 
17 Moore is? 
18 A. Joyce Moore is an employee in the city's 
19 utility billlng department. She is a senior customer 
20 service representative. 
21 Q. Do you recall reviewing this document before 
22 it was sent to the association? 
23 A I do not. 
24 Q. Let's turn to the next page on that. I am not 
25 sure that this is necessarily associated with this note 
Page 72 
1 from Ms. Moore, but it is part of the exhibit so we will 
2 treat it that way. This appears to be a summary of the 
3 City of Pocatello connection and capacity fee history, 
4 and the perrnif fee history from 2003 through 2010. 
5 ., Let me ask you, does this document look 
6 familiar to you? 
7 A. Yes, I believe I prepared this document. 
8 Q. As I thlnk about it, the Initial letter that I 
9 referred to, I think it was Exhibit No. 10, this was 
ID this letter that you prepared. I don't know if you want 
11. to look at that again. But under B of that it says the 
12 total amount of fees collected in the last seven years 
13 and it says see spread sheet attached, and this is in 
14 reference to that. 
-15 A I believe so. 
16 · Q. And today you have given us the 2012 numbers, 
17 so we wouldjustneed to getthe 2011 numbers. 
18 Let's go ahead and mark the next one. 
19 (Deposition Exhibit No. 17 marked for 
20 identification.) 
21 Q. I'll again represent to you this is another 
2Z document provided in response to the public records 
23 request. It indicates it's from David Swindell. That's 
24. your signature? 
25 A: Itis. 
Page 73 
1 Q. And did you prepa_re this document? 
2 A. !did. 
3 Q. And then if we could take a minute and take a 
4 look at the referenced attachments to that. There 'is 
s the memorandum from Justin Armstrong. 
& A. Yes. 
1 Q. And also Jon Herrick, WPC department? 
s A. Right. 
9 Q. And then there i§ a Tab C that says Detailed 
10 notes on all funds --
11 A. It's an extraction from our Comprepensive 
12 · Annual Financial Report. 
13 Q. But you are the one that put Tab C there and 
14 attached it as part of this --
15 A. That's correct. 
16 Q, And also on Tab D. 
17 A. Correct. 
18 Q. L!;!t's go back to the front of this document, 
19 the first page. Now, in the memorandum there is 
20 reference to the debt financed projects for water and 
21 sewer, and I want to point you first to Section 1 (a) 
22 with regard to the water. Now, in there it describes . 
23 the purpose of the bonds and then it goes on to say that 2, as of June 20, 2010. there is 6.8 million and change 
25 remained in the loan proceeds project account (Fund 
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Page 20 (Pages 74-77) 
David K. SwindeH ·12/14/2012 
Page 74 
1 073), and you probably have answered this earlier, so 
2 the Fund 073 is a separate fund where these proceeds are 
3 kept? 
4 A. Co.rrect. 
5 Q. And then how are these funds administered once 
6 they are kept there? 
7 A. When you borrow money to _appropriately account 
s for the purposes of the funds'for which you.borrowed the 
9 money on a tax exempt status under IRS rules, you put 
10 that money into a capital projects fund. That way it's 
i 1 easier to ans\ver questions about were the proceeds of 
12 the bonds used for the purposes for which the bonds were 
13 authorized both in the election and are they atax 
14 exempt purpose authorized by the IRS, so you are trying 
15 to service two purposes there. 
16 So the actual proceeds from the loan go into a 
11 · separate fund; we established it as Fund 73. And then 
18 in addition we needed to have a debt service reserve 
1s that was part of the bond covenants and we put those 
20 dollars into Fund 61. · 
2.1 Q. So 61 is the reserve and 73 -· 
22 A. Is the project construction account. 
23 Q. T/;le project construction account. 
24 A. Right. 
25 Q. Are funds withdrawn from that Fund 73 to go 
Page 75 
1 towards the bonded projects?. 
2 A. Correct. 
3 Q. That's something that would be reflected in 
. 4 the budget book? 
s A. Correct. 
s Q. And then the debt service fund, you said 
1 that's actually a reserve account? 
s A. Right. It typically equals one year of debt 
9 service, although sometimes the covenants of the bond 
10 can be a little different than that. And you ·are just 
11 required to hold those as a reserve, and that's just a 
12 part of the loan condition. So what ·actually happens, 
13 then, is when a bond payment is due, the operating fund, 
14 bl this case the water fWJd, Fund 31, will transfer the 
15 money into the debtservice reserve fund. The debt 
16_ · service reserve fund makes the bond payment and the 
11 residual balance is what the debt service r~serve 
18 requirement was. 
19 Q. So the payment would come out of the, you said 
20 the operations and maintenance fund? 
21 A. Yes, you can view it as a family of funds. 
22 When you take on debt, water actually expanded and now. 
23 the water enterprise really has three funds. It has its 
24 parent fund and then it has a fund where the bond 
25 proceeds reside, and then it has the debt service 
Page 76 
1 reserve fund from which you will maintain the debt 
2 s.ervice reserve and from which you will pay the debt 
3 service as it becomes due In future years. 
4 And then the parent account, Ftind 31, has to 
5 fund the debt service account to make its payments and 
s to maintain the reserve. 
7 Q. So the bond payments that come out of the 
B operations and maintenance --
9 A. Ultimately, yes. 
10 Q. -- of either the water fund or the 
11 wastewater • -
12 
13 
14 
A. The wastewater fund works the same way. 
Q. How often are payments made on these·bonds? 
. A. Generally these are semiannual payments. 
15 There is an interest payment and then there is an 
16 interest and principal payment. 
17 
18 
19 
20 
Q.. Twica a year? 
A Twice a year. 
Q. And what are the dates? 
A. I don't recall offhand. 
Q. That would be reflected in the budget book. 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. We will get into this in more detail later, 
24 but I presume there is an amortization schedule that is 
2s prepared? 
Page 77 
1 .A. Yes. 
2 Q. And that sets out the payments for over how . 
3 many years the bond -
4 A. Right. I believe that was a 20-year bond . 
s Q. So this first one 9.5 million issued in '08, 
s it'~ got a pay-off date of 2028? 
1 . A. That would be correct. 
8 Q. -Do you know wha_t the semiannual payment is for 
g this particular bond? · 
10 A. I would say there would be an interest payment 
11 and an h!terest and principal payment. I believe the 
12 total is a little less than the 961 that was initial 
13 reserve and I think it dropped down. It's actually 
14 761,000, I think it's around three quarters of a million 
15 dollars. 
16 Q. And that's the total annual payment? 
11 A. Right. 
ts Q. Do you recall If that amotmt changes from yeas 
19 to year or is it the same all the way through? 
20. A. It is materially the same every year, a little 
21 different, a thousand bucks or so; it depends on how the 
22 bonds were sold and marketed what the final schedule 
z3 turned out to be. I have the final schedule In a book 
24 on my desk if you need that. 
zs Q. What's the label for that, again? 
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Page 21 {Pages 78-81} 
Page 78 Page 80 
I A. We call it the bond book. It's actually a 
2 book on tllat bond prepared by our bond attorney for that 
3 transactlon. . 
4. Q, And I may request that, but I'll hold off for 
5 now. 
6 MR. OLSEN: Let's go ahead and mark the next 
7 exhibit. 
g {Depo~ition Exhibit No. 18 marked for 
9 identification.) 
10 Q. I'll just again ask you to confrrm that first 
11 of all that's your signatu~e and that you prepared this 
12 in response to the information request made by the 
13 association. 
14 A Yes. 
15 MR. HALL: You are talking about the first 
1 s page of the exhibit or the entire exhibit? 
17 MR. OLSEN: Well, there is a three-page 
18 memorandum and then there is an attachment --
19 · MR. HALL: Three-page memorandum? I only have 
20 two pages. 
21 MR. OLSEN: May I see the exhibit. 
22 (Exhibit No. 18 handed to Mr. Olsen.) 
23 {Pause in proceedings.) 
24 MR OLSEN: Let's go off the record. 
25 {Discussion off the record.) 
Page 79 
l MR. OLSEN: Back on the record. 
2 Q. So you have confirmed, Mr. Swindell, that this 
3 is a _memorandum prepared by you of three pages, and 
4 attach1;d with that is an August 22, 2005, Jetter to 
5 Logan Robinson and also I'll represent to you ·that the 
6 ·ctraft on this handwritten language'ls the way-it came to 
7 us as patt of the information request. 
8 MR. HALL: Mine doesn't have any so I'm not 
9 sure what you mean .. 
10 MR. OLSEN: Well, that's the exhibit. 
11 MR. HALL: The copy you gave me is just 
12 different. 
13 MR. OLSEN: lgave you a slightly different 
14 copy. lfyou want to go and make a copy of the actual 
15 exhibit to keep your record straight, I'd be hapPy -· 
16 MR. HALL: That's okay. I just want to verify 
17 that the docwnent is the same document. You seemed to 
18 be acting like this letter was attached to this 
i9 memorandum. There is a fairly significant change lri 
20 dates. 
21 MR. OLSEN: This is the way it came to us. 
22 MR. HALL: Okay, fine. 
23 Q. (By Mr. Olsen.) Now that we hopefully have 
24 gotten that straightened out, Mr. Swindell, does that 
25 appear to be a true and correct copy ofthe·memorandum 
1 you prepared and then also the attachment to that 
2 memorandum? 
3 A. I'm nqt sure that is an attachment to this 
4 memorandum. 
s . Q. Do you recall providlng us a copy 9f that 
s letter to Mr. Robinson? 
7 A. We must have. 
Ii .- MR. HALL: The question he asked you is 
9 whether you recall providing him with a copy of that. 
. 10 A. I don't know. I believe someone in the city 
11 must have provided this to you, It ebviously is 
12 something that came out of the mayor's office. All I 
13 can really say for sure what I did is my memorandum. 
14 Q. · Understood. Part of what we are doing is, as 
15 your counsei mentioned, is figure out what you recall 
111 and what your process was. 
11 This is in reference to this return on equity 
ia question that we asked about, it's a line item in the 
19 budget, I think it's also been called an enterprise 
20 · funds account. Ara there any other terms that you use 
21 for it? 
22 A. My deposition~-
23 Q. Your affidavit1 
24. A. I am sorry, my affidavit explains and provides 
25 kind of an update on this and the language did change a 
Page ~l 
1 little bit subsequent to this: Mayor Chase referred to 
2 those transfers·as a return on equity. That was a 
3 transfer from the city owned utility to the general 
4 fund. Mayor Blad wanted to describe it differently and 
5 have it more on an accounting basis si~ilar to what we 
6 do with privately owned utilities like Intermountain 
1 Gas, so you will see it reflected in the new budget 
8 books and in my affidavit. as a payment in lieu of taxes 
9 and a franchise fee. The amounts and the concept are · 
10 simJlar. 
11 Q. The concepts, regardless of what they .. 
12 apparently they have been referred to in different ways 
13 over the years, is something that goes throµgh the 
14 budget process and gets approved by the council? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. When do you recall this first being 
· 17 implemented, this fund transfer program? 
18 A. I'm going to say 200 3, but it might be 2004. 
19 Q. How would we be able to find out exactly when 
20 this program started? 
Zl A. The program existed well prior to my arrival 
Z2 but to be labeled as a return on equity and to be 
Z3 specified that way was something that I was part of and 
24 I believe we got that in the '04 budget !hat was built 
25 in '03. 
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Page 22 (Pages 82-85) 
David K. Swindell 12/14/2012 
- Page 82 
.Page 84 
I Q. I am assuming at some point you made a I :Yith regard to ExhibifNo.18. We are actually on 
2 presentation or there was a presentation made at a city 2 Exhibit No. 18. This is back to this return on equity 
3 council meeting with regard to this program? 3 program. It's my understanding that the city's attorney 
4 A Right. 4 · is Dean Tranmer; is that right? _ 
5 Q. Would that be reflected in the minutes, 5 A. Dean Tranmer is the city attorney, yes; 
6 presumably? 6 Q. Have you ever sought a legal opinion from Mr. 
1 A. Presumably. I don't know. 1 Tranmer or anybody in the legal department with regard 
8 Q. But it was discussed at the council -- 8 to the legality of this program? 
9 A. Right. Us been -- 9 A. Yes. 
)0 Q. And approved as part of the budget. 10 MR HALL: Objection, that seeks to intervene 
11 A Yes, it's part of the budget process. 11 in the attorney-client privHege betWeen him and the 
lZ Q.. Let me Just talk about your involvement with 12 dty. 
13 it You said you recall it being a program initiated 13 MR. OLSEN: Not in this case, becaus_e we are 
14 prior to your arrival but that you -- I think you 14 talking about •• this is not tn relation to the case. 
15 mentioned you were the one who first called it a return 15 Well, let me ask a different question. 
16 on equity? 16 Q. A~ the time that you got involved and got tlrls 
17 A. Right, I wanted to formalize it and have it 17 process formalized, did you ever seek a legal opinion 
18 reflected in the city accounts in a formal fashion. 18 from Mr. Tranmer or anybody _in the legal department with 
19 Q. How did you for,!11alize it? 19 regard to the legality of this program? 
20 A. As you see here. This part of the exhibit 20 MR. HALL: Same objection. Yoa are asking to. 
21 (indicating) that's in capital letters, that's just an 21 seek information in violation of the attorney-client 
22 extraction of the budget book. 2Z privilege, between the-city attorney and his client, the 
23 Q. So you formalize9 it by putting it into the 23 city offi:cials. He is not going to answer, it's a 
24 budget. 24 violation of~he attorney-client privilege. 
25 A. Right. 25 MR. OLSEN: I want him to tell me. 
Page Bl Page as 
1 Q, And just for the record, you are referencing . 1 MR. HALL: He is not the one who is going to 
2 midway down the document the all caps letters that have 2 tell you. 
3 amounts _to the right ofit, probably the key one there 3 Q. Mr. SWindell, are you going to follow the 
4 is ~vhere it says TO 00!-0000-393.99-00 Return on Equity? 4 advke of your attomey and not answer this question? 
5 A. Yes. 5 MR. HALL: I am instructing him not to answer. 
6 Q. And FY!l, that was $1,585,237? 6 Please proceed.· 
7 A. Yes. 7 MR . .OLSEN: I want a yes or no from him. 
8 Q, Well, let's go ahead and turn to this le!t;er 8 MR. HALL: He is not going to answer. 
9 dated -- this is Page 4 of this particular exhibit, 9 MR. OLSEN: I want a yes or no from Mr. 
10 August 22, 2005, letter to :Mr. Robinson. Do you recall 10 Swindell. 
11 anything about this letter, did you review it? 11 MR. HALL: You can want it the rest of your 
12 A. I recall having some input into this letter. 12 life. I am instructing hfui not to answer. 
13 The mayor asked for some information, but I didn't 13 Q. (By Mr. Olsen.) Are you going to answer the 
14 actually draft this letter. But I am sure he got these 14 question? 
15 numbers from me. 15 A.. My attorney has instructed my not to answer. 
16 Q. Thank you. 16 MR HALL: He is following his attorney's 
17 MR. HALL: Before we go on to the n~t 17 instructions. 
18 exhibit. It's noon. So should we take our lunch break 18 MR. OLSEN: That's all I am looking for. And 
19 now? 19 I will certainly be asking the.courtto compel that 
20 MR. OLSEN: It sounds good. 20 because I think it's not protected by the privilege in 
21 (Lunch recess taken from 12:01 p.m. to 21 this instance. So I would urge counsel to reconsider. 
22 1:00 p.m.) 22 AnYV11ay, moving OIL 
23 MR. OLSEN: Back on the record after lunch in 23 Let's go ahead and mark the next exhibit as 
24 the deposition of Mr. David Swindell. 24 No.19. 
25 Q. I wanted to ask you o~e more brief question 25 (Deposition Exhibit No.19 marked for 
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Pavid K.· Swindell 12/14/2012 
Page. ~4 
1 A. Not on this report. That would be in the 
2 annual financial reporf; the details, the ending cash 
3 balance in each fund. 
4 Q. And that's not ill the budget book, right, 
s because the budget book --
6 A. No, the budget book is ju~t a plan of revenue 
? and a plan of expenditures. 
a Q. So that's in the financial report. I believe 
s you provided us financial reports with our FOIA request 
10 and I will just double check. · 
u A. Right, and you have the most current one that 
12 I provided you this morning. 
13 Q. Let's go back lo that first VI/PC report that 
14 you were looking at earlier. 
1s A. Okay. 
16 Q. Now I want you to go to Page 3 of that report. 
11 Now we have this Analysis of Inputs and what I really 
18 need from you isjustifyou could please ~plain to me 
19 this chart. 
20 A. It relates to this table (indii;ating). 
21 Q. Whenyou say this table, the Measures of 
22 Inputs? 
23 A. The Measures of Inputs table. It is a graph 
24 of the total, and the real dollars in FY04. There are 
25 two line~ on.the Analysis of Inputs chart, and if it 
Page 95 
1 were in color you would see the difference, they are on 
2 different lines . 
. 3 The way I do these charts for the council is I 
4 want them to focus on the real inputs which strips out 
5 the effects of inflation. If you look at the Measures 
e ot Inputs chart it's easier to explain. Let me explain 
1 to you that table and then the chart is just a chart of 
s those numbers. 
9 · Q. I am going to go back to this first ·chart you 
10 were looking at. So, yes, if you could -- it looks to 
11 me on that lower line, let's go back to the Analysis of 
12 Inputs, the first number on that lower line is 
13 4,892,397, and that was on the measures of inputs the 
14 total actually spent on those three areas in '04; am I 
1s reading that correctly? 
1s A. Yes. 
17 Q. And that's reflected. And then ifwe follow 
1s that line, those various numbers then reflect the actual 
19 spent thro),lgh 2008. 
20 A. Okay. 
21 Q. So what I am trying to figure out is -
22 explain better to me what that upper line is, then. 
23 · A. I am pointing to the upper line on the chart. 
24 The upper line is simply a graph of the totals that are 
25 here (indicating). 
Page 9G 
1 Q. The upper line is? 
2 A. Yes. So, for example, FY08 actual 6,927,000, 
3 you will see the top part of that graph is just kissing 
4 7 million bucks. 
s Q. I see. So I was actually incorrect earlier. 
6 So what does the 6,206,125 represent? 
7 A. That is the deflated real purchasing power, 
8 that's what $6,927,000 is worth in FY04 purchasing 
9 p_ower, which is the initial number on the chart. It's 
10 reiilly only worth 6.106,000 if you deflate it according 
11 to the Consumer Price Index. 
12 Q. So is what you are suggesting here -- you are 
13 trying to track the increases from a CPI context --
14 A. Correct. 
15 Q. -- and how-· 
16 A. It's a way to express to the council, all 
17 right, the chart went up, expenses went up, is it 
18 because of inflation or is it b.ecause of other things. 
Is This one demonstrates it ain'tjust ilJflation, it went" . 
20 up because of other things. · 
21 Q. It's because the government is printing more 
22 dollars and they are not worth what they used to be. 
23 A. That's all that is. Well, yot.i get it, you 
24 widerstand, 
25 Q. That may be all the questions I have because 
Page 97 
1 as I look, it looks like you have similar th'ings going 
2 on when we are looking at water. Yes, that's all the 
3 questions I have on that exhibit. 
4 I think this next one may be a repeat of one I 
$ already went over with you, so I am not going to ask you 
6 any questions about that. 
7 MR HALL: Are you g?ing to mark this one or 
8 not? 
9 MR OLSEN: No. 
10 A. Did I answer your question on the real 
11 purchasing power graph adequately? 
12 Q. Yes. 
1:i MR OLSEN: Mark this, please. 
14 (Deposition Exhibit No. 21 marked for 
15 identification.} 
16 Q. I am going to hand you Exhibit No. 21, and I 
17 don't know how much time we will spend on it as it 
18 predates your time. 
19 This is a study that the association obtained 
20 from Black & Veatch and I think you said earlier that 
21 Mr. Gallagher was part of Black & Veatch before he went 
22 to Red Oak Consulting? 
23 A. Yes. 
24 Q. And this is a wastewater rate study done back 
25 in '97. My question to you is have you ever seen or 
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1 revie,;.,ed this report before? 
2 A. I think I am going to say no. 
3 Q. Let's put it away, then. 
4 · A.. It was before my Ume and I think the only 
5 relevant thing here is that Mr. Gallagher, I have been 
6 told, has done the financial analysis for the City of 
1 Pocatello since I believe 1986, and this is obviously 
s one of his reports when he was with Black & Veatch. No, 
9 I have not had a copy of that 
10 Q: So we will now move on to what we will mark as 
u Exhibit No. 22. 
12 (Deposition Exhibit No. 22 marked for 
13 identification.) 
14 Q. I'll represent to you that this appears to be 
is another report done by Black & Veatch, Mr. Gallagher, 
16 and I have the same question, have you ever reviewed 
11 this report. 
18 . A. I can't recall. 
19 Q. And I'll just note, too, earlier you gave me a 
20 Black & Veatch report that we need to make sure --
21 A. Right, from 2002, and those are the earliest 
22 reports that I have that I have worked with during my 
23 tenure with the city. 
24 Q. Can we get somebody to copy these while we are 
25 waiting? 
l 
2 
. 
3 
4 
5 
s 
1 
8 
9 
JO 
MR. HALL:· Off the record. 
(Discussion off the record.) 
. MR. OLSEN: Back on the record. 
Q. Now, as you look through these reports and 
Page 99 
also in reviewing your affidavit, which we will get to 
in a minute, there is a lot of discussion about the · 
system buy-in ~ethod that is being used as a basis to 
determine capacity fees. Can you describe to me in your 
own words what you understand the system buy~in method 
to be? 
LI A. It's a calculation of the capacity fee based 
12 upon ~ buy-in method. My understanding of that is that 
13 over the years the rate payers have built a system, paid 
14. fo~ it, it has some residual capacity, they pay for it, 
15 and then when a new connector comes on the system, ·they 
16. absorb part of that capacity. The capacity fee is an 
17 equity contribution that is calculated to be an . 
lB equivalent contribution as to what the-rate payers are 
19 estimated to have made over the years "to the backbone 
20 system. 
21 Q. Aie those calculations that you make as a CFO? 
22 A. No, John Gallagher makes those as our 
23 consultant. We review them, we are responsible for 
24 them. 
25 Q. When you say you review them, what do you 
Page 100 
1 review? 
2 A. We review the methodology by which he 
3 calculated these things. We provided hlm the valuations . 
4 and the status of our systems. We are responsible for 
s the inputs to some of his calculations obviously, and in 
6 the end it's a policy recommendation that the council is 
7 responsible for. 
B Q. But ultimately Gallagher and Red Oak, they are 
9 the ones who do the calculations. 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. And it's based on inpu~ that you have given 
12 him. 
13 A. Right. 
14 MR. OLSEN: Let's go ahead and mark the next 
15 exhibit. 
16 (Deposition Exhibit No. 23 marked for 
17 identification.) 
111 Q. Now, I'll represent to you that this is a · 
19. resolution entered into by the city on the 16th of 
20 August of 2001. You'll have to refresh my memory. Were 
21 you employed at the time that this resolution passed? 
22 A. Actually, no. 
23 Q. Do you know who the prior CFO was? 
24 A. My understanding the position was vacant. Ron 
25 · Timpson three years ear~er was at a position where he 
J.>age 101 
l did most ofmy duties. He passed away. 
2 Q. Durlng the time that the position was vacant, 
3 do :¥OU know who handled your responsibilities? 
4 A. My understanding was a budget committee from 
5 the mayor, the city treasurer, the HR director and the 
6 IT director, IT being our lingo for information 
1 teclmology. 
-
8 Q. HR, IT director, treasurer. 
9 A. Right. 
10 Q. That was for about, did you say three years? 
11 A. Three years. I was actually employed by the 
12 city I believe on the 20th of August. They passed the 
13 budget a .week prior. This must have been part of that. 
14 But it's a standard fee resolution. What are your 
15 questions on it? 
16 Q. ·Go down to the fourth. and fifth paragraph, it 
17 indicates, it says, "VVlrereas, a local builders' 
18 association later took issue with the amount of the 
19 plant capaclty fees and the engineering study itself and 
20 persuaded th_e city council to review the plant capacity 
2.1 fees: and 
22 "Whereas, the city subsequently established a 
23 committee to provide recommendations regarding a number 
24. of city fees and the city council approved those 
25 recommendations in regard to sewer capacity f~es." 
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1 design ls executed on the ground according to their 
2 plans, and you hire -- we even hired Keller to open the 
3 bids and manage the bidding. So that's what all of that 
4 is. 
s MR. OLSEN: Let's take a short·break and then 
6 we will close to done. 
7 (Recess taken from 2:16 to 2:30 p.m.) 
s MR. OLSEN: Back on the record. Let's mark 
9 the next exhibit. 
10 (Deposition Exhibit No. 32 marked for 
11 identification.) 
12 Q, l'lljust represent to you this is a copy of 
13 an affidavit that we received in our office in support 
14. of the summary judgment motion. I just want you to 
1s confirm that it's a true and correct copy. 
16 A. ·It appears to be. 
11 Q: An~ that that's your signature on the last 
18 page • 
19 A. It is. 
.20 Q. If you would turn to Page 2 of that. Paragraph 
21 No. 5, there is reference to an impact fee governed by 
22. the code under 67-8201. And ljust need to confirm with 
23 you, does the city have an impact fee in place right 
z4 now? 
·25 A. No. 
Page 123 
1 Q. If you would turn to the following page, it 
2 starts with -- I guess it continues v1ith Paragraph 6 and 
3 on the following page there is reference to •· well, 
4 Paragraph 5 talks about this buy-in. equity buy-in that 
5 we discussed earlier and then on the last sentence of 
6 that it indicates that in coming up with this equity 
Page 1.24. 
1 A. Yes. 
2. Q. You are indicating here that the city ls 
3 relying on Red Oak. Now. you mentioned earlier that Red 
4 Oak had access to your files here in the city? 
5 A. Yes. · 
6 Q. In what way? 
7 A. They had access to all of the financial 
s records of the city, the status reports on the 
9 utilities, anything that we had that would assist them 
1 o in building a financial plan, and anything that would 
11 assist them in a fair and proper calcula~on of the 
12 capacir;y fees. 
13 Q. Let's move on to the next exhibit here. 
i4 (Deposition Exhibit No. 33 marked for · 
15 identification.) 
16 Q. I'll represent to you that these were 
17 . responses to some discovery requests that Mr. Hall's 
18 office provided to us. My question to you is first of 
19 all have you ever reviewed these responses before, or -
20 tWs document? 
21 A. I don't believe I have. I haven't seen this 
22. document. 
23 Q. Were you Involved, do you recall -- I'm not 
24 asking you to divulge any attorney-client 
25 communications, but do you recall being requested to· 
Paee 12s 
1 assist in responding to this discovery? 
2 A. I don't think specifically, it was never 
3 r.ela1ed to me. I get requests for information from 
4 departments, including my legal department, at various 
5 times, but•• 
6 Q. You don't recall being involved in preparing a 
1 bu;f in formula, that you relied on a City of Pocatello . · 1 . response to or providing information? 
8 wastewater utility financial planning study prepared by 8 A. Not specifically other than -- obviously there 
9 Red Oak Consulting? 9 are a lot of documents here that we have already gone 
10 A Yes. 10 through and our legal department bas those and provided 
11 Q. And I think you said earlier that they are the 11 access to our attorneys in this case. 
12 ones that did the calculations -· 12 Q. If you could turn to Page 12 of this response. 
13 A. Right those studies right there (indicating). 13 Now, if you look at Request For Production No. 9, that 
14 Q. And you discussed earlier what your 14 request is for any and all information with regard to . 
15 involvement was in that process? 15 these 2006 and 2010 reports that we alluded to earlier 
16 A. Yes. 16 with Red Oak Consulting. And it suggests tl!at we 
17 Q. And then Jet's look at Paragraph 14, these 17 provide all documents in defendant's possession 
18 aren't paginated so we will just have to go by 18 pertaining to these reports and its relationship with 
19 paragraph .. Are you with me there? 19 this consultant, including but not limited to contracts, 
20 A. Yes. 20 internal or external communications, working papers, 
21 Q. The first part of that indicates that it's a 21 meeting minutes or notes, and formal or informal 
22 policy choice adopted by the city upon recommendation of 22 internal or external memorandums. 
23 a water and wastewater study provided by Red Oak· 23 A. l am not sure ·· you are on No. 9? 
24 Consulting. So this is just a reaffirmation of what you 24 Q. Yes. If you want to take a minute just to 
25 said earlfer. 2S review what Ijust read. 
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1 MR. HAJ,.L: He was reading the question up here 
2 (indicating). 
3 THE WITNESS: Oh, I was reading the response. -
4 Q. Take a minute and review that, if you would. 
s A. (Witness complies.) Okay. 
6 Q. Po you recall anyone ever coming into your 
7 office and saying please give me all the files to Red 
s Oak Consulting? 
ll A. No. I mean I remember taU<lng a little bit. 
10 abot.1.t this with our attorneys, but the volumes of 
11 information --
12 MR. HALL: _That's okay, yciu have answered 
13 adequately by simply saying you have talked to your 
14 attorneys about this issue. 
15 Q. I don't. want you to share with me what the 
16 conversation was. 
11 A. The only real thing I know is in the end the 
18 final products. 
19 Q. I'lljust say in the responses we got the 
20 final products, we got these reports, !Jut yve don't 
21 have P• w~ll. in this request we didn't get any of~ 
22 other information. 
23- MR. OLSEN: Let's mark the next two exhibits. 
24 (Deposition Exhibit Nos. 34 and 35 marked 
is for identification.) 
Page 12? 
1 Q. Let's start with No. 35, Mr. Swindell. rll 
2 just represent to you that these are supplemental 
3 responses. If you could turn to Page 13. So we are 
4 back to this Response to Request fa( Production No. 9, 
5 and we received a supplemental response, this vvas in 
s September of this year, ·wherein it states that the 
7 defendant has not identified additional documents in its 
s possession responsive to this request and then it goes 
9 on to say that defendant is inquiring with Red Oak 
10 Consulting. · 
11 • Do you know if there has been inquiries made 
12 to Red Oak Consulting pursuant to this response to 
13 obtain records? 
14 MR. HALL: I instruct you not to speculate. 
15 What you know, you know. 
16 A. I know they made contact. I don't know what 
17 -the results of !hose inquiries were. 
18 Q. Who has made contact? 
19 A. I believe Kirk Bybee did. 
20 Q. Who is Kirk Bybee? 
21 A. He's a deputy city attorney for the City of 
22 Pocatello. 
23 Q. To your understanding, Mr. Bybee has made 
24 contact with Red Oak with regard to this? 
2s A. -Yes. 
Page 128 
1 Q. Do you know if he has received any response 
z from them? 
3 A. I don't know. 
4 MR. HALL: I was going to object because you 
s were going to get into the attorney-client privilege but 
6 he already answered and said he didn't know, so I guess 
7 we don't need to worry about it. 
8 Q. Let's look at 34, and this is some 
9 correspondence going back and forth between Mr. Hall's 
10 office and I, and I presume-- well, let me just ask 
11 for the record. Have you reviewed any of this 
12 correspondence be£ ore? 
13 A. ·No. 
14 Q. I do want to turn your attention to, go to the 
15 last page of this particular exhibft, the December 7 
16 letter. If you go down about the fourth sentence where 
I 7 it starts "If you review," are you there with me now? . 
13 A. -okay. 
19 Q. "If you review your discovery requests, you 
20 asked that the city provide any documents in its , 
·21_ possession. The city has provided all documents in the 
22 city's possession related to Red Oak Consulting and the 
23 2006 and 2010 rate studies." , · 
24 My question to you is to. your knowledge has 
25 the city provided all the documents with regard to Red 
Page 129 
· 1 Oak in its possession? 
2 MR. HALL: If you know. Since you weren't 
3 involved in the r~ponses.to discovery, you probably 
4 don't know what was produced and what wasn't --
5 Q. I am just asking what you know. 
6 A. I knov,v my office has provided anything that 
7 has been requested of ~e firiance department. 
s MR. HALL: That's fine. 
g A. I believe we h~ve provided everything, but 
10 I--
11 Q. Did you review it before it went out, w_ould it 
12 go through you, something like that --
13 A. - Yes. 
H (Deposition Exhibit No. 36 marked for 
15 identification.) . 
10 Q. I'll represent to you, Mr. Swindell. that 
11 these are, what.I have handed you is Exhibit No. 36, is 
18 about l 90 pages of e-mails that were provided -- these 
19 were not provided in djscovery, however, they were 
20 provided as part of that initial public records request. 
21 A. Okay. 
22 . Q. In 2010. And first I want to ask you some 
23 questions and then there are some things we need to 
24 point out before we go any further. If you look at 
2s Page 1 -- and I have put a Bates number on the 
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1 right-hand corner so that we can know what page we are 
2 referencing. Do you see that where it says 00017 
3 A. Yes, you call that a Bates nwnber? 
4 Q. Yes. 
s A You have your lingo and I have mine. We each 
6 learned something. 
1 Q. Who is Janene Orr? 
8 A. Janene Orr was an employee of the water 
9 deparlm.ent, she was the princip~l administrative 
10 assistant to the water superintendent and also provided 
11 administrative support to Greg Lanning, the director of · 
12 pub lit works. She recently retired: 
13 Q. When did she retire? · 
14 A. Within the last two months: I can'.t give you 
15 the exact date. 
16 Q. Do you know if she is still in town? 
11 A. I don't know, but I think she is still in the 
1a local area. 
19 
20 
21 
. 22 
Q. And then Greg Lanning, I think we have alluded 
to him briefly, but tel1 me a little bit more about Greg 
Lanning. 
A. He grew up in Wyoming •• 
23 Q. I am sorry, let me get more specific. 
24 A.. We did have that relationship, because we bath 
zs grew up there. 
Page 131 
1 Q. Did you know him in grade school? 
2 A. l\Io, we didn't grow up in the same city, he 
3 grew up in Casper, I grew up n Riverton. 
4 Q. When did you first meet him? 
5 A. When I assumed duties here. 
s Q. He was working here at the time? 
7 A. Yes .. 
·s Q. What was his position? 
9 A. He was the director of public works. 
10 Q. Vyas he director of public works when you came 
11 to work here? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. And he retired as the director of public 
14 works? 
15 . A. Yes, to take anotherjob,justrealrecently 
16 . wlth ~e State of Wyoming. 
. 17 · Q. !{we. go down a little furtherin the page, 
1.~ ~ere is from a Tod4 Cristiano. 
10 · .. ;·A· Yes. 
2q · ·. ', o: . Do you know who he is? 
i°(·:;~'.-'--~· ~ do,·r have met Todd. Todd is an employee 
22· }h~t ,~orked.for John Gallagher, the consultant. 
23 . .:-::· i:· Q:_:-: S_q.~e is part ot Red Oak Consulting? 
· 2~ :.;-:;:·.J.\:)~~a~tly. 
is ; ''./;:. 8:)~~ .. ~en John Gallagher's name is there. · 
Page 132 
1 A. He was the principal on the financial 
2 planning. 
3 Q. If you would turn the page. We have another 
4 e-mail dated January 31, this is Bates No. 2, 2010, at 
s 3:50, one more name to .ask you about, Randy Allen, \'ilho 
6 is that? 
7 A. Randy Allen ls the superintendent of the 
s sanitation department. By way of explanation, when we 
9 do these financial plans for i.vater and waste1.vater, we 
10 also do the same sanitation department as ,veil. They · · 
11 are not nearly as complicated but we get it done on the 
12 cheap that-way. 
13 Q. Turn the page, Bates No. 3, Jon Herrick, again 
14 looking at the To: Subject: on an e-mail sent onJanuary 
1s 27, Jon Herrick you mentioned earlier, he is the 
16 wastewater •• 
11 A. The wastewater superintendent. 
18. Q. And Justin Armstrong is the water 
19 superintendent 
20 A. Correct. 
21 Q. And let me Just ask you, on these e-mails, 
22 when it's referring to Dave Swindell, am I to presume 
23 that's you? 
24. A. That would be me. 
as Q. There is also reference in these e-mails to a 
. Page 133 
1 Cody Berg. Is he with Red Oak Cons~ltlng? 
2 A. He was. He was an assistant to J ohp just like 
3 Toddwas .. 
4. Q. Do you know if he is still there? 
s A. I don't know. He was new at the last time we 
6 did the study. 
1 · Q. But you don't know if he is tp.ere still? 
s A. I don't know. 
9 Q. Go to Bates No. 35-. 
10 A. Okay. 
11 Q. There is another name there, Darcy Taylor. 
12 This is a February 10, 2010, e-mail. 
13 A. Yes. 
14 ·Q, Who is Darcy Taylor? 
15 A. Darcy Taylor is the senior paralegal in the 
16 city's legal department. Her office is about 30 feet, 
11 and lam motioning about 2:00. 
13 Q. Thanks for putting that on the record. 
19 · A. That was probably not very helpful, I am 
20 sorry. That's who she is. · 
21 Q. Tum to 176. 
22 A. Okay. 
23 Q. There is a June 4, 2010, e-mail. Have we 
24 discussed Greg Lanning yet? 
25 A. You asked me a little bit about what 1 knew 
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1 about him and I kind of made -a joke that we both grew up 
z in Wyoming and then got off on other topics. What was 
3 your question? 
4 Q. I am sorry, we did taJk about him. Tammy Roy 
5 in the cc. 
a A. I do not know who that is. I presume that's 
7 someone in John Gallagher's office but I donot know. 
8 Q. How about Debbie Brady? 
9 A. Debbie Brady is the administrative assistant 
10 in the sanitation department. She works for Randy 
11 Allen. 
12 _ Q. Go to 180. This is a July 13, 2010, e~mail 
JS from a Cindi Chacon, C-H-A-C-0-N. Who is that? 
14 A. Cindi Chacon is the senior administrative 
15 assistant in the water pollution control department. 
16 She is a-direct report to Jon Herrick. 
17 Q. Here is my concern about these e-mails, and 
1a this is probap]y more direded to Mr. Hall. if you look 
19 through these e-mails, for instance. on Bates Stamp 171, 
20 and at leas( several dozen other places, there are 
21 .attachm~nts referenced in the e-mail and many of them 
22 appear to have girect correlation to the work that was 
23 being performed by Red Oak Consulting, and these 
24 documents we do not have. 
25 . I guess my fllst question to you, Mr. 
Page lJS 
1 Swindell, is are these e-mails still kept somewhe.e in a 
2 file electronically? 
s A. Probably not at tlus point. I would have to 
4 ask my director of information technology how far back 
5 the tapes go, but there is a date certain wher.e it's 
6 deleted and then they are lio longer available. The 
1 attachments, like on 171 that you mentioned here, water 
a report, Pocatello markups --
9 Q. 'I don't want you to get into that --
10 A. Normally what you do is you download the file 
11 because you don't want it sitting in your e-mail because 
12 your e-mail box will become too full and those documents 
13 are·· 
14 Q. So would these have been printed off at some 
15 pomt? 
16 A. I don't know; I print a lot of mine. I 
17 probably received this and I probably printed it. l'm 
18 sure I don't have lt anymore. 
19 • Q. There is a policy in place for .deleting 
20 e-mail? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. Is it a written policy? 
23 A. Yes, it's part of the records retention policy 
24 of the-city. 
25 Q. Can that be found anywhere? 
1:'age 136 
1 A. Yes .. 
2 Q. Is that something that can be found online? 
3 A. Probably not onliµe but there is policy on 
4 e-mail retention from the IT department. 
s Q. That will be something that we will certainly 
6 follow up with Mr. Hall. 
7 A. We will get that 
B Q. Clearly there are a lot of files pertainlllg to 
9 Red Oak, if you look through these e-mails and you look 
10 at the numerous attachments, and there is reference to 
11 me~tings. I am assuming when you have a meeting, are 
12 · there notes kept of the meeting? 
13 A. Generally, yes, that would be one of Todd's 
14 jobs, Todd Crlstiano. When you do these kind of 
15 studies, as you know-- welL maybe you don't know. But 
16 there are physical meetings, they travel to Pocatello a 
17 couple chimes. Those meetings we brought stacks· and 
18 stacks of information, some of which was useful, some of 
19 which wasn't. Then there are conference calls and there 
20 are drafts sent hack and forth, proposed slides and so 
21 on and so forth, all to arrive at a product 
2z (Indicating), and these are the products. 
23 · Q. And that's what we need to get. Because the 
24 product is one thing but the work that leads up to a 
25 product Is something that we hav? requested·· 
Page. 137 
1 A. I'm not sure it's all available but we will 
z provide you with what -- . 
3 MR HALL: We can follow up. _You said you 
4 have had Exhibit 36 since before you filed the lawsuit 
5 as a result of your public records request. 
6 . MR. OLSEN: Right. 
7 Q. One more thing I want to point out in Bates 
8 No. 35, Exhibit No. 36, Bates No. 35, if you look at the 
9 attachment there it refers to the Red Oak.contract. I 
10 presume you have that in your records still. or do you 
n know at this point? 
12_ A. I don't know. I presume we do. There was a 
13 contract that had to be approved by the city council, so 
14 I am sure we have a copy of that It basically details 
15 the fee schedule and what the deliverables look like, 
16 like any consulting contract would. 
17 MR. OLSEN: Here is what I am going to 
18 propose, Mr. Hall, until we check in to see what is in 
19 the attachments on these, I don't want to inquire any 
20 further with Mr. Swindell because I don't think that, 
21 without having these attachments which are referenced in 
22 detail in the e-mails, that I can adequately examine 
23 him. So I am going to propose that the city go back to 
24 its records, check its e-mails'. We got these in •• our 
25 records request was in 201 ~. so they were at least there 
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1 available then. 
z But, in any case, I want to ~eep the 
3 deposition open to allow us to first of all obtain the 
4 file on this and these documents referred ta, and I · 
5 would just request that the defendant go through each 
6 one of these e-mails and find the attachments to them 
7 and anything else that happens to be in his file. 
s including •• I would note that there were numerous 
9 meetings held, as you ·referenced, so I would presume 
10 there should be some notes on that. I will ask that for 
11 not only the 2010 study, because these are pertaining to 
1z the 2010 study, but also anything that you would have 1n 
13 your file for 2006. And if the answer ls that you don't 
14 have anything, that It's all been discarded, I need to 
1s know the answer to that. And I need some clarification 
l6 on that. · 
17 And also would remake my request that. again, 
18 because of the close working relationship With the city 
19 and this f'mn, that you also, as you agreed to do in 
20 your supplemental response, go to Red Oak and get those 
21 files, follow up w1th Mr. Bybee or whatever the case may 
22 be. 
23 Sa that is my request on the record and you 
24 can feel free to respond ~o that if you want to. 
2s MR. HALL: You have had the eamalls that are 
Page 139 
1 contained in Exitibit No. 36 for over hvo years. I don't 
2 see anywhere in your request for discovery to us where 
3 you have asked us to do what you are now· asking us to 
4 do, so feel free to send me _a letter with what specific 
5 requests you have. As we talked about earlier, we will 
a review them and make a determination as to whether they 
7 are timely arid appropriate, and respond accordingly. 
s With regard to leaving the deposition open, we 
9 will not consent to that.. We have already been in front 
10 of the judge on this matter because we are pa,st the time 
11 frame for discovery to have been completed in this case. 
12 The court gave you until today to complete the 
13 deposition of Mr. Swindell, that was the court's order. 
14 So we are not going to agree to something differeJ').t than 
15 what the court ordered in tll1s case. And of course we 
16 have a motion for summary judgment pending with time 
17 frames already set forth for responses, and we Intend to 
18 comply with those. 
19 MR. OLSEN: Thank you. In response to that I 
20 just want to say that, first of all, I don't think we 
21 have had those e-mails for two years. But, in any case, 
22 the attachments and the documents referenced in the 
23 e-mails have cettainly been reql!ested numerous times. 
24 And the other thing that we may consider is 
25 just moving to strike Mr. Swlndell's affidavit and also 
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1 reliance upon Red Oak if we can't get compliance. Vve 
2 would prefer not to do that, but, anyway, I will put 
3 that in a letter to you and you can respond accordingly. 
4 MR. HALL: We will have him read and sign the 
s deposition. 
6 (Witness.excused at 3:10 p.m.) 
7 {Sign~ture requested.) 
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3 .I. DAVID K. SWINDELL, being first duly swam. depose 
4 and say: That I am the witness named in the foregoing 
5 deposition; that I have read said deposition and know 
B the contents thereof; that the questions contained 
7 therein were propounded to me: and that the answers 
s therein C:Ontained are true and correct, except for any 
9 changes that I may have listed on the Change Sheet 
10 attached hereto. 
11 DATED this_ day of , __ , 
12 CHANGES ON ERRATA SHEET YES_ NO_ 
13 
14 
15 
16 
. DAVID K. S\Nil\iDELL 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this_ day 
17 of _______ , __ • 
18 
19 
20 NAME OF NOTARY PUELIC 
21 NOTARY PUBLIC FOR ____ _ 
2Z RESIDING AT ______ _ 
23 MY CD1v!MISSION EXPIRES ___ _ 
24 
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OFFICE OF 'l'H! MAYOR 
911 North 7th .l\w!nlm 
P.O. Box4169 
PU(atella, ldr.ho 83205-
(208) 23'1-6163 
Fax: (208) 234-6297 
www.pocatello.us 
Ms. Randi Thomson 
fl.RIAN C. BLAD 
Mayor 
Building Contractor Association of South East Idaho 
770 E. Chubbuck Road 
Chubbuck. lD 83102 
RE: [nformation Request 
Dear Ms. Thomson: 
The attached material is provided in response to your information request. 
Question l) Water. Se,:ver connection and building fees in the last seven years. 
ANS: Spreadsheet attached. 
Pocatello Cily Couadl: 
ROGEn BRAY 
STEVE BROV•tN 
CRAIG COOPER 
RON ffiASUR!i 
GARYMOORE 
EVA JOHNSON NYE 
a._ \Vere ,.vate1, sewer and building permif fees eac;h placed in separate and-segregated accounts? 
'ANS: \.\later fees were placed in the. water fund 031, sewer fees were placed in the Water 
J>o tlution Coi1trol Fund 032, and bui.lding permit_ fees. were placed in the General Fund 001. 
The1:i ',s .iid separ;itiori'°~}' ;e'gre1iatf6;1' h~yoj1J · tl1~ ·,rlU·1~f f~~el:'. 
b. Total amount of fees collected in the last seven years 
ANS: see spreadsheet attached. 
c. Information regarding accounts where the fees were deposited. Total deposits made in those 
accoi.mts. · . 
ANS; Tota]s per spreadsheet attached. The. fees were attributed to the account lines listed, 
receipte_d to the fonds as described and dep,osited in the city's main bank account at Wells FargCl 
Bmk · 
cl. Record or ledgers or financial spreadsheets ~videncing withdrawals from the re~pective 
accounts, including amou11ts withdrawn. where those funds were allocated, for what purpose. 
ANS: attached is a computer disk (City of Pocatello Ae-count Activity Years 2003 - 2009) 
containing four pdf files that are the transaction journals for the four funds FY03-FY09, listing 
every expense transaction in these fonds: 
1) General Fund, 7,674 pages 
2) Water Fund, 926 pages . 
3) Water Pollution Control (sewer), 910 pages 
4) Property Abatement Fund 964, 3 pages 
e. Formal or informal mem.oranda or communications providing instrnction or guidance for th:;: 
1nanagement of such funds. l:Z~•-~---. 
i! .I\ I. . • 
.AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY / AFPIRMATIVE ACTION EMPLOYER 
'I' l! ,'ln1:r:M1 I DEPOSITION- ~ 
j EXHIIHT ~ ~ La _, 
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ANS: The d(icmne.nt gtdding all the funds of lhe- city is the budget. The FY 10 budget book is 
provided. · 
I'. Formal and/or inforinal memoranda or communications.\Vith regard to oversight procedures or 
internal auditing procedures. 
ANS: Tbere are no special internal c.ontrol doc-tunents for these accounts except for a specific 
cash handling prOl:edure in Che building department (provided). The.re are mimerous formal and 
informal memorancl.r regarding oversight of dly accounts ra11ging from purchase policy to city-
wide cash receipting procedures, etc. These are available if you want them; we were unable to 
define your n;quest fu1iher. 
g. Any external audits performed mi the respective. accounts. 
ANS: The Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (CAFR) is audited and includes Che general 
fund, water fund, WPC fund and Propel"ty Abatement Fund. A disk withthese reports in·pdf 
formal is provided FY2005 thm FY2009 ("City of Pocatello CAFR · 
2005/2006/2007/2009/2009"). PY2003 and FY2004 are provided in bard copy. 
h. Any intemal or external reports prepared in regard to the respective accounts. 
ANS: The city contracted for external reports on the Water Fund and Water Pollution Control 
Fund in December, 2006 which analyzed the capacity fees in those two funds. Hard copi_es are 
provided. In ~une, 2010, those reports were updated. The. final reports for the 2010 · update are 
1:irovicled h1 pdf forma.t on the attached disk ("20 IO Rate Study''). 
Sincerely, 
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MEMORANDUM FOR: City Clerk . . 
.-/ \ ,.,-;;? 
FROM: David Swindell~ ChiefFinru1cial Officer "'2J::-f" ~-·-•····.'~r.;;,:,>"'' · 
SUBJECT: BCASEI request of September 24, 2010 
DATE: Sep1cmber 29, 2010 
l. FOR INFORMATION . 
. 2. Pu~·pose. To pl'Oviderespqnse to BCASE1 request item #3 
3. Discussion. 
a. Request: l'page 19 ofthe."FY2010 Budget Book" identifies ''transfers1' made of the 
Water Fund, Water Pollution a11d Control Fund and General. Please provide info11nation 
regarding these transfers from 2002w2010, including a specific breakdown of where the funds 
were transfer·red, how such funds were utilized and by what authoiity the transfel's were made. 
Please provide ·all records pertaining to these ti·ansfers. '' · 
b. "T1·:msfers'1 nre-shi.fts of dollars from one fund to another; they are authorized by the 
City Counc.il in the budget similar to any other expendihll'e, even though the money stays withi.J1 
the city. 
c. Water Fund, The transfei·s for FYI 1 are planned per the.attached adopted FY11 
budget worksheet. They .are similar to the transfers for FY 10 and previous years. 
TXFR EMPLOYEES REC COUNCIL 001-0700w393.99-00 
TXFR TO O 16-0000-393 .99-00 FOR Rrv.tERG REP AIR FUND 
TO 001-0000-393.99-00 RETURN ON EQUITY · 
TO 061-6801 -393.99-00 FOR DEBT SERVICE PYMT FOR 
THE WATER BOND 
600 
20000 
1585237 
728138 
The $600 is transferred to the general fund, Human Resources Deparbnent (001-0700) to support 
y~arly activity of the employees recreation cotmcil for Water Department Employees (Christmas 
Party, Summer Thailk:-You BBQ, etc). · 
The $20,000 is t~ansferred to Fund 016, Emergency Repair to help fund a contingency .:fiµld for 
emergency repair of facHities (HVAC unit going out, etc.). · 
The $1,585,237 is ll'ansferred to the General F1md (001) for a return 011 equity~ to help fnnd the 
activities of the General Fund. Records in the finance department include a draft of a letter sent 
to a citizen in 2005 that explains the origins of the transfer ( draft attached). Finance also has a 
draft of information provided to Moodi s investment service during the examination ai1d rating 
,~ 
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of the 2008 Wafer Bond. Transfers in the Water Fund are discussed i11 pages 2-3 of this 
document (attached). 
TI1e $728, l 3 8 is transferred to Fun<l 061 (Water Debt Service Fund) to fund debt service 
payments on the Water FLJnd debt. 
An additional trnnsfer of $1,311 is made to Fund 952 (Retirement Severance), based on Vz of 1 % 
of annunJ wages in the water admin division. The transfer saves up funds to pay for water 
department employees who retire with accumulated sick leave and vacation payouts. Ftmd 952 
helps fund what would o!herwise be an unfunded lump sum requirement. Similar transfers are 
v, made from the Water Transmission Division (031-3008, $7,825) and the Water P111iflcatio11 
Dh1sion (031-3009, $1,509). · 
d. '\Vater Pollution Control Fund. 111e tl'ansfers fol' FYI 1 are planned per the attached 
adopted FYl I budget worksheet. They ai·e similar to the transfers fot FYlO-and previous years. 
TRANSfoER TO 001.0700.393.99-00 REC COUNCIL 
TO 001-0000-393.99-00 RETURN ON EQUITY 
TRANSFERTO 016-0000-393.99-00 FOREMERREPAIR 
TRANSFER TO 060-6100-393.99-00 STATE LOAN 1897w01 
TRANSFER TO 060-6200-393.99-00 STATE LOAN 1898-09 
TRANSFER TO 060-6300-393.99w00 STATE LOAN 1899-01 
TRANSFER TO 060-6400-393.99-00 BOND BANK 2004A 
600 
1263654 
'.40000 
365824 
438695 
822726· 
267516 
These transfers follow a similar patl:em to the Water Fund, previously discussed. 
$600 is tt'ansferred to the General Fund, Human Resomces Department (001-0700), to help fond 
the yearly activities of the emJ)loyee recreation council for Water Pollution Centro!. emp]oyees. 
$1 ~263,654 is transferred to the General Fund as a return on equity to help fund the activilies of 
the General Fund. · · 
TI1e $20,000 is transferred to Fund 016, Emergency Repair to help fond a contingency fond for 
emergency repair of facilities (HV AC U11it going out1 · etc.). 
Follr 1ransfers are made to four divisions \,1thin Fund 60 (WPC Debt Service Fund) to fund debt 
annual debt service payments on four debt is.sues. 
Additional transfers are made to Fund 952 (Retirement Severance), based on !h of 1 % of annual 
wages in the_ WPC divisions. 11le transfer saves up f"Ul)ds to pay for water department employees 
who l'etire with accumulated sick leave and vacation payouts. Fund 952 helps fund what would . 
otherwise be an unfunded lump sum requir~ent. The Fund 952 transfer amo1.mts are $3,221 
(Operations & Mah1tenance); $1,520 (Lift Stations}; $1,009 (Sludge Re-Use); and $736 
(Laboratory & Pre-Treatment). 
401
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e. General Fund. The general.fond transfers for FYl 1 are provided per the attached printout. 
In general, they include transfers· to Fund 952 for retirement severnnte in all departments, similar 
to that discussed above. Some departments have transfers to Fund 078 (Capital Savings)· to save 
up for vehicles or other capital expenses. Since general fund departments have no fund of their 
own, this provides a mechanism for a department to save for a lump sum expense in a futme 
year. Activities with tl1eir own funds (i.e. Water) don't need this, since tl1ey can build fut~d 
balance within their fond. The city hall division (001-0300) and non-departmental division (001¥ 
0800) has. additional transfers for governmental debt sei-vicc (Fund 59)-to pay for the city hall, 
library and Ross Park Pool debt service payments. 
f. Transfer Records 2002-2010. Printouts oftran.-,fers from the Water Fund, Water Pollt11ion 
Control Fund and General Fund 2002-2010 are provided. 
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August 221 2005 
Logan Robinson 
4530 Sonth 5111 
Pocatello TD 83204 
De:,u- Mr. Robinson: 
0 
In response to your letter of August 9, 20051 here are t11e answers to your questions: 
Question #1: "Number of signatures required on a referendum petition on the water 
raise proposal and the reference from which you derive the figure. n 
ANSWER: Pocatello Code 1.30.020 States: Ntnnber Of Petitioners Required: To 
enact an ordinance or to repeal an ordinance by referendum, the petitions must bear a 
number of qualified signatures equal to t\venty percent (20%) of the total number ·of 
electors who cnst votes at the last general election in the city, or such other number of 
signatt1res as may be provided by Idaho Cooe.~• At the November 2003 General Electio11 
8,972 people voted. In case you ru-e not :::w::re, Pocatello water rates are enac.ted nsing a 
resolution not an ordinance. Therefore, you may want to check with en attorney to see if 
a referendum can be us~d to change water rates. 
Question #2: . "Copies of the letters sent in during the public comment period." 
ANSWER: The 6 letters that were received by the City during the hudget hearing 
and proposed rate increase hearing are enclosed. 
Question #3: "Amount of money the proposed new raise would generate." 
ANSWER: During the regular meeting of August 18, 2005, the Council approved 
a water rate resolution reflecting a 3 % increase hi. rates. Interpolating from the rate st:udy 
indicates that this would incl'ease revenues $260,471 dl,l!'ing FY06. The actual increases 
in revenue will depend upon weather, the demonstrated impact of higher rates on sales 
volume, and growth in the number of customers. The rate ·study. has generally 
overestimated revenue generation in the past and Finance would estimate $230,000 
(about 11 o/o less than the rate study). · 
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Question #4: "Amounf of mone)•-thc city truces out of ea.ch of the following fim.ds for the 
so called ''enterprise. funds, 11 (Water fund, Sewer Ftmd, Snnitntion F~md). 
ANSWER: The \Vater, Sewer, and Sanitation Funds are the 1'ente11,rise funds". 
They are called the henterprise funds" because the money placed i11 these fonds comes 
mainly from the fees generated by each of the three public 1tt.iiity enterprises. I wiil 
assume there was a lypographical error in your fourth question and the word ''for" should 
be "or". There are four components to the internal transfers from each utility. They are: 
1) Administrative Su1>port Fee. This fee compensates the General Fund for payroll 
nnd lmmM resources st1ppol't and for finance and accounting services. For departments 
housed ii1 city hall, there is a rent component to pay for custodial services and utilities. 
The human resm1rces component is based on the number of employees. The finance 
component is based on the nun1ber of finance transactions for the previous fiscal yeal'. 
The city hall fonnula is based on square footage occupied within city hall. This same 
formula is used for each department in the city (i.e. everyone pays the administrative fee, 
it is not unique to the utilities). If the utilities were independent, they would have to hire 
a contractor lo do this or add theh' own staff, software and facilities to obtain these 
services within the t1tility. For FY05 the annual administrathre support fees fo.r the 
utilities are: 
Fnnd 030 S:rnifatfon: HR component (39 employees) 
F1md 031 Water: 
Finance component (251 pages of transactions) 
City Hall rent component (0 square feet) 
Total: 
HR component (44 employees) 
Finance component (237 pages of transactions) 
City Hall rent component (1,300 square feet) 
Total: 
Fund 032 Water Pollution ContJ.·ol: HR component {26 employees) 
Finance component (232 pages of transactions) 
City Ha1l rent component (0 square feet) 
Total: 
$19,842 
$33,109 
$0 
$52,951 
$22,386 
$31,263 
$19,111 
$72~759 
$13,228 
$30,603 
$0 
$43,831 
2) Payment In Lieu ofTnxes (PILOT). The City Council has_ chosen to ma.'<e it a City 
policy to have _the "enterprise fi.mds,, make a payment in 1ie1.1 of taxes to the General Ftmd 
based on the depreciated valuation· of their-physical plants and last year, s city property 
tax levy rate. This paym!;nt is similar to the federal govenunenfs payment of PILOT to 
some local communities~ and is a method to pay something for their use _of police, fire 
and streets. If they were. private'lltilities, they would be making a payment based on 
their market value, not their depreciated physical asset value. Since it is based 011 
depreciated assets, the amount varies by utility. For FY05 the PILOT is: 
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Fund 030 Sanitation 
Ftmd 031 Water 
Fund 032 Water Pollution Control 
$16,059 
$151,967 
$18.0,178 
(~ 
\ } 
........ · 
3) Return on Equhy (ROE). The CHy Council has also chosen to make it a City policy 
to have the ccenterprise funds" pay a rate of return on each 11tility equal to 7% of the 
eq·uity in each business. By way of comparison, private regulated utilities are allowed 
between 11.5% and 13.5% rate of rehtrn hy the Idaho Public Ulilities Commission. This 
is a policy decision of the City Council, but it docs compensate the taxpayer for the lack 
of.any franchise fee or olhel' payment for use of the public right of way, The money goes 
· to the General Fund which the City Council utilizes as a propeliy tax substitution. The 
dollar amount beh1g transferred as a return on equity payment has not been changed 
since tlle Fiscnl Year 2003 Budget (while the inflatio1i rate has increased at about.3% per 
year). Since it is a percentage of equityt the amount varies with the equity in each 
"enterprise" (equity= assets - liabilities). For FY05 the ROE is: 
Fund 030 Sanitation 
Fund 03 l Water 
Fund 032 Water Po-Jhltion Control 
$529,300 
$I,677t500 
$1.337,200 
4) Other transfers. There are some other nonHg~neral fund transfers invoMng the 
"entcl]Jrise fonds" that"are not addressed here involving the purchase of centralized 
services. For exrunple: 
o foe! costs (from the utilities to Fund 003, Street). The "enterprise fundsn 
reimburse their own fuel costs lo the sireel department. which purchases foel 
in bulk and maintains a fueling site for all the City Departments. 
o billit1g costs (from the utilities to Fimd 052, Utility Billing). The "enterprise. 
funds'' transfer money to Ut_ility Billing ta pay for their billing operations, 
Technically, these are also monies the city transfers from the "enterprise funds'\ but 
based on pl'ior contacts with you, as well as your recent letter, it appeared to me that these 
were not the focus of the infom1ation request We can provide further information 
regarding these cost reimbursement type of transfers if I am mistaken in that regar·d. · 
Sincerely, 
Roger W. Chase 
Mayor 
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Nathan M. Olsen 
PETERSEN Moss HALL & OLSEN 
485 "E'.' Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Telephone: (208) 523-46SO 
Fax:(208)524-3391 
. ISBN: 7373 
0 
I1'l THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT· 
O:F THE" STATE OF IDAHO, lN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY 
BUJLDING CONTRACTORS 
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST IDAHO, 
· an Idaho non·p~ofit corporation, 
Plah1tiff, 
. vs. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
1m111ici1>alityt · 
Defendant, 
STATEOFlDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Bai mock ) 
CaseNo. CV-2011-05228-0C 
Ali'FJDA VIT OF 
DA YID L, BUN'l'ER 
... · ....... ~ ;...~ ... : .. · ...... 
I, Dnvid L. Hunte1·i do solemnly swear (01· affirm) that the testimony givell in this swom 
statement is the tmtll, the whole hulh, and nothing but the tt'Ulh, that it is made 011 my personal 
knowledge1 and that I would so testify bl open courl ir called \1po11 to do so. 
1. Attached is 14Exhibk l 11 a true nnd conect copy of n repo1·t l have prepared as Plaintiffs 
expert in the above descl'ibed matter. 
Al1FlDA VlT OF DA VlD L. HUNTER- Page 1 
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2. Attached as "Exhibit 2" is n true and correct copy of my Curricuh1m Vitae which includes 
my background & qualifications, os wet! ns my experience as an expert witness in lcgul 
proceedings. 
DATED this 24 dayofMay, 2013. 
~1lL.flu11tcr_ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 24 day of May, 2013. 
AFFIDAVIT OF DA VlD L. HUNTER- rngc 2 
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CERTIFICATa' OF SERVICE 
l J1ereby certify that lam a duly licensed attorney i~ the State ofidflho> with my office in 
Idaho ~alls, Idaho, nm! that on tht"lA! day of Mny, 2013, I served n tmc nnd correct copy of 
--.--- . 
I 
"the foregoing document 011 the peI'sons listed below by first class mail, with the correct postage 
thereon, or by causing the snme to be delivered in. accordance with Rule 5(b ), I.R.C.P. 
Persons Serve<!: 
Blake G. Hall, Esq. 
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, P.A. 
490 Memodal Drive 
P.O. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630 
FAX: {208) 523-7254 
BMAIL: bghall@nliptlnw.1101 
Honomble·s1ephen S. Dtmn 
Bannock County Courthouse 
.624 E. Center, Room 220 
Pocatello, Idaho 83201 
FA..X: (208) 236-7208 
AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID L. HUNTER- Page 3 
Method of Service: 
( ) mail j/5 hand ( ) fax ( ) email 
( )'mail ( ) hand ( ) fax ( ) email 
(Judg~~r _Chmnbers Cop;~f.. 
, .. , ,\ I\. 
.. I /I I .. 
:.. :!" . . i \i {! ,:. • I . , 
II ·I f . ' ' . 
'I ·, i ••• ···-·· I I · : <', .. -: I i 
§ W\L. ~.\{,: --- ' 
Nathan M. Olsen 
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DAV1D L. HUNTER Cl1 A, PLLC 
C<11·tljlu<f J>11b/ic Acc111111tm1/ 
CerlUl~1i; 111n110, cauro,nla anti lawn 
2Hi Norlh8tll 
PO Box l24J 
Pocatello, ID 832IM,12•13 
Plio1111: 208,:?3l-•l212 
Ji'Jllil 20!!-233-3575 · 
E-mull: dlllcp11@11wcsl1.1trlre.ne1 
Hat:ha11 Olsen 
1'.l:l:omey at L.iw 
PetersM I Moss & Hall 
41!5 E Sb·:eet 
Id.iho Falls,. ID 834.02 
Rli:1 BCJ\SEI 
May 1 '1, 2013 
Idaho sixth Judicial District foi: Ba1mock Cou11ty 
case No. cv-2011-os22a~oc 
D0a1· J.lr, Olsen 1 
Mcuili~r 
Amefloan lnalilll!oof 
~artlfiad Public Aecounl~nl, 
1114'10 Sci;~!y O/ Ol'A':11 
lw1a SIX!ely of Cl'A'11 
UIOII AGsotra11on or OP/1'6 
Yo\l l1ave aslted that: :r p:i:epare ~m ;.malyaia of various documents for the 
p,1i-pose of providing an op.inion 1:egat"<ling the imple111entnti(Jn ol! the 
C.ll:y of Pocatello (iast:.ewater llates and CapE1c.lty Feeis imd t:he Watei· 
Ral:es and Capacity Faea as provided by Redoak Consulting a11d lt:s 
predecesaor Black & Veatch Cornmll:ing. 
You have pt·ovided n1e with the following documents for review in my 
analyais1 
D0cu111e11ts identified as Bates Nos. 4568 to d.834 
Doou111ents identified aa Bat.es Nos. 4664 l:o 5190 
Oocmments identified as Bates woa. 5200 to 5324 
Discover)' Exhibits 2 l:o 4 Bates ~los. 88 l:.o •107 
Emails 
lb:hibt l:s 004 / 0211 022 / 026 / 02? 
Hunt:ei· Report 
RateStudy 05; OGi 07; On; 09 
RatestudyFieldsizes 
SUMMARY OF Oi!NION 
l, There is a lack of complete dal:a in the information provicled 
which 1:equired reverse type mathematical computations to am\lyze 
the data, The missing ot: incomplete data included but was not: 
limited to the detailed COlllputal:iona in COl,nputing the ltOE and the 
PILOT pel;centages; lists of. clatailect assets and comp:ds.lng l:l1e. 
sy1.1tems1 reaonclliation 1•,orkshnota hel!ween the oonsultant' s 
reporl:s and the illdependent zmditor• a 1·eports1 detailed 
co1111nitationn on l:eplaaement value a11d deprec:l.ntecl value of system 
assets. 
l 
.. ·. ' .... ··:i .. -,.,.-= 
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2. Findillgs and Conchtsiona: 
a. '.!'he RecloaJt Study uaes t:he concept of Ret:.urn on 11:guit.y (ROE) 
and Paymant ill i:..ieu of Taxei. (PILOT} to inflate and ove:ratate 
the operating and maint:e11a1\Ce {OM} fees of the 1taatev1ater and· 
WateL· Syoteme fo1.• t.he P.m:poue of funding the General fund of. 
the City of Pocatello. 
b, •rhe RedOak stucly, by defining replacement value to be fair 
market value, results in nn inflated and overstated value of 
the Wastewater and tlater systems in the camp\\tations qf 1:he 
capacity fee to (rhargo new 1.uu~r1,1 of the respectiv1;1 aystema. 
c, 'l'he RedOak Study, uses mathematical presentatlonl'J ancl 
accounting comtept:a that a1·e not adequately docuntenl!ed, 
explained,- and disclosed which result in erroneoua eonchtt.dons 
and financ:l.11.l resulta for dete'l."ntining the OM fees and the 
-Capacity fees of the Wastewater and the l•lat::eLA ay11i:e11te. 
d. The minapplioat.ion of account;i.ng pdnoiplee relating to 
ac:coiml:ing 1uethodr; and transactions >:ela~ing t.o l:be ROlil mid 
the P!J.OT concept may have resulted 1n a 1llisapplicat.io11 of 
Generally Acr:epted Accounting Principles (Oil.AP} which ·n1ay have 
been requiL·ed l:o be reported in the independent nocount:.roit 
certified annual aL1dit repo1·t: as a .disclosure, modified 
report, or finding. 
OVlilRVII!lW 
The City of Pocatello commissioned Blaok « Veach consulting to prepare 
an analyaio of the Waste.water Rnten and the tlal:er Ral:aa with the 
initial Repo,:t (in my 1·eview) issued on August 1!1, 1997, SuhsC3quent;. 
updflted Repo>:l:.s were lsstu.<1d on December 2l, 2.002: December 12, 200G; 
·and June 18, 2010. 
'l'h.e illit.ial 19!>7 repOl:'I:. !:.hat baa bean provicled covers the 1'1a11t~ !·ls.tei: 
system only whi1e the subseq\,ellt >::eporta also include. a sepa:rate 1·eport 
on !•later Rates. 
The purpose of the Studies a1ul reports was l:o examine the service rates 
for ntonthl)' service, ;:is well as tile determi1'lation of capacity fees to 
be cliarged for lHH·I customers utilidn9 the respective oyntem:l. I 
prepared a response t:o tlle 1~97 Study t:.llat:. waa 1?ent to tho r,tayo-:i;f fJ 
office and .f!o the Pocatello City council tllat was dated Nay 18 1 1991l, 
S\lbsequent p1:esentntio1,e to the City Council resnltecl in l;l1a fees (or 
increases) reoommendM by t:he l!'.l!J7 St:uay not being i~lemented or being 
modified by the council. In reviewing the subsequ1,mt Stud.f.es of 2002, 
200G and 2010, they have followed the fundamental approach of the 1997 
Study. 
Tbe Studiea all hnve a fundamental J.'.ll'.eaentation manner that is divided 
into eimila:i: cbaptera. 11hile there ia some varianoe between repol~l:s, 
the t11pical ohapteL·s a1·e identified as an Executive Summary, Op81.'at:i.ng 
Fund, capital Reaerve 1 Cost of Service, Service Rates, and Capaaity 
Feel'!. · 
To navigate tbe info>.'roatio11 in the reports, :it :l.s necessary to 
underst:ancl some basic concepts of a !'later Syflt:em and a Waste 11al:ei· 
Syste1n, ThP.re are two basic comr,ionents to a system, which nl"c t:he 
Operal!ion and Maintenance 11·eferred t:o as t:he O&t4) and the capit,,l 
Asset (which is the delivery, collection, storage and other fixed 
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mrneta of t:he system) , l'litliin the O&M portion of tlie nyetem fall tbe 
daily operal:ion and the associated costs, Wlthin the Ca)?il:al asset 
portion of the 6yste1n fall the improve1nant:, remodel, and expanuion 
costs. · 
My foa,1s and op1nion adtlreases accounting ii;sues and economic: baueIJ 
which call into question 1:he renulta and. conc:lnaions of the Sl!udi~s. 
My approach will be to adch-ess each component: (O&M} and (Capital 1lsaet) 
sepai:ately. l'lhile the lqa,tei· and the waste tlat:.er Rystams are sepairat:e 
,me! distinct, !:hey do share t.he common bond t.hat the studies were 
prepai·ed by the name oonimltant and the proi:ientation is substantially 
1:he same in l:heory. · As such, my comments wJ.l;!. generally appiy to both 
Systems, ancl ~,here needed, some specific oomniants being made, 
couunento on Generally Mcepl:ed Accounting Princil)les· (01\AP) relating l:o 
governments and municipalities need l:o be made. There is a distinction 
betwe.en Gov.e:rnment,;il versus Bnl:erpriae Fund Accounting, 'l'hia 
pi:-eiie11tation is not designed to be an education i11 a.ccounting 
pdnciples, b\lt :r:atbeJ.' to point out: that OMP require$ local 
governments l:o use the eflt.erpi:ise fund type t:o account fo:t' "buuinena· 
type activities· - actlvit:ies simibr to those fo,ind in the p:civa.te 
sector. Business l:yi,e activities i nolude tiervioe~ pr:l.m,u:ily funded 
t:h1.·o,19h \lsei- chaxgea. 'i'he l'l111,;tewater Syatem and the l'Jate1: Sysl:ei11 mee~ 
theGe criteria. 
In t.he informal:.ioi1 pi:ese11ted for my revieti was the City of Pocatello, 
Idaho, comprehensive Annual J,•,i.nanoial Report: with Atl<l:lted Government 
Wide Financial Statementa for the Fiscal .Year Ended September JO, 2000 
(hereafter cal.'led the ANMlJ1l.L REPORT) • In the AHNOAL REPORT audited -
finanaial st:al~en1ent:.a define- and i·eJ:erence and report the Wastewater 
System and the \'later system i1s Enterprise Funda and use the Entetprine 
·Fund acc:ountJ.ng for. theil: repo_rl:ing. l believe tl1at pi:esentation mode 
is fl oorrec I: presenl:a I: ion me l:bocl, 
one of. tl1e feat\li:es and requiremonts of an 2nterprise Fund la tho goal 
to be ~elf-sustaillins, WbJ.le funding o:r support from tlle general 
governmental funds of 1:he municipality are aJ.l(>Wed it generally 
lll:::i.l:l.zes use1· fees u basis !;or it.a flu.molal needs. At times, an 
Enterprise Fund niuy 1·eceive special 9ranta from ot:he,: governmimtal 
entities. Tile inflow of c~sh fl.'am other f11nd1a h usually not 
recommemled because distributing !:he cash from an Enl:erp:dse Fu11d la 
often prohibited or seve1.·ely restricted. Usually the User fean 
9enerated by the lilnterp1.·ise F1md are to be used for the maintenance and 
operations· wi!:h ao111etimaa a portion of ouch fees allocated to re$ai"Ve11 
fo.r major repairs Ol' improvements. Capital eXpP,ndittll:'88 are fl'8(j\lently 
i,a.id to,~ by special grants h•om othei· governmental agencina, capital 
reael.--ves (as previously mentioned), bond iss,1eo, and special 
m.1scssments. 
DISCUSSION OE' WASTEWATER SYSTEM 
OPERATIONS AND MAINrENANCE 
- .--
The first- inf.or.mation preeented for my l'eview was t:he 1997 repol"t, It 
was for a period of five years until the year 2002. Each study 
theroaHer pt·esente<l projeotiona nnd recommendations for the subsequent: 
3 
413
( 
\ l () 
five years. 'l'he !!\teat report dated June 10 1 2010 project:a f:l.na11aial 
data f.ot the yea,;s i!Oll to 201S. 
The mune:dcal conclusions of any proposal, projection 01.· stt1dy at·e. 
sensitive to the assumptions 111a.de. In the Bl:\1diea prepared by !ledOak, 
l )lave l'elld the asin1mpt.ious and \•rill not: ·opine on their validity, 
i'hose assumpt:ionn are listed in Sectlol\ l. 3 of the ?.010 S\:ucly (and 
similar sections of 1:he previous Studies). Suffice it to say that if. 
ally of. the pi·ojected increaaes are erroneous or unrear.,onable t:l1en l:he 
suggested ral:e increaf.les would likewise be in error. 
Rach of the Studies allocal:.es a pm:Hon of tl1e Service Revenue t:.o be 
t1·a"sfei:i-e<l to a. ca1,ital I111provemenl! Fund. 'l'lle 1997 and the 2002 
studies each imlical:a that it: ls the cm:rent policy l:o eommit lOt of 
the Service Fee revemte to tha c.i.pital :Cmprove111ent UUnd. In the 2002 
Study the projections for the years 2003 - 200'.I - 2005 list additional 
amounts beyo1\d the 10% t:o bs funded to the capital Irnpt:ovement Reserve. 
The 2006 81:.udy recl11c:ea tl1e: amount projected to be t:i:anofe1·red to the 
capital Improvement Fund to au annual amount of$ ~ao,ooo wh;ich 
\·epresents less than 8% of the Service Fee revenue. The. 2010 m:udy 
uses that: )'ear (:1010} as a ba:;:e ye~n.· ancl inclicnteo a total of 23% of· 
the Set·vice Fee revenue was or should be transferred to the capital 
Impr-ovement. Fund. The 2010 Sl:\ldy furthe._• projects !::he amount .of 
tranafei:a fol.' the yeaxa aoll to 2015 t:o be in the -range from n to 18% 
of $Qrvice Fee r.P.venues. 
'l'he 2010 Study outlines in C'hapte-r 3 l::l1e parainel:e.1:s of the Capital 
Improvement F\tl'lcl. '!'here is n reco111111endal:.ion to maintain a balance :in 
1:he funcl of 211: of fixecl assets with the x:estLltant amount of reserve to 
be appxo:dmately $1. l million. 'l'his would suggest that the fixea asoet 
halanca of tha ioaste !·later system to be app1.·oxima!:ely $55 million. 
However, a teview 01: 1:.he AMJ:nJAL REPORT indicates the n~I: fixod ,nssets 
of the sysl:ern to be $•l l 111ill i.on. The infoi:mation is inconclusive as to 
t.he difference and what i1nproveme11ts may have been macle in the two 
years between 2000 and 2010, 
'l'he im1>01.·tancc of the ~hcuaaion· on capital. Improvement reserves is tha 
tact 1:hs.t ::lt h~1;1 an impact. 011 the resultant fees. By its nnture i I: 
gives tha implicat:ion that a 1:1orti.011 of the user Fees are being ael: 
aaide l:o pay for items of capital na.t:ure l:Ju1t do not oaour on a regular 
daily basis. rf the proposed amounts are in fact bHing eet aside t.l1en 
the cash fo available fm: l:l1ose expenditu~es, If the l.Jl.'Oposed amounts 
o1re nol: being aet aside t:.han the c..-:illeoted fees a>:e being 
disproportionately allor.al:ed to the operation and 1nainl!enance aa . 
c>ppose.cl to the cnpital portions ot the system· unlens t.he end proj eated 
fee st1:ncti1re.. ie cl1angecl, XI\ other. words, if the e11d fee 
recommendat.io)\ .is by example t1el:. at_ $"100 with a 1,rojectecl allocat.i.011 of 
10% 01· $10 to the cap:l.1.:al reserve and that resarva is not actually eel:. 
aside, tllen the Oparntione and Maintenance port.ion ·Bystem bas been 
1nib1lidizecl hy the Capital Improvement !JOl't:ion· of the operation leav:l.ng 
qpeu the problemo foi· the capital expenditur~s when they actually ooc\lr 
i11 tl1e future. Further, if t:l\c model and the proposal is the bas is tor 
establiai1i1tg fees and t,he model is not follol'led, then t:he actual 
decisions may be misleading to l!he users imd patrons who have been told 
tha study was the basis f.m.· the establishment or change in th1;1 User 
Fees, 
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n necond item in the studies commencing in 2002. ia a line item with the 
title of "ttel:llTO on Equity•1 (ROE) and 0 Payment in··Liem-of-Taxes 
(PlI,O'i'). 'l'he a1:ummption given in Election l. 3 of the 2010 study is the 
City of Pocnte..llo is to be paid 12. D!/i of the Study Period Reve11ue 
Reqn.irement:n for the tuie of the City's asset:n and right-of-waye and 
l. 8% for the PILOT. These amounta wt1Jn1 compt1l:etl as $1,263 1 654 for 
each year of the projected period 2011 to 2015 for the ROE ,incl t:be 
amotillt: of $185, 0651 f:o1· the PII..OT. I ·am unable to determi na 1mppo:rt of 
bow these oomputat::lons were l.ll."l."ived al:, and if. these feea ar.e based 
upon Revenue, why they do ·not aha11ge each yeal: na Revenue changes. 'the 
:l.002 Study liut:s a 1,e1.·ccntage for 1:hese r.hargei:; at 17-1 and-3%-, but. uses 
constant~ dollar amount p1·ojecl:ed fo1· the yeat·a i'!003 to 200? of 
$1,337 1 200 for the ROE and a V11J.·lable amount of app~oximate.ly $180 1 000 
t:o $203,000 f.or the PILOT. 'l'be 2006 study lists a pe1·c,entage. at lG,8% 
and '.3.G%, bnl: 111~es a. constant clolla1• amount of $1;337 1 200 for tl1e ROE 
a.nd a val'iable amount of uppl:ox:imately $203 1 000 to $3°'1 1 000 f.or the 
} 1en1.·s "200B t.o 2010, In review of the AMIWAL REPORT (FYB 9-30~08) ! am 
unable to determine if: this fee or a portion thereof, was actually pd(l 
to tl1e City of Pocatello. 
The Capital Improvement portion of the projections, tllr. ROE portion of 
the projections, and PILOT portions of. tha pxoject:ions oomhine to egmtl 
fl:om a lo\'/ of 28%- to a high of nea.?."ly •12\ of the waatewater syatem 
1:evenue. 
CONCLUSION~ OPF.RATIONS AND MaI~~ENANCE 
The first guefJt.i<>n to be a.akecl is wllet:be1.· these two il!emu are actually 
being funded with cash. Deoause l:be a111oun1:s cannot be tr.aced to an 
actual funding (in any amount) it: would appear that t:he ef.f.ect of the 
b,1dge_t line ite111 is used for the purpose of. raising the OM foe wit:houl: 
adequately fitnding the futm:e capital improvement: needs of t:be ayetern. 
l'lith i·espect to t:he ROE and t.he · PILOT fee, becauRe there are no deta:l.ln 
pi·ov:lded an l:o tllirJ computation and .authority of qbarge and 
reasonableness, it. can only be ooncluded thnl: it is a device t.o inflate 
the OM f.eu,! lf otmh ROE and PIJ .. OT fee is then paid in full or in pa~t 
to the City of. Pocatello the r.esult can only be concluded 1:he pur:poae 
ia for extracl:ing Waste\'1al:er ):'evennea fo1· t.be Oerteral Operation of the 
City of. Pocac.eUo. J.l.e a result of these issttes there is a high 
·probability the Operations and Maintenance Fees are ove1.·stat:ed in tile 
2010 study and those that precede(] it:, 
CAPACITY li'EJ!: 
'l"lle capacity fee if.i a charge tl1e i·Jaatevrater system asaasses ne~, uaer1.1 
for 1:he eq\lity the existing uaen have inwml:ed in 1;he system, 'l'he 
process :ls often refe1.·red to as-the "buy-in" method. 'l'his is discuoaec1 
in detail in Chapter 6 of the 2010 St\1dy. There are -t..wo major 
conrponenl:i; used to determine the chin:ge. The numerator ;lif tl)e ayr;tem 
etJllil:y Eincl the denorninatox is the mullbet of system users. If either or. 
these amounts are in erro-r the resultant chai·ge is in error. 
~'ha 2010 study defines !:fol equity of exist.f.ng usera as the replacement 
co.st in current dollars of tl1e syst.em witho,11: regard to depreciation. 
This definition llttggeats tbat the value of a 50 yea:r old antiquated 
syatem at the end of itn useful life l1a.s !:he same eq11ity aa a br1md new 
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system built in t:he current: year with a remaining SO year life. Most. 
lmsine11aes would dispute rmch .i compc:n:iaon when pui·obasi119 a capll:al 
as!iJet. As a result a new user may pay a premi\1111 pr.ice for an old. 
antiquated system 011 one day and be forced t:o pay full prlirn aga . .ln on 
the second day t•1hen it bl:eaks nnd is required to be replaced. 
The 2010 St;udy, as well MJ the other studies, appem.·11 to be t1:yll1g ta 
define net: eouity as the fair marlcet value lass debt. 'l'hey then use 
1:he rcplc1cement coa I: in today's dolla1·s as the starting value and then 
subtract the debt for their co111putation. _This definition of fair 
market val\le .i.s cont:ra1:y t:o dl b\leinesa definitions and appraisal 
definitions that indicate the fair 11\tu:ket value is generally betweell a 
willing buyer and a willing aellex, neitlier party unduly influenced to 
act. Further, all known· bualmrns appraianl 111odels !:hat uee a potential 
repJ.aoeme-nt c:oet: a11 a component to establisb value, take int:o 
conaidet·al:ion the «se and the wear and tear of the respective asaet 
being valued. 'l'he 2.0lD study also uses an lnflationa,:y factor for the 
futm:e period t:o provide for highe1· replacement costs, but again 
1dl:hout accounting fo1· the rednct:ion in value d\le to .age and wear. 
1'his anomaly c<1n be somewhat: mitigated if an adeq\1a.te capital 
replaccn1ent 1-,aaerve ie in place front the existing users eciual to l:he 
amount of. depi:eoiation taken on the acquisition oost of the system. 
'l'his concapl: is 1·e£erenced u a depl:eciation · resei-ve and is sometimes 
used as a means to pxovide the cash needed for capital improvement o:i.· 
replaceR1ent when fixed as sees reach tbe end of their useful lif.e. The 
actual fonding o.f 1mch a .1:!l~erve is -!I management: iseue and a budgeting 
issue, howeve1· 1 the Btudy i.s flawed unless it det:er1nine2 and taken· inl:o 
conoidei:at:.ion 1~hat: management hall done 01· as an alternative p:rovides a 
companion schedule as to the ef.fect:a if n reererve ia being established 
or not, which illllst.:rates the difference 01· effect .of the managemant 
decision. 
The second component of tl1e capacity fee is the equivalent· users, This 
becomes the denominato>: of tho e~10.t;ion in clatel"mining the value of the 
"ec1uity" for the buy~in, '!'be 2010 study has tnblea that allow the 
projected gallons pei: clay flm, over tl1e pe1•iod 2 011 l:.o 2015, The St\l<lY 
i;ug9este that for eacli year of. t.he period that approximately l~O new 
u~era will co111e into t:lle system of which 110 will be in Chubb\1cJ; north 
of_ :r: 8G and 80 will lni in Pocatello ~nd Chubbuck sot\tll of l RG, r 
have t10t clet:ern1ined if these inci:eases are 1:eal:l.stic, but point to the 
issue th$ n11111ber chose11 has an effect on the outcome of the final 
capa.c.i.ty fee charge. 
CONCLUSION - CAFAClTY..E!!l! 
The equity b11y~in method fol" A new u:se): i8 a f.rague11tly used method l;o 
determine t.he aosl: fo1· a new usei: to begi11 using t:t1e existing 
1'1aatewater Syatem. I do not dispute that concept. The issue that: ie 
called into question is the oomputat:l.on of tl1e "fair val\\e" of the 
system being used to oornput:e the "equity" and I find that the n1et:hod 
\lsed by the 2010 St:mly l1t113 a high probability of overlftating that value 
which reanll:s in the oha:q1e fo,: hook"t1J.? to be overstated. Furtber, 
tba t the number. of proj ect:ed new \1Ge1:s I if in error, could cause the 
fo1;1 to be ove1·stated or \mderstal:.ed depending on the dire,;,t:.J.on of the 
error. If l:he inc:reaae is too high of a number tl1en the rea11lt:ant fee 
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is unde:i:sl:nl:ed. If the inc.:-ease is !:oo low tl1en l:.he reaultanl: f.ee ia 
oversl:ate,l. 
DISCUSSION OF WATER §_!,~T~ 
OP.EBATIONS AND MAINTENANCE 
The· 2010 Water systetn st:,1d}' follo~1s the same format, theory amt 
p1·esental:ion as thnl: of the ~lnstet1ater Study. As a ,:e$Ult, nll of the 
same issues ancl concerns and ar9umen_ts are raised, It ia noted the 
ffrst study nvl'l.ila.ble for my tevie,1 011 the l'later System ia that of 
2002. 
The m1me.rical conolua;ions of any proposal, projection or study are 
acnaitive to· the assumptions made, In 1:he studies pi-epa~·ed by Rcdoalt I 
have read the assumptions and will uol: opine on their validity. Those 
,rnsumpl:ious at'e Hated in Section 1,3 of the 2010 Study (and similar 
FJections of the previous StutU.es} , Suffice it to say that .if nny of 
the projected inoreanes are e1:roneouv or \mr.easohable then 1:11e 
silggestecl rate inc:reeises would like\•JiBe be in erl."or. 
llach of tbe S1:udiea allocates a portion of the Service Revenue l:o he 
transferred to a Capital Improvement Fnnd. The ?.002 study ind.icates 
that it 1a tl1e curre111: policy to commit 1ot .of tl1e Se1:vfoe Fee ).'evenue 
to l:he Capital Improvement. Fund. In the 2002 st:1idy the p.rojecl!ione for 
tl1e years 2003 - 2004 ¥ 2005 li1:1t otddil:ional ai.nounta beyond the 10% t:o 
be funded l:o the capital Improvement Reserve. ':!'he 2006 study .r.~rl\1cea 
the amount projected to be transferred to the capital ltnprovement llund 
to reduce t:be annual amount to f 00. Tha 2010 Study uses that yeai-
(2010) as a base year with no transfer to the Capital Improvement Fttnd 
for the year OT' l:lle 2011 year. In 2012, there is apvroxim«tii!ly 1% of 
R~vll!nues to the Capital I111provement Fund. '!'he 2010 stucty further · 
pi·ojecl:s the amount of transfers for the yetu:11 2llt3 to 2015 to be in 
the ra1\ge fl:om 20%- to 2!1.% of se:nrice Pee revenues. 'l'he assumptions 
indicate 1:hese tra11sfe'l:'s a1:e required, but I was unable to locat;e nny 
comment that .indicates further dincussion on such a ntatedal n111.t!:er. 
The 2010 St\1dy does not oho\•1 any recommendal:ion to mainl~ain a- Capital 
rinpravemenr. FUlld, 
Tl1e im1~ortance of the discussion on Capital Improvement reserveu ls the 
fact t:liat it han all impact 011 !:he resultant. fees, ny :I.ts na.ture it 
9lves the implication 'that a portion of the Usei: Fees are heiug set 
aslde to pay for itema of. capi~al nature that QO not OCl'!Ur on a regular 
daily lwda. If the proposei1 am1;1nnts are in fact being set aside t11en 
tl1e cnah is available r.or those e:-tpenclitm:e&, lf !:ha propoaed amounts 
axa 11ot bein9 set aside then the ·collected fees ar!ll being 
d.itlp:i:opol:'tionately allocated to the Operation and Mainl:.enanoe as 
opposed to the capital portions of the system unleSR the end projected 
fee struct:t1re is changed. l11 other wo1·ds, if the end fee 
reao111menclatiol1 is by ox:.impla set. at $100 with a pra:leoted allocation of 
10%- or $10 to the capital .reserve al\d that; rei:ierve is not acl:.ually set 
aside, 1:hen the operations and Maint:enru1ce portion system has been 
tnibe.idized by tll& capital Improvement portion of the operation le11ving 
open l:he proble111s for the capital expenditurea wlien they nol!ually occur 
in the future, · Further., if the model and c11e proposal is the basis for 
ent.abliehing fees and the modal ;I.a not -followed, then the actual 
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decisions may Im misleading to tl1e usel."n and pal:rons who have been l:old 
the Study was the basis for l:.l!e eeta:blishment 01.· change in the TJ/Jer 
Fcea, 
A second !!:em in the studies eohlmenoing in 2002 is a line item wil:h the 
title of. "Rel:.m:n 011 Equ:i.t:y" IRO!i!) an<l "Payment ·i11-Lieu"of-Taxas 
(PILO'J'), 'rhe assumption given h1 Section 1,3 of t:he 2010 St:udy ia the 
city of Pocatello is 1.:0 b1:1 paid 13 ,ot of L:lle study Period Revenue 
Req\1 iJ:eme11ts for the uae of the . Cit:y i a asael:a and right-of ~11,aye and 
2 • .31 foi: the pn.o'.!.', These 111Rountr.i were aomput.ecl as $1,585,23? for 
eaah year of. t1le p1·ojeoter! period ao11 to 2015 for the ROE and variable 
au1ount of app1:o:ximal:ely $1.5ll,OOO to $300,000 for the ·P:moT. r am 
t1nable to determine m.1pport of hot11 these computat:tons wei·e arrived at, 
&!ld. if. 1:he ROB is based upon Revem1a, why !t doea not~ change each year 
as .Revenue changes. 'l'be 2002 Bt:1.1dy_does not liat a percent.age f.or 
t11cse charges bu_!: useo constant rloJ.la1: a111ount proj eotecl for the yea1:a 
2003 to 200·1 of $1,677, soo fo1· the ltO'B and a variable nmount of. 
a1>p1•oximate1y .$150, 000 l:o $110, ooo for the Pir.oT. The ::.1006 study does 
not give a percentage, but. \11!81.l a constant dollar amo\tnt of $1,677 1500 
f.or the ROE and a variable amount of apprm:imal:.ely $190,000 to $:l H, ooo 
f.ol'I t.ha years 2000 to 2010, In review of tho 1\HHUAL REPORT (FYE .51~30~ 
o~l l am unable to determine if t:h.ls !ee 01: a poxtion thereof, \o/llB 
;i.ct\Ially paid t:o the City of l'ocatello. 
The capit.d Impl.·ovement poi·tion of the project1011s,· tho ROI!: portio1) of 
the projections, and PILOT. portionu of. the pro:Jecl:iono combine to equal 
froDl a low of 19f1 to a high of neai-ly dOt. of !:he Hater System revenue, 
CONCLUS IOM - Ol?ElU\11':CONS AND Mi\.lN'-'lilNANCE 
•rhe first question ta be asked is whether these t:wo itums are ·actually 
being funded with cash, Because tha amounti; cnnnot be traced l!Q a1i 
act\1al .fonding (il1 any antounc) it would appear that t:.he effect of the 
budget line it.em .is ttned for the purpose of 1·ai1:ling the OM fee l'litlloltt 
~decJuately fundlng the fut1u:-e ca11il:al improvement: needs of !::he sy1,1tem. 
t!Hh respec:r. t:o the ROB and the PILO'l' fee, because t:he1.·e a1·e no clet:aile 
provided as t:o this computat.;lon ai:ld authoril:y of cbai·ge and 
reasonableness, it can. only be coneludod that lt is a device l:o illflat.e 
the Ot,t .fee, If such ROE and PILOT fee is t:he11 paid in full 01· ill pal."t: 
t.o tlle City of Pocal:ello the :i:eaull:. can only be cpncluded 1:.he purpose 
ls fol· extracting Water revenues for tllo General Operation of the City 
of Pocatello. Ae a 1·ermll: of theae. ianues thel'e ia a. high probability 
the Operations and Ma.tntenance Fees are overat:ated in the 2010 study 
aud those thnl: 1,receded it. 
CAPACI!l':C li'EE 
'!'he capacity fee is a charge t:be Wastewater System aaacssea new users 
foi: the equity the-exist::ing user.a have invested in the syatem. The 
proceas 'is often refer.red to as the ~·Jmy~in" method. This ia discussed 
in detail in Chapte1: 6 of tl1e 2010 · study. Tb!!l."e are l!l'TO major 
componen~a used to determine l:he charge. The numerat:or is the sy11tem 
equ.il!y and the denominatol.· iii the munber of system usera. If eit:her. of: 
t:}Hn1e nmounts ai·e in error the resultant charge is in er:ror. 
0 
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The 2010 Sl:udy defines t:l1e equity of existing uaerfl as clle replacement 
coal: in. cm:re11t dollal:s of tbe syste111 wit:lloUt regard l:o dep,:eciatio11, 
This definition sng9ests thnt tlle Vttluc of a SO year old antiquated 
t,i}•stem at tl1e e11d of its usef:ul l_ife has 1:he same equity as n bt·an.d new 
syat.e111 lmil I: in the ourrnrit yeai· with R remaining 5 o yl)ar life. Mos I: 
businesnes would dhipute such a comparison when pm·cbaaing a capital 
asfh'lt., I\S a t-a1rnlt· a new user may pay n p1.·emium pi"iae foi: an olcl 
antiquated .syate111 on one dPy aud be forced to pay full price again on 
t.be second day when it ln:eaks and is reguired to be ropla.ced, 
'i'he 2010 St:udy, as tile well as the other ntt1diea, appea1· to he trying 
to define net eg11:i t:y as !:.he fail.· mttrket val.u, lGsa debt, They then use. 
the 1·$place111ant c()i)t i11 t:oday• a dollars as the starl:.ing value illld then 
subl:l:'Mt the de.ht for their co111putation, This definition of fair 
market value is contrary to nll bm-.inesa definitions Rnrl appraisal 
defill!tions that .indicate the F.ai>: ·market. value is generally between a 
willing buyer and a willing seller, neither party unduly influenced t.o 
act. Further, all known buainess appi:aisal modela that: uoe a potenHal 
replaceine11t cost as a component to establi11h value, take into 
cons.i.deration the age and the weai: and t:ear of the respective asset 
being valued. The 2 010 Study al130 uses nn inflatio11a1y factor for 1:he 
future period to provide for higher 1:eplacement oosta, hut again 
wH.J1out ac.counting for the reduction in value due to age and wear. 
This anomaly can be somewhat mltigat!ed. if an 1:tdequate capital 
upla-ce111en.t rese1·vc is in place f1·om the existing uaer.e eqtial to the 
nmount of deprec:l.ai;.!011 taken on t:he acqulsil:.ion cost! of the ays1:e111. 
'l'hia concept is 1:eferencecl as a deprecriation reserve aml .i.a aometimes 
used as a 111eun.s to provide the cash neecled for capital improvemenl:. or 
replac:e111ent when fixed anaets reach the end of their useful life. The 
actual. f,mding of. such a reserve ia a 1nauage1nent issue and a budgel:ing 
issue, however 1 1:he Sl:lldy ia nawed _unleas it de·termines and takes into 
consideration whul:. 111ana.9e1nent has done or as an nltexnative pro,ticles a 
companion achedule ae to !:he effects if a 1·esel.-ve ia being established 
ol:' not, which ill,1al:l.'"al:es 1:he difference or e:Efeal: of 1:he management: 
decit.ion. 
The second co111ponent of tile capacity fee ia the equivalent users. 'l'his 
becomes tbe denoniinatol:' of the equation ln clete1"n1irdll9 tbe -value of l!he 
"equity'' f.or l;be b\ly-.ln. The ::lOlO study baa tables that show t.he 
projected gallona per day flow ove.1· 1:.he period 2011 to 2015. The Study 
ouggests that. for each year of the 1,eriod · t:hat ap11rcximately 190 ne,~ 
uaera wU.l come inl:o the system of which 110 w.lll be in Chubbttok north 
of I 86 and ao will be ill 'Pocatello and Cliubbuck aouth of I 86, I 
have not determined if these inc:t·eases are realistio1 but point to the 
issue l:be mtmber chosen has an effect on the outcome of the fi11al 
cai)aoil!y fee chm:ge. 
CONCLUSION - CAP.AC!TY FEE 
'l'l1e eguil:y buy .. in metho<l fc)l: a new u1;1er is a frequently u11ed method to 
determine t:he cost fo1.· 11 new uaer to begin ttBing 1:he existing 
~lastewai:.el' System. I do not diflput.e that concept. 'J.'he issue that is 
called .iuto question ia the c0111p1.11:ation of the "fair value" of the 
ayotem b~ing ui;ed to compute t.he "ecruil:y" and I find that the met:llod 
used by 1:he ao10 Stt~dy ltas a high probability of QVerst:.nting that value 
9 
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which i:elilults in the oh111:9e for l1ook-11p to be overstated, Further,· · 
that t:be nun1be:r of: p:r;o;!ected new usen, if in error, ooul<l c&.\u1e the 
f.ee to be overatated or understated depending on the direction of the 
$n°ol', If the increaae is l::oo hlgh of a nuntber than l:be resultant: fee 
.ls m1ders1:ated, If the inci:o.ase is t:oo low then the i:es11ltant fee is 
ovei·st.ated. 
E'INAI, S"Q'MMARIZEl) COMCLUSION OD' WASTEWATER 2\ND WAT.ER S'l'l!!)Y l~POR~S 
l, The 2010 Si:udy X'eports for both the l'la.stewater and the l·Jatet 
systems. irne accounting and projections teohn1ques that have 1:he 
effect of ovorat:at:ing 1:lle charges for the Service Fae J:nd the · 
capaoity Pee. 1\ nignificant beneficiary of these overst:al:en1ente 
ap1)ears to he (~he city of Pocatello for ita general operat.l.onal 
needt.1 with 1·eapeot to l:.lle ROE and PILOT charges in the Snrvioe 
portion of the studies, Fu>:ther, tl1e Capaoi l!y Fee overetateU1e11t 
tends to have new users eubsidiz:l.ng the Service portion of the 
syutems. 
2. If the City of Pocata_llo chooses not to implement: l:he Stt1d}' in 
full \:lithout: identifying t.he changP-s nncl follmting the 
computnl:ions to concluaion then !:he r.e1rnlt:a.1it fees do nol:· have 
l'l~oriomk basis. 
ln 1:ha fitst: insl:nnce., the full fee as proposed is oventat.l'ld ae a 
J;esult of flawed parameteu in !:he Studies, In the oecoud instance, 
the .fees bt':come arhil:. rary due to the 1>olitical proceae, 
l'lhile the 20l o Redoalc atudy is not required to he presented in 
accordance with Generally i1ccept:od J\cooun.1:.ing Principles (OAAPl the 
adoption of. the study (becaur;e of the conaept:s ;i.·elated l:a the ROE and 
the PUOT J:eee) by the City of Pocatello, may result: in a departure 
from GAAP l!llat is regui>:ed to be J:eported in the ammal ce:rt.:\fled audit 
report pt·epared by l:be independi!nt certif$.ed public ncmountant: so as t:o 
not malte the annual audH mial.eadi11g to its users, such dJ.solosure may 
have boen l'eq\1:h;ecl to be repo1•ted in l:be auditor• :s opinion report, 
footnotes to the :financial stal:.ements·, 01: a finding of gtiestionable 
contu under Gove;1:mnental At1dltin9 standards. 
Very truly yours, 
~~~~~ 
~id L. Hunter 
Cei:tifi&d Public Accountant 
OL11:vls 
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2, Attached as 0 Exhiblt 2'' is a t111e nncl correct copy of my C11n·icuhun Vitae which incluqes 
my bnr.kgl'mmd & quul ificalions, ns well ns my experience as an expe1t witness in legal 
J>rocecdiugs. 
DATRD Ibis 2il dnyof May, 2013. 
,..d L. Hunler 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 24 dny of May, 2013. 
APFIDAVIT OF DA YID L. BUNTER.- Pago 2 
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EXHIBIT ''2'' 
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Dm1id L, limiter 
Certffierl Public Accom1t1mt 
P.O. Box 1243 
Pocn.tello, JD 83204 . 
Telephone (208) 232-4272 .Facsimile (208) 233-3575 
E-Mail !llb.9pa@qwe.'lloffice.net 
CURRlCULUM VITAE 
PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYMBNT· 
2004 - Present 
1983-2003 
1981-1983 
· 1976 • 1981 
1974-1976 
Selfemployed CcJ"/f/ied 1'11hlic Acco,mtrmt (David L. Httnter CPA, PLl.C) 
Cerlified Public Accou11t(mf {Ilnglosi;m, Hnnler & Ca1>oll PA, CPA 's, Pocatello1 JD) 
Cerl{fied Public Accotmtant (John A. Eng1Bso11 & Associates, CPA 's, Pocatello, ID) 
Certified Public Accou11/r1111 (Ilnglo:,011. Jones & Dnrton. CPA 's, l'ocalello, ID) 
Stq{f ,-lccmmumt (Grnf & Company PC, CPA's, J:airfield, IA) 
PROFESSIONAL UCENSING 
Cerlitied Public Accountant - Slnle of ldnho 
Certi fled Pnblic Accountnnt - Slate of Cnli fomla 
Corlified Pnblic Acco\11\tilllt - Slate of Jown (non-active tic,mse) 
EDUCATION 
Unfl'fmiO• of Iowa- Bachelors ofBusiness Administration (1974) 
LaM 11·ee Co111m1111i1y ScJiooll· - High School Diploma (1968} 
PROJlESSIONAL EDUCATION AND COURSEWORK 
Certified Public Accountants Exam (] 977) Certified Vnlue Analyst Exam (200'.l) 
Ammnl continuing ed11cntlo11 as required by Jclalio, Iowa and California Slate Boards of Aecou11tnucy. 
Subject matter includes: auditing; financial slntemenlsj taxation ofindlviduals1 pnrfnerships, fiducinrics, 
corpomtious; embezzlement and fi·aud investigation; other related tax and accou11th1g subject molter. 
PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
American I11stilute of Certified Public Accountants 
Ida Ito Society of Cert! lied Public Accoun1n111s 
Iowa Society of Certified Public Aceotintnnts 
Pocatello Es!nle 1~1a1111ing Council 
Utnh Society ofC011ified Public Accountants 
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE 
Cortifled audit expedonco ns pl'ojccl manager nnd ten111111ombcr involving audits of: 
o ·state Chartered Savings Bm1ks 
o School Districts 
o Cities, Counties and Municipalities 
o Watei' 011d Sewer Districts 
o Not fo1· Profit Organizations 
o- Post Secondary Private Scliools 
o Privalely Ow11ecl Business in Health Care and Mmmracluring 
o Title nud Escrow Companies 
- .,. ,• ......... , ..... . 
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Financial and hwation experience in: 
" Personal nnd business income tn:mtion, including 1i1ulti-slate·appJications 
o Payroll, sales nnd excise taxation, inclucl ing m11lti·state applications 
o Fiduciary taxatiou, includi11g estates and tmsts 
o Business formation, dissolulio11 and reorg1mizalion 
o Ilankmptcy planning and aclmiuistration 
o- 'l'axpayer·andit representation before slate agencies ofidabo Smle Tax Commission and California 
Fmnchise Tax Board 
o · TOXJ>nyer nudil reJ>i"esenta!io11 before the Internal Revenue Service including: 
o Personal, business and estate audits, employment taxes 
o Appeals and appellate divisions . 
o United Slates Tax Court 
Litigation support ex})edence: 
" Embezzlement and fraud 
0 ausiness vnlunlion 
., JJankruplcy 
o Persoiinl iltiury and wrongful death claims 
o Divorce proceedings . · 
(I Contract dispntos and damage claims 
.o Parent infi'inge.menls 
o F..state J>roceedings 
While Jllost cnses ore settled oul of court, I have been involved in lbc discovery process as well as prepared 
wrirten reports 1md opinions rogni·ding n number ofcnscs involving lite abo\le subject ma1te1·s. 
PROFESSIONAL PROGRAMS AND PRESENTATIONS 
Accounting leclure presentations nt ldnbo Stnlo University evening and oxlonded courses 
Pocatello Esiate Planning Council 
LEADERSHIP AND PROFESSIONAL POSITIONS HELD 
Director, Southcm Idaho Chnptcl' ofCerlllied Public Accountanls 
Pl'esidenl, Southern Idaho Clmp!cr ofCettifiecl Public Accounlnnts 
Member, Co11timting Educa!lon Committee for ldaho Society of Certified P11blic Accountants 
President, Pocatello Estate Platming Council 
E...XPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY 
Testimony givcm in Fedeml Ba11krnptcy court, Idaho District; Federal District Com\ Idaho District and 
Magistrate Courts 
Depositions given .for cases involving bankmptcles, business disi>ntes 11ncl valuations, eslates and lmsts, and 
personal j1\jury claims 
1980 Federal District Court in the Case ofDonnld BlockweJI 
1983 Fodera! Bnnkrnptcy Court in lhe Case of MeMn nnd Diane Fuuk 
1986 Deposition in the Case of the Estate ofMarla Downing 
l 990 Sixth Dlsll'ict COtil't ofldaho in Bannock County in the Divorce of Glee Miclmelson 
2006 Sixth Dislrict Court of Idaho in Rmmock County in !he Case No. CV-200S-2526DR 
involving fbe divorce of Glee Michaelson. I testified. for the plaintiff. 
200? My deposilion was taken on March 7, 2007 nnd eominlled on July IO, 200? in reference to 
Case No. CV 06-,10473, Adversary Cnse No. 06-8099 in !he U.S. naukruptoy Co,11·1, District 
of Idaho. 
2008: My deposition was taken on Mm·ch 11. 2008 in reference 10 Case No. CV 06-0513-E-IUB, i11 
!he United States District Coul't for the District of Idaho. 
200S My deposition wns taken on September 16, 2008 in reference to JAMS Cnsc No, l•l1000,JS7l 
424
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2012 M)' testimony was gh•en on Feb111ruy28, 20I2 in the United States District Com1 forlhe 
District ofldaho in connection with Civil Action No. CV-09-229-E-BL\V. l 1es1ificd for the 
Plaintiff 
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Michael D: Gaffney, ISB No. 3558 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
Telephone: (208) 523-5171 
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732 
Email: gaffney@beardstclair.com 
Nathan M. Olsen, ISB No. 7373 
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN 
485 "E" Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Telephone: (208) 523-4650 
Facsimile: (208) 524-3391 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
n,,-1• ~ F'n - \ P'1'-·\ ~ 1 8 lU J A r, 
DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
BANNOCK COUNTY IDAHO 
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on 
behalf of itself and all others similarly 
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself 
and all others similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
municipality, 
Ci . 
Case No.: CV-2014-1520-0C 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO CITY'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The plaintiffs submit this memorandum in opposition to the City's motion for 
summary judgment. 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO CITY'S MOTION FOR 
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DISPUTED FACTS 
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The Court is familiar with the facts underlying this lawsuit. This lawsuit 
comprises a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim based upon an unlawful and unconstitutional taking 
asserted by two class plaintiffs, those persons or entities improperly charged a Payment in 
Lieu of Taxes (PILOT) or its precursor component of connection/capacity fees and those 
persons or entities improperly charged the same component fee as part of a user fee for 
water and sewage utilities by the defendant, City of Pocatello. 
The plaintiffs, rather than going into an extensive factual rendition, for purposes 
of this response, challenge certain factual assertions made in the Defendant's 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (hereafter "defendant's 
brief'), Factual History and Statement of Fact [sic]. 
First, the plaintiffs dispute the assertion on page 7 in the defendant's brief 
characterizing the PILOT charge, as well as the precursor charges designated "rate of 
return" or "return on equity," as a tax. The connection/capacity fee and the user fee were 
both designated "fees" thus any component of those fees carries the same designation. 
Second, the plaintiffs dispute the assertion on page 7 of the defendant's brief that 
"the City inunediately discontinued charging the PILOT fee" following the Court's 
issuance of its decision in the Building Contractors lawsuit in 2013. Spreadsheets 
provided by the city and referenced below suggest that these fees were being collected 
into 2014. _ 
Third, the plaintiffs dispute the assertion on page 7 of the defendant's brief that 
"the City has never charged a PILOT to the connection/capacity fee and the two different 
fees have no relationship." This assertion is contrary to an extensive analysis done by this 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO CITY'S MOTION FOR 
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Court in the Building Contractors case and is unsupported by any documentation 
provided by the City, again, as discussed in detail below. 
ARGUMENT 
1. The City is collaterally estopped from asserting that (1) no connection fees 
were improperly comingled with the General Fund and (2) there was no PILOT 
component to the connection/capacity fees. 
Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, bars relitigation of an issue previously 
determined when: 
( 1) the party against whom the earlier decision was asserted had a full and 
fair opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the earlier case; (2) the 
issue decided in the prior litigation was identical to the issue presented in 
the present action; (3) the issue sought to be precluded was actually 
decided in the prior litigation; ( 4) there was a final judgment on the merits 
in the prior litigation; and (S) the party against whom the issue is asserted 
was a party or in privity with a party to the litigation.1 
All five elements of collateral estoppel are present in this case barring the City from 
relitigating the issues addressed in Section A of its brief. The Motion for Summary 
Judgment based upon Section A of the City's brief should be denied summarily under the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel. 
Section A of the City's brief attempts to re litigate the issues of whether the 
PILOT fee was a component of connection/ capacity fee and whether the PILOT fee was 
comingled with the City's' General Fund, thus making the fee unconstitutional and 
violative of the Idaho Revenue Bond Act, LC. §§50-1001, et seq. The Court has already , 
definitively addressed both these issues at length in its Memorandum Decision and Order 
on City's Motion to Reconsider and Plaintiffs' Amended Motion for Reconsideration, 
1 Stoddard, 147 Idaho at 191,207 P.3d at 167 (quoting Rodriguez 11. Dep't of Corr., 136 Idaho 90, 92, 29 
P.3d 401,403 (2001)) 
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filed November 15, 2013 in the case Building Contractors Association of Southeast Idaho 
v. City of Pocatello, Register Number CV - 2011 - 5228 - OC, Sixth Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, Bannock County (hereafter "Memorandum Decision"). In fact, the 
City, referring to that case as the Building Contractors case quotes extensively from the 
Memorandum Decision in Section A of its memorandum. 
The City fails, however, to address the conclusions found beginning on page 7 of 
the Court's decision and continuing through page 12 and in passim throughout the 
decision, that (1) that there was never "any evidence as to how the connection fees and 
user fees could have been separately accounted for prior to March 2013" and (2) "[a]fter 
the connection and user fees were co-mingled into. the water and sewer funds, the 
evidence supports, and the city concedes, that the city then transferred money from the 
water and sewer funds into the general fund under transfers had been called by various 
names. "2 In essence, the Court held that this "comingling" of the funds provided a right 
for the Builders Association ( on behalf of the connection fee payers) to challenge the 
"use" of such funds, regardless of how they were assessed. 3 In other words, in the end, 
the Court held that the "use" of connection fees for the PILOT was in itself a component 
of the connection fee that, again, could be challenged. 
These conclusions were derived from the Court's extensive review of a number of 
different sources of information which are resubmitted contemporaneously in this case as 
attachments to the Affidavit of Nathan M. Olsen In Opposition to City's Motion for 
2 Olsen Aff. Ex. A., consisting of the CV-2011-5228 Nov. 13, 2013, Memorandum Decision, p. 8 
(emphasis added) 
3 Id. p. 13 
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Sununary Judgment. Since the City has raised this issue in the instant case, the plaintiffs 
feel it serves economy and efficiency by quoting the findings of the Court at length: 
As noted, the record reflects that prior to March 2013 the connection and user fees 
were collectively poured into the water and sewer funds accounts. In his 
deposition, Swindell explained that when the building department collected a 
connection fee as part of a building permit, 'then those funds and dollars are 
credited to the water fund or water pollution control fund as appropriate.' 
Swindell further explained that connection/capacity fees were channeled into 
three funds: 1) building permit-designated as fund 001; 2) water-designated as 
fund 031; and 3) wastewater - designated as fund 032.Swindell also explained 
that the user fees were poured into the water and wastewater funds named above 
in his first affidavit Swindell stated: "the capacity/connection fees are collected in 
segregated into the appropriate water and wastewater fwids." In the letter to 
Logan Robinson, Mayor Chase names the "Water, Sewer and Sanitation Funds" 
as the "enterprise funds." Mayor Chase explains they are called the ''enterprise 
funds" because the money placed in these funds comes mainly from fees 
generated by each of the three public utility ent~rprises. 
Next, money from the above named funds was transferred into the general fund 
under a program that has had various names including, Return on Equity, Rate of 
Return, PILOT, and franchise fees. 
*** 
Swindell further explains that the "internal franchise fee" AND "Payment In Lieu 
Of Taxes (PILOT)" have replaced the "rate of return" or "return on equity." The 
franchise fee and PILOT are two different transfers that are taken from the water 
and wastewater funds. Swindell explained that "the combined amounts of FY 13 
franchise fee and PILOT are 13.8% of planned revenue for water and 15.5% for 
sewer." 
According to Swindell's Fourth Affidavit, the City does not charge a PILOT fee to 
connection fees, but only to the user fees charged to the customers of the systems. 
What the Affidavit does not say is that PILOT fee has never been charged to 
connection fees during the time that both connection and user fees were coM 
mingled. However, prior to that Affidavit, it was clear that all connection and user 
fees were poured into the three "enterprise funds." The City then had a policy of 
transferring money from the water and sewer funds into the general fund. 
Therefore, the rate of return/return on equity or the PILOT/franchise fee should 
not be characterized so much as a fee collected by the water and sewer funds but a 
"transfer" fee based on a City policy to transfer water and sewer funds to the 
general funds. .In his memo to the City Clerk, Swindell explained that for FY 11 
the City plan to transfer $1,585,237 from the water fund to the general fund "for a 
return on equity, to help fund the activities of the General Fund." Similarly, in FY 
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11 the City plan to transfer $1,263,654 from the Water Pollution Control Fund to 
the "General Fund is a return on equity to help fund the activities of the General 
Fund." These transfers did not include additional transfers that were made from 
the water and sewer funds (1) into the General Fund to support the Human 
Resources Department; (2) into the Emergency Repair Fund to build reserves for 
emergency repair of facilities; and (3) into the Debt Service Funds, which were 
each outlined separately from the "return on equity11 transfer. 
Based upon the foregoing, it appears clear to the Court that revenue collected 
from both connection fees and user fees was being, or could have been, 
transferred into the General Fund pursuant to the PILOT fee, charge to the water 
and sewer department as a means of transferring connection and/or user fees to 
fund general city expenses .. It is clear that the connection fees (i.e., fees paid only 
by builders of new construction) and user fees were co-mingled into the water and 
sewer funds, from which the City transferred the PILOT fees into the General 
Fund. 
* * * 
What is clear and undisputed at this point is that revenue collected from the 
connection fees and user fees collectively were transferred to the General Fund, 
via the PILOT the transfer program, and used to "help fund the activities of the 
General Fund. "4 
As this Court pointed out, Swindell attempted to take the position in his Fourth 
Affidavit that a PILOT has never been charged to connection fees during the time that 
both connection and user fees were co-mingled. This is the same position that the City 
takes in this case in Section A of its memorandum. To that end, the City submits the 
Second Affidavit of Joyce A. Stroschein and incorporates the Affidavit of Joyce A. 
Stroschein filed on or about August 29, 2014. Ms. Stroschein states a number of times in 
both affidavits that the city has never charged a PILOT component to the 
connections/capacity fee.5 Among the various attachments to the Stroschein affidavits, 
there are no source documents that support these statements. Exhibit A to Ms. 
4 Id. pp. 7-13. Footnotes omitted. 
5 Stroschein Aff. 1 8 and Second Stroschein Aff. 13. 
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Stroschein's second affidavit merely demonstrates that there were PILOT transfers to the 
General Fund From FY 2006 Through FY 2014.6 As noted in plaintiffs Motion to Strike, 
Exhibit A to the. Second Affidavit of Joyce A. Stroschein appears to be spreadsheets 
created specifically for this lawsuit (without reference to primary source documents) 
merely showing the effects of the lost revenue to the General Fund resulting from the 
Court's injunction prohibiting any further transfers of PILOT charges. 
Again, regardless of Ms. Stroschein's testimony attempting to resurrect an issue 
already adjudicated, the Court in the Builders Case has already found and decided that 
the transfers of comingled funds into the general fund were, in effect, "a charge" to both 
the user and connection fee payers. As well established in the record, at least until March 
of 2013, connection fees can be traced directly to the general fund for PILOT vis-a-vis 
the comingled water and user funds. 
Finally, there is additional, ancillary evidence that leads to the same conclusion 
that the Court did not cite, but which bolsters the Court's prior ruling. First, Swindell 
testified that moneys collected for both the connection/capacity and user fees were 
deposited and co-mingled into two unsegregated accounts with water fees going into the 
"Water Fund," and sewer fees going into the "Water Pollution Control Fund."7 Further, 
and equally important is how the funds were viewed by Swindell, the water and sewer 
department heads and the Pocatello City Council. Each year Swindell obtained from both 
the Water and Sewer Departments a proposed budget outlining their desired needs for the 
6 See also Olsen Aff. Ex. B 
7 Olsen Aff. Ex. C, consisting of Dec. 14, 2012, Dave Swindell Dep. 53:47:16-25, 47-53:1-18, 63:7-25, 64, 
Ex. IO 
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upcoming year. 8 With the assistance and supervision of Mr. Swindell, the department 
heads presented their proposed budget to the City Counsel for approval.9 The pre-PILOT 
fees (before they were "redescribed" as PILOT fees)1° out of the water & sewer funds 
explicitly were explicitly earmarked to fund the General Fund in the budget: 
A) The so called "Return on Equity" or "Enterprise Funds" program 
which transfers significant sums into the City's general fund to "help 
furid the activities of the General Fund.''11 
This program was "formalized" by Swindell and approved by the City Counsel 
after he became employed as the City's CFO in 2001.12 The purpose of this program as 
described by the City Mayor in 2005 was to allow for a "rate of return" or profit on each 
utility "equal to 7% of the equity in each business."13 This ''money goes to the General 
Fund which the City Council utilizes as a property tax substitution."14 Since at least 2005, 
the City has transferred substantial amounts of the water and sewer funds into the City's 
general revenue fund under this program, with $2,848,891 transferred in 2011 alone and 
at least $17,952,136 from 2005 through 2011.15 16 
The second piece of ancillary evidence that supports the Court Memorandum 
Decision comes through the plaintiffs' identified expert, David Hunter, CPA, in his report 
8 Id. 35:6-25, 36-46, Ex. 5, 6, 24 
9 Id. 
10 Stroschein Aff. ~ 5. 
u Olsen Aff. Ex. C, consisting of Swindell Dep. Ex. 18 
12 Id. 79-83:1-15, Ex. 18 
13 Id., Ex. 18 
14 Id. (emphasis added) 
is Id. 
16 See, January 4, 2013, Plffs Res. To Def.'s Mot For SJ and MTS, in CV-2011-5228 at p. 4 (emphasis 
added).This point is remarkably consistent with Joyce Stroschein's affidavit testimony bemoaning the 
lost revenue to the City that led to imposition ofa property tax increase in 2015. Second Stroschein Aff. 
111. 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO CITY'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY RJDGMENT- 8 
433
t'\ 
~- y 
submitted to the Court on May 24, 2013.17 After analyzing the City's records and 
testimony, Mr. Hunter indicates in his "Final Summarized Conclusion" that the "capacity 
fees" determined by the City were "overstated" and that: 
[A] significant beneficiary of these overstatements appears to be the City of 
Pocatello for its general operational needs with respect to the ROE and PILOT 
charges in the Service portion of the Studies. 18 
Again the City never refuted Mr. Hunter's analysis and opinion on this point. In 
essence, the fact that both user and connection fees were impermissibly transferred for 
use under the PILOT program is a well-settled fact already determined by this Court, 
which the City cannot and has not refuted. 
Thus, the City improperly took PILOT fees from both user and connection fee 
payers. The City never appealed or sought reconsideration of the Memorandum Decision 
and should therefore be collaterally estopped from taking a contrary position in the 
current lawsuit. 
2. At most, the Affidavits of Joyce A. Stroschein create an issue of fact whether 
PILOT charges were applicable to connections/capacity fees and transferred to the 
General Fund. 
The City submits, along with its brief, the Second Affidavit of Joyce A. 
Stroschein and incorporates by reference a prior affidavit filed by Stroschein on or about 
August 29, 2014. Although Stroschein apparently is the current CFO for the City of 
Pocatello; she did not hold that position at the relevant times pertinent to t?is lawsuit 
insofar as she identifies herself in both affidavits as the City's Finance Manager from 
17 Olsen Aff. Ex. D, consisting of the affidavit and report of David L. Hunter in CV-2011-5228. 
18 Id. Hunter Aff. Ex. 1, p. 10 (emphasis added) 
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2008 -2014.19 The CFO and IRCP 30(b)(6) designated City representative during the 
Building Contractors litigation was David Swindell, whose testimony was referenced 
extensively by the Court in the Building Contractors case and is cited in the prior section 
; 
of this brief. At all times relevant, there is no evidence that Stroschein had speaking 
authority as a IRCP 30(b )( 6) witness to discuss the PILOT fee policy of the City. 
Regardless of her authority to speak on behalf of the City about the PILOT fee 
program, in her first affidavit at ,r 8, Stroschein states that the City "has never charged a 
PILOT component to the connection/capacity fee." She reiterates this statement in ,r 3 of 
her second affidavit. The City virtually ignores the Court's prior findings in attempting to 
resurrect this "undisputed factual" issue. 
What is problematic about Stroschein's affidavit testimony is threefold. First, 
despite the fact that she submits exhibits to both affidavits, none of those exhibits present 
data either in the form of source material (i.e. ledgers, invoices, QuickBook or Excel 
entries) or secondary summary spreadsheets that reflect or support her conclusory 
statements related to PILOT charges vis-a-vis the connection/capacity fees. Second, she 
parses her testimony in such a way as to ignore the pre-PILOT Jee return on equity and 
rate of return charges that the Court earlier concluded were unquestionably being 
transferred to the City's General Fund as discussed in the previous section.2° Finally, 
Stroschein' s affidavit testimony completely contradicts the prior testimony of Swindell 
and the various discussions of the water and sewer department budgeting process, again 
19 Stroschein Aff. 1 1 and Second Stroschein Aff. 1 2 
20 In fact, noting that in 2011 the City "redescribed" the rate of return and return of equity fees as PILOT 
fess, Stroschein carefully avoids submitting affidavit language to the effect that rate of return fees and 
return of equity fees were not a component of connection/capacity fees. Stroschein Aff. 15. 
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discussed above21 in which Swindell, Mayor Chase, the department heads and the 
Pocatello City Council discussed at length pertaining the use of the impermissible fees, 
i.e. franchise fees, PILOT fees, return on equity fees and rate of return fees, to fund non-
water and sewer functions through the General Fund and, even more inappropriately, to 
provide an alternative to increase property taxes to replenish the General Fund. 22 
At the swnmary judgment stage, all factual inferences are drawn in favor of the 
plaintiffs. When such inferences are applied to the affidavit testimony of Joyce 
Stroschein, her testimony, at most, creates a material issue of fact as to whether PILOT 
fees were associated with the connection/capacity fees collected by the City and whether 
those fees were transferred to the General Fund, and thus unconstitutional and violative 
of the Idaho Revenue Bond Act 
3. There was an unconstitutional taking. 
a. The PILOT component of the user fee qualities as a compensable 
property interest. 
The City argues that the PILOT component does not constitute a compensable 
property interest for purposes of the Plaintiffs' claim for an unconstitutional taking. The 
essence of the City's argument is that "monies paid are not a recognizable protected 
property interest."23 This assertion is incorrect based upon relevant Idaho case law that 
the City fails to cite and which rejects the argument advanced by the City. 
In BHA Investments, Inc. v. City of Boise, 141 Idaho 168, I 08 P .3d 315 (2004), 
the Idaho Supreme Court held, "[m]oney is clearly property that may not be taken for 
21 Supra at p. 6 
22 Jd. 
23 Def. Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. at 8-9 (citations omitted). 
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public use without the payment of just coinpensation."24 The BHA Investments, Inc. 
decision is squarely·on point and is clear, unequivocal legal authority that stands contrary 
to the proposition advanced by the City. Yet, the City never cites or discusses the BHA 
Investments, Inc. decision. The Idaho Supreme Court continues: 
To put the matter simply, the taking of money is different, under the Fifth 
Amendment, from the taking of real or personal property. The imposition of 
various monetary exactions-:taxes, special assessments, and user fees-has been 
accorded substantial judicial deference. 25 
The Idaho Supreme Court ultimately found that the "City had no authority to charge the 
liquor license transfer fee, its exaction of the fee constituted a taking of property under 
the United States and Idaho Constitution.',26 
In the Building Contractors suit, this Court.unequivocally found that "any fee 
which includes a PILOT component is unreasonable, arbitrary and contrary to statute. "27 
The portion of user and/or connection fees assessed to pay PILOT fees to the City, failed 
to conform to the statutory requirements ofldaho Code§ 50-1028.28 Since the City had 
no authority to charge the PILOT component of the connection and user fees, "its 
exaction constituted a taking of property under the United States and Idaho 
Constitutions. "29 
b. The PILOT component of the user fee was used without just 
compensation. 
The City argues that the PILOT fee was not used without just compensation. The 
City misapprehends its burden on summary judgment. Under Rule 56( c ), as the moving 
24 Id. at 172, 108 P.3d at 319 (citing Brown v. Legal Found o/Wash .• 538 U.S. 216 (2003)). 
25 Id. (citing BHA Investments, Inc. v. State, 138 Idaho 348, 63 P.3d 474 (2003)). 
26 Id. 
27 Mem. Dec. and Order p. 24, dated November 13, 2013 
28 Id. 
29 See BHA Investments, Inc., 141 Idaho at 172, 108 P.3d at 319 
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party, the City must come forward with affirmative evidence establishing that there are 
no triable issues of fact that just compensation was given for the use of PILOT 
component. 30 Rather than present the Court with admissible evidence of the just 
compensation provided to each of the user fee payers, the City merely argues 
generalities, assumptions and conclusions: "[t]here is no factual basis to conclude that the 
PILOT transfer did not provide just compensation to the user fee payers."31 The City's 
argument is not on par with its burden. It must affirmatively demonstrate to the Court that 
any PILOT transfer transaction provided identifiable compensation to the user fee payer 
rather than merely positing the absence of evidence as proof of compensation. · 
At the very least, the issue of just compensation is a question of fact for the jury. 
32 In Covington, the Idaho Supreme Court wrote: 
In Rueth v. State, 100 Idaho 203, 596 P.2d 75 (1979), this Court held that all 
issues regarding inverse condemnation are to be resolved by the trial Court, 
except the issue of what is just compensation. Once the trial Court has made the 
finding that there is a taking of the property, the extent of the damages and the 
measure thereof are questions for the jury. 33 
Although Rueth involved an inverse condemnation, the holding that just compensation is 
a jury question is equally applicable to this case. 
Regardless of the City's failure to provide affirmative evidence in support of its 
argument, just compensation is "measured by the property owner's loss rather than the 
government's gain."34 The U.S. Supreme Court has observed that: "[w]e ... noted that 
30 See Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c); see, e.g., Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527,531, 887 P.2d 
1034, 1038 (1994); Shelton v. Shelton, 225 P.3d 693,698 (Idaho 2009) 
31 Def. Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. at 10 
32 City of Coeur d'Alene v. Simpson, 142 Idaho 839, 854, 136 P.3d 310,325 (2006); Covington v. Jefferson 
Cnty., 137 Idaho 777, 780, 53 P.3d 828, 831 (2002) 
33 Id. (emphasis added) 
34 Brown v. Legal Found. of Washington, 538 U.S. 216, 235-36 (2003) 
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the private party 'is entitled to be put in as good a position pecuniarily as if his property 
had not been taken. He must be made whole but -is not entitled to more. "'35 In Brown, 
Justice Stevens made clear that the measure of just compensation is measured by net loss 
to the plaintiff rather than public gain.36 In this case, it is undisputed that since 2006 the 
City has taken no less than $28,329,231.13 from connection and user fee payers for the 
impermissible PILOT program.37 That is over $28 million that signify the collective fee 
payers' or "property owners' loss."38 Again, no amount of generic "public gain" through 
services provided to the public as a result of this taking can compensate for the property 
owners loss.39 
Thus, the City's arguments about the benefits that the city or its residents derived 
from the use of the fees is irrelevant and does not establish the absence of triable issues of 
fact as to whether just compensation was received. The fact is that the user payers lost 
significant, identifiable sums of money because of an impermissible fee. They have 
receive no compensation for those sums and the fact that the City allegedly provided 
certain benefits makes no difference for purposes of ascertaining whether just 
compensation has been made. There has been no compensation made to the class 
plaintiffs. The City does not even attempt to make an effort to disarticulate and establish 
the relative value of the services for each individual impermissible user fee paid, and 
likely cannot make such a determination. In short, there has been no correlation or 
connection between the alleged services provided and the user fees themselves. 
35 Id (citing Olsonv. United States, 292 U.S. 246,255 (1934)) 
36 Id. at 236 
37 See Olsen Aff. Ex. B. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
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Ultimately, the City cites no legal authority for the notion that just compensation 
can be determined through services or municipal benefits derived from the taking. This is 
clearly because such a notion is antithetical to fundamentals of a takings analysis. 
Invariably, every single case where there has been a taking it is done with some 
identifiable benefit to the government and its citizenry'. For example, taking property to 
widen a road will "benefit" all citizens who use the road. However, the use of the road by 
the person whose property was taken to effectuate the widening of the road does not 
constitute just compensation for the market value of the taken property. Courts require 
more than just the incidental enjoyment of the services resulting from a taking to find that 
the individual has received just compensation. 
4. The Court's ruling in Building Contractors has retroactive effect. 
The Court's decision does not inherently limit itself to prospective application. 
Instead, the Court deals with the connection and user fees from both historical and future 
perspectives. For example, the Court enjoined future connection and user fees from being 
assessed a PILOT fee for general fund purposes.40 Yet, the Court also wrote that "[t]o the 
extent that PILOT fees have, are, or will be charged to the connection fees being 
accumulated in the water and sewer accounts the Court finds the connection fees are 
being used impermissibly. Additionally, any PILOT fees drawn from user fees are also 
impermissible taxes. "41 
Decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court follow the "usual rule" as to retroactive 
application to all past and pending cases. 42 The Court has discretion to limit retroactivity 
40 Mem. Dec. & Order, p. 26, November 13, 2013 
41 Id. at 23 
42 BHA Investments, Inc., 141 Idaho at 173, 108 P.3d at 320 
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and weighs three factors: ( 1) the purpose of the decision; (2) the reliance upon the prior 
law; and.(3) the effect upon the administration of justice if the decision is applied 
retroactively .43 It is unclear whether a District Court has the authority to limit the scope 
of its prior decisions when a final judgment has been entered in that case and the case has 
no subsequent history, i.e., appeal. In this case, all of the factors weigh in favor of 
applying the decision retroactively. 
As to the first factor, the Plaintiffs submit that the purpose of the Court's prior 
order was specific and narrowly tailored to resolve the propriety and permissibility of the 
PILOT components. The decision was certainly designed to provide prospective, 
injunctive relief and to prevent the City from further taking property that it had no 
authority to take. One of the fundamental purposes of the finding was whether the City's 
actions vis-a-vis the PILOT transfer fees, historically, were ever permissible. The Court 
found that they were not.44 This finding and the entry of an injunction are independent of 
a claim for the return of payment attendant to that taldng. By necessity, the Court's first 
order of business is to determine the legality of the fee and, if illegal, to stop any further 
assessment of the fee. Only then can the issue of repayment for an unlawful taking be 
addressed. 
Second, the Court relied upon prior law to reach its findings. There is no credible 
dispute over this fact. The Court relied on a significant amount of clear case law authority 
in reaching its conclusions. 
43 Id. 
44 Mem. Dec. & Order, pp. 22-24 
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The third factor relates to the number of cases that would be reopened if the 
decision were applied retroactively.45 The Court's decision was narrowly tailored and 
factually specific to make this element a non-issue because no prior case would be 
reopened. In fact, no cases are being reopened, this case is independent from the Building 
Contractors case insofar as it is a case about the recoupment of fees to two classes not 
represented in the Building Contractors case, the classes of plaintiffs wrongfully assessed 
PILOT and pre-PILOT connection and/or user fees respectively. 
Finally, the City argues that the issue of an unconstitutional talcing was previously 
litigated in the Building Contractors litigation. In fact, that was not what was litigated in 
the Building Contractors case. The Building Contractors case litigated the f egality and 
constitutionality of the PILOT fee and the ability of the City to collect those fees going 
forward. This case is a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case for a refund of fees to the identified classes 
of plaintiffs flowing from the City's imposition of a fee structure that resulted in 
unconstitutional talcings. 
5. The City is not immune from the claims articulated in the Complaint. 
The City's Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA) immunity arguments citing LC. §6-
904A are fundamentally flawed. While the City may have "discretion" as to whether or 
not to construct utilities, it does not have discretion to act outside of its authority by 
imposing of unconstitutional fees related to the utility. Indeed, under the City's 
interpretation of the "discretionary function" defense, there could never be a claim 
against the City for any of its actions. That is certainly not the intention of Sterling v. 
Bloom, 111 Idaho 211, 723 P.2d 755 (1986), which states that "clearly, then, 
45 BHA Investments, Inc., 141 Idaho at 173, 108 P.3d at 320 
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'discretionary function' does not include functions which involve any element of choice, 
judgment or ability to make responsible decisions; otherwise every function would fall 
within the exception."46 Moreover, the budgetary decisions made by the City on its 
assessment and expenditure of revenue and fees are fundamentally operational in nature, 
and not for policy purposes thereby eviscerating any claimed immunity under Sterling. 
The City's interpretation of Section 6-904A suggesting that under no 
circumstances can an injured party recover improperly collected taxes or a fee is equally 
flawed. The statute does not preempt or supplant other available statutory relief in this 
regard, not the least of which is_42 USC§ 1983 under which this lawsuit is pled.47 
Section 1983 provides redress for property improperly taken pursuant to the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Idaho Code Section 63-3074 
provides an avenue for the refund of taxes or property illegally or erroneously seized to 
satisfy a tax obligation.48 Simply put, this section is limited solely to "ordinary 
negligence claims. "49 
In Greenwade, the Court analyzed the meaning of the apparent prohibition of 
claims arising out of an assessment of a tax or fee. The Court wrote: 
The term "claim," as used in the ITCA, describes claims arising from tortious 
conduct. Greenwade's claim for the return of property erroneously or illegally 
seized for the payment of taxes does not appear to fit the definition of a claim for 
tort damages, and thus would not be barred by LC.§ 6-904A.50 
46 Id. at 227, 723 P.2d at 771 
41 See Complaint, Jury Demand and Request for Class Certification, 11 
48 See Greenwade v. Idaho State Tax Comm 'n 119 Idaho 501', 808 P.2d 420 (Ct. App. 1991) 
49 Id. See also, Harris v. State Dep't of Health & Welfare, 123 Idaho 295,847 P.2d 1156 (1993) 
so Greenwade, 119 Idaho at 504-05, 808 P.2d at 423-24 
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Though Greenwade involved a claim to return property seized under the Idaho Income 
Tax Act, the notion expressed by the Greenwade Court applies here. This case involves 
the return of money impennissibly taken by the City, plus prejudgment interest. The 
nature of the Plaintiffs' claims does not involve damages as that term is used in Idaho 
Code 6-904A. Instead, it seeks a refund of fees illegally imposed by the City. Idaho Code 
6-904A does not impliedly or expressly prohibit such an action.51 
Finally, and perhaps most important, the ITCA does not immunize the state or its 
political subdivisions from claims based on federal law.52 To the extent the plaintiffs 
allege takings under the United States Constitution, the ITCA does not apply. 
6. Conclusion and relief requested. 
Based upon the above-articulated submission, the plaintiffs request that the City's 
51 Id. at 506, 808 P.2d at 425 
52 Holloway v. Brechtse, 279 F. Supp. 2d 613,616 {E.D. Pa. 2003); BHA Investments, Inc. v. City of Boise, 
supra at322 
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NATHAN R. STARNES, ESQ. 
HALL ANGELL STARNES, LLP 
1075 S Utah Avenue, Suite 150 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Telephone (208) 522-.3003 
Fax (208) 621-3008 
!SB No. 's 2434, 7012 & 7484 
bgh@hasattomeys.com 
. sla@hasattomeys.com 
nrs@hasattomeys.com 
Attorneys for Defendant City of Pocatello 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STA.TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY 
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on 
behalf of itself and all others similarly 
situated~ ED QUINN, on behalf of himself 
and all others similarly situated, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
municipality, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Bannock ) 
Case No. CV-2014-1520-0C 
TlDRD AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A. 
STROSCHEIN 
Joyce A. Stroschein, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
1. That I am over the age of eighteen {18} and am competent to testify in this matter. 
I make this affidavit based on my own personal knowledge unless otherwise indicated. ·--. 
This affidavit is made under the penalty of perjury. 
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2. I am the current Chief Financial Officer ("CFO") and Treasurer for the City of 
Pocatello. I have served in the finance department of the City since October 2001, 
including City Controller from 2006-2008 and the Finance Manager from 2008-2014. I 
am knowledgeable regarding the financial affairs of the City, including the types of funds 
that include a PILOT component and the varying types of services provided within the 
City for water and sewer. 
3. Calculation of how much a PILOT component is incorporated into a given user 
fee is a complex and multifaceted calculation. The impact of the PILOT component on 
any given fee may vary significantly based on the user. That is, the amount of a PILOT 
component on one user may vary dramatically for another. For example, there would be a 
difference in the amount of a PILOT apportioned to a residential single-family unit 
versus a commercial unit. Likewise, there would be a difference in the amount of a 
· PILOT apportioned to a residential customer living in a townhouse without a yard versus 
a residential user who has a large yard and required more volume over 1,000 gallons or 
who has a larger service line (i.e.,%", 1", 1 W', etc.). Attached hereto as Exhibit A are 
Utility Billing Rates that demonstrate the costs for a given user, whether residential, 
commercial, etc. 
4. Importantly, the motivations for a refund for a taxpayer will likely be drastically . 
different between renters who do not pay property taxes. That is, assuming that the City 
were required to repay the PILOT, the taxpayer will likely have a strong desire to 
minimize the amount of the award because ultimately the taxpayer will be required for 
shoulder the heavy burden of repayment of the tax. Conversely, the renter would likely 
have a motivation to obtain a larger damage award. 
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5. If the Court were to award damages in this litigation, the impact of a damage 
award for each individual user in the City of PocEttello will be a complex and onerous 
task. The analysis would require two complex steps to identify the amount ofrefund each 
user would be entitled to. First, the City would have to determine how much PILOT was· 
incorporated into each rate. More specifically, the City would have to identify what 
portion of a given rate (i.e., commercial, multi unit, single family, etc.). The second step 
would be to analyze at each respective user account and determine what the monthly use 
was on a month-by-month basis. This would require the City to examine the monthly 
usage for each user for each month that a reimbursement was required. 
6. With respect to the first step, in order for the City to determine how much PILOT 
was incorporated into a given rate, the City would be forced to hire an expert with the 
necessary technical expertise to provide the necessary information regarding how a given 
rate was developed, including the amount of a PILOT apportioned to said rate. The City 
would hire Raftelis, the finn that performed the rate study, to analyze and provide this 
information. 
7. One the amount of the PILOT apportioned to each rate has been identified by 
Raftelis, the City will then be required to identify bow much each rate user would be 
permitted to recover on a monthly °basis. For example, when looking at a sewer rate, there 
will be a base service charge that may include a PILOT but also a volwne charge per 
1000 that would also have a PILOT component. Thus, a given user may have a higher 
volume charge that would include a larger amount of PILOT. This amount would 
fluctuate based on the monthly usage. In order for the City to perform this step of the 
analysis, the City would be forced to hire software experts to create a software program 
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that can data mine this infonnation. The software would be unique to the City and not 
available commercially. The program would be used to detennine the impact on the cost 
per user and usage rate for each user in a given month. 
8. As of February 2015, the City had 16,826 active accounts billed by the City of 
Pocatello. Each active account may, however, have subaccounts tied to them (multi-
family, apartment, complexes, landowners of multiple properties, etc.). Given that the 
population of the City does fluctuate, the City would have to identify other closed 
accounts that fall within the prescribed period of time. Thus, the City would have to look 
at a minimum of 16,826 active accounts for each month. In a twelve--month period, the 
City would be required to examine approximately 201,912 accounts, exclusive of 
subaccounts. 
9. Finally, any damage awards that were assessed against the City would require a 
rate study to be perfonried. In order for the City to ensure it has sufficient capital to 
operate the City and repay the damage award (in addition to the experts required to 
calculate the damages) the City must know how much money will be required for a bond. 
Beca1.1se the City does not have any current reserves to repay any damage award, the City 
will be forced to go to bond for the amount. Any bond will necessarily require the 
property taxes to increase to repay said bond. In order to develop a rate, the City looks at 
capital needs (improvements or equipment) to develop the.revenue requirements for the 
City. Thus, while the rates may decline, the City would be forced to increase property 
taxes (as it did in 2015) to satisfy the deficiencies and repayment ofa bond. It is 
noteworthy, that individuals who did not live in the area during the period when a PILOT 
was collected will be forced to bear the burden of increased taxes if a damage award was 
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assessed. Ultimately, the amount of work for the City is significant, expensive, and 
lengthy. Depending on the individual user, the motivations and arguments for and against 
the class action vary. 
10. Given the complexity of the user rates and the numerous potential account types, 
the identified Plaintiffs, Ed Quinn and Hill-Vu Mobile Home Park, are not representative 
of the class members. Specifically, Ed Quinn has a single-family account. Neither Mr. 
Quinn nor Hill-Vu Mobile Home Park can represent the interest of a commercial user, an 
industrial user, a newly arrived homeowner, a renter who is a user fee payor, etc. 
Attached hereto as Exhibit Bis a true and correct copy of Ed Quinn's Utility Service 
record. 
11. Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of Hill~Vu Mobile Home 
Park's Utility Service record, which demonstrates garbage, sewer, and water utilities. 
This account is a residential multi~unit account. 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SA YETH NAUGHT. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO, before me the undersigned, a Notary Public 
in and for said State, this 2cid day of~ 2015. 
- Apiil. 
IQotaryPublic for Idaho 
Residingat: MoCum,nnyl . 
My commission expires: ·2/22/20/ 8" 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the 
following this _g_ day of March, 2015, by the method indicated below: 
Michael D. Gaffney, Esq. 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Fax: 529 .. 9732 
NathanM. Olsen, Esq. 
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN 
485 "E" Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Fax: 524~3391 
[\c'.(Mailing 
['} Hand Delivery 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[i,Mailing 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
G.HALL 
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EXHIBIT A 
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UTILITY BILLING RA TES-FISCAL YEAR 2015 (Second phase, WA & GA) 
EFFECTIVE OCTOBER!, 2014 
WATERRATES 
LINE SIZE INSIDE OUTSIDE CB-Inside UNMETERED 
3/4" $ 8.35 $ 12.53 $5.85 $33.13 per unit-Inside City 
1" 9.70 14.55 6.79 $49. 70 per unit-Outside City 
l W' 15.50 23.25 
2" 20.20 30.30 
3" 51.50 77.25 
4" 82.40 123.60 
6" 155.00 232.50 
8" 225.00 337.50 
10" 352.00 528.00 
12" 504.00 756.00 
VOLUME CHARGE (PER 1,000 GALS} 
Single Family Unit (first25,000 gallons) 
Single Family Unit (over 25,000 gallons) 
Multi Units 
Commercial 
Summer line 
Unpotable 
Hydrants (by pennit only @ CM rate-Water Dept) 
10.85 
14.14 
INSIDE 
$2.28 
2.86 
2.12 
1.74 
2.80 
NIA 
1.74 
OUTSIDE 
$3.42 
4.29 
3.18 
2.61 
4.20 
0.57 
NIA 
FIRE LINES 
2" $ l.50 
4" 8.90 
6" 24.75 
8" 52.05 
10" 89.20 
CB-Inside 
$1.60 
2.01 
1.96 
SEWERRATES 
Single Family units 
Multi-family/Commercial: 
Service charge per billing 
Volume chg per 1,000* 
Industrial: 
Service charge per billing 
Volume chg per 1,000* 
~ervice {1 (!ickug/lVk} 
MU/SF Residential Cart 
MU Additional Unit Cart(s) 
CB Residential Cart 
CB/SF/MU MCR ** 
MU/SF 64-gallon Cart 
CB 64-gallon Cart 
Business Cart 
Additional Pickup 
Additional Pickup Day 
Garbage-only Recycling Cart** 
Yard Waste Collection 
Cart cleaning charge 
3-yard Container 
3-yard Con-Special Pickup-SPU 
Inside Citv Outside City 
$28.20 $33.85 
6.25 
4.06 
7.50 
4.88 
6.25 
2.15 
CB-Inside 
$19.74 
l\.fONTIILY SANITATION CHARGES 
Base Charge Rent Tax Billing Charge 
$14.78 $ $ $1.62 
14.78 
10.35 1.14 
14.78 
13.64 1.62 
9.55 1.14 
14.78 1.62 
12.84 
12.84 
5.00 
5.00 
20.00 
73.52 9.71 .59 1.62 
16.98 (minimum) 
Total 
$16.40 
14.78 
11.49 
14.78 
15.26 
10.69 
16.40 
12.84 
12.84 
5.00 
5.00 
20.00 
85.44 
16.98 
*Based on winter water average (November through April consumption) unless location also has an active summerline. 
**Billing fee may apply, 3-month minimum 
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UTILITY BrLLING RATES-FISCAL YEAR 2015 (First phase, Sewer only) 
EFFECTIVE AUGUST l; 2014 
WATER RATES 
Lu';'E SIZE INSIDE OUTSIDE CB-Inside UNl\lETERED 
3/4" $ 7.94 $ 11.92 $5.56 $3 I .86 per unit-Inside City 
I" 8.70 13.05 6.09 $47.79 per unit-Outside City 
lW' 13.32 19.98 9.33 
211 16.41 24.61 11.49 FIRE LINES 
3" 44.99 67.49 2" $ 1.50 
4" 71.32 106.98 4" 8.90 
6" 129.82 194.74 6" 24.75 
8" 189.95 284.93 8" 52.05 
IO" 292.93 439.39 10" 89.20 
12" 414.28 621.42 
VOLUi.\rIE CHARGE (PER 1.000 GALS) INSIDE OUTSIDE CB-Inside 
Single Family Unit (first 25,000 gallons) 
Single Family Unit (over 25,000 gallons) 
Multi Units 
Commercial 
Summerline 
Unpotable_ 
Hydrants (by pellllit only@ CM rate-Water Dept) 
Single Family units 
Multi-family/Commercial: 
Service charge per billing 
Volume chg per 1,000* 
Industrial: 
Service charge per billing 
Volume chg per 1,000* 
Inside Citv 
$28.20 
6.25 
4.06 
6.25 
2.15 
$2.22 
2.78 
2.05 
1.66 
2.71 
I.66 
SEVt 'ER RA.TES 
Outside Citv 
$33.85 
7.50 
4.88 
$3.34 
4.17 
3.08 
2.50 
4.08 
NIA 
CB~Inside 
$19.74 
$1.56 
1.95 
l.90 
MONTHLY SANITATION CHARGES 
Senice (1 pickup/wk) 
MU/SF Residential Cart 
MU Additional Unit Cart(s) 
CB Residential Cart 
CB/SF/MUMCR** 
MU/SF 64-gallon Cart 
CB 64-gallon Cart 
Business Cart 
Additional Pick-up 
Additional Pickup Day 
Garbage-only Recycling Cart** 
Yard Waste Collection*** 
Cart cleaning charge 
3-yard Container 
3-yard Con-Special Pickup-SPU 
Base Chat'ge 
$14.31 
14.31 
10.02 
14.31 
13.21 
9.25 
14.31 
12.43 
12.43 
5.00 
10.00 
20.00 
7I.20 
16.44 (minimum) 
9.40 
Tax 
s 
.56 
Billing Charge 
$1.56 
I.IO 
l.56 
I.IO 
1.56 
l.56 
Total 
$15.87 
14.31 
I I.12 
14.31 
14.77 
10.35 
15.87 
12.43. 
12.43 
5.00 
10.00 
20.00 
82.72 
16.44 
*Based on winter water average (November through April consumption) unless location also has an active summerline. 
**Billing fee may apply, 3-month minimum , 
***Pilot project concluding November 30, 2013. If it continues the price will increase from $5.00 to $!0.00 April I, 2014. 
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UTILITY BILLING RATES-FISCAL YEAR2014 (Amended) 
EFFECTIVE DECEl\·IBER 20, 2013 
WATER RATES 
LINE SIZE INSIDE OUTSIDE CB-Inside UNl\'IETERED · 
3/4" $ 7.94 $ 11.92 $ 5.56 $31.86 per unit-Inside City 
I" 8.70 13.05 6.09 $47.79 per unit-Outside City 
I W' 13.32 19.98 9.33 
2" 16.41 24.61 11.49 FIRE LINES 
3" 44.99 67.49 2" $ 1.50 
4" 71.32 106.98 4" · 8.90 
6" 129.82 194.74 6" 24.75 
8" 189.95 284.93 8" 52.05 
IO" 292.93 439.39 10" 89.20 
12" 414.28 621.42 
VOLUl\1:E CHARGE (PER 1.000 GALS) 
Single Family Unit (first 25,000 gallons) 
INSIDE OUTSIDE CB-Inside 
$1.56 
1.95 Single Family Unit (over 25,000 gallons) 
Multi Units 
Commercial 
Summerline 
Unpotable 
Hydrants (by permit only@CM rate-Water Dept) 
Single Family units 
Multi-family/Commercial: 
Service charge per billing 
Volume chg per 1,000* 
Industrial: 
Service charge per billing 
Volume chg per 1,000* 
Inside Citv 
$21.83 
4.80 
3.07 
4.80 
1.66 
$2.22 
2.78 
2.05 
1.66 
2.71 
1.66 
SE\VER RATES 
Outside Citv 
$26.05 
5.70 
3.66 
$3.34 
4.17 
3.08 
2.50 
4.08 
NIA 
CB-Inside 
$15.29 
1.90 
MONTfilY SANITATION CHARGES 
Service {l J:!icku:g/wk) Base Charge Rent Tax Billing Charge 
MU/SF Residential Cart $14.31 $ $ $1.56 
MU Additional Unit Cart(s) 14.31 
CB Residential Ca11 10.02 I.IO 
CB/SF/MU MCR** 14.31 
MU/SF 64-gallon Cart 13.21 1.56 
CB 64-gaUon Cart 9.25 1.10 
Business Cart 14.31 1.56 
Additional Pickup 12.43 
Additional Picla1p Day 12.43 
Garbage-only Recycling Cart** 5.00 
Yard Waste Collection*** 10.00 
Ca11 cleaning charge 20.00 
3-yard Container 71.20 9.40 .56 1.56 
3-yard Con-~pecial Pick'llp-SPU 16.44 (minimum) 
Toti!! 
$15.87 
14.31 
11.12 
14.31 
14.77 
10.35 
15.87 
12.43 
12.43 
5.00 
10.00 
20.00 
82.72 
16.44 
*Based on winter water average (November through April consumption) unless location also has an active summerline. 
**Billing fee may apply, 3-month minimum 
***Pilot project concluding November 30, 2013. If it continues the price will increase from $5.00 to $10.00 April I, 2014. 
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UTILITY BILLING RATES-FISCAL YEAR 2014 
EFFECTIVE OCTOBER 1, 2013 
WATER RATES 
LINE SIZE INSIDE OUTSIDE CB-Inside UNMETERED 
3/4" $ S.75 $ 13.13 $ 6.13 $35.09 per unit-Inside City 
I" 9.58 14.37 6.71 $52.64 per unit-Outside City 
I Ya" 14.67 22.01 I0.27 
2" 18.07 27.11 12.65 FIRELrNES 
3rr 49.55 74.33 2" $ 1.50 
4" 78.55 ll 7.83 4" 8.90 
6" 142.99 214.49 6" 24.75 
8" 209.22 313.83 8" 52.05 
10" 322.64 483.96 IO" 89.20 
12" 456.30 684.45 
VOLUME CHARGE {PER 1.000 GALS) 
Single Family Unit (first 25,000 gallons) 
INSIDE OUTSIDE CB-Inside 
$1.72 
2.15 Single Family Unit (over 25,000 gallons) 
Multi Units 
Commercial 
Summerline 
Unpotable 
Hydrants (by pennit only @CM rate-Water Dept) 
Single Family units 
Multi-family/Commercial: 
Service charge per billing 
Volume chg per 1,000* 
Industrial: 
Service charge per billing 
Volumechgper 1,000* 
Inside Citv 
$25.85 
4.80 
3.63 
4.80 
l.97 
$2.45 
3.06 
2.26 
1.83 
2.99 
I.83 
SEWER RATES 
Outside Citv 
$30.85 
5.70 
4.33 
$3.68 
4.59 
3.39 
2.75 
4.49 
NIA 
CB-Inside 
$18.IO 
2.IO 
MONTHLY SANITATION CHARGES 
Service fl E!icku!!/wk} Base Charge Rent Tax Billing Charge 
MU/SF Residential Cart $14.46 s $ $1.56 
MU Additional Unit Cart(s) 14.46 
CB Residential Cart 10.13 l.10 
CB!SFflvIU MCR** 14.46 
MU/SF 64-gallon Cm1 13.35 1.56 
CB 64-gallon Cart 9.35 l.10 
Business Cart 14.46 1.56 
Additional Pickup 12.56 
Additional Pickup Day 12.56 
Garbage-only Recycling Cart** 5.00 
Yard Waste Collection*** 10.00 
Cart cleaning charge 20.00 
3-yard Container 71.94 9.50 .57 1.56 
3-yard Con-Special Pickup-SPU 16.61 (minimum) 
I21ru 
$16.02 
14.46 
11.2:, 
14.46 
14.91 
I0.45 
16.02 
12.56 
12.56 
5.00 
10.00 
20.00 
83.57 
16.61 
*Based on winter water average (November.through April consumption) unless location also has an active summerline. 
**Billing fee may apply, 3-month minimum 
***Pilot project concluding November 30, 2013. If it continues the price will increase from $5.00 to $10.00 April I, 2014. 
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SANITATION CONTAINER RATES 
Effective October 1, 2014 
Temporarv 3-vard Container Service 
Daily rental charge 
(Daily rental charge with sales tax) 
Each pickup of container 
Monthly billing charge 
3-yard Container Service 
Rental charge 
Monthly service 
Monthly billing charge 
Container cleaning charge-privately owned containers 
Special Pickup (5 minute minimum) 
Roll-off Box Service 
Monthly 17/20-yard box rental 
Daily 17 /20-yard box rental 
Monthly 30/32-yard box rental 
Daily 30/32-yard box rental 
Monthly 40-yard box rental 
Daily 40-yard box rental 
Monthly billing charge 
Pickup charge per pull 
Bannock County landfill charge per ton 
Bannock County landfill charge for clean inert fill per ton 
Overweight charge per ton 
Re-location Charge 
Privately Owned Compactor Service 
Pickup charge per pull 
Bannock County landfill charge per ton 
Bannock County landfill charge for clean inert fill per ton 
Overweight charge per ton 
Monthly billing charge 
Compactor deaning fee 
$ 2.36 
(2.50) 
25.00 
1.62 
$ 9.71 
73.52 
1.62 
100.00 
17.00 
$ 89.39 
2.98 
99.93 
3.33 
118.57 
3.95 
1.62 
167.94 
25.00 
17.00 
50.00 
75.00 
$167.94 
25.00 
17.00 
50.00 
1.62 
250.00 
Sales tax of 6% will be assessed on all rental charges except customers who are exempt. 
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UT220U01 
Customer ID: 61005 Name: QUINN HOMES 
Location ID: 41824 Addr: 2085 SUNRISE WAY 
Cycle/Route • . . . . 04 26 Amount due . . • . . : 
Initiation date. . . 41514 Pending ....... : 
Termination date C.A.F.# ....... . 
Number of bills . . . 1 Maintain .E-notif ication 
Cust/Loc status (F4) A Customer type (F4) •• 
Y=Yes 
4/02/15 
08:51:24 
$9.41 
$.00 
Inactive 
Type options, press Enter. _ 
1=Select 2=.Assign 3=User defined S=Display 6=Assistance progrmn 
7=Rate group change B=Renewable 9=Suspend 
Qpt Service Rate group Service Assigned !ro: 
> WA WATER PO. SF I Active. Service 
F2-Bquifaz F3=Exi t F4=Prompt FS=Update owner 
F7•Alternate addr F8=Reprint appl 
F6=Recurring charge 
F24=Hore keys 
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OT220U01 /.r··--~ .. ::. c1my OF PO""~nn:o'LLO '· \, ... l.,,ft,:,l,,llf 
Cu$ ... Jmer Services Maintenance 
Cu~tome~ lD: 46681 Name: HILL-VO MOBILE HOME PARK 
Location ID: 28918 Addr: 4530 S 5TH AVE 
':1/U~/l!:l 
08:45:36 
Cycle/Route. . 02 26 Amount due . . . . . $5,189.00 
Initiation date 10194 Pending . . . . . . . $. 00 
Termination date . . C.A.F . .f •••.•••• 
Number of bills . . . 1 Maintain E-notification Y=Yes Inactive 
Cust/Loc status (F4) ~ Customer type (F4} 
T'ype options , press Enter. 
1=Se1ect 2=Assi911 3=User defined S=Display &=Assistance program 
7=Rate group c'.b.ax,.ge 8=Renewa1:>le 9=Su•pend 
Opt Service Rate .vroup Service Assigned To; 
> GA GARBAGE PO MU I Active Service 
GO GARBAGE ONLY PO <,~tJ I Available Se:r~ice 
> ST STORM WATER PO MO I Inactive Service 
> SW SEWER · PO NP I Active Service 
> WA WATER PO :MO I Active Service 
F2=Bqaifu: F3=Ezit 1'4=Prompt F_S=Update owner F6=Recurring charge 
F7-:AJ.te:rnate addr F8=Reprint appl F24=Ko_re keys 
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EXHIBIT C 
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U'l'::lZUUUl (' 0: CITY OF POCATELLO 
cut ~Saa.er Service$ Maintenance 
Customer ID: 46681 Name: HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK 
Location ID: 28918 Addr: 4530 S 5TH AVE 
Cycle/Route •... ; 02 26 Amount due ...•. 
Initiation date 10194 Pending ....... : 
Termination date • . C.A.F.# ••••••.• 
Number · of bills . . . 1 Maintain E-notification 
Cust/Loc status {F4) A Customer type (F4) 
9/0j/14 
08:06:41 
$5,392.00 
$.OD 
Y=Yes Inactive 
Typ1;1 options, press Ent~i'. · 
1=Select · 2=Assign 3=0ser defined S=J)isplay &=Assistance program 
7=1.ate group change 8=Renewable 9=Suspend 
Opt Service Rat:e group Service Ass;i.gned io: 
> GA GAR~AGE PO MO I Active Service 
GO GARBAGE ONLY PO MU I Available Service 
> ST STORM WATER PO MO r· Inactive Service 
> SW SEWER PO MU I Active Service 
> WA WATER PO MU I Active Service 
F2=Eq11ifax F3=Exit F4=Prompt F5=UpQate owner F6=Recurring charge 
F7==Alternate addr F8==Rep:riiit app1 · F24=More keys 
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BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ. 
SAM L. ANGELL, ESQ. 
NATHAN R. STARNES, ESQ. 
HALL ANGELL STARNES, LLP 
1075 S Utah Avenue, Suite 150 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Telephone (208) 522-3003 
Fax (208) 621-3008 
!SB No. 's 2434, 7012 & 7484 
bgh@hasattorneys.com 
sla@hasattorneys.com 
nrs@hasattorneys.com 
Attorneys for Defendant City of Pocatello 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY 
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on 
behalf of itself and all others similarly 
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself 
and all others similarly situated, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
municipality, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Bonneville ) 
Case No. CV-2014-1520-0C 
AFFIDAVIT OF BLAKE G. HALL 
Blake G. Hall, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am one of the attorneys for the Defendant in the above-referenced matter. I am over 
the age of eighteen and competent to testify. This affidavit is based on my personal 
knowledge unless otherwise stated. 
AFFIDAVIT OF BLAKE G. HALL-1 
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.. 
2. That attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the Third Affidavit of 
David K. Swindell from the Bannock County case of Building Contractors v. City of 
Pocatello, Case No. CV-2001-5228-0C. 
3. That attached hereto as Exhibit Bis a true and correct copy of the Idaho Secretary of 
State printout of the Certificate of Assumed Business Name of Hill-Vu Rocking R 
Mobile Home Parks. 
4. FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT. 
Dated this _g_ day of April, 2015. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO, befo 
for said State, this;)._ day of April, 2015. 
LESLIE GEORGESON 
Notary Public 
State of Idaho 
AFFIDAVIT OF BLAKE G. HALL. 2 
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.. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following 
this~ day of April, 2015, by the method indicated below:· 
Michael D. Gaffuey, Esq. 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado Street _ 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Fax: 529-9732 
Nathan M. Olsen, Esq. 
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN 
485 "E" Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Fax: 524-3391 
AFFIDAVIT OF Bl.AKE G. HALL- 3 
[l('f Mailing 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[M Mailing 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
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BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ. 
SAM L. ANGELL, ESQ. 
NATHAN R. STARNES, ESQ. 
HALL ANGELL STARNES, LLP 
901 Pier View Drive, Ste. 203 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Telephone (208) 522-3003 
Fax (208) 646-7108 
JSB No. 's 2434, 7012 & 7484 
bgh@hasattomeys.com 
sla@hasattomeys.com 
nrs@hasattorneys.com 
Attorneys for Defendant City of Pocatello 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY 
BUILDING CONTRACTORS 
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST IDAHO, 
an Idaho non-profit corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
municipality, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
; ss. 
County of Bannock ) 
Case No. CV-2001 ~5228-0C 
THIRD AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID K. 
SWINDELL 
David K. Swindell, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
I. I am the current Chief Financial Officer ("CFO'') for the City of Pocatello. I have served 
as the CFO of the City since August, 200 I. I am over the age of eighteen and competent to 
testify in this matter. This affidavit is based on 'my personal knowledge unless otherwise stated. 
THIRD AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID K. SWINDELL· I 
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2. In my capacity as the CFO for the City of Pocatello, I am intimately familiar with the 
financial affairs of the City and its adoption of policies related to franchise fees, Retum on 
Equity policies, PILOT fees, Enterprise Funds, and the Capacity/Connection fees. 
3. Plaintiff has a fundamental misunderstanding of how capital improvements are financed 
by the City. A capital improvement does not have to be paid for by a bond. There is no 
requirement that a municipality go into debt to build capital improvements. Often times, the City 
will pay for capital improvements projects without any debt being incurred. These projects are 
financed entirely from user fees that are collected and accumulated over time. Where a very 
large project is required and it is not practical to finance the project without debt, a bond will be 
requested. Under Idaho law, a revenue bond is appropriately issued pursuant to Article 8, 
Section 3, Idaho Constitution and the Idaho Revenue Bond Act, Idaho Code §§ 50-1027 through 
50-1042. It is worth emphasizing, however, that not all capital improvement projects are 
financed through a revenue bond and there is no legal requirement that a municipality undertake 
debt to finance capital improvements when the improvement. can be paid using existing cash 
reserves. 
4. User fees have no relationship to the connection/capacity fee. The connection/capacity 
fee is only charged to recover a new connector's proportionate share of the City's wastewater 
and water backbone facility costs. "A new customer must ·'buy-in" to this system by making a 
contribution equal to the amount of equity a similar existing customer has in the system. Note 
this is not the cost to p1·ovide new service to the new custo111er, and when new capacity is 
needed, all customers will bear the cost" (City of Pocatello Wastewater Utility Financial 
Planning Study, June 18, 2010 Red Oak Consulting, page 6-1 "System Capacity Fees", emphasis 
added). Of importance, and framing how the City views a capacity fee, the connection/capacity 
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fee does not cover expansion. ThusJ the Connection fee is a contribution equaJ to the amount of 
equity a similar existing customer has in the system. The Connection fee is not the cost to 
provide new service to new customers; when new capacity is needed, all customers will bear the 
cost equally. The connection fee is to offset the cost for existing users whose capacity will be 
diminished by the new users and will, thus, require replacement of existing infrastructure more 
regularly. 
5. The water and wastewater departments have money held in four different fund groups. 
The first fund group is Fund 31 and 32. Funds 31 and 32 are the operating funds. This fund is · 
comprised entirely of user fees that are collected by the water and wastewater departments, 
respectively. The second fund group is Funds 37 and 38. Funds 37 and 38 are the capacity fees. 
This fund is comprised entirely of the connection/capacity fees that have been collected by the 
water and wastewater departments. The third fund group is Funds 60 and 61. Funds 60 and 61 
are the debt service funds for the water and wastewater departments. The debt service funds are 
reserves that are set aside to meet the annual debt service payments required by the bond 
covenants. The final group is Funds 73 and 74. Funds 73 and 74 are the construction funds. 
These funds are where all of the proceeds from the bonds are placed for water and wastewater; 
Money for bonded projects will be withdrawn from these funds to pay for approved bonded 
projects. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the City's Monthly Cash 
Report for June 2013. 
6. The Monthly Cash Reports are public records and can be accessed on the City's website 
at http://www.pocatello.us/finance/finance_cash.htm. The Monthly Case Report identifies the 
current cash in each of the City's respective funds, including the funds above. 
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7. Currently, the City has not spent any of the connection/capacity fees. Rather, these fees 
have been placed in a .dedicated fund (Fund Nos. 37 and 38). Fund 37 holds the 
connection/capacity fees for the water department. Fund 38 holds the connection/capacity fees 
for the wastewater department C'WPC"). Each of the respective funds contains all of the 
connection/capacity fees gathered between 2007 and current (as of July 2013). As of June 2013, 
Fund 37 contained $1,391,089.36 and Fund 38 contained $1,217,131.20. Fund 37 and 38 is 
dedicated to holding only the connection/capacity fees. There are no other funds that are held 
here. 
8. Funds 37 and 38 were initially created in March 2013 to increase transparency of how the 
connection/capacity fees were spent. As ·of todays date, none of the connection/capacity fees 
have been spent. Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the Monthly Cash 
Report for February 2013. Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of the 
Monthly Cash Report for March 2013. 
9. Currently, I am in the process of compiling the FY2014 Budget for the City. The City 
has detennined that the connection/capacity fees will be used for debt service. As such, the City 
has budgeted approximately $725,000 for debt service for the water department in FY2014. The 
City intends to use the remaining funds from Fund 3 7 for debt service in FY2015. The City has 
budgeted approximately $1,384,000 for debt service for the wastewater department in FY2014. 
This will exhaust nearly all of the funds in Fund 38. Using this approach, a11 of the 
connection/capacity fees can be accounted for and there has been no funds transferred to the 
general funds from the connection/capacity fees. 
10. All of the bond funds have been placed and segregated into construction accounts found 
in Funds 73 and 74. Of the initial $9.5 million dollar water bond from 2008, there remains 
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approximately $1,303,841.57 of that bond. The remaining amount has been spent on capital 
improvements projects (e.g., water main replacement or construction of the South Valley Water 
Tank). Currently, there are no bond proceeds in Fund 74 (WPC). Despite the constnlction funds 
being exhausted, the City still must retire the bond. This is done using funds from user fees and 
co1U1ection/capacity fees over the course of several years. The funds that are used to make the 
annual debt service payment sit in a reserve account fund (Funds 60 and 61 ). 
1 I. While the City does budget for certain items, the amounts actually expended may not be 
consistent with the budget. More specifically, a budget is simply an attempt to identify how 
money that is collected by the City will be spent in a given year. If the money collected for the 
year is lower than that budgeted, the money cannot be spent consistent with the budget. 
Furthermore, as it relates to water and wastewater budgets, the budget does not differentiate 
between bonded funds and user fee funds. The City will spend fees consistent with the available 
funds in the operational fund (and when available, funds in the construction fund). Simply 
because a project is budgeted for does not mean that the project actually was canied out. 
Moreover, just because a project is budgeted at a certain amount does not mean the project 
actually cost that same amount. 
12. It is also important to emphasize that the connection/capacity fee is entirely separate from 
the ROE or PILOT fee. As I have explained previously, the PILOT fee (rate of return) is a 
payment in lieu of taxes fee charged directly to the utility. The fee operates similar to the 
property taxes assessed to and paid by Idaho Power or Intennountain Gas ( except the PILOT fee 
does not include County or school district). The PILOT fee is a cost of doing business for 
both the water and sewer departments. The respective departments charge user fees and those 
fees take into consideration the 'PILOT fees that have been charged. The PILOT fee is set by the 
THIRD AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID K. SWINDELL - 5 
471
City, with my assistance. The PILOT fee is derived from the City's property tax against the 
systems valuation. The PILOT fees are not assessed to arty specific individual or entity in the 
City but are only assessed against the water or wastewater department respectively (there are 
other departments that also pay PILOT fees). Attached hereto as Exhibit D is a true and correct 
copy of the FY2014 Budget worksheet accounting for the PILOT fees (including the FY2013 tax 
rate being applied). 
13. I have reviewed the expert report and affidavit of Mr. Hunter. Mr. Hunter incorrectly 
asserts that the finance department of the City lacks appropriate oversight. I personally am 
involved with multiple discussions with the City's legal department regarding all aspects of the 
City's budget and fee systems. Numerous discussions with legal counselhave occurred about 
the appropriateness of the PILOT fee and the best method to implement this fee. The PILOT fee 
has 110 relationship to the connection/capacity fee. If the connection/capacity fee is detennined 
to be unreasonable, the PILOT fee is not invalidated. 
14~ I have also informed the auditor of all potential legal issues, including the PILOT fee. 
Each year the auditor has separate meetings with the City's legal staff and the Mayor. I am 
present at both meetings to explain the nature of the office call (make sure the auditor is aware of 
the City's lawsuits and that Management understands their role),. I then leave to ensure my 
presence does not improperly influence the auditor. Following the meetings, the auditor prepares 
a note disclosure in the published financial report that identifies any financial exposure that is 
material to the entity. The City takes its responsibility in keeping the auditor informed very 
seriously and has done so each year. Mr. Hunter's assertions that the City's financial department 
lacks oversight is conclusory, false, speculates about what conversations were had with the 
City's auditor. The City complies with all aspects ofGAAP. 
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15. Because I have a background in accounting, I am aware of general accepted accounting 
principles ("GAAP"). I employ those principles when I prepare financial statements for the City. 
Mr. Gallagher's statement that GAAP is not applicable in developing his recommended rates is a 
correct statement of fact Accounting principles relate to how transactions have occurred and 
what the financial position of the entity is at a specific point in time. Accounting principles are 
not forward-looking with an attempt to predict future needs. Convers~ly, the purpose ofa 
financial rate study, such as the rate studies used to detennine the capacity fees, is necessarily 
' 
forward-looking. Accounting principles can help detelinine what fuel costs may be in 3-5 years, 
what an EPA discharge pennit may require, or what the effect a significant boom in development 
might be on the existing water systems. A financial rate study is ,designed to specifically address 
these concerns in an effort to assist the City can maintain viable and long~lasting infrastructure. 
Without a rate study, the City would never be able to plan for future needs based on current 
trends. As the City's CFO, I rely heavily on these types of studies, in conjunction with 
discussions with the various utility superintendents and the Direct of Public Works to ensure the 
City's future needs are accounted for and met. The failure to use rate studies that project future 
needs would be a breach of my obligations to the City and its residents. 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SA YETH NAUGHT. 
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/';, ,., 
DAVID K. SWINDELL 
SUBSCRJBED AND SWORN TO, before me the undersigned, a Notal'y Public in anp 
for said State, this~ day of August, 2013. 
KONNI R. KENDELL 
NOTARY PUl:ILIC 
STATE OF 1DAH0 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby ce11ifythat I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following 
this ../.l- day of August, 2013, by hand delivery, mailing with the necessary postage affixed 
thereto, facsimile, or overnight mail. 
Nathan M. Olsen 
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN 
485 "En Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho s·3402 
Fax: 208-524-3391 
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[ J Mailing 
~ Hand Delivery 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] E-Mail 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Courthouse Box 
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Monthly City Cash Report 
A short discussion to provide helpful infonnation on how to read the report. 
a. Timing. We present this report to the Council on the third Thursday of the month, reporting 
the cash situation as of the end of prior month. Thus, during the October meeting we report the cash 
situation as of the end of September and so on. 
b. What is included. The cash report displays all the money that the city has. A household 
analogy might be list of what you hold in all of your checking and savings accounts, There are things 
other than cash that are impo11ant. Jike debt and non-financial assets. We report those in our annual 
audited financial report. Still, cash is very important and the Council monitors it monthly. 
c. Structure of the report. 
J) Statement of Cash and Cash Equivalents for City Funds. By "city funds,'' we mean the money 
avai1able to support operations, as opposed to money restricted to support activity in three trust funds. 
We report that separately, per 3) below. In this one-page section, citizens should note how much 
money we have, how it Went up or down versus the prior month, and how the money is invested. It is 
nonnal for the city to "lose" cash in most months, as expenses exceed revenue. The exception is in 
January and July, when revenue spikes with semi-annual property tax receipts. 
2) Change in Cash and Cash Equivalents for Qty Funds. This one page report details how the 
cash changed during the month, with emphasis on revenue received. The major expense is "all checks 
issued." We don't detail the expenses here but we do provide a separate report that does {Payroll and 
Claims Report). Citizens should note the various revenue sources and we often provide comparisons 
to prior years on important items such as sales tax revenue and so on. 
3) Statement of Cash and Investment Balances for Trust Funds. This is where we discuss the 
status of the three trust funds, with Police Retirement being the largest. This one page shows the 
investment status, discusses changes·during the month and summarizes the fund balances all on one 
page. Citizens should note how this money is invested and how fund balances changed. Since the 
retirement fund has long-term liabilities, it is typically invested in long-tenn bonds. 
4) Fund balances for All Funds. This report displays the cash by city fund, with a comparison to the 
previous month. The total on this report equals the total of the city funds {report #I) and the trust 
funds {report #3). The second page provides discussion and analysis for the month. Citizens should 
note funds that are negative, as these are borrowers from the General Fund. Some funds are always 
negative because they are financed with federal grants. We spend the money and then wait to get 
reimbursed. While typical, it is sti11 important to monitor. · 
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CITY OF POCATELLO 
-
STATEMENT OF CASH, CASH EQUIVALENTS AND INVE~Ef!!5 BALANCES FOR CITY FUNDS __ 
ASOF JUNE_30!._2D13 
,..--------
___ .............. 
.. 
-.......-...... 
·-
.-, 
·---Value at Market 
Cash cm Hand $ 29,107.71 
cash in Banks 2;822,207.36 
--Cash held bvthird parties 681,042.46 
Cash held atthe State of Idaho Investment Pool 7,851,721.07 
Total cash $ 11,384,078.62 
lnvesbnenls at Faim1arket Value 
Current Investments 
City Government 
Certificate of Deposit $ 2,594,813.04 
Money Market Funds "Th, 
.. ,.·-b.e.r'4-D···- $ 5,009,636.95 
Total cash equivalents $1,2, 8,<El94.36 f om last $7;604,449.99 
Total cash and cash equivalents monl h. Repres1 nts ~ $ 18,988,528.61 
1::.! .. ··- .. ----" --· -··-· m.estment ~ 
Lona-Tei'm Investments 
General Government 
State Investment Pool Bond Fund $ 5,029,755.66 
...... _.., 
... ; ·-·-1 · 
--·-loni erterm 
Total long-tenn investments inve stments f--+ $ 5,029,755.66 
Total Cash, Cash Equivalents and . .,, II._..__ __ ,_..._ ~-
Long-Tenn invesbnents hli w": Down $1,278,69: .43 --1 .$ 24,018,284.27 
1t0 in last mor1h 
·-
.. 
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--· 
Change In Cash and Equivalents City Funds 
June 30, 2013 
--.. -..----
_ _..._ .......... _ 
Cash Receipts 
-- 1-~·- I Cemetery Receipts 18,765.00 0.47% Police Resource Officiers - School DisC25 - 19,576.34 0.49% ____ ,.. --Golf Lease 22A70.17 0.56% AFLAC remainder receipted 26,506.41 0.66% 
--
· Em.ironmental·Engineering 28,100.0Q 0.70% 
-Police Fees and Fines 33.~5.74 0.85% 
-Airport Rent & Landing Fees 39,519.35 0.99% 
Cheyenne Conidor.;,ID Dept ofTransportation 40,98M9 1.02% 
---~ Worker:s Compensati_on Premiums 45,796.SS 1.14% 
Transit SeMce ChafQes 51,593.26 1.29% 
Airport Security Grant 6$.537, ()0 1.71% 
:=-IJIIDllllllR~~lllf~li~-~~?ii~'fitW: 1.71% 
Water SeMce Charges and LID 119 receipts . 79,295.661 1.98% 
Community Recreation Center Ser.foe Charges 1 92,Q45'.321 2.29% 
: -ij~~fliifi[fi}fil-t, ·: . -; : 2.82%' 
Building Fees and Permits 116,572 .. 84 2.91% 
Other l\lliscellanE!ous receipts 119,p92,99 2.!38% 
Water Pollution control Ser\4ce Charges 187,065;97 4.66% 
Ambulance I 240,641.58 6.00% 
Bannock County tax 860,037.57 21.44% 
Utility Billing Senfce Charges 1,738,.097.03 43.33% 
from outside murces 4,011,262.06 100.00% 
Cash Disbursements 
Total payroll and material claims per July 4th report -5, 176,735.34 
Leas Trust Funds Claims 58,523.20 
City Fund payroll and material claims ~s. 11 a,212.14 
Merchant fees (credit card acceptance feest 0.00 
Bank sel'llice charges -2,513.02 
-Retume(i Checks I -2,450.63 
Bond payments expensed -114,490.28 
Other checks cut (Libraiy trustee, Youth forum, Police narc's) -2,545.27 
Administrati,on support fee 54.92 
Total ·cam dispersed to .outside sources -5,240.156.42 
Net ~Sh received by operations -1,228;894.36 
-Internal activity 
Long-te!Tll inwstments sold 
City PortfOlio 
. 
Other disbursements 
capital Gain/Loss 
1operating result for June 2013: 
I 
Other Receipts I 
Principal Accrued 1Down $1,278,692.43 I 7,895.60 
Long-tenn imestment purchased 
"' 
0.00 
Net ,;hange In cash and Jang term lnvesfment 
"' 
-1,220,998.76 
Fair Market Value Adjustments 
"' City Long Term pQrtfolio 
' 
-57',693.67 
Net change in cash value and long tenn investment value i $ (1,278,692.43)1 
I 
·- ". 
.... 
- -· 
'.-. ---·· .. 
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CITY OF POCATELLO 
STATEMENT OF CASH, CASH EQUIVALENTS AND INVESTMENTS BALANCES FOR TRUST FUNDS 
._......,..,... 
AS OF JUNE 30, 2013 
-----·-·~ ~ 
----------·· Cashin Bank 
--· 
$219,936.46 
-~--Cash held in Broker Accounts 32.08 
---·--·-
- ·-
_Total cash and i:ash equivalents $219,968.54 
LONG TERM INVESTMENTS 
-·-~--Municioal Bonds $4,985,465.09 
----FNMA. Mortgage Notes 
--
"All the Trust money we 2,010,847.90 
FHLMC Mortaaae Notes 
----~m- have": Down $279,455.59 for ·- 39,010.29 GNl'll\l\ MortQaae Pools the month 31,237.63 
--Other Aaencv Bonds 
' 
284,078.30 
·-FHLB notes "'-.. $92,592.00 
Total Cash, Cash Equivalents and Long-Term Investments ia. $.7;663, 199.75 
---- Change in Cash and Equivalents For Trust Funds 
For June 2013 
Cash ·Receipts 
-Return of lnwstment Capital 4,052.31 
Interest (;i~~~ .. , . .,____ 
hom outst!e. sources 26,841.46 
Cash Disbursements 
All checks issued -58,481.15 
---Postage ,.10.12 
. ----
Bank fees -31.93 
Admin Support Fee -54.92 
-
. . Total cesh dispersed _____ , 
to outside sources 
Net cash recel11ed by operations_ 
-
-$31,7~6.66 
Internal activity 
Long-term inwstments sold 
Police Retirement Portfolio -$4,055.59 
Other disbursements 
Capital Gain/Loss -32.78 
--Other Receipts 
Principal Accrued 
Long-tem, inwstment purchased Trust operating result for 0.00 
Net change in cash and long term investment the month: Down $279,455.59 -$35,825.03 
Fair Market Value Adjustments (Unrealized) 
- ''('A~W:---·-Police Long Term portfolio 
-........... Iii' 
--· Net change l,i cash value and long term investment value .. -$279,455.59 
TRUST FUND BALANCES - CHANGE 
June 30, 2013 
FUNDS CASH CASH NET 
ENDING ENDING CHANGE 
BALANCE BALANCE IN CASH 
05131/13 08130/13 BYFUND 
POLICE RETIREMENT lRUST 7,926,062.70 7,646,608.91 -$279,453.79 
AIRPORT BOND lRUST 16,589.47 16,590.84 1.37 
SO.BAN.HVVY.DEV.TRUST 3.17 0.00 -3.17 
TOTALS $7,942,655.34 $7,663,199.75 -$279 455.59 
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I CASH I CASH NET 
·- ~-~----· -I ENDING ENDING CHANGE 
-·- - -----------~--=· 
J 
FUNDS I BALANCE._+ BALANCE IN CASH 
·- BYFUND ·-. 05131113 .06/30/13 
001 _ GENERAL FUND 2,952,642.83 . 2,313,520.26 (639,022.57) 
-
002 LIABILTJY INSURANCE FUND ·-- ~1,509.39 -· 606,974.82 '65,465.43 
003 S1REETFUND 
-·~-· 
1,233,730.06 1,018,370.41 (215,359.67) 
004 RECREATION FUND 3.39,341.09 325,862.89 (13,478.20) 
005 CEMElERY FUND 232.374.01 215,442.99 (16. 931. 02) 
006 AIRPORT FUND 349,'371.81 332.,750.98 (16,620.83) 1007 
- LIBRARY FUND 418,421.59 - 370,385,43 (48,036.16) 
009 POC. REG. TRANSIT FUND -· (344;823.21 ) __ ._ (524,414.38 ) (179,591.17) 
012 VIDEO SERVICES FL.IND - - -~ 93,941.03 (18,405.22) 112,346.25 
013 BUSINESS IMPROV. FUND {0.00) {0;00) 0.00 
014 CHIEF 1HEATRE FUND 113,032.32 112,864.86 (167.46) 
016 EMERGENCY REPAIR FUND 2,371.95 10,692.37 8,320.42 
017 STORMWAlER ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE FUND 136,007.19 166,265.37 30,258.18 
SUBTOTAL SPECIAL REVENUE FUNDS 3;133,&R47 2,729,136.77 (404,545.70) 
030 SANITATION FUND 3,443,460.94 3.497,088.01 53,627.07 
031 WAlERFUND 1,458,544.44 1,443,947.04 (14,597.40) 
03.'2 WAlER POlllffiON CONTROL 2,011;255:54 1,756,681.54 (254,574.00) 
---~-----~~-----···--·-- -- ~-~---···· 035 AMBULANCE FUND 149,257.80 1s1.m.os 47;91~.28 
037 WAlER CAPACITY FEE 1 ;364,869.36 1,391,089.36 2S,220,00 
038 WPC CAPACITY FEE 1, 193;031.20 1,217,131.20 24;100.00 
SUBTOTAL ENTERPRISE FUNDS e;s20;41s.2e 9,503,114.23 {117,305.05 
050 INFORMATION SVS1EMS FUND 203;651.33 221,794.72 17,943;39 
052 UTILITY BILLING FUND 710;269.62 705,948.41 (3,321;21) 
·-~--053 MEDICAL INSURANCE FUND 1,351_,833. 70 1,382,667.65 30,833.96 
054 PUBLICWORKS DIRECTOR 64,463.07 79,747.71 15,264.64 
055 FUEL FUND 155,493.39 121,713.45 (33,779.94) 
.-~M~·.~ ·~w~,~~--··~-.~~-· --~---- . ·-· 056 WORKERS INSURANCE FUND 870,976.53 &91,862.71 20,906.18 
SUBTOTAL INTERNAL SERVICE FUNDS I 3,3&6;887.64 3,404, 754.&tl 47,867.02 
059 DEBT SERVICE FUND GOV (34,783.09) (31,044.09) 3,739.00 
060 DEBT Sl:RVICE FUND WPC (129.36) 219,944.80 220,074.16 
051 DEBT SERVICE FUND WAlER 719,722.52 719,696.60 (25.92) 
SUBTOTAL DEBT SERVICE FUNDS 684,810.07 908,597;31. 223,787;24 
070 FEDERAL AID PROJECTS (296;228.04) (474,337.00) (178;108.96) 
071 S1REET SPECIAL PROJECTS 310,000.00 310,000.00 0.00 
072 AIRPORT CONSTRUCTION (481,696.86) (542;544.18) (60,847.32) 
.073 WAlER CONSTRUCTION ··~----~·-····-~-~--~ ~ 1,353;089.50 - 1;303,841.57 {49,247.93) 
075 FIRE APPARATIJS CAPITAL 33,054.00 37,185.75 4,131.75 
076 BUILDING RENOVATION 81,199.00 86,939,00 5,740.00 
on SlREETEQUIPMENT CAPITAL 0.00 0.00 0.00 
078 CAPITAL ACQUISffiON FUND 399,319.10 400,402.43 1,083.33 
079 ANIMAL CONS1RUCTION FUND 2,754,380.45 2,753,816.52 (563.93) 
SUBTOTAL CAPITAL PROJECT FUNDS 4,153,117.15 3,875,304.09 (277,813.06) 
OBO FORECLOSURE STABILllATION (0.00) (0.00) 0.00 
oa1 CDR-CDBG ENTITLEMENT FUND (13,406.77) (144,773.21) (131.366.44) 
082 
,_ 
ENERGY BLOCK GRANT --------·-·~-~-· (0.00) (0.00) -··----·· 0.00 
088 POLICE GRANT FUNDS " 9,780.87 10,893.52 1,112.65 
SU_BTOTAL GRANT REVENUE FUNDS (3,625.90) (133,879.691 (130,253.791 
951 POLICE RETIREMENT TRUST 7,926;062.70 7,546,808.91 (279,453.79) 
952 'RETIREMENTPAYOlITTRUST 415;882.76 419,?17.28 3,334.52 
953 AIRPORT BOND TRUST 16,589.47 16,590.84 1.37 
954 EIDC REVOLV. LOAN 1RUST 132,944.30 132,918.38 (25.92) 
955 CDR LOAN TRUST 286,334.41 296,429.49 10,095.08 
957 ZOD1MPROVEMENT1RUST 72,282.69 73,105.69 823.00 
···-····-··--958 WAlER ACQUISITION TRUST 116,239.21 116,239.21 o.oo 
959 SIDEWALK REVOL. LOAN TRUST 13,169.18 13,143.26 (25.92) 
960 STANDROD 1RUST 1 B0.(i72.56 180,574.05 UiO 
961 SO.BAN.H\NY.DEV. lRUST 3.17 0.00 (3.17) 
962 FACADE LOAN lRUST 77,177.85 77,151.93 (25.92) 
il63 PARKS AND RECREATION DEVELOPMENTlRUST 3,288.43 3,288.43 0.00 
964 PROPERTY ABATEMENT FUND 66,778.06 70,073.09 3,295.03 
SUBTOTAL TRUST AND RESTRICTED FUNDS 9,307,324.79 9,045,340.67 (261;984.221 
970 SEIZED FUNDS AGENCY 24,349.12 23,364.12 (985.00) 
971 UNCLAIMED PROPERTY AGENCY 0.00 0.00 o.oo 
973 STAlE SALES TAX.AGENCY 0.00 0.00 0.00 
g74 COBRA INS. AGENCY 10,124.59 12,231.70 2,107.11 
~-~ 
-·---.. -· 
............. --......... 
"nn nnn nnn 
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~1::>U: 1 3>11'1NUKUU Jl"(U::>1 HlLl,::>/Z.oti • HIU;0/4.!. ·1.ou, 
961T ISO. BAN. HWY. DEV. lRUST --- ·-·-----'" 1--------·-·---·-··,-····-·· . O.l. ~ ·-·- ------~-~-----: I 3.17 l (3.17); 
962 FACADE LOANlRUST [ --77,177.85 77,151.93' ---(25.92)i 
-963 PARKS AND RECREAllON DEVELOPMENT TRUST 3,288.43 3,288.43 o.oo 
964 PROPERlY ABATEMENT FUND 66,778.06 70,073.09 3,295.03 
SUBTOTAL TRUST AND RE$TRICTED FUNDS 9,307,324.79 !!,045;340.57 1261,984.22) 
970 SEIZED FUNDS AGENCY 24,349.12 23,364.12 (985.00) 
971 UNCLAIMED PROPER1Y AGENCY 0.00 D.00 o.oo 
973 STATE SALES TAXAGENCY 0.00 o.oo 0.00 
974 COBRA INS. AGENCY 
----~-i=- 10,124.59 12,231.70 2, 107,11 975 FIREFIGHTERSECTION 218 0.00 0.00 0.00 
SUBTOTAL AGENCY FUNDS 34,473.71 35,595.82 1,122.11 
TOTAL ALL FUND TYPES 33,239,632.04 . .31,681,484.02 (1,558,148.02) 
o;scus.sioo & Ana!¥§1s ("Ql&Y Funds''): 
.... 
,_ City Operating result for June 2013 was a loss of $1,271!,692.43. ,_ 
,_ ,_ 
,- City Revenues: : June was an a1.erage month for re\enues (S4m \6 $3.2m last year). We recei\.ed Slate Liquor I-
,- re1.enues of 113,302.00, an increase of 3.69% o\er last years 109,267.00. We recei1.ed the following grant rewnues: ,_ 
,_ Airport Grant of $61!,427.00, Federal Construction Grant of $40,988.09. I-
,- City Expenses: ~penses were nonnal for June. We had $5.2 million in expense, {w. $4.7 million in 2012) and 4 
.... 
,_ million in re-.enue such that at month's end, the city is down $1,278,692.43 (city funds). .... 
,_ L.. 
.__ City Investment .Posh.Ire: At month .end, City funds were 79% In cash or ,short-tenn imiestments and 21 % iii long tenn .... 
,- in\estments. $12,881,476.73 ofall assets (54%) were in one of the two State of toalw imestment pools and .... 
,_ $5,009,636.95 of all assets (21%) were in money market accounts. Key lnwstment rates: L.. 
--
----
~ 
,- Investments Rate Change vs. lest month I-
-
State Investment Pool Short Term: 0.1648% .up.0103% .... 
·-
State Investment Pool long Term: 1;945% down.116% ~ 
,- Money Market rate .05% no change .... 
-ft . 
...... 
~ Trust Operating Result for June is a loss of $279,452.52. We issued $58,481.15 in.benefits. Interest earnings of 
-
$22,789.15 were not enough to coi.er expenses and unrealized market losses of $243,630.77. 01.erall, the trusts funds 
hai.e 2.8% of their imestments in cash or cash equivalents and 93.2% are in l009er term im.estments. 
-
- Combll!l!d Cl&Y i!!!!:I Itllil lDIUDil El!![[AWIDg An1IJ111; '---
- All the money we haw: $ 31,681.41!4.02 ... 
-
Less the stuff we really shouldn't touch: L.. 
-
Sanilatioil Enterprise 3,4:97, 088.01 I-
I·-
Water Enterprtse 3,467,485.21 
-WPC Enterprtse 1,s1s,s2e.34 ,_ Medical Resene 1,382,667.86 '-
c-- Workers Comp. ReseM 891,882.71 ;... 
c-- Trust Funds Hia3Hl~Zf:i 
·-
,- Result: $ 12,802,534.34 
-
,- This positi\e number, hence no in!emal borrowing this month. It ls $6,692,065.42 more than one year ago. Toe total L.. 
-
amount of cash. cashequh.elents, and long tel!TI im.estments Is $4,551,463-42 more than one year ago (much due to the .... 
$2,753,816 in the animal shelter construction fund, the result of bond proceeds for the project; rest due mostly to modest .... 
,- improi.ements in utility cash balances). .... 
,- .... 
I-
Outlook: July will be an abow aierage month for re\enues. We will receh.e our second largest property tax remittance 
.... 
from Bannock County for property taxes paid in June, which is when the second half of the annual assessment Is due. 
'-
,-
We expect expenses to be a1erag, with some allowance tbr seasonal contstructiori acthAty and peak employment for 
'-
seasonal summer operations. 
,_ ... 
~ Overall: June's performance was satisfacto'Y. '-' 
-
.... 
,_ Respectfully. .... 
- Da\.id Swindell, Chief Financial Officer 
L.. 
,- L.. 
,__ .... 
,-
1--
,_ 
'-
,_ '-
I I I I 
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EXHIBIT B 
482
Monthly City Cash Report 
A short discussion to provide helpfu I information on how to read the report. 
a. Timing. We present this report to the Council on the third Thursday of the month, reporting 
the cash situation as of the end of prior month. Thus, during the October meeting we report the cash 
situation as of the end of September and so on. 
b. What is included. The cash report displays all the money that the city has. A household 
analogy mjght be list of what you hold in all of your checking and savings accounts. There are things 
other than cash that are i111portantt like debt and non~financial assets. We report those in our annuaJ 
audited financial report. Still, cash is very important and the Council monitors it monthly. 
c. Structure of the report. 
1) Statement of Cash and Cash Equivalents for City Funds. By "city funds:' we mean the money 
available to support operations, as opposed to money restricted to support activity in three trust funds. 
We report ~hat separately, per 3) below. In this one .. page section, citizens should note how much · 
money we have, how it went up or down versus the prior month, and how the money is invested, It is 
normal for the city to "Jose" cash in most months, as expenses exceed revenue. The exception is in 
January and July, when revenue spikes with semi-annual property tax receipts. 
2) Change in Cash ·and Cash Equivalents for City Funds. This one page report· details how the 
cash changed during the month, with emphasis on revenue received. The major expense is "all checks 
issued." We don't detail the expenses here but we do provide a separate report that does (Payroll and 
Claims Report). Citizens should note the various revenue sources and we often provide comparisons 
to prior years on important items such as sales tax revenue and so on. 
3) Statement of Cash and Investment Balances for Trust Funds. This is where we discuss the 
status of the three trust funds, with Police Retirement being the largest. This one page shows the 
investment status, discusses changes during the month and summarizes the fund balances all on one 
page. Citizens should note how this money is invested and how fund balances changed. Since the 
retirement fund has long-term liabilities, it is typically invested in long~term bonds. 
4) Fund balances for All Funds. This report displays the cash by city fund, with a comparison to the 
previous month. The total on this report equals the total of the city funds (report# 1) and the trust 
funds (report #3). The second page provides discussion and analysis for the month. Citizens should 
note funds that are negative, as these are borrowers from the General Fund. Some funds are always 
negative because they are financed with federal grants. We spend the money and then wait to get 
reimbursed. While typical, it is still important to monitor. 
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CIT\" Of POCATELLO 
--· STATEMENT OF CASH, CASH EQUIVALENTS AND INVESTMENTS BALANCES FOR CITY FUNDS 
-·-~· 
ASOF FEBRUARY 28, 2013 
- ·-·--· 
·-
Value atMa_rket 
Cashon Hand $ 25,612.70 
Cash in.Banks 12,658,226.76 
Cash held by third nartles 684,271.95 
Cash held at the State of Idaho Investment Pool 6,676,027.59 
Total cash $ 20;044, 139.00 
lnvesbnents at Fairmarket Value 
current Investments 
City Gov~.rnment 
CertlfiCErte of Deposit $ 2,593,954.73 
Total cash eq1,1ivalents "Thel lumber": i own $2,593,954. 73 
Total cash and cash equivalents .p1;111:10, llilU.1'1 Tl'O TIRISI r $ 22,638,093.73 
- ·-·-.t.t.." 
---·--~~ ft-·· ,~ 
caslio1 short'tenn 
Lona-Tenn lravestments imiestr ~ts 
General Government 
State Investment Poof Bond Fund $ 5,037,794.97 
Ren ""Sents 11 %. 
T<~tal long-tenn inve$bnenus tota in longer erm -.. $ 5,037,794.97 
imv istments 
Total Cash, Cash Eauivalenls and " .. .. 
Long-Tenn investmen1S 11e": Down .. ··- H $ 27,675,888.70 lhil $2,011,68 .96 
frc mlastmorm, 
. ··-. 
.. 
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----
.. 
Change in Cash and EquivalenlsCity Funds 
.. . .. - .. 
,-
February 28, 2013 
----
cash Receipts 
Police Caribou Cnty grant ·--·-· 8,354.84 0.23% 
····--.-.-.-~ Airport Grant 12,610.00 0.35% 
Animal Control Fees and Fines 15,480.33 0.43% 
Water & LID119 16,648:89 0.47% 
Fire fighting reimburse Lemhi Co 20,180.80 0.57% 
Cemetery Receipts 24,675.00 0.69% 
..... _ .... 
Police Fees and Fines 37,522.10 1.05% 
-Building Fees amf P~its 40,820.39 1.14% 
-~-~ Workers Compensation Premiums 43,359.61 1.21% 
Airport Rent & Landin~f Fees 44,3Sq.41 1.24% 
Transit SeNice Charges 49,062.90 1.37% 
Ccinimunity Recreation Center Seniice Charges 55,021.34 1.54% 
Other Miscellaneous Receipts 64,125.59 t80% 
Transit Grant.:state 64,469.00 1.80% 
118JIIRIIIJf8-~~f~lll,fi\!i;. ;~;J.{g-11111 
Ambulance 240,641.58 (i, 74% 
Water Pollution Control SenAce Charges 2_62,352.46 7;35% 
Cheyenne Corridor-ID Dept of Transportation 281,214.99 7.87% 
~··· •-. 303,478.49 ~· 8.50% 
"l,·IJ-···'. Utility BIiiing Senace Charges . 1,445,488.63 40.47% 
from ot1tside spurces 3,571,730.09 100.00% 
Cash Disbursements 
Total payroll and material claims per March 7th report -5,609,934.42 
Less Trust Funds Claims 58,491.29 
--City Fund payroll and material claims -5,551,443.13 
Merchant fees (credit card acceptance fees) -5,319.91 
Bank seri.ice charges -1,470.25 
Returned Checks -1,833:55 
Water Bond Payment -9;249.62 
Account corrections and adjustments ~39.77 
Other checks cut (Library trustee, Youth forum, Police narc's) · -1;375.78 
Administration support fee 51.75 
Total cash dispersed to outside sources -5,570,680.26 
Net cash received by operations -1,998,950: 17 
lntern11I activity 
Long,temi ini.estments sold 
City Portfolio 
Other. disbursements 
Capital Gain/Loss Operating result for February 2013: Other Receipts 
Principal Accrued Down $2,011,688.96 8,620.12 
Long~tenn investment purchased "-. 0.00 
Net change in cash and long ierm Investment "-. -1,990,330.05 
Fair Market Value Adjustments "-. 
City Long Tenn portfolio ,, -21,358:91 
Net change in cash value and long ferm investment value $ (2,011,688.96) 
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CITY OF POCATELLO 
STATEMENT OF CASH; CASH EQUIVALENTS AND INVESTMENTS BALANCES FOR TRUST FUNDS 
AS OF FEBRUARY 28, 2013 
Cashin Bank $421,731.63 
Cash held in Broker Accounts 32.0B 
Total cash and cash equivalents $421,763.71 
LONG TERM INVESTMENTS 
Muriicioal Bonds $4,944,703.34 
FNMA l'vbrtaaae Notes 
"All the Trust money we 2,186,255.11 
-FHLMC llllortgage Notes ha"''': Down $30.108.27 for 48,958.00 
GNIW\ Mortgage Pools the month 151,978.52 
----
---· 
--
··-~-·H--•-Other Paencv Bonds .......... 296,886.00 
FHLB notes -........... $98628.50 
Total Cash, Cash Equivalents and Long-Term Investments "' $8,149,173.18 
Change In tash and Equivala:nts For Trust Funds 
For February 2013 
cash Receipts 
·--- -- ... -~·---
~tum of lm.estment Capital 61,267.32 
lrite~st -; 
i'rom outside soun:-es 72,195:76 
tash D1sburseinen1s 
All checks Issued ~~-; .,_,,~~y~ .• . " .. 
Postage -10.14 
Long,tenn imestments purchased -100,000.00 
Admin Support Fee ~51.75 
Total cash dispersed -15B54a04 
---------·---
to outside a>un:-es 
Net cash received by operations -$86,347.28 
Internal activity 
Long-term im.estments sold 
Police Retirement Portfolio -$61,287.32 
Other (lisbursements 
Capital Ga.in!Loss 712.69 
Other Receipt$ 
----· 
·-----__._-_, .. ___ __.-~~-·--·~- ~~~· ----·-.-----
Princloal Accrued 
Long-te1m im.estment purchased Trust operating result for 100,000.00 
Net change in cash and long term investment the month: Down ~$46921.91 
. . . . .. $30,108.27 
Fair Market Value Adlustments (Unrealized) 
Police Long Tenn portfolio -............ ~4-t 
Net change in cash value and Jong term investment value ... -.$30, 108.27 
TRUST FUND BALANCES ~ CHANGE 
February 28, 2013 
FUNDS CASH CASH NET 
ENDING ENDING CHANGE 
BALANCE BALANC!: IN CASH 
01/31/13 02/28/13 BY FUND 
951 POLICE RETIREMENTTRUST 8,162,691.45 8, 132;582.77 -$30, 108.68 
953 AIRPORT BOND TRUST 16,586.83 16,587.24 0.41 
----~-----~---·------ -..---· 
3.17 ·o:oo 961 SO. BAN. HWY. DEV. TRUST 3.17 
TOTALS $8179,281.45 $8,149,173.16 -$30, 108.27 
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I CASH CASH NET 
--~·~--
--- -
___ •• .__w I ENDING ENDING CHANGE 
FUNDS j __ BALANCE BALANCE IN CASH 
I 01131/12 02128/12 J BY FUND l 
I 
001 GENERAL FUND 8,780,937.12 7,675,637.97 (1,105,299.15) 
-
002 LIABILITY INSURANCE FUND 623,712.02 688,969;08 65;257.06 
003 S1REETFU!:JD 1,835,304.26 1,540,671.80 {294;632.46) 
004! RECREAllON FUND 449,914.40 422,634.50 (27,279.90) 
005 CEMETERY FUND 291,854.34 292,476.27 621.93 
-006 AIRPORT FUND 565,131.71 511,375.81 · (53,755.90) 
007 LIBRARY FUND 837,070.98 738,921.67 (98, 149.:11) 
009 POC. REG. "TRANSIT FUND (344,905.15) (456;038.56 ) (111,133.41) 
012 VIDEO SERVlOES FUND ······- -·· ---·--·~--
-~-.. -·--
55,404.49 12o;as4.53 ----- 65,490.04 
013 BUSINESS IMPROV. FUND 0.00 0.00 0.00 
014 CHIEF THEATRE FUND 113,486.46 113,432.BB (53.58) 
016 EMERGENCY REPAIR FUND 17,724.17 (8,405.52) (26,129.69) 
017 STORMWAlER ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE FUND 246,827.68 .265;081.93 18,2!>.\.25 
SUBTOTAL SPECIAL REVENUE FUNDS 4,691,625.36 4,230;014.39 l461;510.97) 
030 SANITA110N-FUND 3,383,756.54 3,446;614.27 62;857.73 
031 WAlERFUND 3,907,603.84 3,668,986;51 (23B;617. 33) 
032 WAlER POLLUTION CONTROL 825,024,47 1,092, 12$.37 267,103.90 
035 AMBULANCE.:FUND ---·----· 66,917.04 -·- 18,969.47 (47,947.57) 
SUBTOTAL .ENTERPRISE FUNDS 8, 183,301.89 8,226,698.62 43;396.73 
.050 INFORMATION SYSlEMS FUND 271,818.92 281,233.57 9,414.65 
052 UTILITY BILLING FUND 629,952.63 629,001.63 (951.00) 
053 MEDICAL INSURANCE FUND 1,414:,996.91 1,413;309.07 (1,667.84) 
054 PUBLIC WORKS DIRECTOR 176,132.30 190,170.97 14,038.67 
055 FUEL FUND 79,555.24 62,091.1.9 (17,464.05) 
056 WORKERS INSURANCE FUND 833,888.48 659,257.99 25;369.51 
SUBTOTAL INTERNAL SERVICE FUNDS 3,406,341.48 3,435,064.42 28,719.114 
059 DEBT SERVICE FUND GOV 54,188.02 55;408.97 1,220.95 
060. DEBT SERVICE FUND WPC 1.-406.973.44 1,401,108.76 (5,854.68) 
061 DEBT SERVICE FUND WATER 722,951.20 722,92tt28 (25.92) 
SUBTOTAL DEBT SERVICE FUNDS 2, 184,112.66 2,179,443.01 (4,669,65) 
070 FEDERAL AID PROJECTS (613,984.94) (399,964.50) 214.020.44 
071 STREET $PECIAL PROJECTS 0.00 .Q.00 o.oo 
072 AIRPORT-CONSTRUCTION (462,958.11) (452,474.85) 10,493.26 
073 WA1ER CONSTRUCTION 1,6.70,992.1)6 1,638,459;70 (32,532.36) 
075 FIRE APPA!'(AlUS CAPITAL 16,527.00 20,658.75 4,131-75 
.. 
076 BUILDING RENOVATION 58,239.00 63,979.00 5,740,00 
on STREET EQUIPMENT CAPITAL 0.00 o.oo o.oo 
078 CAPITAL ACQUISmON FUND 394,985.78 396,069.11 1,083,33 
79 ANIMAL C:ONSTRUCTION FUND 270.00 (336.25) (606,25) 
SUBTOTAL CAPITAL PROJECT FUNDS 1,064;060.79 1,266,390.96 _ 202,380.17 
080 FORECLOSURE STABILIZATION (1,661.54) (911.05) 750.49 
061 CPR-CDBG ENTITI.EMENT FUND 1,343.77 (19,041.42) (20,385.19) 
082 ENERGY BLOCK GRANT (0.00) {0.00) 0.00 
OBS POLICE GRANT FUNDS 23,099,93 18,278:25 (4,821.68) 
SUBTOTAL GRANT REVENUE FUNDS 22,782.16 (1,674.221 (24,456.38) 
951 POLICE RETIREMENT TRUST 8,162,691.45 8,132,582.77 (30,108.68) 
952 RETIR!::MENT PAYOUT TRUST 402,544.68 405,879.20 3,334.52 
953 AIRPORT BONI;) TRUST 16,586,83 16,587.24 0.41 
954 EIDC REVOLY: LOAN TRUST 105,909.41 105,883,49 (25.92) 
955 CDR LOAN lRUST 290,211.14 290,185.22 (25.92) 
957 ZOO ANlMAL 1RUST 76,661.22 76,415.39 (245.83) 
958 WA1ERACQU1Sm0N 1RUST 102,565.43 116,239.21 13,673.78 
959 SIDEWALK REVOL. LOAN 1RUST 13,272.86 13,246.94 (25.92) 
960 STANDRQD TRUST -··-·-··--·-- ------" 181,112.93 - 181,113.04 ----"--o.ff 
961 SO.BAN.HV\IY.DEV.TRUST 3.17 3.17 0.00 
962 FACADE LOAN TRUST 78,981.53 77,255.61 (1,725.92) 
963 PARKS AND RECREATION DEVELOPMENT TRUST 3,043.43 3,288.43 245.00 
964 PROPERlY ABATI:MENT FUND 63,255.99 63,126.57 (129.42] 
SUaTOTAL TRUST AND RESTRICTED FUNDS 9,486;840.07 9,48,,806.28 (15,033.79) 
970 SEIZED. FUNDS AGENCY 25,847.50 34,718.61 8;871.11 
971 UNCLAIMED PROPERlY AGENCY 0.00 0.00 0.00 
973 STA1E SALES TAX.AGENCY ----- O.OD ,__ 35.29 35.29 
974 COBRA INS. AGENCY 11,107.10 9,401.86 (1,705.24) 
975 FIREFIGHlER SECTION 218 o.oo (712,475.31) (712,475.31) 
SUBTOTAL AGENCY FUNDS 36,954.60 (668,319.551 (705,274.15) 
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\Jt).! , : h'\l..AU~ LUAN I KU::, I .:' 
--------- f!l.~lfl.oJ j ___________ _,!,,i::o:>J' 
r ... 
_____ \"I, U:>.\J.:J 
-· 
963 - iPARKSAND RECREATION DEVELC .·------·1-· ::NTiRUST : 3,043.43 - 3,288.a. 245.00 
964' jPROPERTY ABATEMENT FUND T 63,255.99 63,126:57 l -----·------ (129.42) 
-· ~ 
. SUBTOTAL TRUST AND RESTRICTED FUNDS 9,496,840;07 9,48.1,806.28 (15,033.79) 
970 SEIZED FUNDS AGENCY 25,847.IID 34,718.61 8,871.11 
.. 
971 UNCLAIMED PROPERTY AGENCY 0.00 0;00 .o.oo 
973 STA1E SALES TAX.AGENCY --- --·-·-----···---- -·-·· 0.00 --------· 35.29 ---------- 35.29 
9741 COBRA INS. AGENCY 11,107.10 .9;401.86 (1,705:24) 
.... --
-975' FIREFIGHTER SECTION 21 B 0.00 (712,475.31) (712,475.31) 
-----------· SUBTOTAL AGENCY FUNDS 36,964:60 (668,319.55 (705,274.15) 
TOTAL ALL FUND TYPES 37,866;859.13 35;825,0&UB (2,041,797.25) 
-
~T"" 
l:!ilillllHla:o I AniilYAili ("Cib'. EMDlhl"): 
-
Qty Operating result for February 2013 was a Loss of $2,011,688.96. 
-
- City Revenues: Februaiy was an average month for revenues ($3.6m vs $3.4m last year). The_ City received quarterly 
,-- payments from the county of State Sales Tax $466,313.75 (up 2.93% from last years $453,651.61) and Cable Franchise 
-
Fees of $75,572.99 (down 2.67% from last year). The City ieceived Transit Grants of $64,469.00, IDT Construction 
-
Grants of $281,214.99, and Aiiport Grant of $12,~10.00. 
'"--
--
City E~pen,es: Expenses were normal for Febn,iary. We had $5.6 million in expense, (vs. $5.1 mUlion in 2012) and 3.6 
million in revenue such that at month's end, the city is Down $2,011,688.86 (city·tunds). One unusual everit was the 
- processing cif the section 218 social security refund for firemen for year 2009. Portions of this revolved thru the city's 
- payroll accounts. 
-
- City lnvesbnent Posture: At monlh end, City funds were 82% in cash or short-tenn investme:nts and 18% In long term 
I-- investments. $11,713,822.56 of all assets (33%) were in one of the two State of Idaho investment pools. Key inv1:1stment 
,-- rates: 
- Investments Rate Change vs. last month 
- State Investment Pool Short Term: 0.251% up.091% 
---
,_ 
State Investment Poo!Longlerm: 2.203% up.037% 
-,__ 
- D:ilillllHl!!D 1Dd AnllJ§il l"ID11l Eundl"): 
-
-
Trust Operating Result for Februaiy is a loss of $30,108.27. We issued $58,481.15 in benefits. Interest earnings of 
-
$10,908.44, realized gains of $712.69 and unrealized gains of $16,813.64 were not enough to cover expenses. Overall, 
,_ the trusts funds have 5% of their investments in cash or cash equivalents and 9~ are in longer term investments. 
~ 
!Ji!!Dbio1d "11¥ 1Dd Ir:1,11t lommal E!:!![C!1:W:iD9 ADIIY.li&: 
All the money we h;ave: $ 35,825,061.88 
- Less the stuffwe really shouldri'!touch: 
- Sanitalion Enterprise 3,446,614.27 
- WE!ter Enterprise 6,030,371.49 
-- WPC Enterprise 2,493,237.13 
- Medical Reserve 1.413,309.07 
-
Workers Comp. Reserve 859,257.99 
-
Trust Funds a H:a m. la 
-
Result: $13,433,098.75 
- This positive number, hence no internal borrowing !his month. II is $1,476,865.39 less than one year ago. The total 
- amount of cash, cash equivalents-. and long tenn investments is $1 ;587,862.97 less than one year ago. 
-
- Outlook: March will be an average month for revenues. We expect expenses lo be above average becaus;e March will 
- have three payroll dates {1 March, 15 March and 29 March). We also expect to complete the 2010, 2011 and 2012 
- section 21 B social security refunds forfireftghters. 
-
,__ Overall: February's perfonnancewas satisfactory. 
·-
,-
>--- Respectfully, 
-
t-- David Swindell, Chief Financial Officer 
,__ 
~ 
I I I 
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EXHIBIT C 
489
Monthly City Cash Report 
A short discussion to provide helpful information on how to read the report. 
a. Timing. We present this report to the Council on the third Thursday of the month, reporting 
the cash situation as of the end of prior month. Thus, during the October meeting we report the cash 
situation as of the end of September and so on. 
b. What is included. The cash report displays all the money that the city has. A household 
analogy might be list of what you hold in aJI of your checking and savings accounts. There are things 
other than cash that are important, like debt and non-financial assets. We report those in our annual 
audited financial repmt. Sti11, cash is very important and the Counci1 monitors it monthly. 
c. Structure of the report. 
I) Statement of Cash and Cash Equivalents for City Funds. By "city funds," we mean the money 
available to support operations, as opposed to money :restricted to support activity in three trust funds. 
We report that separately, per 3) below. In this one•page section, citizens should note how niuch 
money we have, how it went up or down versus the prior month, and how the money is invested. It is 
nonnal for the city to "lose" cash in most months, as expenses exceed revenue. The exception is in 
January and July, when revenue spikes with semi-annual property tax receipts. 
2) Change in Cash and Cash Equivalents for City Funds. This one page report details how the 
cash changed during the month, with emphasis on revenue received. The major expense is "all checks 
issued." We don't detail the expenses here but we do provide a separate report that does (Payroll and 
Claims Report). Citizens should note the various revenue sources and we often provide comparisons 
to prior years on important items such as sales tax revenue and so on. 
3) Statement of Cash and Investment Balances for Trust Funds. This is where we discuss the 
status of the three trust funds, with Police Retirement being the largest. This one page shows the 
investment status, discusses changes during the month and summarizes the fund balances all on one 
page. Citizens should note how this money is invested and how fund balances changed. Since the 
retirement fund has long-tenn liabilities, it is typically invested 'in Jong-term bonds. 
4) Fund balances for AH Funds. This report displays the cash by city fund, with a comparison to the 
previous month. The total on this report equals the total of the city funds (report #1) and the trust 
funds (report #3). The second page provides discussion and analysis for the month. Citizens should 
note funds that are negative, as these are borrowers from the General Fund. Some funds are always 
negative because they are financed with federal grants. We spend the money and then wait to get 
reimbursed. While typical, it is still important to monitor. 
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CITY OF POCATELLO 
STATEMENT OF CASH, CASH EQUIVALENTS AND INVESTMENTS BALANCES FOR CITY FUNDS 
--
AS OF MARCH 31, -~013 
--~--
-
-
Value at Market 
cash on Hand $ 25,247.71 
Cash In Banks 5,239,754.93 
Cash held bythird parties 692,899.36 
Cash held at the State of Idaho Investment Pool 6,677,314.26 
Total cash $ 12,63S,216;26 
Investments atFainnarket Value 
Current Investments 
City Government 
Certificate of Deposit $ 2,594,095;85 
Money Market Funds $ 8,QQ0;364;os 
Total ~sh eq1.dvalents "TheN 1mber": :$10,594;459.94 
·Total cash and cash equivalents •Up~:1"11 .'.?o..:-~, rn .mlast ;. $ 23,228,676.20 '---. _,.._ ' :~-o, :-
-~ 
,v .. , 
.cash ot llhorttenn 
Long-Tenn Investments investm ents 
GenerJI Government 
State Investment Pool Bond Fund $ 5,052,861.85 
··--
Ren "ESents ll !it. 
Total long-term Investments tota in longer erm -+ $ 5,052,861.85 
:lll'l\ll stments 
Total Cash, Cash Equivalents and ... I,··• .. 
Long-Tenn investments h= .-": UD~i. lli549_3f H $ 28,282.538.05 
frc mlastmoi th, 
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Change in Casti and Equivalents City Funds -
March 31, 2013 
-- . Cash Receipts I 
.. 
cemeteiy Receipts 8,871.19 0.11% 
-Traffic Receipts 9,407.87 0.11% 
Westem State Equip. Cat Exe refund 9,788.89 0.12% 
Grarit - Entitlement - Federal 12,474.74 0.15% 
Animal Control Fees and Fines 15,667.15 0.19% 
Airport Rent & Landing Fees 29,496.52 0.35% 
Polio¢ Fees and Fines 52,401.16 0.63% 
--· Transit SeNice Charges 60,053.48 0.73% 
Worke'6 Compensation Premiums 64,704.07 0.78% 
Other Miscellaneous Receipts 68,490.88 0.83% 
Building Fees and Pennits 73,299.49 0.89% 
C<:immunity Recreation Center Service Charges 94,507.62 1.14% 
water & LID119 Receipts 1.01,977.79 1.23% 
·-----·-~·--~M-Oa_,-____ 
·~--
_.,,_ 
Transit Grant-State ID 124,414.00 1.51% 
Chey;enne Cc:irridor,ID Dept of Transportation 125;265.08 1.52% 
Water Pollution Control Sernce Charges 168,890.63 2.05% 
Bannock Co1.1nty-Ambulanoe 240,641.58 2,91% 
Bannock Cou_oty tax 368,171;93 4.46% 
-
19.78% 
25.70% 
34.80% 
tiom. outside _a,urces 8;25B;160.59 100.00% 
C;tsh D1$bursements 
Total pa;yroll and material claims per March 7th report -7,770,285.66 
Less Tru$t Funds Claims 58,503.89 
City F.iind payroll and material claims -7,711,781.77 
Merchant fees (credit card acceptance fees) 0.00 
Bank s1:1rvice charges -1,001.05 
Returned Checks -2,377.95 
Water Bond Payment 114,490.28 
Gemeral ObUgaUon Bond Closing Costs -64,873.00 
Account corrections and adjustments -341.39 
Other checks cut (Library trustee, Youth forum, Police narc's) •744.99 
Administijlth:>n s11ppeirt fee 51.75 
Total cash dispet$ed to outside sources -7,666,&78;12 
Net cash received by operations 591,582.47 
Internal activity 
Long~t~rm iovestments sold 
City Portfolio 
other disbu~ements 
Capital Gain/Loss Operating result for March 2013: Up Other Receipts $606,649.35 
Principal Accrued 8,784.43 
Long-term investment purchased 
" 
0.00 
Net change In cash and long term Investment '\.. 600;365.90 
Fair Market Value Adjustments '\.. 
City Long Tenn portf91io '~ 6,282.45 
Net change In cash value and long tem, Investment value $ 605,849.35 
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- CITY OF POCATELLO 
------STATEMENT 5)F CASH, CASH EQUIVALENTS AND INVESTMENTS BALANCES FOR TRUST FUNDS 
·-AS 0~ MARCH 31, 2013 
Cash tnBank $437,041.34 
-Cash held in Broker Accounts 32.08 
-----~ 
·--Total cash and cash equivalents $437,073.42 
-
LONG TERM INVESTMENTS 
Municipal Bonds $5,000,516.34 
FNMA Mortgage Notes 
"All the Trust money we 2,184,437.22 
FHLMC Mortaage Notes have": Down $12,373.75 for 46,408.45 
GNMA Mortgiage Pools the month 70,197.60 
Other Aaencv Bonds 
"-
299,659.80 
FHLB notes ............ $98,SOEi.60 
Total Cash, Cash Equivalents and Long-Term Investments .. $8,136,799.43 
Change in Cash and Equivalents For Trust Funds 
For March 2013 
Cash Receipts 
Return of lnwstment Capital ~ Interest 
from outside soumes 208;639.10 
cash Disbun;ements 
All .checks issued ~~·: 
Postage -22.74 
Long-terrn im.estments purchased -134,773.75 
Admin Support Fee -51.75 
Tot;,I cash dilspersed ~193,329.39 
to oullide soun:es 
Net cash received by operations $15,309.71 . 
Internal .activity 
Long-term investments sold 
Police Retirement Portfolio -$129,179.90 
Other disbursements 
Capital Gain/Loss 788.68 
Other Receipts 
Princlpal Accn1ed 
long-term investment purchased Trust operating result for 134,773.75 
Net change in cash and long tenn Investment the month: Down $21,692.24 
· . ·. . $12,373.75 
Fair Market Value AdiustmenlS (Unrealized} 
Police Long Term portfolio "-
-: Net change in casi value and long term investment value ,. .-$12,373. 75 
TRUSTFUNDBALANCES-CHANGE 
March 31, 2013 
FUNDS CASH CASH NEI' 
ENDING ENDING CHANGE 
BALANCE BALANCE IN CASH 
02128/13 03/31/13 BY FUND 
POLICE RETIREMENTTRUST 8,132,582.77 8,120,208.20 -$12,374.57 
AIRPORT BOND 1RUST 16,587.24 16588.06 0.82 
SO. BAN. HWY. DEV. lRUST 3.17 3.17 0.00 
TOTALS $8,149,173.18 $8,136 799.43 -$12,373.75 
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'Ii 
I CASH CASH NET cit.-----····· I ENDING ENDING CHANGE 
. 
·-· I I FUNDS BALANCE BALANCE IN CASH -------·--,--.·· 02/28/13 03/31113 BY FUND 
! I 
001 GENERAL FUND I 7;675,637.97 5,326,204.00 (2,350,433.97' 
I 
002 LIABILITY INSURANCE FUND 688,969.08 422,689.28 (266,279.80) 
------003 STREET FUND 1,540,671.80 1,201,438.29 (339,233.51) 
004 RECREATION FUND 422;1534.50 406,673.78 (15,960.72) 
-005 CEMETERY FUND 292,476.27 257 ,22.7. 79 (35,248,48) 
·---~----· 006 AIRPORT FUND 
-------·-
511,375.81 425,673.41 (85,702.40) 
007 LIBRARY FUND 738,921.67 616,660.88 (122,260.79) 
-
.. 
.009 POC.REG.lRANSITFUND (310;624.78) 145,413.78 (456,038.55) 
·-012 VIDEO SERVICES FUND 120,894.53 92,520.82 (28,373.71) 
013 BUSINESS IMPROV. FUND 0.00 10a.97 108.97 
014 CHIEF THEATRE FUND 113,432.88 113,379.30 (53.58) 
-- ·--·-016 EMERGENCY REPAIR FUND (2,530.10) (8;405.52) 5,875.42 
017 STORMWA TER ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE FUND 265,081.93 . 273,985.59 S,903.66 
SUBTOTAL SPECIAL REVENUE FUNDS 4,230,014.39 3,497,203.23 1732,811.16] 
030 SANITATION FUND 3;446,614.27 3,520,104.41 73,490.14 
031 WATER FUND 3,668,986.51 2,133,481.12 (1,535,505.39) 
032 WATER POLLUTION CONTROL 1,092,128.37 1,234,148.23 142,019.86 
035 AMBULANCE FUND 18,969.47 53,530.88 34,561.41 
037 WATER CAPACITY FEE '1,364,869.36 1,364,869.36 
-038 WPC CAPACITY FEE 1,193,031.20 1,193,031.20 
SUBTOTAL ENTERPRISE FUNDS 8,226,698.62. 9,499,165.20 1,272,466.58 
050 INFORMA 110N SYS1EMS FUND 281,233.57 259;597.78 (21,635;79) 
052 unLITY ·BILLING FUND 629,001.63 637,327.55 8,325.92 
053 MEDICAL INSURANCE FUND 1,41~.3(19.07 1.418. 776.36 5,467.29 
054 PUBLIC WORKS DIRECTOR 190,170.97 200,066.24 9,895.27 
055 FUEL FUND 62,091.19 83,962;09 21,870.90 
056 WORl<;ERS INSURANCE FUND 859,257 .. 99 896,636.37 37,378.38 
SUBTOTAL INTERNAL SERVICE FUNDS 3,435,064.42 3,496,366.39 61,301.97 
0.59 DEBT SERVICE FUND GOV 55,408.97 65,321.25 9;912.28 
060 DEBT SERVICE FUND WPC 1,401,108.76 208,012.88 {1,193,095,88) 
061 DEBT SERVICE FUND WATER 722;925.28 722,899.35 (25.92 
SUBTOTAL DEST SERVICE FUNDS 2, 179,443;01 996.233,49 .(1, 183,201Ui2 
070 FEDERAL AID PROJECTS (399,964.50) (315,274.98) 84,689.52 
071 STREETSPECIAL PROJECTS 0.00 0.00 0.00 
072 AIRPORT CONSTRUCTION (452,474.85) (442,303.25} 10,171.60 
073 WA1ER CONS1RUCTION 1,638,459,70 1,577,894.43 (60,565.27) 
075 FIRE APPARATUS CAPITAL 20,658-.75 24,790.50 4,131.75 
076 BUILDING RENOVATION 63.979 .. 00 89,719.00 5,740.00 
077 SlREET ECUJPMENT CAPITAL 0.00 0.00 0.00 
078 CAPITAL ACQUJSmON FUND 396,069.11 397,152.44 1,083.33 
079 ANIMAL CONS1RUCTIDN FUND (336.25) 2,799,683.75 2,800,020.00 
SUBTOTAL CAPITAL PROJECT FUNDS 1,266,390.98 4,111;6$1.89 2,845,270.93 
080 FORECLOSURE STABILIZATION (91.1.05) (911.05) 0.00 
081 CDR-CDBG ENTilLEMENT FUND (19,041.42) (3B;276.07) (19,234.65) 
082 ENERGY BLOCK GRANT {0.00) (0.00) 0.00 
088 POLICE GRANT FUNDS 18.278.25 33,242.76 14,964.51 
SUBTOTAL GRANT REVENUE FUNDS ·1,674,22 -5,944.36 '4,270.14 
951 POLICE RETIREMENT TRUST a,132,582.n 8,120,208.20 (12,374.57) 
952 REllREMENTPAYOUTTRUST 405;879.20 409,213.72 3,334.52 
953 AIRPORT BOND lRUST 16,587.24 16,568.06 0.82 
954 EIDC REVOLV. LOAN TRUST 105,883.49 105,857.57 (25.92) 
955 CORLOAN TRUST 290,185.22 287,297.30 (2,887.92) 
957 ZOO IMPROVEMENTlRUST 76,415.39 7~,077.56 (4,337.83) 
958 WAlER ACQUISfflON TRUST 116,239.21 116,239.21 0.00 
959 SIDEWALK REVOL LOAN TRUST 13,246.94 13,221.02 (25.92) 
960 STANDROD TRUST 181,113.04 181,114.55 1.51 
961 SO.BAN.HWY.DEV.TRUST 3.17 3.17 0.00 
962 FACADE LOAN lRUST n,255.61 77,229.69 (25.92) 
963 PARKS AND RECREATION DEVELOPMENT TRUST 3,288.43 3,288.43 0.00 
964 PROPER1Y ABATEMENT FUND 63,126.57 62,997.15 (129.42} 
SUBTOTAL TRUST AND RESTRICTED FUNDS 9,481,1106.28 9.46U3&.63 {16,410.65 
970 SEIZED FUNDS AGENCY 34,718,61 24,576.34 (10,142.27) 
971 UNCLAIMED PROPER1Y AGENCY 0.00 0.00 0.00 
973 STATE SALES TAXAGENCY 35.29 20.31 (14.98) 
974 COBRA INS. AGENCY 9,401.86 9,515.36 113.50 
- - --·-· ---
_ ... .,.., ..... 
",,i;.-, .a..,e, ll'!l4'\ nn" ., .. ., A"71: '°l1 
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' )!ltiU ··' :~IAl'lUKUU IHU~I . H:ri,n;,.U4 • ·un,'!"14.~' , l.::n, 
961 i iSO. BAN. HWY. DEV. lRUST __ · . ···---····----- ,--------- 3.17 J ------. . . 3.1'.. ---·-· 0:00 
962 , FACADE LOAN lRUST 77,255.61 77,229.691 (25.92): 
1-9-53c+-t,.P--A=RK--S,-A"'"'N""""D;-,R=E=c=R=EA-,Tl=oc-N-,.D~E~V-E-LO-P-M=E=NT-lR=u-s=T-+-----'-3"-,2-ss-.. 4---13 .. --- 3,288.43 0.00 
964 PROPERTY ABATEMENT FUND 6:t126.57 62;997.15 1 (129.42) 
SUBTOTAL TRUST AND RESTRICTED FUNDS 9,481,806.28 9,465,335.63! {16,470.651 
970 SEIZED FUNDS AGENCY --+--~34":"',i!e-71""8;..,,.61~--_.......24,..,.,,,5~76,;..,.34,;;.,;..;-. ---{~10=",-r,14~2.'=27=1.) 
·------------------·---··-·· 971 UNCLAIMED PROPER1Y AGENCY 0.00 0.00 0.00 
~---------+-------!··--····· 973 STATE SALES TAX AGENCY 35.29 20.31 (14.98) 
974 COBRA INS. AGENCY 9,4.01.85 9,515.36 11s·.so 
975 FIREFIGHTER SECTION 218 ----(712,475.31) 0.00 712,475.31 
SUBTOTAL AGENCY FUNDS (668,319.55) 34,112.01 702;431.56 
TOTAL ALL FUND TYPES .35,825,061.88 36,419,337.48 594,275.60 
plscuuioa & AnaJysis ("CHy Funds"l: 
-
,_ City Operating result for March 2013 was a gain of $606,649.35 -
1- ,-
,- City Revenues: March was an above average month for revenues ($8.26m vs $3.5m last year). The increased revenues ,-
- are due to 941 social security refunds from the IRS of $2.1M and General Obligation Bond sales of $2.9M. The City ,-
- received llD Grants of$125,265.08, Transit Grants of$124,414,0D, and Entitlement Grant of $12,474.74. .... 
-
,__ City Expenses: Expenses were above nonnal for March, Both March In 2013 and March in 2012 were three payroll .... 
,__ months wllich made them above nonnal compared to other months. The city also executed a pass thru social security .... 
rt!fund to firefighter.. that withdrew from the system via statewide election last July. We had $7.66 million in expense, (vs .... 
- $7.8 million in 2012) and $8.28 million in revenue such that at month's end, the city is up $606,649.35 ln the city 
f--o op~J"ating fun~s. The Fire departm,nt section 218 Social Security ref~ncJ w.aS money In .and money out; but the animal -
--- shelter bond proceeds are naturally held just forlhat puipose. Less the effect of the 1>olid proceeds, normal operating -
- result would be a cash loss of $2,202,078.06 instead of a gain of $606,649.35. A loss Is a typical opeialing result for -
- March, which normally has very modest revenue but continued operating expenses in the ta>:funds. Reader$ should -
- note that tile General Fund is down -$2,350,433.97 forMan:h 2013. That's typical. March2012 general fund was down - -
,_ $1,888;860.32 for example. ,-
,_ ,-
- City Investment Posture: At month end, City funds were 82% in cash or shorMelTTI investments and 18% in long term ,_ 
_ investments. $11,730,176.11 ofall assets (35%) were in one of the two State of Idaho investment pools and ,_ 
_ $8,000,364.09 of all assets (24%} were in money market accounts. Key investment rates: ,... 
- Investments Change vs. last month -Rate 
··- State Investment Pool Short Term: down.079% --0.179% 
-
,_ 
State Investment Pool Long Term: 2.359% up.166% ,_ 
-
-
Money Market rate .05% new 
-
-
-
DllCUSSjDn aud Alllllllil l"l[llst E11ods")i 
-
- Trust Operating Result for March is a loss of $-12,373. 75. We Issued $58,481.15 in benefits. Interest earnings of -
- $79,459.20, realized gains of $788;68 were not enough to cover expenses and unrealized losses of is4,D65.99. Overall, -
•- the trusts fundS·hive 5% of their investments in cash Or cash equivalents and 95% are in longer term investments. -
,__ Combjned Cil)' and Irust Internal Borcowjng Analysis: 
._ All the mpney we have: ·s 36;419,337,48 
,..._ Less the stuff we really shouldn't touch: 
'- Sanitation Enterprise 
.._ water Enterprise 
___ WPC Enterprise 
-
-
-
Medical Reserve 
Wolken; Comp. Reserve 
Trust Funds 
Result: 
3,520,104.41 
4,434,274.91 
1,442,161.11 
1,418,776.36 
896,636.37 
813679943 
$ 16,57M84.89 
- This positive number, hence no internal borrowing this month. It is $3,311,550.78 more than one year ago. The total 
- amount of cash, cash equivalerits, and long tenn investments IS $4,798,051.18 more than one year ago. 
-
_ OuUook: April will be an above average month for revenues as we expect to received our share of State revenues, 
e- (Liquor, Highway User and Sales Taxes) co,llected durin,g the first quarter of the 2013 calendar year. We expect 
,__ expenses to be average. 
,_ Overall: March's pelformance was unusual, given the bond proceeds and social security p.ass-thru, but satisfactory. 
,_ Respectfully, 
,_ David Swindell, Chief Financial Officer 
I I I I 
,_ 
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city or ~ocaceiio _ 
Budget L(:-·)1 Miscellaneous Informati( \Entry 
FY2014 BUDGET 
8/07/13 
12: 01: 10 
Budget level 
Account number 
Total budget amount 
. 2013 001 0000 370 61 · 00 INTERFOND REVENUES / PAYM 
Seq.#/ 
2,482,847 
Pri9rity Freeform information 
l 00 03Q-300J-S30.96JS SANITATION 
2 .. no 031-3001-530, 9615 WATER 
3 00 032-3010-53Q,96J5 WPC 
4 oo OSQ-SQOQ-530,96-15 INFO TECHNOLOGY 
s no 052-5200-530, 9615 HTTT.TTY BU,I,JNG 
6 no PMT lrsf I,IEtt bp TAXES BASED -QN E':V:J3 
7 no Q;·D0972222Sl -··. . 
a on 
9 00 
10.00 
JJ QO 
12 00 
1'3=Exit 1'7=Update F9=Copy F12=Cancel 
TAX RATE 
Amount 
66286 
- 1 37S:frTQ 
3703 
+ 
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Budget L( \1 Miscellaneous Informatir '·\-Entry 
FY2 014 BUDGET 
O/U//13 
12: 02: 25 
Budget level 
A'.ccount number 
Total budget amount 
2013 031 3001 530 96 15 INTERFUND CHARGES/ PAYME 
Seq.#/ -
1,034,544 
Priority Freeform information 
1, on 001 -QDQD-37Q-6J oo GENERA!, FUND 
2 oo BASED ON VALUE OF J Q6, 327,327 
3 00 FYJ3 CITY TAX RATE DE -, 009729799 
4.00 
5 00 
6 .ao 
7.00 
.e. oo 
9 QO 
JO ,00 
J J 00 
12,00 
F3=Bxit F7=Update F9=Copy Fl2=Cance1 
Amount 
) 034544 
+ 
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~•wI ~• ~v~a~~-·~ 
Budget L(- '>:l Miscellaneous Informati,< ; Entry 
FY2014 BUDGET 
0/Vf/J..j 
12: 03: 12 
B·udget level 
Account number 
Total budget amount 
Seq.#/ . 
2013 032 3010 530 96 15 INTERFUND CHARGES/ PAYME 
1,375,670 
Priority Freeform information 
l 00 001-0000-370 6) an GENERAL FIINO 
2' no BASED ON '\TAI'.IJE OF 141. 387,320 
3. oo FYJ3 crTv TAx RATE op 009229799 
4.00 
5 00 
6 00 
7 no 
8 00 
9 00 
l O 00 
lLOQ 
J 2 .OQ 
F3=Exit F7=Update F9=Copy Fl2=Cancel 
Amount 
J 375670 
+ 
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• 
CERTIFICATE OF EILED EFFEC'T~VE 
ASSUMED BUSINESS NAME .. 
Pursuant to Section 53N504, fdaho Code, the undersigned . I -~: r? -, ? 7 r:·: 9: D 6 
submits for filing a certificate of Assumed Business Name; 
Please type or print loeihly. 
Jnstructions are Included on back of application. 
1. The assumed business name which the undersigned use(s) in the transaction of 
business is: 
Hll!Nu & Rocking R Mobile Home Parks 
2. The true name(s) and bysjness address(es) of the en1ity or individual(s) doing 
business under the assumed business name: . 
liimi complete Address 
Ricky G Robinson 3535 Somerset Dr, PocatellO, 10 83201 
Logan Robinson 5354 W Old Hwy 91, Inkom. ID 83245 
3. The general type of business transacted under the assumed business name is: 
D Retail Trade D Transportation and . Public Utilities 
D Wholesale Trade D .. Construction 
· · · · D Services · D Agriculture 
D Manufacturing· D . Mining 
0 Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate 
4. The name and address to which future 
correspondence should be addressed: 
Hill-Vu & Roeking R Mobile Home Parks 
4530 S 5th Ave 
Pocatello, ID 83204 
5. Name and address for this acknowledgment 
copy is (ff olhur Chan #4 above): 
... , .......... ~ ... •-:.-
S~tgjnii~i~~~~~~:;·~·--!---i .. :,!..,,.i:;_:::i,;-,~·-= -~--~-~-!--! .. ·~·---~---~·-·=---=· =·=· ~~~------ .. 
Printed ame: Ricky G Robinson . 
Capacitymtle: .... · P._a...,rtnbe ... r_~-------
Slgnature: --,t11~--------
lllln,rrnl Rw. 
Submit Certificate of 
Assumed Business 
Name and $25.00 fee to: 
Secretary of State 
450 North 4th Street 
P0Box83720 
Boise ID 83720-0080 
208 334-2301 
Secnitary of State u11 anly 
JDA11) SECRETARY OF STATE· 
84/27/2812 15188 
Cit 5Bl3 CT1 269813 111 1321797 
1 I 25.N 111 25.H ASBIii NAIi I 2 
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! 
--·-·- ·----------•-··-··•· ·---·--·-- ·····•··--··•-------·-'---· • '•"'• · .. ••• -··--- ---· .-.--·-,-·-~-~.,-~·--,...l....-~------•~w·-~~-·-~---·- • ____ [ __ ····-·-··----- ··-·-···•••~.- ..... ~-·····--·•---- •· • •••,• • .~ '••• '•••••••••••• • •••• •••• - • •• .. - ··- ·-··--·--·· ....... . 
1/30/2014 IDSOS Viewing Business En1ity 
IDAHO SECRETARY OF STATE 
Viewing Business !Entity 
4530 S 5TH AVE 
POCATELLO, ID 83204 
[ New Search ] [ Back to Summary ] 
Type of Business: ASSUMED BUSINESS NAME 
Status: CURRENT, CURRENT 27 Apr 2012 
State of Origin: IDAHO 
Date of Origination/ Authorization: 27 Apr 2012 
File Number: D155220 
Ben Ysursa, Secretary of State 
Filed 27 Apr 2012 ORIGINAL 
FILING 
[ Help Me PrintNiew TIFF ] 
View Image (PDF format) View Image (TIFF 
format) 
Idaho Secretary of State's Main Page State of Idaho Home Page 
Comments, questions or suggestions can be emailed to: sosinfo@sos.idaho.gov 
http://www.accessidaho.org/public/sos/corp/D 155220.httnl 1/1 
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Michael D. Gaffney, ISB No. 3558 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
Telephone: (208) 523-5171 
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732 
Email: gaffney@beardstclair.com 
Nathan M. Olsen, ISB No. 7373 
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN 
485 "E" Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Telephone: (208) 523-4650 
Facsimile: (208) S24-3391 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
( .. -\ 
~ ?,' 
:,r 
2015 APR IO PM 12: 07 
BL .. ~ DE~UTY LERK 
DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
BANNOCK COUNTY IDAHO 
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on 
behalf of itself and all others similarly 
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself 
and all others similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
municipality, 
Defendant. 
Case No.: CV-2014-1520-0C 
ORDER SHORTENING TIME 
This matter having come before the Court by means of the plaintiffs' Motion to 
Shorten Time, and good cause having been found, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the time for hearing Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike 
Affidavit of Blake G. Hall and Third Affidavit of Joyce A. Stroschein (IRCP 7(b)(3)) and 
Motion to Strike Portions of the Affidavit of Joyce A. Stroschein filed August 28, 2014, 
ORDER SHORTENING TIME - 1 
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The Second Affidavit of Joyce A. Stroscheinfiled March 13, 2015 and Third Affidavit of 
Joyce A. Stroschein Dated April 2, 2015 be shortened to Monday, April 13, 2015 at 2:00 
p.m. 
y.v-
Date: April J.Q., 2015 
~ itonorak stephenDunn 
ORDER SHORTENING TIME • 2 
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/ 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on Apri1 ll)20I5, I served a true and correct copy of the ORDER 
SHORTENING TIME on the following by the method of delivery designated below: 
Blake G. Hall 
Sam L. Angell 
Hall Angell Starnes 
1075 S. UtahAvenue, Ste 150 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Fax: (208) 621-3008 
Michael D. Gaffney 
Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Fax:.(208) 529-9732 
Nathan M. Olsen 
Petersen Moss Hall & Olsen 
485 E Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Fax: (208) 524-3391 
~: U.S.Mail 
!Cf:: U.S.Mail 
~, U.S.Mail 
fill 
.,,,,,;- Hand-delivered 
Q Hand-delivered 
ID.J 
.;;.,.) Hand-delivered 
~ 
'"·"" Facsimile 
~ 
.,.,,,,,. Facsimile 
I 
lfk 
,,,.,;, Facsimile 
ORDER SHORTENING TIME - 3 
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Michael D. Gaffney, ISB No. 3558 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
Telephone: (208) 523-5171 
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732 
Email: gaffney@beardstclair.com 
NathanM. Olsen, ISB No. 7373 
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN 
485 "E" Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Telephone: (208) 523-4650 
Facsimile: (208) 524-3391 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
BANNOCK COUNTY IDAHO 
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on 
behalf of itself and all others similarly 
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself 
and all others similarly situated, 
Plaintiff's, 
vs. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
municipality, 
Defendant. 
Case No.: CV-2014-1520-0C 
MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF 
THE AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A. 
STROSCHEIN FILED AUGUST 28t 
2014, THE SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF 
JOYCE A. STROSCHEIN FILED 
MARCH 13, 2015 AND THIRD 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A. 
STROSCHEIN DATED APRIL 2, 2015 
The plaintiffs, through counsel of record, hereby move to strike the following 
MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF THE AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A. 
STROSCHEIN FILED AUGUST 28, 2014, THE SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A. 
STROSCHEIN FILED MARCH 13, 2015 AND THE THIRD AFFIDAVIT OFJOYCE 
A. STROSCHEIN DATED APRIL 2, 2015 - 1 
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portions of the Affidavit of Joyce A. Stroschein filed August 28, 2014 as follows: 
I. Paragraphs 5 and 13 in their entirety insofar as they are inconsistent with 
the Court's prior findings and conclusions articulated in the Court's Memorandum 
Decision and Order on City's Motion to Reconsider and Plaintiffs' Amended Motion for 
Reconsideration, filed November 15, 2013 in the case Building Contractors Association 
of Southeast Idaho v. City of Pocatello, Register Number CV - 2011 - 5228 - OC, Sixth 
Judicial District of the State of Idaho, Bannock County (hereafter "Memorandum 
Decision") related to PILOT fees (and its precursors) assessed in regard to 
connection/capacity fees. 
2. Paragraphs 14 through 19 in their entirety on the basis of foundation and 
relevance. The affiant has failed to reference or provide source documents for any of the 
referenced funds identified, Additionally, the paragraphs are irrelevant to the issues 
raised in the City's pending motion for summary judgment. 
The plaintiffs move to strike the following portions of the Second Affidavit of 
Joyce A Stroschein for the reasons enumerated below: 
1. Paragraph 3, first and second sentences on the basis that there is no 
foundation for said statements and the statements are conclusory in nature. 
2. Paragraph 4, first and second sentences on the basis that the statement is 
without foundation, vague and argumentative. The statement regarding "substantial 
compensation and benefit to the user fee payer" is also speculative and unquantified, 
therefore does not address the issue of damages or mitigation of damages, just 
compensation or any other remuneration to the plaintiffs to support an affirmative 
MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF THE AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A. 
STROSCHEIN FILED AUGUST 28, 2014, THE SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A. 
STROSCHEIN FILED MARCH 13, 2015 AND THE THIRD AFFIDAVIT OFJOYCE 
A. STROSCHEIN DATED APRIL 2, 2015 - 2 
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/.-··~~'?", 
:~ 
defense that the defendant provided fair and reasonable· compensation for imposition of 
the unconstitutionally levied fees. 
3. Paragraph 5 in its entirety, except for the eighth sentence which states 
"The PILOT transfer provided the monetary support for all General Fund services," 
insofar as the remaining statements are irrelevant, without foundation, conclusory and 
speculative. 
4. Paragraph 12, first sentence and third sentence insofar as they are without 
foundation, speculative and unquantified and therefore do not address the issue of 
damages or mitigation of damages, just compensation or any other remuneration to 
support an affirmative defense that the defendant provided fair and reasonable 
compensation for the imposition of the unconstitutionally levied fees. 
The plaintiffs move to strike the following paragraphs from the Third Affidavit of 
Joyce A. Stroschein dated April 2, 2015: 
1. Paragraph 4 of the affidavit is speculative and improper insofar as it makes 
a number of assumptions about the "motivations" for various class members vis~a-vis 
damage claims. 
2. Paragraphs 5 through 9 on the basis that it improperly invades the 
province of the finder of fact and also attempts to draw legal conclusions as to how 
damages would be calculated. Additionally, these paragraphs are also speculative insofar 
as they attempt to outline steps that the city would take to finance any damage award, 
whether the city has sufficient funds to cover a damage award, etc. This evidence is 
inadmissible in the same fashion that admissibility of insurance or other means to pay a 
MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF THE AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A. 
STROSCHEIN FILED AUGUST 28, 2014, THE SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A. 
STROSCHEIN FILED MARCH 13, 2015 AND THE THIRD AFFIDAVIT OFJOYCE 
A. STROSCHEIN DATED APRIL 2, 2015 - 3 
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judgment is inadmissible. 
3. hs 10 and 11 impennissibly make legal conclusions, i.e. whether 
I 
/ 
/ 
/ 
MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF THE AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A. 
STROSCHEIN FILED AUGUST 28, 2014, THE SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A. 
STROSCHEIN FILED MARCH 13, 2015 AND THE THIRD AFFIDAVIT OFJOYCE 
A. STROSCHEIN DATED APRIL 2, 2015 - 4 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
() 
I certify I am a licensed attorney in the state ofldaho and on April[_, 2015, I 
served a true and correct copy of the MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF THE 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A. STROSCHEIN FILED AUGUST 28, 2014, THE SECOND 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A. STROSCHEIN FILED MARCH 13, 2015 AND THE 
THRID AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A. STROSCHEIN DATED APRIL 2, 2015 on the 
following by the method of delivery designated below: 
Blake G. Hall 
Sam L. Angell 
Hall Angell Starnes 
1075 S. Utah Avenue, Ste 150 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 . 
Fax: (208) 621-3008 
Bannock County Courthouse 
624 E. Center 
Pocatello, ID. 
Fax: (208) 2 
D· YI~ C]' 
.i' U.S. Mail/.:,_; Hand-delivered ··"' Facsimile 
<.s. Mail Q Hand-delivered l;J, Facsimile 
MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF THE AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A. 
STROSCHEIN FILED AUGUST 28, 2014, THE SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A. 
STROSCHEIN FILED MARCH 13, 2015 AND THE THIRD AFFIDAVIT OFJOYCE 
A. STROSCHEIN DA TED APRIL 2, 2015 -  
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Michael D. Gaffney, ISB No. 3558 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
Telephone: (208) 523-5171 
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732 
Email: gaffney@beardstclair.com 
Nathan M. Olsen, ISB No. 7373 
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN 
485 "E" Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Telephone: (208) 523-4650 
Facsimile: (208) 524-3391 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
BANNOCK COUNTY IDAHO 
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on 
behalf of itself and all others similarly 
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself 
and all others similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
municipality, 
Defendant. 
Case No.: CV-2014-1520-0C 
MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF 
BLAKE G. HALL AND THIRD 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A. 
STROSCHEIN (IRCP 7(b)(3)) 
The plaintiffs hereby move this court for an order striking the Affidavit of Blake 
G. Hall and the Third Affidavit Joyce A . .Stroschein on the basis that the affidavits were 
served in violation ofIR CP 7(b)(3)(B). This motion is supported by the Affidavits of 
plaintiff's co-counsel Michael D Gaffney and Nathan M. Olsen. 
MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF BLAKE G. HALL AND THIRD 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A. STROSCHEIN (IRCP 7(b)(3)) - 1 
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Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 7(b)(3)(B) requires that any affidavit filed in 
opposition to a motion must be served on the opposing party so that it is received no later 
than seven days before the hearing:. 
(B) When a motion is supported by affidavit(s), the affidavit(s) shall be served 
with the motion, and any opposing affidavit(s) shall be filed with the court and 
served so that it is received by the parties no later than seven (7) days before the 
h . 1 eanng. 
Regardless of the certificate of service attached to the affidavits, the affidavits of 
opposing counsel, Michael D. Gaffney and Nathan M. Olsen, along with the date stamps 
demonstrating receipt of these documents show that the affidavits were received on April 
7, 2015 or only six days before the hearing. The April 6, 2015 post marked envelope 
shows that the City's counsel misrepresented when mail service was effected by four 
days. 
Normally, a difference of one day would not be hugely significant, however in 
this case, the Affidavit of Blake G. Call contains exhibits totaling almost 40 pages, many 
of which are multiple spreadsheets related to purported collection of connection and user 
fees related to Pocatello water and sewage department. 
Likewise, the Third Affidavit of Joyce A. Stroschein contains eight pages of 
purported financial documents related to utility billings, without any explanation or 
foundational documents related to the preparation of these summary documents. 
Under the circumstances, the failure to provide these documents in accordance 
with the rule does not allow the plaintiff sufficient time to determine the significance of 
1 IRCP 7(b)(3}(B) (emphasis added) 
MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF BLAKE G. HALL AND THIRD 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A. STROSCHEIN (IRCP 7(b)(3)) ~ 2 
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the documents to the class certification motion, and in some instances determine what the 
documents in fact are designed to represent. 
For these reasons, the plaintiffs strongly urged the court to strictly apply the 
MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF BLAKE G. HALL AND THIRD 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A. STROSCHEIN (IRCP 7(b)(3)) - 3 
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' . 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify I am a licensed attorney in the state of Idaho and on April r, 2015, I 
served a true and correct copy of the MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF BLAKE 
G. HALL AND THIRD AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A. STROSCHEIN (IRCP 7(b)(3)) on 
the following by the method of delivery designated below: 
/ 
Blake G. Hall ltl\l U.S. Mail • Hand-delivered l?Jit · Facsimile 
Sam L. Angell 
Hall Angell Starnes 
1075 S. UtahAvenue, Ste 150 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Fax: (208) 621-3008 
Au.S.Mail IEJ'i': . ''""' Hand-delivered l~h Facsimile 
MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF BLAKE G. HALL AND THIRD 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A. STROSCHEIN (IRCP 7(b)(3)) - 4 
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Michael D. Gaffney, ISB No. 3558 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
Telephone: (208) 523-5171 
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732 
Email: gaffney@beardstclair.com 
Nathan M. Olsen, ISB No. 7373 
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN 
485 "E" Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Telephone: (208) 523-4650 
Facsimile: (208) 524-3391 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
BANNOCK COUNTY IDAHO 
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on 
behalf of itself and all others similarly 
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself 
and all others similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
municipality, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
County of Bonneville ) 
Case No.: CV-2014-1520-0C 
AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL D. 
GAFFNEY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF BLAKE G. 
HALL AND THIRD AFFIDAVIT OF 
JOYCE A. STROSCHEIN 
AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL D. GAFFNEY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF BLAKE G. HALL AND THIRD AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A. 
STROSCHEIN 
- 1 
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I, Michael D. Gaffney, having been duly sworn on oath, depose and state: 
1. I am co-counsel for Plaintiffs in the above-entitled case. 
2. I am competent to testify and do so through personal knowledge. 
3. Attached as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the April 6, 2015 postmark 
on the envelope from Mr. Hall's office which contained the Defendant's Response in 
Objection to Motion for Class Certification, Affidavit of Blake G. Hall and Third 
Affidavit of Joyce A. Stroschein. 
4. Attached as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the first pages of the 
Defendant's Response in Objection to Motion for Class Certification, Affidavit of Blake 
G. Hall and Third }flidavit of Joyce A. Stroschein marked received on April 7, 2015. 
Date: Aprile 
~J 
e on this _JJ 'day of April, 2015. 
Not u lie for Idaho 
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AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL D. GAFFNEY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF BLAKE G. HALL AND THIRD AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A. 
STROSCHEIN 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify I am a licensed attorney in the state of Idaho and on Aprnf, 2015, I 
served a true and correct copy of the AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL D. GAFFNEY IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF BLAKE G. HALL AND 
THIRD AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A. STROSCHEIN on the following by the method of 
delivery designated below: 
Blake G. Hall 
Nathan R. Starnes 
Hall Angell Starnes 
1075 S. UtahAvenue, Ste 150 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Fax: (208) 621-3008 
O:, U.S. Mai~Hand-delivered Or · · Facsimile 
~ .S. Mail ~I Hand-delivered EJ::: Facsimile 
AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL D. GAFFNEY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF BLAKE G. HALL AND THIRD AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A. 
STROSCHEIN 
-3 
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- :ilALL AN __ GELL STARNES, :LLP 
- 1075 S UTAfl, SUITE 150 -
IDAHO FALLS, ID 83402 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
Michael D. Gaffney, Esq. 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
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,;'_/_: ; . io.s-o·y a'] 
l..:'!_,'. 
BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ. 
0 :; ..d. • 
,IL·~ 
,•'·<,I 
SAM L. ANGELL, ESQ. 
NATHAN R. STARNES, ESQ. 
HALL ANGELL STARNES, LLP 
1075 S Utah A venue, Suite 150 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Telephone (208) 522-3003 
Fax (208) 621-3008 
!SB No. 's 2434, 7012 & 7484 
bgh@hasattomeys.com 
s1a@hasattomeys.com 
nrs@hasattomeys.com 
Attorneys for Defendant City of Pocatello 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY 
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on 
behalf of itself and all others similarly 
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself 
and all others similarly situated, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
municipality, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2014-1520-0C 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE IN 
OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR 
CLASS CERTIFICATION 
COMES NOW Defendant, City of Pocatello, by and through its attorney of record, and 
hereby submits this response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification as follows: 
INTRODUCTION 
Before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification. Initially, Defendant City of 
Pocatello would note that a Motion for Summary Judgment has been filed with the Court. 
Inasmuch as that motion addresses the underlying merits of the case, it is important to first 
EXHIBIT 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSETO PlAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION -1 I B 
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BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ. 
SAM L. ANGELL, ESQ. 
NATHANR. STARNES, ESQ. 
HALL ANGELL STARNES, LLP 
1075 S Utah Avenue, Suite 150 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Telephone (208) 522-3003 
Fax (208) 621-3008 
!SB No. 's 2434, 7012 & 7484 
bgh@hasattomeys.com 
sla@hasattomeys.com 
nrs@hasattomeys.com 
Attorneys for Defendant City of Pocatello 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUN1Y 
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on 
behalf of itself and all others similarly 
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself 
and all others similarly situated, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
municipality, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Bonneville ) 
Case No. CV-2014-1520-0C 
AFFIDAVIT OF BLAKE G. HALL 
Blake G. Hall, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am one of the attorneys for the Defendant in the above-referenced matter. I am over 
the age of eighteen and competent to testify. This affidavit is based on my personal 
knowledge unless otherwise stated. 
AFFIDAVIT OF BlAKE G. HALL- 'I 
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BLAKE 0. HALL, ESQ. 
SAM L. ANGELL, ESQ. 
NATHAN R. STARNES, ESQ. 
HALL ANGELL STARNES, LLP 
1075 S Utah Avenue, Suite 150 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Telephone (208) 522-3003 
Fax (208) 621-3008 
/SB No. s 2434, 7012 & 7484 
bgh@hasattomeys.com 
sla@hasattomeys.com 
nrs@hasattomeys.com 
Attorneys for Defendant City of Pocatello 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY 
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME -p ARK, on. 
behalf of itself and all others similarly 
situated, ED QUlNN, on behalf of himself 
and all others similarly situated, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
municipality, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Bannock ) 
TWRD AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A. 
STROSCHEIN 
Joyce A. Stroschein, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
I. That I am over the age of eighteen (18) and am competent to testify in this matter. 
I make this affidavit based on my own personal knowledge unless otherwise indicated. -----
This affidavit is made under the penalty of perjury. 
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Michael D. Gaffney 
Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
- ISBN: 3558 
Nathan M. Olsen 
Petersen Moss Hall & Olsen 
485 "E" Stt·eet, ldaho Falls, ID 83402 
Telephone: (208) 523~4650 
Fax: (208) 524-3391 
ISBN: 7373 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
,-..... 
IN THE DISTIUCT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
. . 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY 
HILL~ VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on behalf 
of itself atid all others similarly situated, ED 
QUINN, on behalf of himself and all others 
similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
municipality, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO . ) 
. ) ss. 
County of Bonneville ) 
AFFIDAVIT OF NATHAN M. OLSEN· 1 
Case No. CV-2014:1520-0C 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
NATHAN M, OLSEN 
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I, Nathan M. Olsen, do solemnly swear (or affinn) that the testimony given in this 
sworn statement is the truth, the whole tmth, and nothing but the truth, that it is made on my 
personal knowledge, and that I would so testify in open ·court if called upon to do so. 
1. I am co-counsel representing the Plaintiffs in this matter. 
2. I did not receive until April 7, 2015, delivered to my office by the U.S. Postal 
Service, Defendant's Response in Objection to Motion for Class Ce11ification; Affidavit of Blake 
G. Hall; and Third Affidavit of Joyce A. Stroschein, all of which contain a date on or before 
April 2, 2015 on the "Certificate of Service.ti 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibif"A" is a copy of.the envelope in which the documents 
described in paragraph 2 above were enclosed reflecting the postal stamp date of April 6, 2015, 
indicating that they were not in fact mailed until that date .. 
4. On March 18, 201 S, I had a teleconference with Nathan Stames, one of the 
counsel for the City of Pocatello in this case .. He info1med me that, after checking with 
representatives from the City, although it would be complex and somewhat laborious, it is 
possible to calculate the amount of the PILOT fee on an individual fee payer basis. He indicated 
that it may require a "special master" to do the research a d calculations, but that it was doable. 
DATED this 81h day of April, 2015. 
AFFIDAVIT OF NATHAN M. OLSEN~ 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby ce1tify that I am a dul,J!i;:ensed attorney in the State of Idaho, with my office in 
Id~ho Falls, Idaho, and that on the_(]_,,_ day of April, 2015 I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing document on the persons listed below by first class mail, with the correct postage 
. . 
thereon, or by causing the same to be delivered in accordance with Rul.e S(b ), l.R.C .P. 
Pe1·sons Served: 
Blake G; Hall, Esq. 
HALL ANGELL & STARNES, LLP 
1075 S; Utah Ave., Ste. 150 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
FAX: (208)621-3008 
EMAIL: bgh@basattorneys.com 
AFF,IDAVIT OF NATHAN M. OLSEN - 3 
Method of Service: 
· ( ) mail (-- ·j hand ( ) fa,,: ( ) email 
/ 
I 
./ 
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HALL ANGELL STARNES, LLP 
1075 S UTAH, SUITE 150 . 
IDAHO FALLS, ID 83402 
ATTORNEYS A.T I.Aw 
Nathan M. Olsen, Esq. 
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN 
485 "E" Street 
Idaho Falls. ID 83402 
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Michael D. Gaffney, ISB No. 3558 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
Telephone: (208) 523-5171 
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732 
Email: gaffney@beardstclair.com 
Nathan M. Olsen, ISB No. 7373 
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN 
485 "E" Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Telephone: (208) 523-4650 
Facsimile: (208) 524-3391 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
BANNOCK COUNTY IDAHO 
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on 
behalf of itself and all others similarly 
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself 
and all others similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
municipality, 
Defendant. 
Case No.: CV-2014-1520-0C 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
All parties will please take notice that a hearing has been set before the Honorable 
Stephen S. Dunn at the Bannock County Courthouse, 624 E. Center, Pocatello, Idaho on 
Monday April 13, 2015 at 2:00 p.m. on the following matters: 
1. Motion to Strike Affidavit of Blake G. Hall and Third Affidavit of Joyce 
A. Stroschein (IRCP 7(b)(3)); and 
NOTICE OF HEARING - 1 
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2. Motion to Strike Portions of the Affidavit of Joyce A. Stroschein filed 
August 28, 2014, The Second Affidavit of Joyce A. Stroschein filed March 13, 
20 l 5 ;~d r~-~~ A~~davit of Joyce A. Stroschein Dated April 2, 2015 
Date: Aprili!/; 
;:;:)'7//' 
Mic aeJr.' o,f,6y 
Of Beard St.,,Clair Gaffney PA 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
NOTICE OF HEARING - 2 
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. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ? 
I certify I am a licensed attorney in the,_ of!daho and on April,J:: 2015, 1 
served a true and correct copy of the NOTICE OF HEARING on the following by the 
method of delivery designated below: 
Blake G. Hall 
Sam L. Angell 
Hall Angell Starnes 
1075 S. UtahAvenue, Ste 150 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Fax: (208) 621-3008 
/ 
~{ U.S. Mail ~and-delivered rth -~,,,.,· Facsimile 
:~~c~e~;e~ty Courthouse ~.S. Mail ~\ Hand-delivered ~J Facsimile 
Pocatello, ID 8}201 
Fax: (208) 236t7().13 / ¢1/"~) // 
~-J 
M1c]iia~ .. G'aff?fy / 
Of BYard St. Olair Gaffney PA 
Attomeyfor Plaintiffs · 
l 
NOTICE OF HEARING - 3 
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• MAY-21-2015 02:E?PM From: ccL)THUR 12082398650 
,· 
Michael D. Gaflb.ey 
Beard St. Clair Oaf.lhey PA 
2105 C-0ronado Street 
Idaha Falls, ID 83404 
ISBN; 3SS8 
Natban M. Ol&en 
Peter11enMoss Hall & Olsen 
435 44E1' Street, Idaho Faus; IO 83402 
Telephone: (208) S23-46SO 
Fax: (208) 524-3391 
ISBN: 7373 
Attorneys :for Plaintiffs 
IN TD DISTRlC'l' COURT OF THE SIXTH JU.0ICI.U, DISTRICT 
OFTBE STATE or IDAHO, IN AND l'OR BANNOCK COUNTY 
HILL-VU MOJ3lLE HOME PARK, on behalf 
<>f itself and all othei'S similarly situated, ED 
QUINN, au beltalf of himself and all otbera 
sim.ilal'ly situated~ 
vs, 
CITY OF POCATELLO, Bll. Idaho 
m,w.icipality, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Bonneville ) 
AFFIDAVIT OF LOOAN ROBINSON - Page l 
MAY-21-2015 16:02 From:12082398660 
Case No. CVw2014-1S2o .. oc 
AFFIDAVIT OF LOGAN ROBINSON 
ID:N+T PMH+o Pageil02 R:95% 
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,.(;~..,·~-~-1 
, MAY-21-2015 02:28PM From:CC\:. -~HUR 12082398650 
{"\ 
To:S __ )3391 
I, X..01an Robjnson, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that the testi.moo.y given in tbis swom 
statement is the tru~ the whole truth, attd nothing but the ll'Uth1 that it is mode <>n my personal 
knowledge, and that I wo1dd so testify in open oourt if called upon to do so. 
l. I am the managm- sud owner 4'Hill-Vu Mobile Home Park,.- one Qfthe plaintiffs in this 
action. 
2. I personally do not tesids in the City of Pooatello. At all times relevant to this lawsuit, I 
have resided in Bannock, County near In.~al10. 
3. Through my property rental b~esses, sinoe the be,gino.iog of 2007, I have on aVCt"age 
paid app1'0ximately$lO,OOOpermouth to the City of Pocatello for monthly water, sewer and 
garbage services. From the beginnius of 2007 through the end of 2013, during the time that the 
City of Pocatello conducted its illegal PlLOT proguim. I believe l have paid approximately 
$840,000 to the City of .Pocatello for these setvices. The City has never .in any way, shape or 
fom1 i-e.imbursed me for any of the fees improperly taken fi:om me for the Pil,OT program or 
other impcmtiasible \lSeB, 
DATED this _1J__ day of ldll/ 
SUBSClUBBD ANO SWORN to befoi 
(SEAL) 
AFFIDAVIT OF LOOAN ROBINSON -Page2 
MAY-21-2016 15:02 From:12082398660 
... 2015. 
}A,:H I .Z015. 
~~~ 
NtitaJ:yhblic for State ofldaho 
Residing at~, Pe, e-fd l O 'J1:) 
My Commission Expires: 6-l o • Ql '2 
ID:N+T PMH+O Page:003 R:95% 
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. {"'°\ 
MAY-ei-2015 02:28PM From:CCb,>iRTHUR 
("''"'!. 
To:S. ~391 ic1082398650 
CBRmICATB OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a dtdy licensed attomey in tho State of Idaho, with my office in 
Idaho Palls. Idaho, and that on the~ day of _fV\o 1 fr--> 20151 sexved a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document on the persons li&ted below by first cles, xnail, with t,he correct 
postage thereon, or by causing the same to be delivered in accordaw:e with Rule S{b), I.R. C.P. 
Persons Served: 
Blake G. Hall, Esq. 
HAU.ANJBLL & STARNES, L1Jt 
1075 S. Utah Ave., Ste.150 
Idaho FaUs, ID 81402 
FAX1 (208) 621M3008 
EMAIL: bgll@hasattomen.com 
AFFIDAVIT OF LOGAN ROB1NSON -Page 3 
MAY-21-201516:03 From:12082398650 
Method of Service; 
( ) man (v'jhaud ( ) fax ( ) email 
Ne.thanM. Olsen 
ID:N+T PMH+O R:96% 
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. ) 
Michael D. Gaffi1ey 
Beard St. Clair Gaffaey PA 
2105 Coronado Stl'eet 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
ISBN: 3558 
Nathan M. Olsen 
Pete1'Sen Moss Hall & Olsen 
485 "En Street, Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Telephone: (208) 523-4650 
Fax.: (208) 524-3391 
ISBN: 7373 
Attorneys fo1· Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY 
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on behalf 
of itself and all others similal'ly situated, ED 
QUINN, on behalf of himself and all othel's 
similady situated, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
municipality, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Bonneville ) 
AFFIDAVITOFNATHAN M. OLSRN -1 
Case No. CV-2014-1520-0C 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
NATHAN M. OLSEN 
532
() 
I, Nntlum M. Olsen, do solen111ly swear (ol' affirm) that the testimony give11 in this 
swom statement is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, that it is made 011 my 
personal knowledge, an~ that I would so .testify hi open court if called upon to do so .. 
I. I am co~cotmsel representing the Plaintiffs in this matter. 
2. Attached as Exhibit 1 is an August 13, 2013 hearing transcl'ipt and "Statement of 
Cash" that was submitted by the City to the Cou1't in the Building Contractors' case and is being 
reproduced and marked here for the convenience of the CoUt't. 
3. Attached as Exhibit 2 are portions of the Red Oak Consulting Water and 
Wastewater Studies which were submitted by the City to the Comt in the Building Contractors' 
case and is being reproduced and marked here fol' the conve 
DATED this 22nc1 day of May, 2015. 
Nathan M. Olsen 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 22nd day of May, 2015. 
AFFIDAVIT OF NATHAN M. OLSEN - 2 
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() () 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby ce1'tify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, with my office in 
Idaho Falls, Idaho, and that on the 22nd day of May, 2015 I sel'ved a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document on the persons listed below by first class mail, with the correct postage 
thereon, 01· by causing the same to be delivered in accordance with Rule 5(b), I.R.C.P. 
Persons Served: 
Blake G. Hall, Esq. 
HALL ANGELL & STARNES, LLP 
1075 S. Utah Ave., Ste. 150 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
FAX: (208)621-~008 
EMAIL: bgh@hasattorneys.com 
AFFIDAVIT OF NA1HAN M. OLSEN - 3 
Method of Service: 
( } mai~}'h~d ( ) fax ( ) email 
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Court Proceedings before Hon. Stephen s. Dunn, Judge 
1 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL 
2 DISTRICT vUDIClAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
10 
11 
BUILDING CONTRAC'.1'0RS, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, )· 
) case No. 
vs. ) CV-2011-5228-0C 
} 
} 
CITY OF :POCATELLO, ) t©fV } Defendant. ) 
. ) 
The above-entitled matter came on for 
12 hearing on the dates and times indicated herein at the 
BANNOCK COUNTY CO~RTHOUSE, Idaho Falls, Idaho. 
13 BEFORE: The Honorable STEPHENS. DUNN, 
14 SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT Judge, Presiding, 
15 
APPEARANCES 
17 Fo.r the Plaintiff: 
18 NATHAN M. OLSEN 
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN 
19 485 E: Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
20 
For the Defendant: 
21 
BLAKE G .' HALL 
22 HALL ANGELL STARNES 901 Pier View Drive, suit 203 
23 Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
24 
25 
1 
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Court Proceedings before Hon. Stephen S. Dunn, Judge 
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( CITY OF POCATELLO 
.,r··-~,. 
\..... ,1 
STATEMENT OF CASH OASH EQUIVALeNTS AND INVSSTMl:NTS BALANCES FOR TRUST FUNDS 
AS OF JUNE 30, 2013 
Cash In Bank $219,936.46 
Cash held In Broker Accounts 32.06 
Tolal ual1 and ea.sh eciulvalents $219.968.54 
1.0NG TERM INVESTMENTS 
Municlnal 13onds $4 985,465.09 
FNMA. Mortaaae t,,loles 
'~II the Trust moneywe 2010847.90 
FHLMC Morklaaa Notes. have": Down $219,46ii.59 flit 39,010.29 
GNMA. M::lrtaaae Pools themonth 31,237.63 
Other Agennv Bonds ...... 284.078.30 
FHLB notes 
""'-
192,592.00 
iotal Cash, Cash Equivalents and Long.Term lnve;tments .. $7,683,199.75 
Chanaa In Cash and l:qu1Valenl$ For Trost Fund, 
fer June 2.013 
Cash Receipt. 
Retum of lnwslmant Capllel 4,052.31 
Interest !l'".ac~ • • ;!f:.111 
Jrom outtlde .sources 28 841.46 
· cam D1sbuNl8m11nls 
All chocks Issued ·58481.16 
Postage -10.12 
eenkfees ·31.93 
Mmln Suppoit Fee -54.92 
Total cam dfspor#d ·rl'"'~'l nn.-D:l":.!3] 
to outlldesourcos 
Net cash received bv operetlons •$31.73S.6S 
Internal aclMty 
l.ong-term lnw&tnients sold 
Police Rallremenl Porlfollo -$4 056.69 
Other disbursements 
· Capllal Gain/Lon -32.78 
Olhor Receipts 
Princllial Accrusd 
Lona-lenn lnwstment 11urchaSt1cf Trust oporaUng raault for 0.00 
Net ol1ang1 In cash 110d Jong form Investment the month! Down $279,-'165.59 .535 a25.03 
Fair MarketVatu1fAdJustmenls tUnrealfied) 
Police Long Term portfolio -......... ~ Net change In cam va/u11 rmd long term Investment value ,,. • 78456.59 
TRUST FUND BALANCES • CHANGE 
June io 2013 
FUNDS CASH CASH NET 
ENDING ENOINO CHANGE 
BALANCE BALANCE IN CASH 
05/31113 06130/13 BY FUND 
POLICE Rl!11REMENT TRUST 7,926,062.70 7.646.608.91 -$279 453.79 
AIRPORT BOND lRUST 16689.47 16.690.64 1.37 
SO. BAN. HWY. DEV. TRUST 3.17 0.00 -3.17 
TOTALS $7 942 655.34 $7,663.199.75 ·$279,455.59 
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001 GENl=RAI. FUND 
(,·~";>i~ 
\ J 
FUNDS 
CASH 
ErRJJNG 
BA!.AHCEi 
05/31113 
2,962,142.$3 
CASH 
ENUING 
BALANCE 
OS130/13 
.r-=~:=ii. 
·.;, 
\ ... _ ...J 
2,318.620,28 
NET 
\A"V\NGE 
L~CASH 
BY FUND 
163$022.$7 
002. LIAelLITT INSURANCE FUND 541,009.39 608,974.62 86,.f66.43 
003 SlREETFUNO 1 233,780.08 1018370,41 121li,359.67) 
004 RECRl:A110NFUND 339,341.09 326,88:U19 (13,478.20) 
loo'- 349,371.81 33:1,760.98. (18,620.83} 006 =MeTERY F ND 232,374.01 21s,,142,99 (18,931.02) 001- L .------:.------+---'4;,.;.1e:",4"=2~1.6==e;-i----3;;:1::,;ao,"":iBS,;;.:;;43..+--"-s-...,.~,4.;.;:si;o3;:;a;:;.1e~ 
0011 POC. REO, 'JFIANSlfFUND {344,823.21 (624,414,38,) (17&,691.17} 
012 VIDEO SERVICES FUNO 112,348.26 93,941.03 (18,-I05.2i 
013 ttu::,1NSSS IMPRQV, FUND (0.00 (0.00) 0.00 
014 CHIEFlHEATRE FUND 113.032.32 112,8&1.86 {167..411 
018 EM1:1tuENC'f REPAIR FUND 11:,37'1.95 10 692.37 8,320.42 
Of7 S100MWATl:R ENVIRONMEMTAL SCIENCE FUND 138,007.19 1611,28!1.37 80,268.18 
SUBYOTAL SPECIAL RWENU!i FUNDS $.133,682.47 2.729.138.77 1404,646,70 
030 SAN/fA110N FUND 3,443 .f60.94 3,497 088,01 53,82.7.0l' 
011 WAlERFUNO 1458,5#.44 1.443,847,04 (14,697,110 
032 vv'AlERl'OLLUTIONCONTROL 2,011,255.54 1758,e81.54 (264,674.00) 
03'5 AM9UI.ANCE FIJND 1d11.2111_1111 An~ A~T ... A7 ,no 
<Ji u,,, """ '"" W\t".Hl.ilH n::c: 1,384,880.3e 1,391,0&0.36 26,220.00 1 kl IFoa9a~w~PiiiCiiCAiAij"Aciirrv~F.i_eeilmmifm"iifflr----+--=-,1rii,1i93,i,'03i.1n.2iio+-...... "";1;i!.9ti,·1i':,1nsiuffto===;..i21i4!ii10iio.ioonlf ~v 
uuu•-11\1. ,.., , - "'""' l'UNIJl!i ',GJW,4111,28 9,503,1lat,iW t IHtJun,urn 
050 INFORMl\1l0N SYSraMS FUNO 
0Sl!: UTILITY B1lLIN1:1 FUND 
053 MEDICAL INSURA""""" FUND 
054 PUBLIC WORKS DIRECTOR 
055 i<UEL FUND 
0118 WORKERS INSURANCE FUND 
SU13TOTAL IN1'1:RHAL SERVICE FUNOS 
1059 DEBT SERVICE FIJND GOV 
060 OEBTSERVICEFUNDWPC 
081 0EBTSERVIC£FUN0WA1T:R 
SUBTOTAL DEBT Sf:RVJOI! FUNDS 
070 FEDERAL AID PROJECTS 
071 STREET SPECIAL PROJ.EOTS 
07.2 · AIRl'0RTC0NS1RUC110N 
073 WAlEROONS1RUCTION 
076 FIRE APPAAAnJS OAPITAl 
076 BUILDING RENOVATION 
077 SlR!:ETEQUIPMENrCAPftAL 
018 CA.P!TALACQU1Sffi0N FUND 
079 ANIMAL CONSffllJCTlON FUND 
SUBTOTAi. OAPIT.Al PROJliCT FUNDS 
oao FORECLOSURE STAPILIZATION 
081 OCR.COB« ENTITLEMENT FUND 
082 ENERGY 81.00K GRANT 
088 POLICI:! GRANT FONDS 
SUBTOTAL GIWIT REV£NUI!. FUNDS 
06"1 POLICE RE11REMENT1RUST 
91i2 RETIREMENTPAYOLrrlRUST 
963 AIRPORT BOND TRUST 
964 EtDCREVOLV, lOANTRUST 
8115 COR LOANlRUST 
957 ZOO IMPROVEMEl'tTTRUST 
9G8 WATERACQu1SmON1RUST 
969 SIDl:WAlK REVOL. LOAN lRUST 
960 STANDR0D1R1JST 
981 SO. BAN, lfN'f. DEV, lRUST 
982 FACADE LOANmUST 
863 PARKS AND RECREAllON OEVELOPMEMl'lRUST 
984 PROPERlY ABATEMENT FUND 
S:UB'fOTAI. TRUST AND RESTRIOT!i'.D FUNDS 
970 SElZED l'UNPS AGENCY 
971 UNCU\~~ED PROPERlY AGENCY 
873 STA lE SALES TAXA8ENOY 
874 COBRA INS. AGENcY 
203,851.33 221,794.72 
710,268.82 700,948.41 
1,351Jl33.70 1,382,667,61S 
64,463.07 79,747. 71 
165,493.39 121,7'3.46 
870,918.63 891,882.71 
3,36$.887.64 3 404,7'4,86 
134,783.09 l31,D«,09 
(129.35 219,944.80 
7t9,722.62 719,696.80 
684,1)10.07 908,Stf,31 
(2911,22&04) (474,33,7;tlo: 
810,0DO.OO :m;l,000,DO 
(481,696.86 (642,&14.16 
1 35~ 0089.50 • 1,303,M1.li7 
83 054.00 37,185.75 
81, 199.00 86 939.00 
0.00 0.00 
soo.:m,.10 400,402.43 
2,764,380.MS 2,763,818,62 
4, 1111.1i7.111 3.876..304.011 
ro.oo ro.oo 
(13,406.77 (144.773.21 
(O.OOJ (0, 00) 
8,780.67 10,893.52 
7,926,082.70 7,646,608.91 
416,882.78 410,217.28. 
1U89.47 18,680.64 
132,944.30 132,918,38 
2811.33"Ui 296,429.49 
116,239.21 -11&.239.21 
1S, 169, 1& 18, 143,26 
180,672.58 180.674.06 
3.17 0.00 
77,177.85 77,161.93 
3 286.43 3,288.43 
68 778.08 70 073,D9 
8 307 324,78 ll,0'5,340,57 
24,34M2 23,3e-l, 12 
o.oo o.oo 
0.00 O.OD 
10,124.69 12,231.70 
nnn t'lM 
30,833.00 
16,28'4.&4 
(39,779.94 
20,tl08.18 
47,887.02 
3,738.00 
220,074.16 
(26.92} 
%23,781.24 
(178 1u8.9BJ 
0.00 
180,841.32] 
(49,247.93] 
4, 131,76 
6,741l.OO 
ll.00 
i,083.33 
lli53,9,,: · 
la77813.0B 
o.oo 
(131,386.44} 
0.00 
1, 111!.G5 
(130,263.79 
{279,<153.79 
333Ui2 
1.31 
(25.92 
10,095.08 
U3.00 
0.00 
(26,92 
1.60 
{3.17: 
(2U2l 
0,00 
8,295.03 
1261984.22 
(986",00) 
o.oo 
0.00 
2,107.11 
11(111 
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1 tltl,0/lr, :iti 1W,ll/'l.UIII 1,bl/ 
: .. ' 961 SO, BAN,·fiM', DEV. TRUST 3.17 0.00 (3.17) 982 FACADE LOAN 1RlJST 77,177.86 77,Ui1.93 {26.~2 
96) PARKS ANO RECREATION DEVELOPMENT TRUST 3,288,-13· 3,288.43 0.00 
06-1 PROPERlY ABATEMENTFUNP . sa.na.oe 70,073.08 3296.03 
( SUBTOTAL TRUST ANP Rl:STRIOTED FUNDS UOT,324.7$ {104& 340,67 (281,984.22 070 SEIZED fUNDS AGENCY 24,349.12 23,384.12 (986,00 
971 UNCLAIMED PROPERlY AGENCY 0.00 0.00 Q.00 
973 STATE SALES TAX AGENCY D.00 o.ao o.oo 
974 COBRA INS. AGENCY 10.124Ji9 12,231.70 2,107.11 
875 FIREFIUHlt:R SECnuN 218 0.00 0,00 0,00 
SUBTOTAL AGENCY FUNOS 34,473.71 Sll.696.112 1,122.11 
TOTAL ALL FUND TYPES 33,239,Gi2,04 31,Qf!,484.02 U ,668, 148,02 
-
PIM11alpn U.11.a.wll (''Olly F~: 
.. 
- City OperaUIIIJ result rot June 2013 1•1as a loss of $1,278,89U3. 
,_ 
i- City Revenues: : June was en awrage monlh tr re\1fflUU (S4nl 1.$ $3.2m last yea,}. We racehad Slt!e Liquor 
.... re\enues or 1t3,302.00, an Increase of 3.69% owr lost yeen 109,267.00. We recel\e<I Ille fothr,vlng grant rewnues: 
... Alrpolf Gran! of $88,427.00, Federal Consl/Ucllon Gtenl of $40,988.09. ,.. 
;: 01m, ExpensH: Expenses were no,mal tor June. We had $6.2 mlflJon In ex(cense, (\I, $4.7 mllUon In 2012) and 4 
,.. 
_ mlt Ion In 1t1enue such thal at month't emr, the clly r, down $1;278,692.43 city runt!&}. 
- City h1ve&1me11t PoGtute: At month end, Cl~ ftrods were 7'1% In cash or shod·tonn fnvslrnenls and 21% In long tellll 
_ lnwslmenlll, $12,881,476.73 of 1111 assels (6 %) were In ons oflhe t~vo Stale of Idaho lnimlment pools and 
..c. $5,0DB,698.95 of all easels (21%) were In money mlllkel a11D0Unls, Key ln\eslmenl «dee: 
i-
Change vs, last month .. Investments Rate .... 
-
State Investment Pool Short Term: 0.1648% up.Ol03K !-
-
State Investment Pool tongTerm: 1.945% down.1™' ~ 
-
Money Market rate .OS% nocllange 
,- i.. 
( ,_ 1'1ust OP.erallno Result lbr June Is a Ion er $27!M52.52. We Issued ,:a,461. '16 In llsnefits. lnleresl e1tmln~ of _ $22,189.16 were not enough to cowr expenssa 11nd umeallied malkst oasaa of $243,630.77. Owtall, lbs trusls1ilnds 
_ ha\e 2.8% of lhal1 lnu1almeole In cash or cash equlvalenls and 93.2% are In tonger l«m lnwslments. 
,_ C~mblpal! Cl~ llld '.l:nlll l11!1!t11DI BQcri:IWl11g A1111l)'Jls; 
-
Alllhe mane; we ha\o: $ $1,661,484.1>2 ... 
-
Leas !he slu we really shouldn1 louch; 
-
Sanltallan E11ta:imae 3,497 ,011&.01 
-
Waler l:nle,pris 3,467,,485,21 
WPC Enleq11:tse 1,876,628.34 ,_ Madlaal Raaer.e 1,382,667.66 
,_ Worker& Comp. Resents 891,862,71 f.. 
i,... Trust Funds 7§!1Ml!i,Zli 
-
Result: $12,802,834.34 
- Thia poallill'l numbs~ he!ICl:I no lnlemal borrowing this monlll. II rs $8,692,GaS.42 more than one )'tit ago. Toe tote! 
,_ amounl of cash, CllshaqUlwlenls, and long !em, lmestmenls Is $4,651,483.42 more lhanone year agD (much du& lolhe • 
,- $2,76318111 In t_he anlmal shelter const,ucllon fund, lho real.Ill of bond pro~eds for 1h11 proJeot rest due mostly lo modeal 
c- lmprowmen!s In u!lflly cash balances). 
.... 
outloolu July 1'1111 be an abcw awrago month for rownuos. Wawlll recslw lll.11' second largest J)lopmy tax remittance -,... 
tom Bat111ock Counl)' for property taxes pall! In JiJM, whk:h I$ WIien the seoonll half of the annual assessment Is due. 
-Wo expect eicpanaes 10 be awrag, l'lllh some a!IO'ovance for sea$0nal conlslructron acth!ly and paak amploymenl for 
,_ 
seasonal summer operations. • 
-
-
overal11 June's pelfo/lllanca was sellslm,lory, 
,... 
ReapaclliJlly, 
~ 
- Oa\ld S1vlndell, Chief Flnanclsl Officer 
-
-
-
-
-
-
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3. Operating F~nd 
· · 3.1. lntroducti on. 
Red Oak devel~ped a five,;year fi~a11claJ plan fat the ~tudy period, 2011 tluough 2015. 
~purees of revem,J~. qnd revenue requirements for tlie. water utility are summarized in this 
section. Table 3-1 shows the flow of fund_s. 
3.2. Reserves:. 
Unrestricted operating reserves available at the beginning of the stµdy pe1iod total . 
$2,799,000. Red Oak recommend~ tbe utility maintain a minimum.operating r,::serve of at 
least 90 days of O&M, or approximately $1.9 mi11ion. 
3.3. Revenue 
Reve~ue for the water utility is derived from water sales; interest income, and other . 
miscellaneous sources: . : . . 
3.3.1. Water-Sales Revenue 
Revenµe of the water utility is derived prhn,l)t'j\y from water tat~s. Water sales rev~.r;iue 
under existing.rates is based on the pi;-ojooted munb~_of water accounts and water usage 
amo~t for ea.eh customor class. Annual revenu~ from existing water rates asswnes an 
annual gi.:owth rate of 1.0 percent for single- family, multifamily, and circuit breaker 
classes, while commercial and summer line customers assume 0.5 P(?!Cent growth 
annually. Annual revenue from existing water sales is projected to increase from $8.9 
million in 2011 to $9.4nilllionin 2015 and-is shown on Line 1 of Table 3Nl. 
. 3.3.2, MiscellAneous Revenu,i . 
Miscel1aneous operating revenue includes site leases, Palisades and Chesterfield reservoir 
water saies, Fory Inc. water sales,. conn~ctions, intere~t income, and other mis~ellaneous 
items. Miscellaneous revenue in: the water operating fund, excludfng interest income, is 
projected to average $445,300 during the,study period. Interest income is calculated using 
2.0 percent annually and iii applied to t~e average annual operating fund balance. 
3.4,·; Revenue· Requirements 
Revenue requirements of the water utility include O&M1 ebt service transfi s the 
~p1tiil improvement fund, 1rMsfers to·the stomiwater fun and.other revenue 
requirements. 
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3.4.1:. Operation and Maintenance Expenses 
Section 3 
I ·operating Fund 
O&M consists: of the cost of perso~el and materials to treat and distribute clean water on 
a routin~ basis. Since these costs arb an ann~al ·obligation of the water utmty, they.must 
be met from annual water sales.revenue. O&M is projected to increase from $7.1 million 
in 2011 to $7.9 million in 2015 and represents 61.5 percent of the study period revenue 
requirements. Table 3·2 summarizes projected O&M ex.penses.; 
3.4.2. Debt. Service 
The water µtility currently ma~es debt service p~yments ·oti a single:water revenue bond. 
Since only water improvements were financed by this issue, the full debt service payment 
!i_projected as a water utility revenue requil"em.ent.- De;,bt:service payments on this issue . 
average $7201000 annually and are expecte~ ~~ cease iif 2028 when 1he loan matures. 
Payments on this loan represent aP.proximately 5.9 percent of total revenue requirements 
throughout the ·study period. An it\terfund loan of $3.2 million is proposed over two 
years, 201 l and 2012, to finance the conskQctio:n. of a central water shop facility . 
Proposed payments on this interfund loan begin in 2011 and average $322,600 during the 
study period. 
3.4.3. Capital lmprCS.vement Fund Transfers. 
The water capiJal.improvement· juµd was established ro'. the City to hetp finance water 
capital improvement projects. Annual transfe~ to· the.capital improvement fund are 
required beginning in 2q1z and continue tbro~g~iout the study period to assist in 
financing the capital improvement program. These tr~nsfers total $8. 7 million and 
represent 17 .1 percent of the study period revenue requirements. All expenditures from 
this fund must be approved by City Council. 
3.4.4. SJormwatitr Fund Transfers 
Cost.s: associated with supporting stonnwater scirvices are included in water utility 
revenue requirem~ts. Sto1mwater ,ervices represent $2701600 or 0.4 percent of study 
period rev.enue·requirements. · · · · = 
3.4.5. Other Revenue Requi.rements · -
Payment in-lieu-of taxes (PILOT) and return on equity remburse the City for the use of 
asset~ and right-of-ways .. These amounts represent 2.3 percent.~d 13.0 pe1·cent of the 
study period revenue requirements~ res~ectively: 
· 3.5. Cash Flow:Analysis 
A comparison c;sf operating fun~ t(?Venue and revenµe_ requirements is shown in Table 3-1 ! 
Projected revenue-under existingiates is jnad~q1.1ate to·meet revenue requirements and 
sustain minimum reserves throughout the.study period. · 
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Section 3 
Operating Fund 
. . . . -
To ensure a sound fiscal utility operation,' aii operating reserve equal. to at least 90 days of 
O&M should be·inaintained. Thus; a:minin1um operating reserve ranging from $1,8 
milli(?n-,in 2011 to $2,0 million in 2015 is retommended. · 
Revenu~s should also be sufficient tc(provide.adwate coverage for d~bt service. Debt 
s";rvice coverage ofat least 125 percent is recommended. ~. - -
P!ojected wate~ sale.s revenue undef existing rates is in~dequate fo m~et revenue 
requirements ahd sustain minimum reserves throughout the study period. Red Oak 
recon_unends adjusting rates at the beginning of each fiscal year during the study period to 
produce the water sales revenue shown fu the tabulation below. 
itE1fllJilr~IJ:;;i~;r,11;: 
2011 $8,933,700 $ 687,900 $9,621,600 
2012 · 9,298,900 1,487,200 10,786,100 
2013 · 9,329,400 2,325,300 11,654,700 
20~4 9,360,200 . 3,233,400 12,593,600 
201S 9,391;200 4,217,000 13,608,200 
Red Oak°fi1r~he1· recommends annually updating the water. utilfty'sfive~yearfi,iancial 
plan to recognize alianges in growth, wate,- sales, operating expen,ses, capital · 
improvement needs, and capital financing requirements. 
" 
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5. Rate Design 
5.1. .Introduction: .. 
In the developqient of schedules of water rates, a ·basi.c consideration is t~ establish · 
equitable charge~. to customers ¢0mJJief!surate with the cost of providi·ng·s~tvice. The 
only .method of assessing eqtirely equitable ~vater rates would lie the determination of 
each ·customer•s biJI based upon their particular service.requirements. Since this is 
impractical, schedules of rates are no~ally designed to meet average conditions for 
gr~ups of customers hav!ng similar service requirements. Rates should be reasona~ly 
simple in application and· subject to as few misinterpretations as possible, 
Cost of service studies are the result of engineering estimates based to some extent upon 
judgment and experience, and detai]ed results should not be used as ex~ct answers;bU:t as 
guidelines to ~e necessity forrate\aajustments. Practical considerations·may enter into 
the fipal choice of charg~, recognizing suoh factors as· previous rate levels, the degree of 
adjustments indicated and policies concerning the application of rates. Recognition of 
EnvironmentalJ>rotection Agency=regulations must also be considered ta assure receipt 
of fe~eral grant funds. 
5.2. Exl~Ung Rates 
EX:isqng r~es have been.in effect since OctQbcr 2008. Monthly base charges vary by. 
meter size and are applicable to all customers. Volume charges vary by customer class 
and include a two-block increasing charge structure for single family residential · 
customers and a uniform. charge structure for multiftunily, comm.eroial, and swmnedine 
customers. Circuit breaker rates are 70% ·of'existing rates for single family and 
sunmi.erline customers with %-, 1-, 1 %-, and 2 .. inch IQ.~ters. Outside City.rates are 50% 
greater than inside City rates. · 
. . 
5.3. Proposed Rates 
. . 
Revenue requirements and cost or'service allocations described in previous sections of 
this report provide the·basis..for designing water rates. Revenuereqµ~rements show the 
need for adjqsqnents and ·tfie 1evet:of'revenue required, Cost of service allocations lead· to 
U11itcosts of service, which areused·in the rate design pl'ocess as a basis for determinjng 
whether proposed rates will reasonably recover cost of service from customer·classes as 
well as prov~de: the total levei of revenue required. . 
Cost of.service rates have been developed for the test period tl:iat proportionately r¢cover 
cJass cost of servioe and increase ~nnual water sl!,les. Proposed rates for 2011 through 
. . 
. . 
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Section 5 
Rate Design 
2014 transition from existing rates to 2015-&mt of service rates· and are shown ht Table 5:. 
1. Proposed rat.es retain the existing.rate structure and· are designed to generate the 
additional .revenue needed in 2011 llirough io1s. 
Proposed rat~s include monthly_seyvice charges and volume charges. P;roposed service 
charges are designed to re.cover costs related to utility billing and meters. Utility billing 
costs are the same for all meter sizes, while ·meter costs vary"by ~eter size. 
volume cblifges are applicable to a11 watel' usage andlare designed to recover volume-
related costs. Volume charges.for fiscal year 2015 range ftom $2.15 per thousand, gallons 
for the nonresidential class to $3.8:5 .per·thousand gallons for sunimerlin~ customers. The 
difference h{ volume charges is reiated to different -usage· and fire protection 
chara?teristics of each: customer class. · 
5.4. Typlc~,: ~onthly Water. BIiis 
Table S:~ compares typical monthly single family and nomesideri~al water bills under 
existing and proposed rates over the·study period. Based on median monthly usage of 
9,000 gallons, single family bills wilt increase $1.93 per-month :from $25.05 under 
existing rates to $26.98 under proposed 2011 rates. 
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2. Operating Fund 
Sources of revenue and revenue requirements for the wastewater utility fur the five-year 
study period, 2006 through 2010, are summarized in this section. Table 2-1 shows the 
flow of funds. 
2.1. Financial Plan Scenarios 
Red Oak analyzed four financial plan scenarios to determine the effects on annual rate 
adjustments by varying the timing and amount of debt issued, and including revenue 
received from existing or proposed capacity fees. The financial plan scenarios included! 
• Scenflrlo J, Includes proposed capacity fee revenue and cash financing capital 
projects from user fees and resenres over the study period. 
• Sce11ario 2. Includes existing capacity fee revenue and cash financing capital 
projects from user fees and reserves over the study period. 
Scenario 1 best reflected the wastewater utility financial objectives of mitigating revenue 
increases, and maximizing the mix of existing debt and equity to finance capital projects. 
2.2. Revenue 
Revenue of the wastewater utility is derived from wastewater service rates, investment 
mcome, and otl1er miscellaneous sources. 
2.2.1. Wastewater Service Revenue 
Revenue of the wastewater .utility is derived principally from wastewater service rates. 
The existing schedule of wastewater service rates became effective October 2005. 
Estimated 2006 through 2010 wastewater service rate revenue is based on the number of 
wastewater accounts and amount of water sales billed fur wastewater service during 200S. 
Annual revenue from existing wastewater service rates, assuming a 2.0 percent growth 
factor for utility billing customers, is projected to increase from $6.8 million in 2006 to 
$7.4 tn1Ilion in 2010. 
Wastewater service rate revenue is received from utility billing and special billing 
accounts. Utility billing accounts are billed by the utility billing personnel. Special billing 
accounts are billed by personnel at the wastewater treatment plant. A summary of 
projected revenue under existing rates for 2006 is shown on the following page. 
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Special BIDJng 
Unmonitored 
Monitored 
Chubbuck (North ofl-86) 
Seplio Haulers 
Total Special B11Ung 
Alt Olher customers 
Total Utillty Billing 
2.3. Miscellaneous Revenue 
rr-'°"::-:.\~! 
\ . .. } 
$51,700 
$957,300 
$503,400 
$49,800 
St,562,lOO 
ti.2~3.900 
$1,321,100 
Section 2 
Operating Fund 
MisceJlaneous operating revenue includes biosolids/land lease revenue, cogeneration 
power sales, interest income, and other miscellaneous revenue. Miscellaneous revenue in 
the wastewater operating fund, excluding interest inc.oine, is.projected to average $78,800 
during the study period. Interest income is calculated using 2.5 percent at111ual interest 
rate applied to the average aru1ual operating fund balance. 
2.4. Revenue Requirements 
Revenue requirements of the wastewater utility include operation and maintenance 
. O&M) expense, routille ca ital outlays, ifebt service and transfers to the capital 
tlllprovement.!Y_n. 
~ *M 
2.4.1. Operation arid Maintenance Expense 
O&M consists of the cost of personnel and materials to collect, treat and dispose of 
wastewater on a routine basis. Since these costs are an annual obligation of the 
wastewater utility, they must be met from wastewater service rate revenue. O&M 
projections include an average 4.0 percent armual inflation allowance. O&M is projected 
to increase from $3.4 million in 2006 to $4.0 million 2010 and represents approximately 
47.0 percent of total revenue requirements. Table 2-2 summarizes projected O&M 
expenses. 
2.4.2. Routine Capital 
Annual capital outlays are projected for recurring minor capital additions and 
replacements. All allowance for capital outlays is projected to range from $30,000 in 
2006 to $303,800 in 2010 and represents about 3.0 percent of revenue requirement. 
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2.4.3, Debt Service 
Section 2 
Operating Fund 
The wastewater utility currently makes debt service payments on State Loan 1897·01, 
1898-09, 1899-01, and a 2014 refunded bond issue. Since only wastewater 
. improvements were financed by the issue, all of the debt service 1s ecte as a ~ astewater utility revenue requirement. e service payments on existing debt average 
a6out $1.9 million annualJy. The""loans mature in 2022) 2023, 2024, and 2014, 
respectively. Payments on existing debt service represent approximately 23.6 percent of 
revenue requirements. 
2.4.4. Capital Improvement Fund Transfers 
The wastewater capital improvement fund was established by the City to help finance 
wastewater capital improvement projects. Equal annual additional transfers of $580,000 
are required in 2007 through 2010 to assist in :financing tl1e capital impl'Ovement 
program. These transfers total 6.0 percent of the study period revenue requirements. 
Payment in-lieu-of taxes and return on equity pay the City back for the use of assets and 
right-of-ways. These amounts repr~ent 3.6 percent and 16.8 percent of the study period 
revenue requirements) respectively. All expenditures from this fund must be approved by 
tl1e City Council. 
2.5. Cash Flow Analysis 
A comparison of operating fund revenue and revenue requirements is shown in Table 2-1 . 
Projected revenue under existing rates is insufficient to meet revenue requirements 
through the study period. 
To ensure a sound fiscal utility operation, an operating reserve equal to at least 60 days of 
O&M should be maintained. Thus, a minimum opel'ating reserve ranging from $585,000 
in 2006 to $690,000 in 2010 is recommended. 
Projected revenue under existing wastewater service rates is inadequate to meet revenue 
requirements of the wastewater utility through 2007. The wastewater service revenue 
increases shown below are projected to meet future wastewater utility expenses) provide 
adequate operating reserves, and satisfy debt service coverage requirements throughout 
· the study period. Itis reco111,nended that this cmhjlow analysis be updated a11nually to· 
reflect curre11t estimates of revenJ1es, O&M, capital inrprove111e11t needs, and capital 
/l1'anclng requirements. 
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5. Wastewater Service Rates 
In the development of schedules of rates for wastewater service. a hasio consideration is 
to est11blish equitable charges to customers commensurate with the cost of providing 
service. The only method of assessing entirely equitable rates for wastewater service 
would be the detemtlnation of each customer's bill based upon his particular service 
requirements. Since this is impractical, schedules of rates_ are normally designed to meet 
average conditions for groups of customers having. similat service requirements. Rates 
should be reasonably simple in application and subject to as few misinterpretations as 
possible. 
The cost of service studies .are the result of engineering estimates based to some extent 
upon judgment and experience, and detailed results ·should not be used as exact answers 
but as guides to the necessity for rate adjustments. Practical considerations may enter into 
the final choice of charges, recognizing such factors as previous rate levels, the degree of 
adjustments indicated and policies concerning the application of rates. Recognition of 
EPA regulations must also be given to assure receipt of federal grant funds. 
5.1. Existing Rates 
Tho existing rates, sho;wn in Table 5-1, have been in effect since October 2005. 
Residential customers are charged a flat rate for all usage. All other customers are 
charged a service charge and a volume charge based on actual winter water usage. In 
addition to volume charge.CJ, industrial users are charged a separate strength charge for 
discharges in order to separately recoup the cost of treating potentially more potent 
wastewater. 
5.2. Cost of Service Rates 
The revenue requirements and cost of service allocations descn'bed in previous sections Jfl. 'oftlilii report provide the basis for designing wastewater rate."9. Revenue req\drements 
'show the need for adjustment and the level of revenue required. Cost of service 
allocations lead to unit costs of service that are l1Sed in the rate design process as a basis 
for detennining whether proposed rates will reasonably recover cost of service from 
customer classes as well as provide the total level of revenue required. 
Cost of service rates have been developed for the test period that proportionately recover 
class cost of service and increase annual wastewater sales revenue. Cost of service rates 
are also shown in Table 5-1 and faclude a flat monthly charge for residential customers, a 
monthly service charge and volume charge for all other customers. Industrial customers 
are charged separately for all sewage strength components including BOD, TSS1 TKN, 
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6. System Caps.city. Fees 
6.1. Introduction 
The City charg~s water capacity f~es to all'new connectors. This fee·is intended to 
recover the new connector's propo~~cµtatQ share of the Ci!}''s water backbone facility 
cos.ts .. The·current water fees have been in effect since October.ioo9 •. 
~.2. System Buy-in Method 
. . 
The capacity fee calculations perfonned in this study are. based.011 tne system buy-in 
metliod. This method is based.on the concept that exi~ting_90stomers, through rates and 
other assessments, have developed a valuable water system. A new customer must "buy~ 
in11·to this system by making a contribution:equal to the amount of equity a similar 
existing customer has in the system. ;Note this is not the. cost to provide new service to the 
new·customer, and when new capacity is needed, all customers will bear·the cost. 
To compute the system capacity fees using the system huY.~in method, the following 
general procedure i~ used: ; · 
.•. Deteanine existing wate~ system equity._ 
• Estimate system capacity. 
• Calculate u11it equity cost. 
• Calculate capacity fee. 
Implementation .of fees designed using the system buy-in mQthod results in new 
customers paying their proportionate share of facility cc;,sts incurred to serve them, The 
fees are dependent on the capacity required to serve a customer and the tlnit equity cost of 
existing facilities expressed as dollars per iqtlt of capacity. Fees u~ng the system t?uyMin 
method can readily be calculated using utility fixed asset records. Because fees can be 
traced to suoh records, they are-generally understood\by customers and supported on an 
engin~ering economic basis. 
6.2.1. Syst~m Equity 
Detennination of the system value ia the fir.st important consideration in using the system 
buy-in methodology to compute capacity fees. System value is-calcul~ed by adding 
replacement co.st of=existing back~one system inves~ent to the cost of planned capi{al 
improvements. The backbone system includes all major water ~istribution and production 
faciUties, . · 
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Section 6 
System ·Capacity Fees 
Replacement cost represents .the cos~ of dupiicating existing facilities at current prices. 
The cost to replace the Citts wat~r system was developed using historical cost 
infonnation fi'om fixed ~s~t records and restating these costs it:i cU1T~t dollars using tlte 
Construction Cost Index'(CCI) published by Engineering News~Record (ENR). Table 6-1 
shows t11e allocation. of system assets to .functional co~f components to ai;r:ive at 2010 
replacement costs. 
~-. ;o determine net eq~ity j~ the system, replacem~t. C?st of_~e ~xisting backb~ne system 
- 1s reduced by the o_utstanding d~bt on ~elated fac1hties. ~qwty 1s not reduced by 
accminilated depreciatio1:1, ·Once a new c~stomer,conn.ects to the water s stem, that 
· customer begins paying c arges for. !i~ice simil§T to all existing customers. These 
charges typically include pa}'lllenf for retirement of outstanding debt. For this reason, it is 
fl( ~cessary to deduct o~tstanding debt from system value before developing tnese fees. 7' 
Table ·6-2 develops the system capacity fee for the study Pt=?riod. System net equity is 
projected to il1¢rease from $48.i million in 2011 to $62.5 million in 2015. These 
h1creases are due to the addition of schedul~d major capital· improvements, reduction in 
outstanding debt, and an annual inflation allowance ofS.O percent. 
6.2.2. Equivalent C~paclty Units 
In order to app_ly an.equitable fee to .new customers, wl customer classes:and meter sizes 
need tb be expressed in common capacity units. The sfiindard capacity unit is defined as 
l1aving the ,average wate~ characteristics of~ existing customer with a 1 ~inch meter. 
Meter sizes 1-inch and smaller serve about 66 perceut of the City's wate~ customers. 
Capacity units are d~termined for a1lother meter sizes based on the meter capacity ratios 
of maximum safe continuous capacity as puJ,lished in the A WW A M6 manual. The 
nwnber of capacity units is projeo!ed to increase from 18,623 in 2011 to-19,363 in 2015. 
6.2.3. Unit Fee Calc.ulation 
The capacity fee p~ capacity unit i~ the r~sult of dividing the net eqµity of backbone 
system investments by the total-capacity units. The proposed 2011 capacity fee is $2,580 
for a C\1Stomer ·with a :l.:inch ,vater m~ter or :~aller. Table :6~3 shows existing and 
proposed- water capacity'fees for each meter siize for the study period. 
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6. System Capacity Fees 
The City charges wastewater,.capacity fees to all new connectors. Th.is fee is intended to 
recover the new coMector's proportionate share of the City's wastewater backbone 
facility costs. The current wastewater fees have been in effect since 2006. 
6.1. System Buy-In Method 
TI1e capacity fee calculations performed in this study are based on the system buywin 
method. This method is based on the coneept that existing custbmers, through rates and 
other assessments, have developed a valuable wastewater system. A new customer must 
"buy-in" to this system by making a contribution equal to the amount of equity a similar 
ex:isting customer has in the system. Note this is not.the cost to provide new service to 
the new customer, and when new capacity is needed; all customers will bear the cost. 
To compute the system capacity fees using the system buy-in method) the following 
general procedure is used. 
• Detennine existing wastewater system equity. 
• Estimate system capacity. 
• Calculate unit equity cost. 
• Calculate treatment plant capacity fee. 
I Calculate collection system capacity fee 
Implementation of fees designed 11sing the system buy-in method :results in new· 
customers paying their proportionate share of facility costs incurred to serve them. The 
fees are dependent on the capacity required to serve a customer and the unit equity cost of 
existing facilities expressed as dollars per unit of capacity. Fees using the system buy~in 
method can readily be calculated using utility ftxed asset records. Because fees can be 
traced to such records, they are generally understood by customers and supported on an 
engineering economic basis. 
6.1.1. System Equity 
Determination of the system value is the first important consideration in using the system 
buy-in methodology to compute capacity. System value is calculated by adding 
replacement cost of existing backbone system investment to the cost of planned capital 
improvements. The backbone system includes all major wastewater collection and 
tJ.'eatment facilities. The backbone collection mains are defined as the system of major 
wastewater collection interceptor sewer mains, typically including those greater than 12 
inches in diameter. Assets have been grouped into two categories, treatment-related 
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Section 6 
Wastewater Service Rates 
facilities and collection-system facilities. This separation recognizes that some customers 
will not receive benefit from the collection system infrastructure, such as customers of 
Chubbuck. 
Replacement cost represents the cost of duplicati11g existing facilities at cmTent prices. 
The cost to replace the City's wastewater system was developed using historical cost 
infonnation from fixed asset i-ecol'ds and restating these costs in cmrent dollars using the 
Construction Cost Index (CCI) published by Engi11eeri,1g News~Record (ENR). Table 6 .. 
1 shows the allocation of system· assets to functional cost components to anive at 2007 
replacement cosls. Table 6-2 shows the percent allocation to functional cost components 
for each asset category. 
To determine net equity in the systems replru::ement cost of the existing backbone system 
is reduced by the outstanding debt on related facilities. Equity is not reduced by 
accumulated depreciation. Once a new customer connects to the wastewater system, that t) 
. .£.ustomel' begins pa)1ng chciries for service like all existing §ustomeis. t[ese charges:__ ? 
d typically include payment for retirement of outstandins: debt. For this reason, it is (JP ·necessary to deduct outstanding debt .from system val~ before developing these fees. -
Table 6-3 develops the treatment plant capacity fee for the study period. Treat:rn.ent plant 
net equity is projected to increase from $37.2 million in 2007 to $44.S million in 2010 . 
Table 6-4 develops the collection system capacity fee for the study period. Collection 
system net equity is projected to increase from $22.l million in 2007 to $24.9 million in 
2010. These increases are due to the addition of scheduled major capital improvements, 
reduction in outstanding debt, and an annual inflation allowance of 4 percent. 
e.1.2. Equivalent Ca~aclty Units 
In order to apply an equitable fee to new customers, all customer classes need to be 
expressed in common capacity units. For the puq10se of this calculation, the standard 
capacity unit is based on the system maximum month flow in gallons per day (gpd). The 
standard capacity unit is a single family· equivalent with a l •inch watel' meter contributing 
200 gpd of wastewater flow. Fees for other water meter sizes are based on the meter 
capacity ratios of maximum safe continuous capacity as published in the A WW A Manual 
M6. · The number of capacity units is projected to increase from 8,058,000 gpd in 2007 to 
8)551,300 in 201 o. 
6.1.3. Unft Fee Calculation 
The treatment plant capacity fee per unit is detennined by dividing the net equity of 
treatment plant assets by the total capacity units. This unit cost is multiplied by 220 gpd 
and the relative meter capacity ratio for the meter size calculated. The proposed 2007 
treatment plant capacity fee is $1,020 for a customer with a 1-inclt water meter. 
Table 6~5 details the capacity fees for each meter size fur the study period. 
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Michael D. Gaffney, ISB No. 3558 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
Telephone: (208) 523-5171 
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732 
Email: gaffney@heardstclair.com 
Nathan M. Olsen, ISB No. 7373 
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN 
485 "E" Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Telephone: (208) 523-4650 
Facsimile: (208) 524-3391 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
C) 
DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
BANNOCK COUNTY IDAHO 
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on 
behalf of itself and all others similarly 
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself 
and all others similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
municipality, 
City. 
Case No.: CV-2014-1520-0C . 
PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL 
MEMORANDUM 
The plaintiffs submit this supplemental memorandum in support of their Motion 
for Class Certification and response to the Defendant City of Pocatello's (City) Motion 
for Summary Judgment. This memorandum is supported by the pleadings previously 
filed in this case, the record in the Building Contractors' case and the affidavits of 
Nathan M. Olsen, Ed Quinn, and Logan Robinson submitted herewith. 
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I. The City's Impermissible Use of Connection Fees Constitutes a Taking 
Regardless of its Assessment. 
As has been noted, the Building Contractors' case solely sought injunctive and 
declaratory relief, i.e. a declaration of rights as to certain City policies and action and a 
halt to any impermissible policies moving forward. In contrast, this case addresses the 
potential compensation for past harms resulting from the City's improper conduct, i.e. the 
taking of property through the City's unconstitutional PILOT program. As such, one of 
the key questions before the Court is whether regardless of the methodology utilized for 
the "calculation" of the connection fees, the improper "use" of connection fees for the 
PILOT can be recovered in a takings action. As discussed below, well established law in 
Idaho suggests that the initial test of the appropriateness of a fee is whether it wa& 
actually used for its authorized and intended purpose, regardless of its calculation. 
A. Connection Fees that Are Not Used for Their Intended and 
Authorized Purposes are Disguised Taxes Regardless of How They Were 
Assessed. 
In a leading Idaho case Loomis v. City of Hailey, l 19 Idaho 434, 807 P.2d 1272 
( 1991 ), the Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the legality of a connection fee being 
collected by the City of Hailey under the so called "equity buy-in" formula developed by 
the City. In so doing, however, the Court established a distinct and fundamental test that 
must be determined before any analysis of the calculation or "assessment" of a fee: 
First, we must determine whether the connection fee constitutes an impermissible 
tax. Secondly, we must determine whether the connection fee is appropriately and 
reasonably assessed. 
Id. 119 Idaho at 438,807 P.2d at 1277. (emphasis added) 
The Court then provides the analysis for what constitutes "an impennissible tax:" 
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The Idaho Revenue Bond Act authorizes the collection of sewer connection fees, 
Schmidt v. Village of Kimberly, 74 Idaho 48,256 P.2d 515 (1953), and it is clear 
that so long as the fees collected pursuant to the Idaho Revenue Bond Act are 
allocated and budgeted in conformity with that Act they will not be construed as 
taxes. However, if fees are collected under the disguise of the Act and allocated 
and spent otherwise, then the fees are primarily revenue raising and will be 
construed as truces. Brewster v. City of Pocatello, 115 Idaho 502, 768 P.2d 765 . 
(1989). Thus, to determine whether the sewer connection fees are in reality taxes 
in disguise we must determine whether the monies collected from those funds are 
dispersed in accordance with that Act. 
In applying the analysis to the facts in Loomis, the Court held that: 
It is undisputed that the City of Hailey places the connection fees into a separate 
fund to be used for replacement of sewer and water system components, however, 
no monies from this fund are transferred to the city's general fund, and none are 
used to retire the bond indebtedness. 1 The monthly service charges are used to pay 
for the bond indebtedness and general operating costs of the systems. 
Id. ( emphasis added) 
If further held that: 
In the present case, the fact that connection fees are specifically expended on 
replacement of system components is entirely within the discretion of the city 
government as long as other revenues allowed by LC. § 50-1033 from the system 
are appropriately used to pay for the other necessary purposes including 
retirement of bond indebtedness; 
Id. 119 Idaho at 440,807 P.2d at 1278. (emphasis added). 
In essence, the Idaho Supreme Court made it abundantly clear that regardless of 
how the municipality assesses or calculates fees, it cannot improperly use the funds. This 
approach simply makes sense, in that it prevents mischief or the "facade" of a particular 
fee formula which has the appearance of propriety but which in fact hides the improper 
use of the fees. Thus, the real question for determining whether a "fee" is in fact a 
"disguised tax" is not how it is calculated, but rather how it is used. In other words, the 
1 As will be discussed and applied infra, the Loomis Court acknowledged that connection fees cannot be 
used for "general fund" purposes or to "retire bond indebtedness." That is because according to the 
statute bond payments are to be derived solely from the monthly charges for services (i.e. the user fee.) 
Id. IC § 50-1033. 
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Court should simply "follow the money" to determine whether there·is a disguised tax: 
In this case, there is no dispute that connection fees have been improperly used in the past 
and since the decision in the Builders' Case. 
B. As Reflected in the Findings, the Record of the Building Contractors' 
Case Connection Fees Were Historically Co-mingled and Transferred to the 
General Fund for the Impermissible PILOT Program. 
The record in the Building Contractors' case includes a voluminous 
number of pages of City budget documents, affidavits and deposition testimony from 
which the plaintiff painstakingly demonstrated to the Court the flow of connection fees to 
the general fund for use in PILOT program (prior to March of2013). Accordingly, 
beginning with page 7 and throughout its Memorandum Decision, the Court affirmed 
that: (1) that there was never "any evidence as to how the connection fees and user fees 
could have been over separately accounted for prior to March 2013" and (2) "[a]fter the 
connection and user fees were co-mingled into the water and sewer funds, the evidence 
supports, and the city concedes, that the city then transferred money from the water and 
sewer funds into the general fund under transfers at a been called by various names. "2 
The Court's findings on this issue were extensive and conclusive: 
As noted, the record reflects that prior to March 2013 the connection and user fees 
were collectively poured into the water and sewer funds accounts. In his 
deposition, Swindell explained that when the building department collected a 
connection fee as part of a building permit, 'then those funds and dollars are 
credited to the water fund or water pollution control fund as appropriate.' 
Swindell further explained that connection/capacity fees were channeled into 
three funds: 1) building permit - designated as fund 001; 2) water - designated as 
fund 031; and 3) wastewater - designated as fund 032. Swindell also explained 
that the user fees were poured into the water and wastewater funds named above 
in his first affidavit Swindell stated: "the capacity/connection fees are collected in 
segregated into the appropriate water and wastewater funds. 11 in the letter to 
Logan Robinson, Mayor Chase names the "Water, Sewer and Sanitation Funds" 
- See CV-2011-5228 Nov. 13, 2013, Memorandum Decision, p. 8 (emphasis added) 
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as the "enterprise funds." Mayor Chase explains they are called the "enterprise 
funds" because the money placed in these funds comes mainly from fees 
generated by each of the three public utility enterprises. 
Next, money from the above named funds was transferred into the general fund 
under a program that has had various names including, Return on Equity, Rate of 
Return, PILOT, and franchise fees. 
*** 
Swindell further explains that the "internal franchise fee" AND "Payment In Lieu 
Of Taxes (PILOT)" have replaced the "rate of return" or "return on equity." The 
franchise fee and PILOT are two different transfers that are taken from the water 
and wastewater funds. Swindell explained that "the combined amounts of FY 13 
franchise fee and PILOT are 13 .8% of planned revenue for water and 15 .5% for 
sewer." 
According to Swindell's Fourth Affidavit, the City does not charge a PILOT fee to 
connection fees, but only to the user fees charged to the customers of the systems. 
What the Affidavit does not say is that PILOT fee has never been charged to 
connection fees during the ti~e that both connection and user fees were co-
mirtgled. However, prior to that Affidavit, it was clear that all connection and 
user fees were poured into the three "enterprise funds." The City then had a policy 
of transferring money from the water and sewer funds into the general fund. 
* * * 
What is clear and undisputed at this point is that revenue collected from the 
connection fees and user fees collectively were transferred to the General Fund, 
via the PILOT the transfer program, and used to "help fund the activities of the 
General Fund." 
C. New Evidence Shows that the Funds Transferred Into the Newly 
Created March 2013 Water & Sewer Connection Fee Funds Were 
Improperly Used to Re-Pay Bond Indebtedness. 
In March of 2013, without any notice or approval from the City council, the City 
created two separate funds to hold the water and sewer connection fees (Funds 37/38), 
and then transferred into those funds from the general fund the equivalent of what it had 
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collected and used from the connection fees from 2007 through 2013.3 The total amount 
deposited into the two newly created accounts at that time was $2,557,900.56.4 
There is nothing further in the Building Contractors' case record with regard to 
what happened to the monies in Funds 37/38. However, after that case was decided and 
the current case was filed, there is now newly admitted evidence on how Funds 3 7 /3 8 
have been or intended to be spent by the City. As such, there is now no question 
whatsoever the every connection fee dollar collected from 2007 through March of 2013 
and thereafter has been impermissibly used by the City. 
In the summer of 2014, the plaintiffs moved for a pre-judgment writ of attachment 
to freeze the newly created Funds 37/38 as a potential source of recovery for damages. 
After the motion was filed, the City of Pocatello approved its FY 2015 Budget.5 The City 
submitted the Affidavit of Joyce A. Stroschein in response to Plaintiffs' motion. Ms. 
Stroschein's sworn testimony includes the following explanation and stunning admission 
with regard to Funds 37/38: 
Funds 37 and 38 are the funds which record the connection/capacity fees. These 
funds are comprised entirely of connection/capacity fees that have been collected 
by the City's water and wastewater departments. At no point has the City ever 
deposited any user fees that contain a PILOT component into Funds 37 or 38, 
these funds represent the entirety of the connection/capacity funds collected by 
the City since its inception in 2007. The third fund group is Funds 60 and 61. 
Funds 60 and 61 are the debt service funds for the water and wastewater 
departments. The debt service funds are reserves that are set aside to meet the 
annual debt service payments required by the bond covenants. 
3 During an August 13, 2013, hearing in the Building Contractors' case, City attorney Blake Hall admitted 
the following: "So the City said here's the length of time we've been charging the connect fee, here's the 
total amount of money that we have spent - or that.we have collected during that time period. Pull that 
money out of our general account, and we put it into a dedicated account so we can assure total and 
complete transparency." See marked trial transcript provided as attachment to May 22, 2015, Olsen Aff. 
as Ex. 1. · 
4 See second page of the "Statement of Cash" as of"June 30, 2013" provided by the City in the Building 
Contractors' case, attached as Ex. l for the convenience of the Court to Olsen Aff. Ex. 1 (and marked.) 
5 Olsen Aff. Ex. 1. 
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In the past monies are (sic) transferred into these funds from Funds 31 and 
32, but after the creation of Funds 37 and 38 we have budgeted and 
transferred monies to Funds 60 and 61 to cover the required current debt 
service payment. 6 
Ms. Stroschein goes onto testify that: 
Consistent with the FY2014 Budget for the City, the City has determined 
that the connection/capacity fees will be used for debt services. As such, the 
City budgeted approximately $725,826 for debt services for the water department 
in FY2014. The City intends to use the remaining funds from Fund 37 for debt 
service in FY 2015. The City has budgeted approximately $1,384,780 for debt 
service for the wastewater department in FY 2014. This will exhaust nearly all of 
the funds in Fund 38.7 
Thus the equivalent of all of the connection fee funds collected from 2007 
through 2015 have been allocated or spent on debt service payment. Of further note, in 
adding up the numbers an additional $320,949 in connection fees had been deposited 
since the end of June 2013 - through July 15-2014. Thus the total amount of fees 
deposited into those accounts since its inception in March of2013 through July 15 of 
2014 is $2,878,849.56 - all of which has been allocated toward "debt retirement." 
In other words, after the City transferred the equivalent of what it had collected 
and spent in connection fees into Funds 37/38, rather than spend those fund~ on the 
"replacement, maintenance or repair" of the existing system as required by statute and 
which it has long indicated to the public were the intended use of these funds, it instead 
has spent or budgeted all those fees and the fees collected thereafter on repayment of 
bonds which is not authorized by law. As emphasized in the Loomis decision, 
connection fees are not to be used for bond retirement, but rather the debt obligations 
should come from the monthly user fees. Loomis at 119 Idaho at 440,807 P.2d at 1278, 
IC § 50-1033. 
6 August 29, 2014, Affidavit of Joyce Stroschein, 114. 
7 Id.115. 
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Simply put, in "following the money," not one single connection fee dollar since 
2007 has been spent for authorized uses under law.8 From 2007 through March of 2013, 
no connection fee funds were spent on replacement, maintenance or repairs of the system, 
but rather were transferred to the general fund where they were improperly expended for 
the general purposes of the City. Then, in March of 2013, in a blatant attempt to "cover 
its tracks," the City transferred the equivalent of what it had collected in connection fees 
into the newly created Funds 37/38. Those funds, and the connection fees collected 
thereafter, were then improperly spent and allocated for debt retirement, effectively 
removing that statutory obligation from the monthly user fees contrary to IC§ 50-1033. 
Thus, the calculation for determining damages from improper taking of connection fees is 
relatively simple - 100% of all connection fees collected by the City from 2007 through 
2015. 
D. The New Evidence Showing the City's Improper Use of the Connection Fees 
in Direct Contradiction of the Red Oak Studies Warrants Equitable Relief. 
Along with monetary damages, the Plaintiffs' Complaint seeks "any other legal or 
equitable relieve deemed justified by the Court." Complaint, Prayer for Relief16. 
Equitable relief differs from that of a damage award in that: 
"EQUITY LOOKS UPON THAT AS DONE WHICH OUGHT TO HAVE BEEN 
DONE." 
Equity will treat the subject-matter, as to the collateral consequences and 
incidents, in the same manner as if the final acts contemplated by the 
8 What is particularly troubling is that this sudden reallocation of the fees contained in Funds 37/38 toward 
"debt service" was clearly a blatant attempt to avoid having these funds frozen pursuant to the Plaintiffs' 
then pending pre-judgment writ of execution. See 120 of Ms Stroschein's affidavit wherein she states 
that "Freezing Funds 37 and 38 will have significant implications on the City's retirement of debt 
obligations." 
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parties had been executed exactly as they ought to have been; not as the 
parties might have executed them. 
Blacks Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth Edition at 435. 
Given the new evidence and facts that have come to light after the completion of 
the Building Contractors' case and the filing of the Complaint in this case, the Court is 
not precluded from providing such equitable relief. As such, it should order a halt of the 
assessment of the connection fees until the City can enact a policy for the proper 
assessment and use of such fees. 
Throughout the Building Contractors' case and this case, the City has heavily 
promoted the "Red Oak •• studies conducted in 2006 and 2010 as the supporting basis for 
the assessment of user and connection fees in the City of Pocatello, including the current 
fees (which are approved on an annual basis by the City council.) The reports were 
utilized to justify a capacity fee rate jump of 1,500% alone between 2006 and 2007, with 
a consistent increase of between 8% to 10% each year since then and until at least 2015. 9 
The Court has relied upon the Red Oak studies in determining that the City's assessment 
of the connection fees, including the steep increases, were appropriate. Given the 
additional evidence in this case, there is now no question that the City did not implement 
a connection fee based on what was publicized by the Red Oak studies, suggesting that 
the studies were prepared and presented by the City in bad faith as well as bringing into 
serious question the methodology that was allegedly used in the studies to calculate the 
connection fees. 
The Red Oak Studies (prepared for water and wastewater respectively) explicitly 
indicate that the '"debt service" payments are to be derived from the revenues obtained 
9 See again copies of the City Resolutions passed in 2006 and 2007, attached as Exhibits 5 and 6 to the 
January 4, 2013, Affidavit of Nathan Olsen in the Building Contractors' case. 
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from the monthly user fees. 10 That debt obligation is part of the "revenue requirements" 
factored into the monthly fee rate recommended by the studies. 11 The studies are also 
explicit in that the capacity or connection fees are based solely on the "replacement" of 
the existing system through capital improvement projects.12 
The studies then make a virtually identical and critically important disclosure with 
regard to the assessment and calculation of the connection/capacity fees: 
To determine net equity in the system, replacement costs of the net equity in the 
system, replacement cost of the existing backbone system is reduced by the 
outstanding debt on related facilities. Equity is not reduced by accumulated 
depreciation. Once a new customer connects to the (water/wastewater) system, 
that customer begins paying charges for service similar to all existing customers. 
These charges typically include payment for retirement of outstanding debt. For 
this reason, it is necessary to deduct outstanding debt from system value 
before developina; these (capacity) fees. 13 
In direct contradiction to the Red Oak studies relied upon by the City in its 
connection fee rates, none of the nearly $3,000,000 dollars assessed and collected were 
ever used for "replacement" of the "existing backbone" of the system. Rather, those 
funds were first transferred to the general fund for general purpose use by the City. Then 
- after having this fact exposed in the Building Contractors• case - the City then 
transferred the equivalent of what it had collected in connection fees during that period 
into newly created Funds 37/38. The City then expended or budgeted all of the funds 
toward debt service which was to be covered by the user fees. 
'
0 See the 2010 Red Oak Studies on Water- Sections 3-1, 3.3.1, 3.4, and 3.4.2, and 2006 Wastewater-
2.2, 2.4, 2.4.3, and 2.5. attached and marked for the convenience of the Court in the May 22, 2015, 
Olsen Aff. Ex. 2. 
11 Id. Water Report Sections 3-3 and 5.3, Wastewater Report Section 5.2. 
12 Id. Water Report Sections 2.3, 2.4, and 6.2.1. Wastewater Report, Sections 3.1- 3.3. 6.1, 6.2. 
13 Id. Water Report Section 6.2.1., Wastewater Report 6.1.1. (emphasis added.) 
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In essence, the Red Oak studies falsely disclosed both the intent and the actual use 
of the connection fees. The connection fees were never used for "replacement" of the 
existing system. They were also misrepresented to be calculated after "deducting 
outstanding debt from system value" because such "charges" belong to the "existing 
customers" not the new connectors: The Red Oak studies were nothing more than a false 
premise to justify massive increases in the connection fees, which in the end were 
improperly used for the general purposes of the City and/or for the debt obligations which 
by statute are the obligation the user fees. This kind of bad faith or arbitrary and 
capricious conduct should not stand and demands equitable treatment by the Court. 
Thus, in addition to awarding damages for all of the improperly collected fees, the Court 
should also invalidate the current connection fee assessments - requiring the City to 
develop legally authorized fee rates. 
II. The City's Improper Use of Connection/User Fees for Other Expenditures of 
the City Does Not Constitute "Just Compensation." 
Using generalities and without citing any authority, the City makes the amorphous 
claim that despite the illegal PILOT transfers to the general fimd, there was no taking of 
fees "without just compensation" because fee payers "benefitted" from the general fund 
expenditures of the City, i.e. through its general services including mayor, city council, 
finance, city hall, etc ... (hereinafter referred to as "fringe benefits." ) Def. Mem. Supp. 
MSJ, pp 1 O~ 13. In essence, the City suggests that - as a result of the improper transfers -
resident fee payers eajoyed such fringe benefits and a resulting reduced property tax rate 
that had to be immediately "increased" after the PILOT program ceased. Id. p. 13. Upon 
further review, this argument is woefully flawed, and if anything further demonstrates the 
injurious effect to the fee payers. 
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First, the City makes the false assumption that all of the fee payers are in fact 
residents of the City of Pocatello. This is simply not the case. In fact, both of the named 
Plaintiffs in this case are not residents of the City. Ed Quinn has been at all times 
relevant and currently is a resident of Bannock County near McCammon, Idaho. (See 
Aff. Of Ed Quinn.) Hill-Vu's owner Logan Robinson has at all times relevant and 
currently is a resident of Bannock County near Inkom, Idaho . (See Aff. of Logan 
Robinson.) Both of these individuals conducted their business in Pocatello, which 
required the payment of the fee. Mr. Quinn paid the connection fee as part of a permit 
fee to allow him to develop property. Mr. Robinson paid the user fees for the rental units 
he owns in the City. Both of these individuals expected the fees to go toward their 
intended and legal uses. They did not obtain that benefit. Instead, the City has now 
admitted that their fees went to the general fund to help reduce the property taxes for the 
residents of the City. Both individuals did not obtain any of the fringe benefits from the 
City services funded in part by the impermissibly used fees. In other words, adding insult 
to injury, not only were Mr. Quinn's and Mr. Robinson's fees improperly taken, but they 
also wrongly subsidized the City's property tax rates. This is not "just compensation" but 
is in fact quite the opposite. 
In addition, regardless of the fee payers' residence, long established authority 
does not support the proposition that "just compensation" can consist of such alleged 
benefits from the impermissible use of the ''taken property." Nor is it feasible. Again, 
the City does not even bother to provide any legal authority as to what constitutes 'Just 
compensation." In fact, this is a fundamental principle that has been defined over time in 
numerous court decisions since practically the implementation of the U.S. Constitution, 
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including by the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has succinctly 
defined the term as follows: 
The Fifth Amendment provides that private property shall not be taken for public 
use without just compensation. And "just compensation" means the full monetary 
equivalent of the property taken. The owner is to be put in the same position 
monetarily as he would have occupied if his property had not been taken. In 
enforcing the constitutional mandate, the Court at an early date adopted the 
concept of market value: the owner is entitled to the fair market value of the 
property at the time of the taking. 
United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16 (1970) (emphasis added). 
Thus, in order for there to have been "just compensation" for property taken, the deprived 
property owner must· 1) be given the "full monetary equivalent of the property taken" 2) 
"at the time of the taking." Id. 
Using this basic doctrine established by our U.S. Supreme Court, the City's 
argument that fee payers received ''just compensation" completely falls apart. First, the 
City has not nor can it possibly demonstrate that fee payers were given the "full monetary 
equivalent" of what was taken from them. This is particularly true given the varying fee 
amounts that were improperly taken by the City. For instance, during the time that the 
City enacted its PILOT program, Mr. Robinson paid around $840,000 in user fees to the 
City, approximately 10% or $84,000 of which was improperly used under the PILOT 
program. (See Robinson Aff.) Yet the City has in no way (nor can it really even 
feasibly) showed that the so called "benefits" that were provided by the PILOT fee are 
equivalent to $84,000 improperly taken. Further, as the owner of many rental units, Mr. 
Robinson's total fees paid were significantly if not exponentially higher that a single 
residence owner during that same period. Yet it is impossible for the City to prove that 
the fringe benefits received by Mr. Robinson from the PILOT fee are exceedingly greater 
than a single residence owner. 
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Regardless, the City is precluded.from making this argument by the fact that it 
cannot show that the so called "benefit" of the PILOT fee was equivalent to the property 
taken at the time of the taking. In fact, there was no such "benefit" at the time of the 
taking because the fee was not yet spent by the City. There is no authority to suggest that 
"just compensation" means some "future" benefit provided by the City. 
In summary, the City's so called "just compensation" argument is wholly 
unsupported by fact or law. More than anything it is a red herring and further reason 
why the City's Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied. 
III. The Fee is a Property Right Protected by the Takings Clause. 
The City has attempted to make the argument that because the PILOT was a 
"disguised tax," that somehow absolves it from a takings action despite the fact that the 
City imposed the impermissible PILOT as part of the utility fees. Simply put, the clear 
authority does not allow the reclassification of a "fee" as a ''tax" to avoid a takings 
challenge. 
Idaho law clearly provides that the exacting of improper fees constitutes "a taking 
of property under the United States and Idaho Constitutions." BHA Invest., Inc. v. City of 
Boise, 108 P .3d 315, 319, (Idaho 2004). There is literally no reason to look to other 
jurisdictions, including federal courts, for an answer to the question whether the Takings 
Clause protects fees such as the ones involved in this case. The Idaho Supreme Court has 
expressly held that the Takings Clause applies to situations such as the present case. 
In BHA Investments, Inc., the Court held, "Money is clearly property that may not 
be taken for public use without the payment of just compensation. Brown v. Legal Found. 
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of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 123 S.Ct. 1406, 155 L.Ed2d 376 (2003)." Id. at 319. The Court 
continued: 
Id. 
In BHA Investments, Inc. v. State we quoted from San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City 
and County of San Francisco, 27 Cal.4th 643, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 269, 41 P .3d 87, 
106 (2002), as follows: "To put the matter simply, the taking of money is 
different, under the Fifth Amendment, from the taking of real or personal 
property. The imposition of various monetary exactions--taxes, special 
assessments, and user fees-has been accorded substantial judicial deference." 
Although we acknowledged that the tal<lng of money by a governmental entity in 
co1U1ection with the granting of a privilege is viewed differently from the taking 
of real or personal property, in that the taking of money in that circumstance has 
been accorded greater judicial deference, we did not hold that money was not 
property. Since the City had no authority to charge the liquor license transfer fee, 
its exaction of the fee constituted a taking of property under the United States and 
Idaho Constitutions. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has similarly noted that fees "can be either a legitimate 
fee or a disguised tax." In re Certified Question of Law, 320 P.3d 1236, 1242 (2014). 14 
Regardless of how the fees are characterized, either as a true fee or a disguised tax, there 
is no obligation on the part of the fee payer to pay the fees under protest. Id. In BHA 
Investments, Inc., the Court noted: 
We have also held that a city's imposition of a purported fee that does not bear a 
reasonable relationship to services to be provided by the city is in reality the 
imposition of a tax. Brewster v. City of Pocatello, 115 Idaho 502, 768 P .2d 765 
(1988). We have not held, however, that when a city imposes a fee that it has no 
authority to impose at all, such fee must be paid under protest before it can be 
recovered. 
The purpose of the analysis regarding excessive fees is to prevent a city from 
imposing an illegal tax by masquerading it as a fee. That analysis does not apply, 
however, where the city does not have the authority to impose either the tax or the 
fee. If it has no authority to impose any fee at all, it does not matter whether the 
fee imposed bears a reasonable relationship to the services provided. It is illegal 
regardless of the amount of the fee. In this case, the City did not have the 
authority to impose either a fee for the transfer of a liquor license or a tax on the 
14 The Court also equates the term illegal fee with that of disguised tax. 
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transfer of a liquor license. Therefore, the analysis of whether liquor license 
transfer fee was in reality a disguised tax does not apply. 
We have declined to apply the payment-under-protest requirement to an action 
seeking recovery of unlawful fees. In Owner-Operator Independent Drivers 
Ass'n, Inc. v. Idaho Public Utilities Commission, 125 Idaho 40 l, 871 P .2d 818 
(1994), we held that interstate motor carriers were entitled to recover the portion 
of their state registration fees that exceeded the amount authorized by federal law 
even though they had not paid those fees under protest. There was no statute 
requiring that the fees be paid under protest in order to challenge them, and we 
refused to apply the payment-of-tax-under-protest requirement to the motor 
carriers in that case. · 
The City ordinance denominated the sum owing as a "transfer fee," not a tax. In 
BHA I, the City argued that it was a properly imposed fee and not a tax. Now, the 
City contends it was a tax all along and that Bravo and Splitting Kings should be 
denied recovery because they did not pay that "tax" under protest. Where the City 
denominated the sum owing as a "fee," the payment-of-tax-under-protest 
requirement does not apply. The district court erred in holding that Bravo and 
Splitting Kings were required to have paid the liquor license transfer fee under 
protest in order to bring this action. 
BHA Investments, Inc., 108 P.3d at 323. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has clearly spoken on the issue of whether Plaintiffs 
may recover against municipalities or governmental agencies for illegal fees/disguised 
taxes. The Court has held that Plaintiffs have a right to recover under the Takings Clause 
of both the United States and Idaho Constitutions. The mechanism for such a recovery is 
appropriately a Section 1983 cause of action. 
IV. Class Actions are Specifically Designed to Address Complex and Difficult 
Cases in an Efficient Manner. 
The City has also claimed that considering the remedy of a class action for the 
numerous affected fee payers is "too complicated" or "too costly.'' In fact, class actions 
are specifically designed to handle complex cases such as this. In addition, it sets up an 
orderly process for those who have been injured and wish to collect under the action. 
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Thus, contrary to what the City is suggesting, this is a more efficient and less costly 
process for the adjudication of the claims. That will certainly be true in this case. 
The fundamental purpose underlying Rule 23, and comparable rules throughout 
the United States, is to simplify the judicial process for complicated cases. 15 The Ohio 
Supreme Court observed that the purpose of a class action is "to simplify the resolution of 
complex litigation, not complicate it." State ex rel. Davis v. Pub. Emps. Ret. Bd, 855 
N.E.2d 444,455 (Ohio 2006). Rule 23(b)'s prerequisites for class actions suggest as 
much. The rule identifies several justifications for maintaining class actions and each of 
the justifications are underpinned by streamlining extremely complex cases. Indeed, there 
is no other legal mechanism for resolving highly complex lawsuits when the requirements 
of Rule 23(b) are met. 
"One of the paramount values in this system is efficiency. Class certification 
enables courts to treat common claims together, obviating the need for repeated 
adjudications of the same issues. See I Herbert Newberg & Alba Conte, Newberg on 
Class Actions§ 1.06 (3d Ed.1992); General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 149, 102 
S.Ct. 2364, 2366, 72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982)." In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel 
Tank Products Liab. Litig., 55 F .3d 768, 783 (3d Cir. 1995). The Third Circuit continued: 
The Supreme Court has articulated other important objectives served by class 
actions. Class actions achieve "the protection of the defendant from inconsistent 
obligations, the protection of the interests of absentees, the provision of a 
convenient and economical means for disposing of similar lawsuits, and the 
facilitation of the spreading of litigation costs among numerous litigants with 
15 Idaho's Rule 23(b) tracks with its federal counterpart. Because there is little Idaho case law on the issue 
of the complexity of class action litigation, and the rules are substantially similar the Court should look 
to federal courts' interpretation ofthe comparable rule. See David Steed& Associates, Inc. v. Young, 115 
Idaho 247,249, 766 P.2d 717, 719 (1988) (impliedly overr'ld by Idaho First Nat. Bankv. Bliss Valley 
Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 824 P.2d 841 (1991)). 
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similar claims." United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 402-03, 
100 S.Ct. 1202, 1211-12, 63 L.Ed.2d 479 (1980). 
Id. at 783-84. McLaughlin on Class Actions described the purpose of the class action 
mechanism as follows: 
The Supreme Court observed more than 60 years ago that it is a bedrock 
"principle of Anglo-American jurisprudence that one is not bound by a judgment 
in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party. 11 Further, 
general principles of standing ordinarily prevent a litigant from purporting only to 
assert the rights of another. The class action is the most prominent exception to 
these baseline legal tenets, available in certain defined circumstances where the 
absent class members' interests are deemed to be adequately represented by 
another similarly situated entity and unitary adjudication of similar claims or 
issues is efficient and fair to the parties. As one state Supreme Court observed, the 
modem class action "is a procedural device that was adopted with the goals of 
economies of time, effort and expense, uniformity of decisions, the promotion of 
efficiency and fairness in handling large numbers of similar claims." 
1 McLaughlip. on Class Actions § 1 : 1 (11th ed.) The treatise continues and identifies the 
three-fold purpose of modem class action practice: 
First, class actions promote the efficient and economical administration of justice 
by avoiding multiple suits that would involve duplicative evidence on the same 
subject matter. As the Supreme Court has recognized, " 'the class-action device 
saves the resources of both the courts and the parties by permitting an issue· 
potentially affecting every [ class member] to be litigated in an economical fashion 
under Rule 23."' As one court asserted in approving the controversial use of 
aggregated as opposed to individualized proof of damages in an asbestos class 
action, "[u]nless we can use the class action and devices built on the class action, 
our judicial system is not going to be able to cope with the challenges of the mass 
repetitive wrong." 
Second, class actions provide a metho4 of protecting the rights of those who 
would not realistically bring individual claims for practical reasons, such as cost 
of prosecution or ignorance of their rights. The determination that a suit presents a 
"negative value" claim for which, on an individual basis, the game is not worth 
the candle weighs heavily on most class certification decisions. The class action is 
presumed to be fair to all persons aligned with the representative plaintiff; since 
all are "parties" to the suit for preclusion purposes, if the suit is successful all will 
be equally entitled to appropriate relief. 
Finally, the class action avoids inconsistent results by offering the efficiency and 
predictability of a unitary adjudication or settlement of the claims of all persons to 
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whom the defendant may be liable based on similar facts. Indeed, defendants have 
''a distinct and personal interest in seeing the entire plaintiff class bound by res 
judicatajust as [the defendants are] bound." 
1 McLaughlin on Class Actions§ 1 :1 (11th ed.) (internal citations omitted). 
All class action lawsuits are, ostensibly, highly complex. They inherently involve 
multitudinous parties and complex legal issues pertaining to bedrock principles 
underlying the notions of class certification. Thus, asserting that the legal issues involved 
in a suit might be too complex to handle in the context of class action is inconsistent with 
the very raison d'etre of Rule 23. 
Once the class is certified, the case proceeds just as would any other type of 
litigation. The Court would set the trial date and relevant disclosure timeframes. Of 
course, given the complex nature of class action litigation, the Court could employ a 
variety of procedures to simplify and streamline the complex evidentiary issues faced by 
the parties. Frequent status conference calls with the Court to keep the Court informed on 
the parties' progress and preparation could be used to manage the case. 
The Court could also, for example, appoint a special master to hear evidence of 
damages and that special master could then issue a report that could be read to the jury. 
The Court could bifurcate proceedings pursuant to Rule 42 and have separate 
trials on the liability component and then another trial on the issue of causation and 
damages. In this case, the evidence should be straightforward since the City can easily 
calculate the percentage of the rate that comprised the PILOT fee. In fact, the City has 
already done so and has that knowledge. Thus all of the parties know the relevant 
percentage. It should be a relatively streamlined process to identify the amount of 
damages and develop an allocation procedure for Court approval. 
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Nat an . Olsen 
Of Petersen Moss Hall & Olsen 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I ce1tify I run a licensed attorney in the state of Idaho and on May 22, 2015, I 
served a true and conect copy of the PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENT AL 
MEMORANDUM on the following by the method of delivery designated below: 
Blake G. Hall 
Nathan R. Staines 
Hall Angell Starnes 
1075 S. Utah Avenue, Ste 150 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Fax: (208) 621-3008 
Nath M. Olsen 
Of Petersen Moss Hall & Olsen 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
D U.S. Mail ~and-delivered D Facsimile 
D U.S. Mail 
El/ 
· Hand-delivered D . ·1 · Facs1m1 e 
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BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ. 
SAM L. ANGELL, ESQ. 
NATHAN R. STARNES, ESQ. 
HALL ANGELL STARNES, LLP 
1075 S Utah Avenue, Suite 150 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 · 
Telephone (208) 522-3003 
Fax (208) 621-3008 
!SB No. 's 2434, 7012 & 7484 
bgh@hasattomeys.com 
sla@hasattomeys.com 
nrs@hasattomeys.com · 
Attorneys for Defendant City of Pocatello 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH IDDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY 
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on 
behalf of itself and all others similarly 
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself 
and all others similarly situated, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
municipality, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Bannock ) 
Case No. CV-2014-1520-0C 
FOURTH AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A. 
STROSCHEIN 
Joyce A. Stroschein, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
1. That I am over the age of eighteen (18) and am competent to testify in this matter. I 
make this affidavit based on my own personal knowledge unless otherwise indicated. This 
affidavit is made under the penalty of perjury. 
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2. I am the current Chief Financial Officer ("CFO") and Treasurer for the City of Pocatello. 
I have served in the finance department of the City since October 2001, including City Controller 
from 2006-2008 and the Finance Manager from 2008-2014. I am knowledgeable regarding the 
financial affairs of the City and its adoption of policies related to the Payment-In-Lieu-Of-Taxes 
("PILOT") component of the user fees, return on equity, and the capacity/connection fees. 
I have served as the CFO of the City since August 2014. I am intimately familiar with the 
financial affairs of the City and its adoption of policies related to the Payment-In-Lieu-Of-Taxes 
("PILOT") fee, return on equity, and the Capacity/Connection fees. I am also familiar with the 
revenue bonds the City has and what the annual bond payment is and how the City has expended 
and operated the various funds within the City, including Funds 37 and 38. 
3. The City previously had revenue bonds for water and wastewater facilities. In 
approximately Fall of 2013, the City was successful in refinancing those revenue bonds to lower 
the total debt obligation. The refinancing was for the existing bonds on existing water and 
wastewater infrastructure and was not for future growth. 
4. In my first affidavit, filed with this Court on_August 29, 2014, Plaintiff erroneously 
suggested that the City was improperly expending the capacity fees in violation of Idaho's 
Revenue Bond Act, Idaho Code §§ 50-1027 through 50-1042. The City has never used the 
capacity fees to fund future growth nor has it transferred the money to the General Fund for use 
or repayment of Ge.neral Fund debts. Rather, the City has only used the capacity fees to pay for 
operation, maintenance, and replacement of existing infrastructure. Bond retirement for a given 
year is intertwined with the continued operation of the City's water and wastewater systems. It 
would be factually incorrect to suggest that the bond retirement for a given year is not part of the 
continued operation and maintenance of the City's infrastructure. In 2013, the City budgeted to 
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use the capacity fees to make current debt payments for the FY2014. The debt payments were for 
the current year only and did not prepay any of the debt obligations. Rather, the capacity fees 
were used to pay current debt service obligations only on the due date of the bond for FY2014 
and not for future debt payments. The debt payment for FY2014 is part of the City's operating 
costs for the water and wastewater departments. Importantly, none of the capacity fees collected 
were used to fmance future growth. Rather, these funds were designed only to pay for the 
maintenance and improvement on existing water and wastewater infrastructure. In sum, the 
payments made were for ordinary and necessary expenses associated with the continued 
operation of existing infrastructure. 
5. It is important to recognize that the City is required to maintain the water and wastewater 
infrastructure to ensure compliance with Federal and State laws. These recent revenue bonds 
were designed to satisfy this specific maintenance requirement and without conducting this 
maintenance upgrades, the City would fall out of compliance and be subject to federal and state 
penalties and fines. The use of the capacity fees was used specifically for these purposes and not 
for future growth. All of the money expended by the City from the capacity fees was only for 
current, same-year expenditures and not future expenses (such as future debt payments). 
6. There is no factual support for any suggestion that between 2007 and March 2013 that the 
capacity fees were transferred to the general fund for use to satisfy the City's general fund 
purposes. Rather, all of the capacity fees were accounted for and moved into Funds 37/38 to 
ensure transparency. Nothing untoward has ever been done with the expenditure of the capacity 
fees. 
7. If an individual did not live in the City boundaries and was not using water or wastewater 
services, they would not have paid any PILOT component because they would not have paid the 
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user fees. In this case, Mr. Quinn states that he has not paid any user fees and therefore would 
not be entitled to any potential recovery if the PILOT fee were deemed to be an improper taking. 
(See generally Quinn Affidavit). 
8. Mr. Robinson states that he does not personally reside in the City of Pocatello but that he 
does own several rental properties located in the City of Pocatello. (Robinson Affidavit, ,r 3). Mr. 
Robinson confinns that he has paid water, sewer and garbage fees to the City for these rental 
properties. As an owner of property located within the City he enjoyed a tangible benefit of, 
among other things, lower property taxes. As I previously indicated, one of the inevitable 
outcomes if the City is required to repay the PILOT fees collected until November 2013 is that 
the City will be forced to bond for any damage award and the property taxes will necessarily 
increase.As such, Mr. Robinson's property taxes will increase, which increase will likely exceed 
any potential recovery in this matter. It is also disingenuous to suggest that Mr. Robinson did 
not enjoy any of the benefits derived from the collection of the PILOT. One such tangible benefit 
was keeping the water and user fees lower because the City was able to consolidate services. Had 
the water or sewer department not enjoyed consolidation of the identifies services (i.e., in-house 
legal, finance, planning & development, human resources, etc.) the operation costs for the 
department would have necessarily increased, which would have required the user fees to 
increase. This consolidation resulted in significant savings to the departments as was detailed by 
the analysis provided for FY2006-FY2014 and attached to my prior ·affidavit as Exhibit A. 
9. Contrary to Plaintiff's assertions, the City cannot "easily calculate the percentage of the 
rate that comprised the PILOT fee:'·' (Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum, p. 19). The PILOT 
is a component of the user fee that was calculated in the Red Oak Studies. The City does not 
have ready access to this information nor has this request been made because it will require the 
FOURTH AFFIDAVIT OF JOYCE A. STROSCHEIN - 4 
578
City to retain the expert senrices of Red Oak. Plaintiffs paint an overly simplistic picture of how 
to determine the PILOT component and how each user would be affected by a damage award. As 
detained in my prior affidavit, the amount of PILOT each individual user paid will vary based on 
a number of factors. This calculation will be a very onerous, expensive, and time-consuming 
project. To suggest that this could be quickly and easily determined is simply false. 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SA YETH NAUGHT. 
SUBSCRIBE9~ SWORN TO, before me the undersigned, a Notary Public in and 
for said State, this _!j_'7I.ay of June, 2015. 
Residing at: 5',-,,yw.fk & .. · /J) 
My commissioll'expires: _...,1~}....:;~.:;ob<...!.'/_.()'------
. I ' 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following 
-this _.;i_ day of June, 2015, by the method indicated below: . 
Michael D. Gaffney, Esq. 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
21 OS Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Fax: 529-9732 
Nathan M. Olsent Esq. 
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN 
485 "E" Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Fax: 524-3391 
[ ] Mailing 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[}(.I Fax 
[-] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Mailing 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[)(I Fax 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
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BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ. 
SAM L .. ANGELL, ESQ. 
NATHAN R. STARNES, ESQ. 
HALL ANGELL STARNES, LLP 
1675 S Utah Avenue, Suite 1.50 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Telephone (208) 522-3003 
Fax (208) 621-3008 
/SB No. 's 2434, 7012 & 7484 
bgh@hasattomeys.com 
sla@hasattomeys.com 
nrs@hasattomeys.com 
· Attorneys for Defendant City of Pocatello 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH WDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY 
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on 
behalf of itself and all others similarly 
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself 
and all others similarly situated, 
Plaintiff, 
v .. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
municipality, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2014-1520-0C 
DEFENDANT'S SUR-REPLY 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW Defendant, City of Pocatello, by and through its attorney of record, and 
hereby submits this Sur-Reply Memorandum in Support Motion for Sununary Judgment as 
follows: 
INTRODUCTION 
The primary issue before this Court is whether the decision in the Building Contractors 
case relative to the collection of the PILOT fee constituted a taking anci whether that decision 
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should be applied retroactively. The City has provided this Court with significant and persuasive 
argument that inures to only applying the decision prospectively. Plaintiffs have made a general 
objection to prospective application but have not raised any additional support for retroactive 
· application in their supplemental briefing. 
Rather than address the merits of this litigation, Plaintiffs have devoted significant time 
addressing issues that are outside the pleadings and have previously been adjudicated in the 
Building Contractors case. Specifically, argument related to the appropriate expenditure of the 
capacity fee under the Revenue Bond Act is outside the scope of the pleadings. This litigation 
was initiated as a class action to recover the PILOT component collected from the user fees and 
capacity fees. As was fully briefed in the City's Moti<?n for Sununary Judgment, the capacity fee 
has never contained a PILOT component. Arguments relative to alleged improper spending of 
the capacity fees is outside the scope of the pleadings. Further, any renewed challenge to the 
amounts and calculations of the capacity fees has previously been resolved in the Building 
Contractors case and is res judicata. 
Even considering the arguments advanced by Plaintiffs, summary judgment on all claims 
is appropriate. The manner in which the City has expended the capacity fees is consistent with 
the Revenue Bond Act. The Revenue Bond Act specifically pennits all revenues to be used for 
payment of the bond and interest when due as well as the operation of the utility. This is exactly · 
what the City has done. As such, there is no legitimacy to the challenge of the City's use of the 
capacity fee being outside the pennissible uses under the Revenue Bond Act. Even ignoring the 
arguments of the prospective application of the Building Contractors case, the Takings Claim 
fails because the residents of the City, including Mr. Robinson, received just compensation for 
the PILOT fees in the fonn of reduced tax.es, consolidation of necessary services, and increased 
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City services. Ultimately, sununary judgment in favor of the City is appropriate and this matter 
should be _dismissed with prejudice. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The Capacity Fees Were Spent Consistent With The Revenue Bond Act. 
Preliminarily, it is important to focus on the scope of the pleadings in this matter. This 
case was initiated as a class action. Plaintiffs sought to certify two classes: (1) capacity fee 
payers in the City of Pocatello, and (2) user fee payers in the City of Pocatello. These classes 
sought recovery of the previously collected PILOT component that was incorporated into the 
·User Fee. Plaintiffs also claim recovery of the PILOT component that was allegedly incorporated 
into the capacity fee. However, as was fully addressed in Building Contractors the capacity fee 
never contained a PILOT. In the most recent supplemental brief filed by Plaintiffs, they seek to 
raise issues that are outside of the pleadings and are not properly before the Court. Accordingly, 
the Court should ignore any argument and only address the issues appropriately before the Court. 
Despite beirig outside the scope of the pleadings, one of the primary arguments advanced 
by Plaintiffs with respect to the capacity fee is whether the capacity fees were expended in 
conformity with Idaho's Revenue Bond Act, Idaho Code§§ 50-1027 through 50-1042.1 Plaintiff 
makes numerous factual statements that lack foundation and are contrary to the plain language of 
the permissible uses under the statute. Plaintiffs suggest that the City's use of the capacity fees in 
the operation of the City's water and sewer system can only be used for replacement and 
maintenance on existing infrastructure. 
As is clear from the existing case law, including Loomis, the revenues collected pursuant 
1 Curiously, Plaintiffs' Complaint acknowledges that the intended purpose of the capacity fees is 
"operation, maintenance, repair, replacement of the existing system and bond repayment." 
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to Idaho's Revenue Bond Act (the "Act") must be used in conformity with the explicit 
recognition that "fees are not utilized for general fund or for future expansion of the water and 
sewer system." Id. at 440, 807 P .2d at 1278. Absent from the record is any evidence that the 
capacity fees were utilized for the general fund or for future expansion of the water and sewer 
systems. 
Rather, as confinned by Ms. Stroschein;the City has never used the capacity fees to fund 
future growth nor has it transferred the money to the General Fund for use or repayment of 
General Fund debts. The capacity fees have only been used for the operation, maintenance, and 
replacement of existing infrastructure. ( 4th Stroschein Aff., ,i 4). The City is required to 
maintain the water and wastewater infrastructure to ensure compliance with Federal and State · 
laws. The bonds were designed to satisfy maintenance requirements and ensure the necessary 
upgrades to the system were made to maintain compliance with applicable laws. ( 4th Stroschein · 
Aff., 15). All of the funds used by the City were for same year expenditures and not future 
growth or expenses. (Id.). If the capacity fees were not used for general fund activities or for 
future expansion, the use of the capacity fees is appropriate. Because the capacity fees were 
expended only for the operation and maintenance of existing infrastructure, the City's 
expenditure of the capacity fees was consistent with the mandates of the Revenue Bond Act and 
Loomis. 
Because the capacity fees were not spent on general fund activities or for future 
expansion of the system, the City acted appropriately in its expenditure of the capacity fees. The 
plain language of the Act and the enumerated uses of"appropriat[ing], apply[ing] or expend[ing] 
the revenue of such works" confirms the City's actions. I.C. § 50·1033. To fund revenue bonds 
that serve the municipalities, it is appropriate to "prescribe and collect rates, fees, tolls, or 
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charges." LC.§ 50-I030(f). Pursuant to Loomis, the collection of a connection/capacity fee is an 
appropriate fee collected as revenue under the Act. Loomis, 119 Idaho at 439,807 P.2d at 1277 
(citing Schmidt v. Village of Kimberly, 74 Idaho 48,256 P.2d SIS (1953)). Idaho Code§ 50-1032 
further mandates that bonds be self-sufficient and that revenue collected be used to pay to the 
bond and the operation and maintenance of the systems that were installed by the bond: 
The council of a city issuing bonds pursuant to this act shall prescribe 
and collect reasonable rates, fees, tolls or charges for the services, 
facilities and commodities furnished by such works or rehabilitated 
existing electrical generating facilities, and shall revise such rates, fees, 
tolls or charges from time to time, to provide that all such works or 
rehabilitated existing electrical generating facilities shall be and always 
remain self-supporting. The rates, fees, tolls or charges prescribed shall be 
such as will produce revenue at least sufficient, (a) to pay when due all 
bonds and interest thereon for the payment of which such revenue is or 
shall have been pledged, charged or otherwise encumbered including · 
reserves therefor, and (b) to provide for all expenses of operation and 
maintenance of such works or rehabilitated existing electrical generating 
facilities, including reserves therefor. 
I.e. § 50-1032 ( emphasis added). Section 50-1032 mandates that the revenue be used to pay 
"when due" all bonds and interest and to further provide for all expenses of operation and 
maintenance. There is no distinction made between types of revenue and how it may be used. 
Idaho Code § 50-103 3 further describes permissible uses of revenue collected under the 
Act: 
Any city issuing bonds under sections 50-1027 through 50-1042, Idaho 
Code, for the acquisition, construction, reconstruction, improvement, 
betterment or extension of any works or to rehabilitate existing electrical 
generating facilities, shall have the right to appropriate, apply or 
expend the revenue of such works or rehabilitated existing electrical 
generating facilities for the following purposes: (a) to pay when due all 
bonds and interest thereon, for the payment of which such revenue is 
or shall have been pledged, charged or otherwise encumbered, 
including reserves therefor; (b) to provide for all expenses of 
operation, maintenance, replacement and depreciation of such works 
or rehabilitated existing electrical generating facilities, including 
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reserves therefor; ( c) to pay and discharge notes, bonds or other 
obligations and interest thereon, not issued under this act for the payment 
of which the revenue of such works or rehabilitated existing electrical 
generating facilities may have been pledged, charged or encwnbered; ( d) 
to pay and discharge notes, bonds or other obligations and interest thereon 
which do not constitute a lien, charge or encwnbrance on the revenue of 
such works or rehabilitated existing electrical generating facilities, which 
may have been issued for the purpose of financing the acquisition, 
construction, reconstruction, improvement, betterment or extension of 
such works or to rehabilitate existing electrical generating facilities; and 
( e) provide a reserve for improvements to such works or rehabilitated 
existing electrical generating facilities. Unless and until full and adequate 
provision has been made for the foregoing purposes, no city shall have the 
right to transfer the revenue of such works or rehabilitated existing 
electrical generating facilities to its general fund. 
LC.§ 50-1033 (emphasis added). Again, like Section 50-1032, Section 50-1033 does not 
distinguish between the types of revenue collected and simply confirms that a municipality has 
the right to use the revenues collected for the five enumerated purposes. Relevant here, 
Subsection ( a) permits the revenues to be used for the payment "when due" of the bonds and 
interest and subsection (b) permits for revenues to be used for the operation of the works. The 
plain language of the Act explicitly permits in multiple statutes that "revenue," without 
distinguishing between the types of revenue, be used for payment of then due bonds and interest. 
In this case, Plaintiffs erroneously suggest that use of the capacity fee, which is revenue 
appropriately collected under the Act, cannot be used to pay then due bonds and interest. This 
argument is at odds with the plain language of the statue. As Ms. Stroschein detailed in her 
fourth affidavit, the collection fees were used to pay for the bonds and interest that were due in 
that fiscal year and not in future years. (4th Stroschein Aff., fl 3-4). That is, the City is using 
revenue for payment of the bonds that are due in that year and are not making a prepayment or 
lump-sum payment of the bond that would be due in the future. No capacity fees were used to 
fund future bond indebtedness or future growth of the water or wastewater systems. (4th 
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Stroschein Aff., 15). Moreover, bond indebtedness is part of the operation of the water and 
wastewater departments. If the bond payments are not made, the system cannot continue in 
operation because the City would default on its obligations. Accordingly, use of the capacity fees 
to pay for the continued operations of the system through ensuring bond payments are made are 
appropriately performed under the enumerated uses in Section 50-1033. 
Finally, the relevant bonds were obtained for the continued operation of the existing 
infrastructure with system updates made to comply with Federal and State environmental laws 
and requirements. ( 4th Stroschein Aff., 15). These upgrades are necessary for the City's existing 
system to remain in compliance with operational guidelines. Use of the capacity fees goes to pay 
for the continued maintenance of the existing infrastructure to comply with federal and state 
guidelines. (Id.). 
Plaintiffs reading of Loomis v. City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434, 807 P .2d 1272 (1991 ), is 
overbroad and inconsistent with the Act and therefore has limited application here. Loomis 
centered on whether a capacity fee could be collected by the City of Hailey and whether it could 
use the collected revenues from "one year to pay for expenses to be incurred in the future." Id. at 
440,807 P.2d at 1278. The focus of the Idaho Supreme Court was not oil whether bond 
indebtedness in the same year could be paid with the revenues collected. The issue in Loomis 
with respect to expenditures was limited in application and materially differs in its application to 
this case. The relevant and applicable conclusions from Loomis to this case are that the City may 
collect a capacity fee and that apply here are that capacity fees cannot be used for general fund 
activities or for future expansion of the water or wastewater systems. So long as the capacity fees 
are "allocated and budgeted in conformity with the Act" ther.e is no violation of the Revenue 
Bond Act. Loomis, 119 Idaho at 439,807 P.2d at 1277. The City has not used the capacity fees 
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for general fund activities nor has it used the fees for future expansion. Thus, the City has 
allocated and budgeted the capacity fees consistent with the Act 
· B. Capacity Fees Have Never Been Used For General Fund Activities-All Of The 
Funds Were Accounted For And Transferred Into Funds 37 and 38. 
As is clearly revealed through Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum, the Plaintiffs'. 
most important motivation in this matter is a second attempt to invalidate the previously 
adjudicated issue of whether the collection and amount of the capacity fee is appropriate. An 
inordinate amount of effort was devoted to the single issue of suggesting that the capacity fees 
should be halted and new rate studies performed. (Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum, pp. 9, 
11). 
As occurred in the Building Contractors matter, Plaintiffs continue to suggest that the 
capacity fees were used for General Fund activities because they were from 2007 through March 
2013 deposited into the General Fund. However, as this Court is well aware, every dollar 
collected in capacity fees was identified and then transferred out of the General Fund in March 
2013 to ensure transparency. As was fully addressed in the Building Contractors case and 
reaffirmed here, none of the capacity fees were spent for general fund purposes or for future 
expansion. (41h Stroschein Aff., 16). Rather, the City has allocated and budgeted the use of the 
capacity fees to conform to the Revenue Bond Act There is no factual support for the suggestion 
that the capacity fees were spent for general fund purposes or for future expansion. Accordingly, 
the Court should ignore this tired argument that has been fully considered and dismissed without 
effect. 
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C. The Red Oak Studies Were Reasonable, Not Arbitrary, and Conform To Statutory 
Requirements. 
Plaintiffs again attempt to attack the Red Oak studies as being created in bad faith or with 
false premises in an attempt to have the study invalidated entirely. (Plaintiffs' Supplemental 
Memorandum, p. 11). As noted above, this request is outside the scope of the pleadings and 
should be ignored. Even though this request is outside the pleadings, no new rate study should be 
order because this Court has previously reviewed the Red Oak study and concluded that the 
methodologies employed to calculate the fees was appropriate: 
The Association argues that Mr. Hunter's method for calculating rates is 
more appropriate that the method employed by the City in creating the 
Red Oak report. However, in the Court's view Mr. Hunter's statements are 
more a criticism of the Red Oak method than they are a recommended 
alternative method. More importantly, although the Red Oak report may 
result in higher rates than Mr. Hunter's suggestions, the Court will not 
dictate to the City what methodology it should employ in calculating its 
fees. Instead, the Court is limited to evaluating whether the fees are 
reasonable, not arbitrary, and conform to the statutory requirements. 
Although the Association challenges the Red Oak study, the Court finds 
that it was a reasonable methodology, which was not arbitrary or 
unreasonable. 
(Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant's Motion to Reconsider, p. 24). The 
methodology used by Red Oak to calculate the fees is not changed by how the City uses the 
revenues it collects. Rather, the Red Oak methodologies would not be altered in any fashion and 
a new rate study would likely render the same fee because the same methodologies used by Red 
Oak would again be employed. The methodologies employed are sound and appropriately 
address how each of the fees were calculated. Plaintiffs real complaint is not with the calculation 
of the fees, which was previously determined to be a "reasonable methodology, which was not 
arbitrary or unreasonable," but rather, with how the City chose to expend the collected revenues. 
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The study does not become invalid based on how the City chose to allocate and budget the 
collected revenues. Accordingly, there is no validity to the suggestion that a new rate study be 
required. 
D. "Just Compensation" Was Provided For The Collection Of The PILOT Component 
Of The User Fees. 
Plaintiffs argue that no just compensation was provided to the purported classes because 
Mr. Quinn and Mr. Robinson do not live in the City and therefore they would not have received 
just compensation for the PILOT. First, with respect to Mr. Quinn, it is obvious that Mr. Quinn 
would not have received the benefits of the PILOT because he never actually paid user fees. 
Because Mr. Quinn did not pay the user fees for water and wastewater services, he would not be 
entitled to any reimbursement of a PILOT. Rather, Mr. Quinn simply argues he did not receive 
just compensation for the capacity fee. As has been previously addressed in the City's 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and Reply in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment, the capacity fees have never contained a PILOT. As such, there is no 
validity to Mr. Quinn's argument that he did not receive just compensation. Mr. Quinn's 
admission that he never paid a user fee confirms that he is not a proper representative of the 
putative class because he does not represent the class as an individual who has not lived in the 
City of Pocatello for the relevant period. 
With respect to Mr. Robinson, he suggests that because he does not personally live in the 
City that he has not received just compensation. Mr. Robinson does, however, admit that he 
owns rental properties with the City of Pocatello boundaries and he pays water and wastewater 
user fees on those properties. As the property owner of Plaintiff Hill-Vu Mobile Home Park, Mr. 
Robinson did receive just compensation in the form of lower property taxes. As noted in Ms. 
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Stroschein's Second Affidavit, "the payment of the PILOT component of the user fee did not 
result in a windfall for the City, nor did those monies sit idly in the City's bank account. Rather, 
all of the PILOT fund transfers were completely exhausted each year to pay for the City services. 
Likewise, the user fee payers received a substantial benefit in a lower user fee because the water, 
sewer,- and sanitation departments were able to operate more efficiently and avoided redundant 
service, such as legal, financial, human resources, etc." (2nd Stroschein Aff.,, 12). 
Mr. Robinson also received tangible just compensation in the fonn of lower user fees as a 
direct result of the consolidation of services. (z1111 Stroschein Aff., fl 5-12; 4th Stroschein Aff., , 
8). Further proof of the just compensation provided is the inevitable increase of property taxes 
that will result from the City's bonding to cover any awarded damages, costs, or attorneys' fees 
if the Building Contractors case is applied retroactively. (4th Stroschein Aff.,, 8). The only way 
to cover the expended PILOT is to go to bond, which will increase all property taxes in the City. 
Moreover, the Plaintiff Hill-Vu Mobile Home Park and its residents did receive tangible benefits 
in the form of fully funded City programs. The PILOT fee did result in just compensation for 
each user fee payer and Plaintiffs have failed to identify any legitimate evidence to support their 
opposition. Rather, Plaintiffs entire argument is predicated on improper conjecture, which is 
insufficient to create a_genuine issue of fact with respect to the just compensation received by the 
user fee payers in the City of Pocatello. 
Ultimately, if application of the Building Contractors case is applied retroactively, the 
result is a negative consequence for all property owners in the City. That is, any retroactive 
damage award would necessitate a costly and extensive process of determining what amount of 
damages is apportioned to each specific user. (Third Stroschein Aff., ,, 3-9). For example, Mr. 
Robinson claims payments in excess of $10,000 per month to the City of Pocatello for monthly 
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water, sewer and garbage services. (Robinson A:ff., ,- 3). The amount of PILOT component paid 
on a monthly basis would vary drastically from a single-family user paying less than $100 per 
month for service. Ultimately, there is absolutely no plausible benefit to be received by the 
taxpayers in the City of Pocatello who own property if the Building Contractors case is applied 
retroactively. Once the City was order to cease collection of the PILOT it immediately did so and 
has never restarted collection of the PILOT. The City has abided by this Court's order and 
continues to do so to date. Prospective application of the Building Contractors case ensures the 
City does not violate the Revenue Bond Act into the future without harming the citizenry of the 
City of Pocatello. 
E. Collection Of An Impermissible Tax Is Not A Property Interest Under Federal Law. 
Contrary to Plaintiffs' assertion, reliance on Federal law regarding the unconstitutional 
takings claim is not only appropriate but required where the only legitimate claim remaining 
after application of the Idaho Tort Claims Act (see Defendant's Memorandum and Reply in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment) is the unconstitutional takings claim under the 5th 
and 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution. As previously noted, uniformity in 
application of federal statutes is vital. Osborn v. Salinas, 131 Idaho 456,458, 958 P.2d 1142, 
1144 (1998). It is inappropriate to ignore federal laws with considering a takings claim under 
federal law; Thus, when considering federal case law interpreting 5th Amendment 
unconstitutional takings claims, the dearth of authority supports the conclusion that the collection 
of a tax deemed to be improper does not result in an unconstitutional taking. 
F. Plaintiffs' Cannot Satisfy The Requirements For Class Certification. 
Plaintiffs severely misrepresent the City's position relative to class certification. Plaintiffs 
suggest that the City objects to class certification because this matter is ~'too complicated" or 
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"too costly." This is not, however, one of the City's arguments in opposition to class 
certification. While this lawsuit has the potential for the resolution to be complicated and costly, 
the objection rests with Plaintiffs inability to satisfy the prerequisites for class certification found 
in Rule 23, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. It is incumbent on the Plaintiff to satisfy all four 
factors in Rule 23(a) and at least one factor in Rule 23(b) before a class can be certified. Plaintiff 
cannot satisfy these requirements. 
In fact, the affidavits of Ed Quinn and Logan Robinson further confirm that they are poor 
class representatives. Specifically, Mr. Quinn and Mr. Robinson confirmed in their affidavit that 
they do not live in the City of Pocatello boundaries. (Quinn Aff., ,r 2; RobinsonAff., ,r 3). Mr. 
Quinn has never paid user fees and would not be entitled to any refund of the PILOT. Mr. 
Robinson claims he does not use any of the services in the City of Pocatello and ignores the 
significant benefit oflower property taxes that resulted from the City's collection of the PILOT 
through the user fees. These admissions confirm that Quinn and Robinson are not qualified and 
competent to serve as class representatives because their interests are antagonistic to the interests 
of the absent class members. See In re Northern Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield IUD Prod Liab. 
Litig., 693 F.2q847, 855 (9th Cir. 1982). Further, the numerous types of potential users are not 
represented by Mr. Quinn or Mr. Robinson (i.e., commercial, industrial, multi-family, etc.). 
Given the argument presented by Plaintiffs, they have failed to advance sufficient 
evidence to find that all four factors in Rule 23(a) and that at least one factor in Rule 23(b) have 
been established. Specifically, Plaintiffs cannot overcome the significant policy concerns of the 
negative ramifications for all property owners in the City of Pocatello. Neither can Plaintiffs 
establish that the two class representatives are typical of the entire putative class or that their 
interest will adequately represent the entirety of the class. For these reasons, and as more fully 
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addressed in Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification, class 
certification is inappropriate at this time. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Defendant City of Pocatello respectfully requests that this Court 
grant its Motion for Summary Judgment on all claims and dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint with 
prejudice. Moreover, Defendant further requests that the Court deny Plaintiffs' request to certify 
the two identified classes. 
With this filing, Defendant considers the matter has been fully briefed and s~bmitted to 
the Court for resolution. Defendant does not believe additional oral argument is necessary but 
will appear at oral argument if the Court concludes additional argument would be helpful to the 
Court. 
Dated this~ day of Jtme, 2015. 
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Nathan M. Olsen, Esq. 
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QUINN. on behalfofhimseJfan: all others 
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MOTION OB.JECTING TO AND TO 
STRIKE THE FOURTH AFFIDAVIT OF 
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2015, and filed with the Court on lunb 5, f015, in support ofD~fendant's Motio11 for Summary 
Judgment filed on Maroh 13, 2011 I . . . 
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Under IRCP § 7(b)(3)(B): 
I 
.Ll,.J.~\,JU/V.l.li,J 
C) 
"When a motion is support d py affidavits(s). the affidavits(s) shall be served with the 
motio.n.'' 
Moreover., IRCP § 56(c) requires t 1any affidavits in support pf a Motion for Summary 
I judgment .. shall be served at least : tja.ty eight {28) days befor~ the time fixed for the hearing.,, 
Id. Although the Court did allow l ave tbr the Plaintiffs to fu~er respond to Defendant's 
Motiun, and for the City to "reply" to such response, it did not J/l'ant Defendant leave to provide 
i 
additional affidavits in support of °ff:i' Motion for Summary Judgment. As such, Defendant has 
' 
not com.plied w:ith the ntles, aim s. Stroschein's affidavit should be stricken and disregarded in 
its entirety. Further, the Court• s c rnsideration of this affidavit would be highly prejudicial in that 
the Defenclar1t providing it as part fits "reply' provides no oPpoitunity for the Plaintiff to 
respond to the entirely new allegat ons of the a:ffidavit. 
Additionally, Ms. Stroesc -in's affidavit contains state:(n.ents that w:e contl'adictory to her 
earlier statements and to o"ther test ntony on the record in the l~ng history of this case. The 
affidavit is submitted in bad faith . y the Defendant in an attem:pt to subvert Plaintiff from 
pointing out these blatant inconsis encies. 
Ms. Stroeschein's a:ffida.vi: also contains a number of st'a.tements which are otherwise 
inadmissible, summed up as follo s: 
Paragraph 3: Lack offoun ation. The statement fails t~ provide any specific infonnation 
with regard to the bonds th t were being repaid with thq connection ·fees, other than the 
vague statement that such , ands were "not for future growth." Further, whether the bond 
obligations are for "future owth'~ or not is completely:irrelevant in the case. Pursuant to 
Article Vill, Section Thre of the Idaho Constitution, b¢nd repayment must be tnade 
"solely" from the monthly, ates. : 
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Paragraph 4: Lack ofFmm ation and argumentative. A;gau.1. Ms. Stroscheinprovides no 
foundation for her stateme t. Further, she is arg1.1ment~ive. Regardless, other than the 
admission that capacity fe s are being used to satisfy 4~~ebt obligationst the statement is 
irrelevant (and contradicto to the record.) 
Paragraph S: Is entirely co lusory and consists of legal, conclusions. 
Paragraph 6: Is entirely co clusory~ argumentative and;consists of'legal conclusions. 
: 
Paragraph 7: Speculative, gumentative, hearsay and c~nsists oflegal conclusions. 
' 
Paragraph 8: Speculative, rgumentative, lack offound.tion. consists oflegal 
conclusions. and hearsay. 
Paragraph 9: Speculative, gumentative, lack of foundation, consist.s oflegal 
conclusions. 
Pursuant to the foregoing, , e Court should suumYnily ~trike the affidavit. Plaintiffs 
request oral argument if deemed n cessary by the Court. 
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I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State ofidaho, with my office in 
Idaho Falls, Idaho, and that on the 12t11 day of June, 2014, I se a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document on the perso listed below by first class diail, with the correct postage 
I 
thereon, or by causing the same to be delivered in accordance 'f,'ith Rule S(b), I.RC.P. 
Persons Served.: 
Blake G. Hall, Esq. 
HALL ANGELL & STARNES, ILP 
1075 S. UtahAve., Ste. 150 
Idaho Fans, ID 83402 
FAX: (208) 621-3008 
EMAIL: b~h@hasattorneys.com 
I 
I 
Method o:li Service: 
) hand r () email 
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IN THE DISTRICT €0URT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
I OF THE STATE OP' IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY 
! . 
i . 
' i 
I 
I-ll.,L-VU MOBILE HOME PAltk, on 
behalf of itself· and all others sim1Iarly 
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf qfhimself 
and all others similarly situated, I 
Plaintiffs, 1 
I 
vs. . I 
CITY OF POCATELLOt m1 Idallo 
municipality, I 
I 
Defendant. I 
case No.CV~2014-1520~0C 
MOTION FPR LEA VE TO FILE FIRST 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
COMES NOW, Plaintiffs iy and through their counsel of record and pursuant to Rule 
lS(a) end 20(a) of the Idaho~ of Civtl Procedure, hereby IllQVC fur an order allowing 
plaintiffs leave to file their First "41le11.ded Complaint, in the form attached hereto. The general 
effect of this amendment would bJ to add declaratory and injim.ctive relief invalidating the water 
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I 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
and sewer connection fees as well las damages d1.1e to the recent arbitraiy and capricious actions 
. I 
i 
of the Defendant. I 
This amendment is necessary because, at the time of filing the original complaint. 
Plaintiffs were.unaware of the internal actions taken by the De;fendant that are the Stlbject of 
these additional claimsJ and/or were taken after the complaint was filed, which were learned 
through discovery. 
This motion may be supported by a memorandwn filed-within two weeks of the tiling of 
this motion pursuant to IRCP § 7. Plaintiffs will also set a hearing to ftn1:he:r support their 
motion through oral _argument. 
DATED this 12111 day of June, 2015. 
Na M. Olsen 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attom~y in the:State ofidaho, with my office in 
Idw10 Falls, Idaho, and that on the 12111 day of June, 2014, I seryed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document on the persons listed below by :first class :qiailD with the co1rect postage 
thereon~ or by causing the same to be delivered in accordance 'o/ith Rule S(b), I.R.C.P. 
Persons Served: 
Blake G. Hall, Esq. 
HALL ANGELL & STARNES, LLP 
1075 S. Utah Ave .• Ste. 150 
Idaho l7alls. ID 83402 
FAX: (208) 621~3008 
EMAIL: bith@l1asattomeys.com 
Method of Serviq~: 0 mail ; ) hand 0 fm< ( ) email. 
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Fax: (208) 529-9732 
ISBN: 3558 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY 
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on behalf 
of itself and all others similarly situated, ED 
QUINN, on behalf of himself and all others 
similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
. municipality, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2014-1520-0C 
AMENDED COMPLAINT JURY 
DEMAND AND REQUEST FOR CLASS 
CERTIFICATION 
COMES NOW the Plaintiffs, Hill-Vu Mobile Home Park, Ed Quinn and all others 
similarly situated and for a complaint against the above named Defendant allege as follows: 
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JURISDICTION 
1. This action· is brought for damages and other ap~opriate relief under 42 USC § I 983 
for violation of the Plaintiffs' civil rights under the color of state and federal law. 
2. Defendant, the City of Pocatello (City) is a municipality incorporated in the State of 
Idaho and administered pursuant to I. C. § 50-101 et al., and located within Bannock County. 
3. The Court has jurisdiction over the City under I.C. § 5-514. 
4. Bannock County is the proper venue for this action under LC. §5-402 or 404. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
5. The City has implemented ••system capacity fees," sometimes referred to as 
"connei;:tion fees" or "capacity fees" which a person must pay along with a separate "building 
pennit fee" prior to or in relation to new construction. Capacity Fees consist of separate fees 
charged for water, waste water, and waste collection as set by the City Council on an annual 
basis. 
6. Usually at the same time the City sets Capacity Fee rates, the City sets monthly "User 
Fees" for customers of the City water, wastewater and sanitation collection system. 
7. The City deposits the _collected C~pacity and User Fees into separate accounts for 
water, waste water, and sanitation. 
8. Pursuant to Idaho law and the State and Federal Constitution, Capacity and User fees 
can only be used for their intended purposes, including operation, maintenance, repair, 
replacement of the existing system and bond repayment 
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9. Around 2005, the City initiated a policy with regard to the Capacity and User Fees 
titled under various names, including "Return on Equity,""Rate of Return," "Franchise Fee," and 
"Payment in Lieu of Taxes" hereafter collectively referred to as "PILOT. 
10. In late 2006, City Mayor Chase requested an opinion from the Attorney General for 
the State ofidaho (IAG) on the legality of the PILOT policy. In an opinion dated February 6, 
2007, the IAG told the City that the policy did not comply with law, setting forth the statutes and 
case law supporting such opinion. The City did not disclose the IA G's opinion to the public. It · 
also disregarded the opinion and continu_ed with the_ PILOT policy. 
11. Since 2007, no less than $30 million has been transferred by the City from the 
water, sewer and sanitation accounts under the guise of its PILOT program to fund the general 
activities of the City. No less than $6 million has been transferred as such since 2011. 
12. The City has also admittedly promoted, planned and spent Capacity Fees for capital 
improvement projects that expand the water, wastewater and waste collection systems without 
first obtaining a bond as required under the Idaho Revenue ~ond Act (IRBA). The IRBA only 
allows Capacity.Fees to be utilized for maintenance, repair and replacement of the existing 
system. 
13. The Building Contractors Association of Southeast Idaho (BCASEI) filed an action 
in the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State ofldaho in and for Bannock 
County (Case No. CV-2011-5228-0C) (Idaho Case) challenging the legality of the City's 
Capacity Fee and User Fee policies, and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. 
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14. In a November 15, 2013, Memorandum Decision and Order the Idaho Court held that 
the City's PILOT programs, or any other program with a similar intent are unconstitutional and a 
violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond Act. 
15. During the discovery stages of the Idaho Case, the City failed to produce the 2007 
IAG opinion and any related correspondence or documents pertaining to that opinion although 
such information was clearly requested. The IAG opinion and its related correspondence was 
provided only through a subpoena by the BCASEI issued directly to the State of Idaho in January 
of 2013. 
16. The BCASEI had to pay the City over $2,500 just to obtain the City's financial 
records to determine the flow of the Capacity and User Fees. 
1 7. The City has also either destroyed or failed to keep and maintain records 
pertaining to its Capacity and User Fee policies. Some records have been destroyed after the City 
became aware of potential claims with regard to these policies. Such conduct constitutes a 
violation of the Idaho Municipal Records Retention Act I.C. § 50-907, et al., and spoliation of 
evidence. 
18. During the course of the litigation in the Idaho Case, as a reaction to a court decision, 
the City withdrew no less than $2,608,220 from the general fund equivalent to the amount of 
Capacity Fees collected by the City since 2007, and have deposited such funds into separate 
accounts, $1,391,089 in City "Fund 3711 and $1,217,131 in City "Fund 38." 
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19. In the summer of 2014, the Plaintiffs moved for a pre-judgment writ of attachment to 
freeze the newly created Funds 37/38 as a potential source ofrecovezy for damages. After the 
· motion was filed, the City of Pocatello approved its FY 2015 Budget. 
20. As confirmed by the sworn statements of City CFO Joyce Stroeschein. under the 
FY 2015 Budget all of the monies in Funds 37/38 have been §Pent or are dedicated toward the 
"bond covenants" or debt obligations ofthe City. Including the amounts collected since March 
of 2013. that amount now allocated toward 1'debt retirement" constitutes no less than 
$2.878,849.56. representing the amount of connection/capacity fees collected from 2007 through 
August of 2014. 
21. The City historically promoted "Red Oak " studies conducted in 2006 and 2010 as 
the su:gporting basis for the assessment of user and connection fees in the City of Pocatello, 
including the current fees (which are approved on an annual basis by the City council). The 
re:gorts were utilized to justify a ca:gacity fee rate jump of 1,500% alone between 2006 and 2007, 
with a consistent increase of between 8% to 10% each year since then and until at least 2015. 
22. The Red Oak Studies (prepared for water and wastewater respectively) explicitly 
indicate that the "debt service"·payments are to be derived from the revenues obtained from the 
monthly user fees. That debt obligation is part of the "revenue requirements" factored into the 
monthly fee rate recommended by the studies. The studies are also explicit in that the capacity or 
connection fees are based solely on the "replacement" of the existing system through capital 
improvement projects. 
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23. The Red Oak studies then make a virtually identical disclosure with regard to the 
assessment and calculation of the connection/capacity fees: 
To determine net equity in the system. replacement costs of the net equity in the system. . 
replacement cost of the existing backbone system is reduced by the outstanding debt on 
related facilities. Equity is not reduced by accumulated depreciation. Once a new 
customer connects to the (water/wastewater) system, that customer begins paying charges 
for service similar to. all existing customers. These charges b:'.Pically include payment for 
retirement of outstanding debt. For this reason, it is necessary to deduct outstanding 
debt from system value before developing these (capacity) fees. 
24. In direct contradiction to the Red Oak studies relied upon by the City in its 
connection fee rates, none of fees assessed and collected were ever used for "replacement" of the 
"existing backbone" of the system. Rather, those funds were first transferred to the general fund 
for general pm;pose use by the City. The City then transferred the equivalent of what it had 
collected in connection fees during that period into newly created Funds 37/38. The City then 
expended or budgeted all of the funds toward debt service which was to be covered by the user 
25. The Red Oak studies falsely disclosed both the intent and the actual use of the 
connection fees, as well as the basis for calculating the connection fees. 
COUNT I-UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKING 
26. All previous allegations are restated and incorporated herein by reference. 
27. The 5th Amen,dment of the United States Constitution, as applied to the states under 
the 14th Amendment, prevents the taking of private property without due process oflaw or 
without just compensation. 
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28. Idaho Const. Art. I § 14 essentially incorporates the 5th Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution. 
29. Under U.S.C. 42 § 1983, a person who is deprived of their rights under the color of 
any act, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any public entity is entitled to redress 
at law or in equity. 
30. Under the doctrine of "Res Judicata" the Court should accept and adopt the 
declaratocy ruling by the Idaho court that the fees transferred for use under the City's PILOT 
policy were impermissibly assessed and collected. 
31. In addition, the City's use of Capacity fees for the purpose of capital improvement 
projects that expand the system are likewise impermissi~le and a violation of the IRBA. 
32. Additionally. the City's use of Capacity Fees for the purpose of bond repayments are 
strictly prohibited and unconstitutional in that under Idaho Const. Art. Vill § 3 such payments 
must "solely" come from the monthly rates. 
33. The City's unlawful fee policies have resulted in the taking of private property of the 
Plaintiffs and similarly situated individuals.-
34. The City's actions have resulted in a violation of the Constitutional rights, by the 
taking of private property without due process of law and without just compensation. 
35. The Plaintiffs and similarly situated individuals and entities have suffered injury 
caused by the City charging an unlawful fee and seek compensation for damages in an amount 
which-will be proven at trial, which in any event is many times in excess of $25,000. 
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COUNT II - UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
36. All previous allegations are restated and incorporated herein by reference. 
37. Plaintiffs have conferred a benefit on the City in the form of Capacity and/or User 
Fees which have been used by the City for purposes not authorized by the Idaho Constitution. 
38. The City has been knowingly and willingly receiving an improper benefit at the 
expense of the Plaintiffs and other similarly situated individuals and entities. 
39. Under the circumstances, it would be unjust for the City to retain this benefit 
without properly reimbursing Plaintiffs and others who have paid the fees. 
COUNT III - INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
40. All previous allegations are restated and incorporated herein by reference. 
41. The City did knowingly assess a Capacity Fee under the false premise that such fees 
· would not be calculated and/or used for bond repayment. which is strictly prohibited under the 
state law and constitution. 
42. Every Capacity Fee dollar that has been collected and used by the City has either 
been used for improper purposes of the general fund or for bond retirement in contravention of 
what was publically claimed and disclosed by the City. 
43. The City has and continues to implement a Capacity policy that is unlawful, 
inequitable, and a violation of Plaintiffs' members' rights.-
44. The continuance of the City's Capacity Fee policies will result in waste or irreparable . 
injury to Plaintiffs and its members. 
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45. Plaintiffs and its members are entitled to injunctive relief requiring the City to cease 
and desist its current unlawful Capacity Fee collections and policies. 
46. The City should further be enjoined from relying upon the Red Oak studies for its 
Capacity Fee rates, which will require a declaration that the current Capacity Fees are not lawful 
or enforceable. 
COUNT IV -EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL AND/OR EQUITABLE TOLLING 
4 7. All previous allegations are restated and incorporated herein by reference. 
,. 
48. The City knowingly made a false representation of, concealed and/or destroyed 
material facts to the detriment of the Plaintiffs. 
49.· Alternatively or in addition, essential information bearing on the Plaintiffs' claims · 
could not be discovered ~ough reasonable diligence. 
50. Alternatively or in addition, the City's fee policies, i.e. PILOT program and capital 
expansion without proper bonding procedures, were void as a matter of law. 
51. The Plaintiffs had no knowledge of the concealed or falsely represented material 
facts. 
COUNT V -ATTORNEY FEES 
52. All previous allegations are restated and incorporated herein py reference. 
53. The Plaintiffs have retained the services of the above named legal counsel to 
pursue their rights. 
54. The Plaintiffs are entitled to recover their attorneys fees and expenses under LC. 
§12-117, 58~115, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and any other applicable statute or rules. 
AMENDED COMPLAINT JURY DEMAND AND REQUEST FOR CLASS 
CERTIFICATION -·Page 9 
611
·\. ·,, 
~-...... -· 
CLASS ACTION CERTIFICATION 
55. All previous allegations are restated and incorporated herein by reference. 
56. Plaintiffs bring this action individually and on behalf of a Class consisting 
of all individuals or entities who have paid Capacity or User Fees to the City since 2007. 
57. Class certification, including the possibility of subclasses, is warranted and 
appropriate under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
Plaintiffs pray for the following relief: 
1. For a monetary judgment consisting of all improperly collected and spent Capacity and 
User Fees since 2007, plus interest at the statutory rate of 12% per annum. 
2. That there be immediate injunctive and declaratory relief preventing the enforcement 
of the current Capacity Fee assessments until as such time the City can enact a legal and proper 
Capacity Fee. 
3. That the City should be required to deposit all monies collected from the unlawful fee 
into a common fund and all members of the class should be allowed to petition the fund for a 
recovery of their damages. 
4. That punitive damages be awarded for the City's wrongful conduct pertaining to the 
Plaintiffs' equitable estoppel claim. 
5. An award of attorney fees and costs, and further that the City should be required to 
reimburse the damages fund for any such awarded attorney fees based upon the allegations 
contained herein so as not to further harm the class. 
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6. Any other legal or equitable relief deemed justified by the Court. 
PLAINTIFFS REQUEST A JURY TRIAL FOR ANY ISSUES TRIABLE BY JURY 
DAIBD this __ day of June, 2015. 
PETERSEN Moss HALL & OLSEN 
Nathan M. Olsen 
Attorneys for the Plaintiffs 
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BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ. 
SAM L. ANGELL, ESQ. 
NATHAN R. STARNES~ESQ. 
HALL ANGELL .STARNES, LLP 
1075 S Utah Avenuej S1;1.ite 150 
Idaho Falls. Idaho 83402 
Telephone (208) 522-3003 
Fax (208) 621-3008 
!SB No.'¥ 2434, 7012 & 7484 
bgh@hasattorneys.com. 
sla@hasattomeys.com 
nrs@hasattorneys.com 
Attorneys for Defendant City of Pocatello 
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fN THE DJSTRJCT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO,_ IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY 
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on 
behalf of its.elf and alJ others simi1ar1y 
situated, ED QUINN, on behalfofhitnself 
and all others similarly situated, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
municipality, 
Defendant. 
Cas~No. CV-2014-l520-0C 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE IN 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION TO STRIKE FOURTH 
STROSCHIEN AF.FIDA VIT 
COMES NOW Defendant, City of Pocatello, by and through its attorney of record, and 
hereby submits this Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike the Fourth Affidavit 
of Joyce A. Stroschein tiled June 5, 201.5 as follows: 
ARGUMENT 
Before the Court Is an attempt by Plaintiffs to strike the Fourth Affidavit of Joyce 
Stroschein ("-Fourth Affidavit"). The Plaintiffs' motion suggests that striking the motion is 
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appropriate because the affidavit was not filed with the original moving papers. It also alleges 
various unsupported reasons to strike.portion$ of the affidavit. The claimed objections are 
unpersuasive and striking the affidavit is unwarranted. The City reqqests that the Court deny 
Plaintiffs) motion to strike the Fourth Affidavit of Joyce A. Stroschein and consider her affidavit 
as part of the City's Mc;>tiou for Summary Judgment. 
A. General Objections 
Plaintiffs suggest that the Fourth Affidavit should be stricken because it was not filed 
with the original moving papers -as stated in Rule 56(c), Idaho Rules- of qvil Procedure. As this 
Court can -appreciate, this case is unique in that the Court provided the parties with additional 
time to make argument outside-the time requirements provided by Rule 56(c)-providing both 
parties to file supplemental briefs to fully address the merits of the-summary judgment. 
Specifically, the matter·was fully briefed and argued to the Court. however, at the hearing 
additional time was provided to supp1einent the briefing and evidence in the record. While 
Plai_ntiffs argue that the rules do not provide for affidavits filed with a reply, the rules likewise do 
not contemplate a .sur-reply; The Court has discretion to allow additional filings and affidavits 
out~ide the rules, 
In this case, Defenda)lt filed a Fourth Affidavit of Joyce Stroschein with the Citf s sur-
reply to address newly raised issues. The filing of the Fourth Affidavit was appropriate and 
preserved judicial reso.urces-l>ecause it avoided the. filing of a motion for reconsideration. In the 
supplemental b1ief filed by Plaintiff they raised new issues, including suggestions that the 
Connection Fees were comingled and Spent for general fund purposes, that the connection fee 
was improperly allocated, and that a n~w rate study was required. Plaintiffs also filed additional 
affidavits that could have easily been prepared and filed with the initial objection . 
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The Fourth Affidavit specifically addresses the factual misstatements made by Plaintiffs. 
A review of the affidavit rev~als that the·affidavit specifically addresses factual misstatements 
that the connection fees were spent for general fund purposes or· capital improvements .. Ms. 
Stroschein also addresses the erroneous suggestion that the connection fees were spent to retire 
future debt. Rather, Ms. Stroschein clarifies that the connection fees were allocated for same year 
debt service. E&eh of these stat~.ments addresses newly raised issues and .not previously argued 
issues. As such, the affidavit was appropriate. 
Witho1,1t specifics. Plaintiffs suggest that Ms. Stroschein offers contradictory statements 
and her affidavit is a bad faith attempt to address claimed inconsistenci~. Nothing in Ms. 
Strosc-hein 's Fourth Affidavit is contradictory to her prior testimony or other statements m~e by 
others in the But/ding Contractors. matt;er. In this case, Ms. Stroschein 's affidavit addresses 
issues that were not previously addressed and clarified specific fiictu_al inaccuracies. It is not bad 
faith to clarify factua.Ily unsupportable statements or to clarify issues that bear on the 
fundamental issues being addressed by the motion for smmnary judgment. Moreover, the City 
has an obligation to identify factually unsupportab)e statements advanced by Plaintiffs. lt cannot 
be consid.ered bad faith when addressing these issµes. Ultimately, the general objection to strike 
the affidavit because it was not filed with the·initial moving brief is not well taken . 
. B. Evidentiary Objections 
Plaintiffs make very broad and general evidentiary obje~tions suggesting the paragraphs 
lack foundation, ar~ speculative; conclusory, or legal co11clusion. Many of the objections related 
to the erroneous legal proposjtion that capacity fees cannot be spent consistent with the Revenue 
Bond Act. 'Inis position is contrary to the plain language of the Revenue Bond Act @mi the Idaho 
Constitution. Specifically, Plaintiffs suggest that the tenn •'revenue" does not include capacity 
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fees. This suggestion is incorrect and contrary to the plain language of the.Act and the 
Constitutfon. Each of the respective paragraph$ wiJI be addressed in turn. 
Paragraph 3; Ms. Stroschein is the CFO for the City of Pocatello and has served in 
various financial roles with the City since October 200 l ( 4th Stroschein Aff., 2). She has the 
ability to confirm that the capacity fees were never used to finance future growth but that any 
fees collected were for existing-infrastructure, as required by the Revenue Bond Act. Thete is no 
foundation for the proposition tbat the Idaho Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 3 requires bond 
repayment solely from monthly rates. Rather. the Constitution states that principle and interest be 
paid solely from "revenue" derived from •~rates and charges·forthe use of and the service 
rendered by" the various facilities. The Constitution does. not distinguish between monthly fees 
and other charges, including capacity fees. This is confirmed bytbe Revenue 8ondAct, which 
states the same. So long as the capacity fees are not spent for general fund purposes or future 
growth and the funds are allocated for the same year, they are appropriately spent consistent with 
the Act and Constitution. Paragraph 3 is appropriate and should not be stricken. 
Paragraph 4: T}Jis paragraph lays the requisite foundation and corrects factual 
misstatements.advanced by Plaintiffs. As has been confirmed by virtually every affidavit 
submitted _i:p this tnatl;er ·and the !Ju.ilding Contractors matter, none of the capacity fees have ever 
been aUocated for the general fund or for future expansion. Ms. Stro~chein can testify what 
expenditures a.re required for the continued operation of a given system. As the CFO she has 
intimatelmowledge of what funds are required to pay for the operation of the system and that 
bond indebtedness payments are included to operate the water and wastewater-systems. She can 
also testify that no connection fees were allocated to pay future indebtedness. Rather., her 
statements address the specific requirements of the Act and Constitution. As ·such, the statements 
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in paragraph 4 are relevant, Jay the requisite foundation and are not argumentative. Para.graph 4 
should not be stricken. 
Paragraph 5: There is nothing that is conc]usory or l~al argument advanced in 
,paragraph 5. Rather, this paragraph addresses the specific requirements o-fthe Revenue Bond Act 
a11d the Constitution and how revenµe collected pursu~.nt to the Act may be allocated. 
Paragraph 6: This paragraph specifically addresses the factual misstatements advanced 
by Plaintiffs in their SupplemeniaJ Brief: Namely, Ms. Stroschein counters the suggestion that 
the capacity fees were used for general fund purposes or improperly expended. These statements 
are no c:onclusory. argumentatiye, ot improper legal conclusion. 
Paragraph 7: !his statement confirms th~ obvious proposition tha,t an individual who 
does not pay user fees would not be entitled to a reimbursement of the PILOT component of the 
user fee. It is illogical to su~geS.t that this statement is speculative~ argumentative. or a .legaJ 
conclusion because an individual cannot receive a refund for something they never paid. There i$ 
no basis for the objections to Paragraph 7. 
Paragraph 8: In his :affidavit, Mr. Robinson en:oneously ~uggests that he has not 
.received any benefit from the PILOT component of the user fee. This is incorrect and paragraph 
8- addresses this argument. Ms. Stro.sche1n has previously addressed the benefits received by 
various users and specifi.cally appJied it to Mr. Robinson who incorrectly concludes no benefit 
frot'.I;] the PILOT com.ponent of the: user fee. Paragraph 8- is not speculative, argumentative, 
lacking foundation, or· conclusory. Rather, they comport with previous· affi.dayit testimony. 
Paragraph 9: Plaintiffs make the conclusory statement that the PILOT fee can be easily 
calculated. Ms. Stroschein confirms that it does not have easy access to this infonnation and 
hiring an outside consultant will be required tQ calculate the PILOT that was incorporated into 
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the user fee u.nder the Red Oak studies. This statement confirms the same statements made in 
. Ms. Stroshein's third affidav:it. Nothing in paragraph 9 is improper and warr~nts being stricken. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Defendant City of Pocatello respectfully requests that this Court 
deny Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike the Fourth Affidavit of Joyce A. Stroschein. 
Dated. this /-1 day ofJ une, 2015. 
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Attorney for National Association of Home Builders 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY 
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK et al. Case No. CV-2014-1520-0C 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, 
Defendant. 
MOTION FOR LEA VE TO FILE AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF NATIONAL 
ASSOCIATION OF HOME BUILDERS IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW Plaintiff Amicus National Association of Home Builders and hereby 
moves the Court for pennission to file the attached Amicus Curiae brief in support of Plaintiff 
Hill-VU Mobile Home Park and in opposition to Defendant City of Pocatello's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. The proposed brief, which is attached, argues that the City of Pocatello 
should not be able to use the illegal PILOT program as a shield against a just compensation 
claim. 
In Idaho, amicus curiae briefs are often accepted by Idaho courts when the briefs provide 
valuable arguments and views. Rugging v. Ada County Paramedics, 188 P .3d 885, fn. 1 (Idaho, 
2008) (amicus brief by Professional Fire Fighters ofldaho and International Association of Fire 
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Fire Fighters Local Union 149 addressing fireman's rule accepted); Bingham City v. Com 'nfor 
Reapportionment, 55 P.3d 863,865 (Idaho, 2002) (Court considered amicus brief filed by 
residents of Madison County urging adoption of specific reapportionment plan); Boundary 
Backpackers v. Boundary County, 913 P.2d 1141, 1150 (Idaho, 1996) (U.S. government joined 
as amicus to contest county ordinance); Toner v. Lederle Laboratories, 732 P.2d 297,312 
(Idaho, 1987) (Pharmaceutical Manufactures Association allowed to submit amicus brief on 
policy considerations of liability claims related to drugs); Poss v. Meeker Mach. Shop, 712 P.2d 
621, 626 (Idaho, 1985) (Idaho Trial Lawyers Association allowed to file amicus brief in workers 
compensation case). While the cit_ed cases are in the appellate context, they demonstrate a 
substantial willingness by the Idaho courts to consider a variety of viewpoints from parties 
seeking to present amicus briefs. 
Here, the view of the National Association.of Home Builders is reflective of the home 
building and development community in Idaho. Its proposed brief is not duplicative and will 
assist the Court by providing an analysis of the applicable case law and the impact of granting 
the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Accordingly, the National Association of Home Builders requests that its amicus curiae 
brief be considered by this Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DATED: June 30, 2015 
MAYNESTAGGARTPLLC 
~ /7-~ 
Steven L. Taggart ~ 
Counsel for National Association of Home Builders 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the June 30, 2015 I served a true and correct copy of the 
attached document, via U.S. postage_ first class prepaid: 
Honorable Stephen S. Dunn 
624 E. Center, Room 302 
Pocatello, ID 83201 
Blake G. Hall, Esq. 
Hall Angell & Starnes, LLP 
1075 S. Utah Ave., Ste. 150 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Michael D. Gaffney 
Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA -
2105 Coronado St. 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Nathan M. Olsen 
Petersen Moss Hall & Olsen 
485 "E" Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
~£UI~ 
Rosalie Wanlass -
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Attorney for National Association of Home Builders 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY 
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK et al. 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2014-1520-0C 
AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF NATIONAL . 
ASSOCIATION OF HOME BUILDERS 
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OF POCATELLO'S MOTION FOR 
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I. INTERESTS OF AMJCUS 
The National Association of Home Builders (NAHB) is a Washington, D.C.-based trade 
association whose mission is to ensure that housing is a national priority and to advocate for all 
Americans to have safe, decent, and affordable housing, whether they choose to buy a home or 
rent. 
Founded in 1942, NAHB is a federation of more than 800 state and local associations. 
About one·third of NAHB's approximately 140,000 members nationwide are builders or 
remodelers, including over 900 members from Idaho. NAHB's builder members construct about 
80 percent of the new homes each year in the United States and play a critical role in the local 
and nationwide economy. NAHB members support the traditional American dream of home 
ownership, as well as for the development of housing (whether ownership or rented) that creates 
livable neighborhoods and communities. Whether high rise or ranch, urban or rural, -NAHB 
builds many types of homes for all types of families. At the end of the day, NAHB members are 
central to the process that determines where and how we, as Americans, live. 
NAHB is a vigilant advocate in the Nation's courts, and the organization uses its 75 
years' worth of national perspective to frequently participate as a party or amicus curiae in the 
courts to safeguard the property rights of its members. 
NABB is well positioned to track the effects of such local public policy measures as fees 
and/or taxes on long·term national policy goals, such as maintaining affordable housing. In the 
instant case, Defendant City of Pocatello ("City") is trying to avoid its Fifth Amendment 
responsibilities by hiding behind an illegal fee scheme. Specifically, the City claims that the 
money contributed by the Plaintiffs does not constitute a property interest. Additionally, the City 
claims that the illegal PILOT component of the user fee is immune to a Fifth Amendment 
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challenge. For both of these claims, the United States Supreme Court says otherwise. 
A decision adverse to the Plaintiffs will empower other Idaho localities to use legally-
questionable funding methods without any recourse. In turn, builders throughout Idaho will be 
forced to expend limited financial resources in order to fight protracted litigation battles. Many 
builders will be unable to mount such a struggle, and ultimately will fold their business and/or 
pass these costs on to consumers. This will price many Idahoans out of the housing market. 
II. LAW AND ARGUMENT 
A. Regardless of Whether the PILOT is a Fee or a Tax, the Money Contributed by 
Plaintiffs Qualifies as a Property Interest. 
The threshold requirement for a takings claim has been, and remains, the demonstration 
of a constitutionally protected property right. The City argues in its Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment that the PILOT component of the fees contributed by Plaintiffs 
are not compensable property interests. Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summ. Judgment at 8, Hill-Vu Mobile Park v. City of Pocatello, ("Defs. Mem."), No. CV-2014-
1520-0C (filed on April 4, 2015) In part, the City cites United States v. Sperry Corp., for the 
proposition that "taxation is not considered to be a taldng because the monies paid are not a 
recognizable protected property interest." Defs. Mem. at 8-9, citing 493 U.S. 52, 53 (1989). A 
close look at Sperry and other United States Supreme Court precedent shows no evidence for the 
City's proposition. 
Evaluation of a takings claim involves a two-step inquiry. Each step must be completed 
in order. The first inquiry is whether the claimant holds a property interest. See, e.g., First 
English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304 (1987). 
Only after this inquiry is complete should a court consider whether that property interest has 
been taken. In Sperry, a private company brought Fifth Amendment Takings and Due Process 
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claim against the federal government in order to recover a user fee that was charged pursuant to a 
federal· statute. This fee was used to pay for the administration of the Iran-United States Claims 
Tribunal. Defendants would have you believe that the Supreme Court rejected the challenge 
because "monies paid are not a recognizable protected property interest." Defs. Mem. at 8. This 
is not true. In fact, the Supreme Court heard the Fifth Amendment Takings claim, meaning that it 
had already moved past the first inquiry as to whether plaintiff had a property interest in money 
he used to pay the fee. Ultimately, the Court found there was no taking because the user fee was 
reasonable; in part, because the user fee was not an illegal tax that violated the principle of 
intergovernmental tax immunity. Sperry, at 60-61. In explaining its holding, the Court stated: 
"[A] reasonable user fee is not a taking if it is imposed for the reimbursement of the cost of 
government services." Id at 63 (emphasis added). Clearly, the Supreme Court would not have 
decided the takings issue in the case if it had first held monies paid are not recognizable property 
interests. 
There's more. In Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, the United States 
Supreme Court held unconstitutional a state statute stating that interest earned on money 
deposited in the registry of the court shall be deemed to be income of the office of the clerk. 449 
U.S. 155 (1980). The County's scheme did not merely "adjust the benefits and burdens of 
economic life to promote the common good"; but instead, it was a "forced contribution to 
general governmental revenues." Id at 163. Further, the Court noted that "[t]he earnings of a 
fund are incidents of ownership of the fund itself and are property just as the fund itself is 
property." Id at 164. The Court closed by saying, "a State, by ipse dixit, may not transform 
private property into public property without compensation, even for the limited duration of the 
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deposit in court . . . . This is the very kind of tlrlng that ·the Taking Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment was meant to prevent." Id 
In Village of Norwood v. Baker, a locality went through condemnation proceedings in 
order to build a road through petitioner's land, and then enacted a separate ordinance which 
assessed upon the remainder of petitioner's land, an amount equal to the amount the city paid for 
the land for the street, plus costs associated with the condemnation proceedings. 172 U.S. 269 
(1898). In short, the village tried to reclaim the very money it had paid for the property. The 
Court held that imposing the financial obligation upon the petitioner effected a taking under the 
Takings Clause. See also Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington, 538 U.S. 216, 241 
(2003)("A law that requires that the interest on [ ... funds] be transferred to a different owner ... 
could be a per se taking requiring the payment of just compensation to the client; Phillips v. 
Washington Legal Foundation, 524 U.S. 156, 172 ("[T]he interest income generated by funds 
held in IOLTA accounts is the "private property" of the owner of the princjpal") (citation 
omitted). 
Most recently, in Koontz v. St. Johns River Management District, the Court held that 
monetary exactions are subject to the same legal analysis as exacti,ons of land. 133 S.Ct. 2586 
(2014). In Koontz, a landowner applied for permits to develop 3.7~acres of a 14.9 acre piece of 
property. Eventually, the governing authority informed Koontz that it would approve 
construction only if he agreed to one of two concessions. Of importance here was the concession 
that in addition to deeding a conservation easement to the government on the other 11.2 acres of 
land, Mr. Koontz would have to pay money to enhance 50 acres of government owned wetlands 
located off site. Similar to Pocatello' s argument in the instant case, the government in the Koontz 
case argued that "a requirement that petitioner spend money improving public lands could not 
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give rise to a taldng." Id at 2599. The Court disagreed, stating, "Respondent's argument rests on 
a mistaken premise. . .. [T]he demand for money at issue here did operate upon ... an identified 
property interest by directing the owner of a particular piece of property to make a monetary 
payment." Id. ( citations omitted). 
Clearly, the United States Supreme Court recognizes that money is a property interest and 
this Court should be troubled with the City's argument stating otherwise. 
B. Regardless of Whether the PILOT Component of the Connection and/or 
User Fees is a Tax or a Fee, the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause Applies. 
In the precursor to the instant case, Building Contractors, Association of Southeast Idaho 
v. City of Pocatello, the court specifically noted that the true test of whether or not fees are 
permissible is whether or not the revenue collected from fees are used for a permissible purpose _ 
under the Idaho Revenue Bond Act. Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant's Motion to 
Reconsider and Plaintiffs Amended Motion For Reconsideration, Building Contractors, 
Association of Southeast Idaho v. City of Pocatello ("Mem. Dec.") at 6, No. CV·2011·5228·0C 
(filed on Nov. 15, 2013). The City "conceded" that it was funneling fees by way of a disguised 
tax. Mem. Dec. at 20. In short, the City's "concession" is a legal trick. In essence, the City is 
operating under the erroneous assumption that its illegal PILOT scheme falls under a general 
rule that legally enacted taxes are not takings. 
As an initial matter, does it really matter in this case whether the PILOT is a tax or a user 
fee? Impact and/or user fees are often measures designed to fund specific infrastructure 
improvements for the general welfare, and operate in the real world similar to a tax. For this 
reason, courts have applied longstanding and fundamental tests to determine whether an impact 
fee is a valid regulatory fee or a tax. Since raising revenue is the primary goal of many fees, 
many courts have concluded that such fees are taxes in disguise. See, e.g., Hillis Homes, Inc. v. 
AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF HOME BUILDERS IN 
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK 
PageS 
632
( ) 
Snohomish County, 650 P.2d 193, 195 (Wash., 1982) (superseded by statute)(holding that 
development fees imposed on new residential construction were invalid taxes.). "[T]he power [to 
tax] must be derived from the state, and a grant of it will be strictly construed, with doubts 
resolves against the existence of any particular aspect of the power." Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., 
Local Governmental Law at 335-37 (2d. ed. 2001). The difference in this case is that the City has 
only relatively recently "conceded" that is employed an illegal tax, but they are doing so only to 
evade their responsibility under the Fifth Amendment. 
It is generally true that the govenunent's use of a valid taxing authority is not a talcing of 
private property lUlder the Constitution. However, this position is not absolute. In Brushaber v. 
Union Pac. R. Co., the Supreme Court stated: 
[A]lthough there was a seeming exercise of the taxing power, the act complained of 
was so arbitrary as to constrain to the conclusion that it was not the exertion of 
taxation, but a confiscation of property; that is, a taking of the same in violation of 
the 5th Amendment; or, what is equivalent thereto, was so want[ ed] in basis for 
classification as to produce such a gross and patent inequality as to inevitably lead 
to the same conclusion. 
240 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1916). 
The Court in Koontz reiterated this principle, suggesting that there is a "point a land-use 
permitting charge denominated by the government as a tax becomes so arbitrary . . . that it was 
not the exertion of taxation but a confiscation of property." 133 S.Ct. at 2602 (citations omitted). 
While the Koontz Court did not set a standard for that exact point, it stated that "despite having 
long recognized that the power of taxation should not be confused with the power of eminent 
domain, we have had little trouble distinguishing between the two." Id (internal citations 
omitted} In fact, the Koontz Court predicted Pocatello's legal strategy by reasoning that "[i]f 
respondent had argued that its demand for money was a tax, it would have effectively conceded 
that its denial of petitioner's permit was improper under Florida law." Id The City should not be 
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permitted to implement an illegal scheme only to hide behind that very scheme when a Plaintiff 
tries to retrieve what is rightly his. 
C. By Forcing Builders to Engage in Protracted Litigation and By Refusing to 
Allocate Any Portion of the PILOT Component Under the Connection Fee, The 
City's Tactics Negatively Impact Housing Affordability By Increasing a Home 
Builder's Development Costs. 
A decision adverse to Plaintiffs cannot be allowed to stand, at least not without an 
acknowledgment that the decision would eviscerate property rights - for builders and developers, 
and all Idahoans. The average home builder is a small business owner who depends on 
consistent, straight-forward, and legal procedures in order to survive. The City enacted an illegal 
scheme in order to transfer funds into the general fund, and now is employing legal tactics to 
further delay just compensation due to .the Plaintiffs. A decision which denies Plaintiffs just 
compensation will simply enable government authorities to test the limits of what they can 
extract from builders. The building community simply cannot sustain repeated attacks upon their 
Fifth Amendment rights. This is not just rhetoric, but statistical as well. 
The U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) has established small business revenue 
ceiling categories for builders (including residential remodelers), for land developers, and for 
specialty trade contractors. U.S. Small Business Administration, Table of Small Business Size 
Standards Matched to North American Industry Classification System Codes (July 14, 2014), 
http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/Size _ Standards_ Table.pdf (last visited May 22, 
2015). Incredibly, 96 percent of builders, 94 percent of land developers, and 98 percent of trade 
contractor establishments are small by SBA standards. Stephen Melman, Structure of the Home 
Building Industry, Special Studies, (Dec. 1, 2010) at 3, available at http://www.nahbclassic.org/ 
generic.aspx?genericContentID=148743&channe1ID=3 l 1 (last visited May 22, 2015). Only 4 
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percent of home builders finished 2007 with $10 million or more in annual receipts. Id. at I. 
Land developers follow a similar profile; 61 percent of land developers having less than $1 
million in business revenue in 2001. Id. at 2. Home remodelers are even smaller with 84 percent 
of all residential remodelers having annual receipts of under $1 million.Id. 
In short, those affected by land use procedures, such as home builders and developers, do 
not just create vibrant neighborhoods, they also fit the profile of your average neighbor who must 
carefully balances revenue with expenses. If Idaho cities continue to enact impermissible fees 
and/or taxes, it will break the backs of the building conununity by delaying construction projects 
and forcing builders to expend large amounts of money in litigation. 
Further, the housing/development industry is a cruel and unforgiving environment. In 
fact, the U.S. Census Bureau reported on the births and deaths of U.S. businesses in 2006. With a 
baseline of 161,650 establislunents in the residential construction industry, 30,697 firms entered 
the industry and 29,095 businesses failed. Melman, Structure of the Home Building Industry at 5. 
The percent change of business births was 19 percent and the percent change in deaths was -18 
percent. Id. Shockingly, this is over twice the turnover as compared to the U.S. manufacturing 
sector as a whole. Id 
Builders need and in fact are legally entitled to a degree of uniform, consistent, and 
predictable land use procedures, and these factors are often the determinative factor between the 
success or failure of a single project or the entire business. 
The building community is not the only one affected by protracted litigation and illegal 
fees. Builders are forced to transfer some of the costs of protracted litigation to the home buyer. 
Even a modest increase in the price of a home has drastic effects on housing affordability for a 
large number of potential home buyers. Nationally, a $1,000 increase in home price leads to 
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about 232,447 households priced-out of the market for a median-priced new home. Natalia 
Siniavskaia, Metro Area House Prices: The "Priced Out" Effect, Special Studies (Feb. 1, 2012), 
available at http://www.nahb.org/en/research/housing-economics/special-studies/state-and-
metro-area-house-prices-the-priced-out-effect-2014.aspx (last visited JW1e 1, 2015). In Idaho, the 
median price for a hose in 2014 was $252,325. Id at Table 2. As the median price of a new home 
increases by just $1,000, 1,088 Idaho households will no longer be able to qualify for a new 
home purchase. Id. at Table 2. In the Boise-Nampa market, a $1,000 increase in the sales price 
of a home will cause an additional 474 households to be priced out of the market. Id. A similar 
increase in the Idaho Falls area causes an additional 108 households to be Wlable to purchase a 
home.Id 
The priced-out effect is exacerbated through government regulation and constraints on 
housing development. Already, regulations imposed by government at all levels accoW1t for 25 
percent of the final price of a new single family home built for sale. Paul Emrath, How 
Government Regulation Affects the Price of a New Home at 1-2, Special Studies (July 5, 2011), 
available at http://www.nahb.org/en/research/housing-economics/special-studies/how-
government-regulation-affects-the-price-of-a-new-home-2011.aspx (la$! visited JW1e 1, 2015). 
Every time a local or regional government raises construction costs by increasing the price of 
construction permits or fees, the cost of building a house rises. For example, permit, hook-up, 
impact, and other fees paid by the builder during the construction phase adds, on average, about 
3.6 percent to the final price of a new home. Id at 7. 
The City commingled connection and user fees and is now asking everyone to believe 
that it somehow was able to only parcel out user fees when it implemented its illegal PILOT 
scheme. Now it is hiding behind that scheme to avoid its obligation to provide just compensation 
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to Plaintiffs. Time costs money, and in this case, it negatively affects home buyer affordability in 
Idaho. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The Fifth Amendment's "guarantee that private property ·shall not be taken for a public 
use without just compensation was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone 
to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a 
whole." Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). The City of Pocatello is not playing 
by this rule of law; instead, the City implemented an illegal PILOT program, but then is standing 
behind that program to claim that is should not have to pay just compensation. Supreme Court 
precedent does not allow for this. 
It is the proper role of this Court to safeguard the liberty and basic rights of private 
property ownership afforded all Americans, including Plaintiff and all others similarly situated. 
Based on the foregoing, Amicus brief, NAHB respectfully requests that this Court deny 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DATED: June 22, 2015 
MAYNESTAGGARTPLLC 
Counsel of Record for Amicus Curiae 
National Association of Home Builders 
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Attorneys for Defendant City of Pocatello 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH.JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF nm STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY 
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on 
behalf of itself and all others similarly 
situated, ED QUINN, on behalfofhimse]f 
and all others similarly situated, 
Plaintiff: 
V. 
CITY OF POCATELLO. an Idaho 
rnunicipali:tY. 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2014-1520-0C 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE IN 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT 
COMES NOW Defendant,.City of Pocatello, by and through its attorney of record, and 
hereby submits this Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs-· Motion for Leave to Amet1d Complaint 
as follows: 
Before the Court is a motion for leave of court to amend the complaint. Plaintiffs seeks to 
amend their complaint to obtain the same relief requested in the Building Contractors action, 
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namely "invalidating the water and sewer connection fees" as well as damages associated with 
the City's use of the connection fees. (PI. Motion for Leave to Amend. pp. 1-2). ·.I 'his motion is 
defective and should be denied for three reasons. First. the Plaintiffs' t'notion shouid be denied 
for ·the undue delay in making this motion. The underlying facts they claim support this motion 
were well known and "Plaintiffs unnecessarily delayed resolution of this matter. Second, the 
proposed amendment would be futile because the amendment rests Qn an improper reading of the 
law regarding the Idaho Revenue Bond Act and the Idaho Constitution. Finally, the issue seeking 
to invalidate the capacity fee is resjudicata having been fully resolved in the Building 
Contractors case. Denial of the motion is appropriate and within the sound discretion of the 
Court. 
ARQUMENT 
A. Plaintiffs Have Failed To Support Their Motion With Authority Contrary To Rule 
7(b)(3). 
The City objects to Plaintiffs filing any written briefs in res_ponse. to this opposition, ~nd 
further, that the City be provided with an opportunity to file a written response to issues raised by 
Plaintiff.i; at oral argument, should the Court. pennit oral argument on this motion. Plairttiffs 
indicated in the.ir Motion Seeking Leave to Amend Co.mplaint that they may be filing_ a 
supporting brief within ·(he 14 days of the motion being filed. Rule 7(b)(3)(C) ·states·: "[l]t shall 
not be necessary to file a brief or memorandum of Jaw in support of a motion~ but the moving 
party must indicate upon the face of the motion whether the party desires to present oral 
argument or file a brief within fourte-en (14) days with the court in suppon of the motion." 
Plaintiffs indicated that It may be filing a supporting memorandum within fourteen days. The 
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moving papers were filed and served on June 12. 2015. More than fourteen days has elapsed and 
Plaintiff$ failed to file a briefin support of their motion. Further, Plaintiff has not complied with 
the requirement that ora] argument be requested. Specifically. Plaintiffs suggest they wi] I s~t the 
motion for hearing to further support their motion through oral argument. There is no explicit 
indication that oral argument is requested1 this is corroborated by the failure to notice up the 
matter for hearing~ Under Rule 7(b)(3)(D), the failure to file a brief and request oral argwnent 
permits the Court to deny thetnotion without notic.c,Bccausc of Plaintiffsj failure to comply 
with RuJe 7(h)(3), the Court should deny the Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint. 
Even if the Court were to find that oral argument had been requested, the desire to 
present oral argument is not mandatory and is left to the sound discretion of the CQurt. Defendant 
.does not believe that oral argument is necessary and that the motion should be denied without 
fi,lrther argument. Defendant has supplied this Court with sufllcient legal ai1d. factual support to 
justify the denial without oral argument. While Defendant does not believe that oral argument is 
necessary and the li'iotion can be denied, Defendant would request an opportunity to file a 
responsive briefing to any written filings made by Plijintiffs. Further, Defendant should be 
provided an opportunity to file a response to any oral argument made by Plaintiff! because it wilJ 
not have had an &4equate opportu:n.ity"to research, prepare and address arguments ~ade in 
support of the motion to amend -at an oral argumen1. To deny the City a full and. fair opportunity 
to prepare and respond to argum¢nts raised by Plaintiffs at oral argument is prejudicial and 
should not be condoned by the Court. The City should not be forced to respond to argum~nts 
blindly and without an opportunity to address arguments advanced by Plaintiffs.. Thus, to. the 
extent that briefing is pennitted ·or oral argµment heard, the City should be pcnnhtcd to file a 
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written response addressing Plaintiffs' arguments. 
B. There Is Insufficfont Good Ca_use·To Permit The. Cpmplaiut To Be Amended. 
Pursuant to Rule 15(_a), Idaho Rules of CiviJ Procedure, afler a responsive ple$.ding has 
been filed a party may atnend a pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the other 
party. ln this case, Plaintiffs seek )eave to amend their complaint to allege ai1 entirely new cause 
o.faction. Leave to amend a complaint should be given when justice so requires. Id. However, 
··r t]he denial of a plaintiff's motion to amend a complaint to add another· cause of.action is 
governed by an abuse of discretion standard of review:·' Estate <l"Becker v. Callahan, l 40 Idaho 
522~ 527, 96 P.3d 623,628 (2004) (quoting Thomas v. J\.fedical Center Physicians, P.A., 138 
Idaho 200,210, 61 P.3d-557, 567 {2002)). Denial of a request for leave to amend is appropriate 
where a valid claim is not being advanced,, the amendment is futile, or the moving ·party has 
unreasoQa,~Jy delay¢d the request. Spur ProductsCorp. v. ,Stoel Rives UP) 142 ldaho 41, 44, 122 
P.Jd 300, 303 (2005); Callahan. 140 Jdaho at 527-28, 96 P.3d at 628-29; Smith v. Great Basin 
Grain Co .• 98 Idaho 266. 272, 561 P.2d 1299, I305 (1977). DeniaJ of Plaintiffs request to amend 
their complaint is appropriate her~ because they have unreasonably delay the filing of this 
request and the proposed amendment is futile because no valid daim is bei.ng advanced. 
1. The Proposed Amendment is Untimely and Prejudicial. 
While leave to amend a complaint should be freely given, it need not be allowed if there 
is undue del.ay 011 the part of the movant. Spur Products, 142 ldaho at 44, 122 P.Jd at 303; Smith, 
1 The test for determining whether the district court abused its discretion is: (1) whether the court 
correctly perceived that the issue was one of discretion; {2) whether the court acted within the 
outer boundarie~ (lf its discretion and consistently with th~ legal standards appHcabl.e to the 
specific choices avaiJabl~ to it; and (3) whether it reached its decision by an exercise of reason. 
Estate of Becker v. Callahan, t 40 Idaho 522, 527, 96 P.3d 623,628 (2004) . 
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98 ldaho at 272,561 P..2d at '1305; Foman v. Davis\ 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227,230, 9 
L..Ed.2d 222 ( 1962). The I ack of d iligeuce is sufficient reason for refusing to permit an 
amendment. Spi1r Products, 142 Idaho at 44, 122 P.~d at 3.03;- Freeman v. Continental Gin. Co .. , 
381 F .2d 459, 469 (5tt' Cir. 1967). ln this case, Plaintiffs seek to amend the complaint to allege a 
claim based on the City~s aUeged improper spending of the capacity fees collected since 2007. 
Plaintiffs suggest this is newly discovered iufonnation, however, how the City allocated and 
budget¢d the- capacity fees has been known for many mon:thst even before this litigation was 
initiated. 
Specifically, in the First Affidavit of J1.1yce Stroschein she articulates_ that the capacity 
fees were used to repay bond indebtedness for the water and v,-astewatet infrastructure. ( l 81 
Stroschein Aff.. if1 l 7~20). This affidavit was filed on August 29, 2-014, in support of the City's 
opposition to & request to show cause that would have improperly frozen Funds 37/38. Plaintiff', 
chose not to pursue the matter further and specifically drd not amend their complaint until the 
instant motip.n. The nearly one year-delay in seeking to amend the complaint will unnecessarily 
prolong_ this litigation and raise issues that couJd have been raised much earlier. This matter was 
filed in st:ate c-ourt (it had previously been filed in federal court :and was dismissed) more than 14 
months ago. The matter will continue to languish in state court without a time]y resolution 
because the proposed amendment will be subjected to a second motion for summary judgment. 
Summary judgment on all claims has already been filed and further delayed following 
oral argwnent at the request of Plaii1tiffs to smhmit supplementtµ briefing. The initial motion for 
summary judgment was filed March 13, 2015. The matter-was argued to the Courton April ll, 
2015. At 1he hearing the Court permitted Plaintiffs to file supplemental briefing. The motion, 
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which was filed more than three months ago stiU awaits resolution. "Plaintiffs' attempt to prolong 
this litigation is- unwarranted and there is not viable explanati"on for any delay in asserting a new 
daim where it has known of the facts it aileges for nearly a year. As other courts have 
recognized, when addressing motions to .amend, '·[ a] busy district court need not allow itself to 
be imposed upon by the presentation of theories seriatim. Liberality in. amendment is important 
to assure a party a fair opportunity to present his claims and defenses, but 'equal attention should 
be given to the proposition that there must be an end finally to a particular litigation.,,. Freeman, 
38 l F .2d at 469~ Friedman v. Tranamerica Corp .. , 5 F.R.D. l l 5, l l 6 (D.Del 1946); Pallottino v. 
City ofRio Rancha, 3-1 F.3d 1023, 1027 (101h Cir. 1994); Midc:iJie:.· Metropolitian District No. J 
Pallottino, 31 F.3d at 1027. Given th~ significant passage ofthile where Plajntiffs have ·not 
sought amendmenl and the unne<.,-essary protraction of this lawsuit, deni~l is appropriate. 
M oreovet, considering the fact that summary judgment has been previously filed~ this 
further supports denial of Plaintiffs' motion to· amend. Numerous other courts have refused 
untimely amendments that were pursued after summary judgment wa.s made. See, e.g .. Union 
Planters Nat'l Leasing. Inc. 11. Woods, 687 F.2d 117, 121 (5th Cir.1982); Canallns. Co. v. XMEX 
Tramp .. LLC, No. 3:13-CV-156-KC, 2015 WL 1S09506, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 31., 2015); 
Eisenmann v. Go-uld~National Batteries. Inc .• 169 F.Supp. 862, 864 {E.D.Pa., J 958);: Gaylord 
Shops. Inc. v. South HiJJs Shoppers' Ci"ty, Inc., 33 F .R.D. 303 (W .D.P~ .• 1963 j. The rea$01nug fot 
refusing to pennit amendments after summary judgment has been filed is sound: "[m]uch ofthe 
value of summary judgment procedure ... \\'ould be dissipated if~ party were free to rely -011: 011e 
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theory in an attempt to defect a motion fqr summary judgment and then. sl10uld that theory prove 
unsound, come back long thereafter and fight on the basis of some other theory." Freeman, 3 8 .I 
F . .2d at 469-70. 
In this ·case, the attempt to amend the complaint merely alleges a theory of recovery that 
has already been adjudicated in Building Contractors and is yet another moving target that the 
City must hit to have this matter fully ai1d finaJJy resolved, The instant m-0tion results in undue 
prejudice on the City supporting denial. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. IS(a)t undue prejudice means· 
undue difficulty in proS¢cuting or de.fe11ding a lawsuit as a result of a change of tactics or 
theories on the part of the plaintiff. Minter v. Prime &111ip. co:, 451 F.3d 1196, 1208 (10th Cir. 
2006}~ see also Jones v. Wildgen, 349 F.Supp.2d 1358, 1361 (D.Kan.2004). While any 
amendment invariably cause~ s9111e "'prac.ticaJ prejudice/~ Jeaye to an'lend may b~ de11ied when 
the amendment ••would work an injustice to the defendants.n Koch v. Koch Indus., 127 F.R.D. 
206, 209-10 (D,Kan.1989). · Prolonged litigation runs contrary to the rules of civil procedure and 
the untimely delay by the Plaintiffs should not be condoned. I.R.C.P. 1. Denial ofthe·motion to 
amend is w1thln the discretion of the. Court and will not be disturbed on appeal so long as the 
Court acts within the reasonable bounds of discretiQn. Denial .is appro_prlate and in line with the 
decisions of numerous other courts that have denied amendment after summary judgment has 
been filed. 
2. The Proposed Amendment Would Be Futile. 
As has be.en the subject of substantial briefing in this matter, the proposed amendment 
would be futile b(!cause it suggests a legal violation wber~ none is present. Plaintiffs advocate for 
a reading of the word ~·revenue" in the Idaho Revenue Bond Act and the ldaho Constitution that 
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does not include capacity fees. Plaintiffs suggest that only monthly user fees: can be used to pay 
for bond indebtedness. This argi1ment i$ contrary to th.e plain 1:artguaie of the Act and the 
Constitution, which permits col1ection of, inter alia. fees as sources of revenue. Neither the Act 
n.or Constitution m~nda4!s any limitatio1)s on the fe_e types used but.rather simply address 
pem1issible uses in tenns of"revenue't only, which necessarily includes capacity fees collected. 
A more complete discussion of this argument is found in the City's sur-reply in support of 
motion for summary judgm~m and is incorporated herein by reference. Needless to say, the 
proposed amendment seeks a re lief that cannot be afforded under- the law. Where a proposed 
amendment does not allege a viable cause of action, denial of the request to amend the pleading 
is appropriate. See Spur P1'oducts, 142 Idaho at 44, 122 P.3d.at 303; Black.Canyon Racquetball 
Club, inc. v. Idaho First Nat. Bqnk, N.A .• 119 ldaho 171,175,804 P.2d 900,904 (1991). 
Furthermore, the futility of the amendment i~ evidenced by the damages claim advanced 
by Plai.nti'ffs. Plaintiffs would not be entitled to a return of the capacity fees collected by the City 
as this Court previously declared the collection appropriate and consistent with the Idaho 
Constitution and the Idaho Reve-nue, Bond Act in the Building Contractors case. Because the 
collection was consistent with Idaho law. the capacity foes would not be recoverable. Rather. the 
only pennissible relief would be an order that the City appropriately spend the c11pacity fees. The 
Court previously mandated that the City properly budget and expend the capacity fees in the. 
Bui/fling Contractors case and the City has complied with the Court's order aiid Idaho law on 
how the capadty fee can be spent. Accordingly, where a claim is advanced for which no relief 
can be affqrded, denial of the motion is appropriate-. The proposed Amended Co.mpfaint seeks_ 
relief that i.s unavailable to Plaintiffs rendering the-0laim futile. 
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C. The Proposed Amended Complaint is Barred By The Doctrine Of Res Judicata 
In addition to the motion being improper because of an unreasonable delay and the 
futility of the proposed amendment, it should likewise be denied because· it ·is barred by the 
doctrine of res judicata. Under principles of res judicata, a valid final judgment rendered on the 
merits by a court of ¢ompetent jurisdiction is an absolute bar to a subsequent action between the 
same parties upon the same claim. Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 fdaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 
(2002); Aldape v. A.kinJ, l 05 Idaho 254, 256, 668 P.2d 130, I 32 (Ct. App. 1983); see Diamond v .. 
Farmers Group. Inc., 119 Idaho 146, .150~ 804 P.2d 319,323 (1990). The tltree fundamental 
purposes served by res judicata are: 
First, it ••[preserves] the acceptability of judicial dispute resolution against 
the corrosive dis.respect that would follow if the same matter were twice 
litigated to inconsistent results.•• Second, it serves the public interest in 
prot¢cting the courts against the burdens of repetitious litigation; and third, 
it adva.nces- the private interest in repose from the harassment of repetitive 
claims. 
Hindmarsh, 138 ldaho at 94, 57 P.3d at 8:05 (quoting Aldape, 105 Idaho at 257, 66.8 P.2d at 133 
(citation omitted)). 
The doctrine of claim preclusion bars not only subsequent relitigation of a claim 
previously asserted, but also subsequent relitigation of any claims relating to the same cause of 
actiqn which were actually made or which migh~ have- bee.n made. Hindmarsh, 138. Idaho at 94~ 
57 P.3d at 805; Wing v. Hulet, 106 Idaho 912, 915-916, 684 P.2d 314. 317-318. (Ct. App. 1984) 
(''[T]he rule against splining .& claim applies even though the remedies or forms ofrelief 
demanded in one suit are different-from those demanded in another."); see also U.S. Bank Nat'/ 
A.~s 'r, v. Kuenzli. 134 Idaho 222, 226, 999 P.2d S77, 881 (2000) (noting Idaho has adopted the 
"transactional approach'' to res judicata ). 
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In this case, the amendment seeks relief that has already been addressed in the Building 
Contractors case. Namely. Plaintiffs (Mr. Quinn only because he is the only person who has paid 
c_apacity fees) seeks to invalidate the capacity fee and recover damages associated with the paid 
capacity foe. Applying the principle$ of res j udil::ata to the proposed amendment it is. clear that 
this newest proposed relief is the same that was raised in the Building Contmcters case and. is, 
therefore, batted. SpecifiCijlly, it cannot Iegitimateiy be argued that the same· parties ate not 
involved. Whi-le the BuiJding Contractors Association of Southeast lc;lal10~ the Plaintiff in the 
Building Contractors matter, are no.t nait1ed plaintiffs, Mr. Quinn was one.of the primary 
individuals involved -as the President of the. Assodation. Mr, Quinn submitted affidavits- in the 
Building Contractors matter a11eging the same .facts as alJeged here. The beneficiaries of any 
relief here would be the same benefid~ries in the Building Contractor.~ matter. Simpl:y put, the 
same parties are involved. 
The sa.n1e claim found irt the Building Contractors case is being requested by the 
proposed amendment here. A review of the Complaint in the Building Contractors case reveals 
the following relief: 
1. That the Court declare the City's S.!!ll~~~!i~P.:.f§~.P.9.0~ to 
be a violation of the Idaho State Constitution and Code as an unauthorized 
tax. 
2. That the Court declare the City's ~!!!U~~~!!9~J~!_ROU~~~ to 
b~. a violation of the Idaho State Constitution and Code in regard to 
bonding requirements. 
3. That the.Court declare the City's connectio.nJee.»olicies to 
be a violation of the United States Constitution and Idaho Constitution as a 
taking of private property without just compensation, for which the 
Plaintiff is entitled to equitable and legal remedies under U.S.C. 42 § 
1983.-
4. That the Plaintiff be provided. injunctive relief by cease and 
desi~t of the enforc.eme1it and collection of the City's current ~9.UP.:!~!!J!\tQ 
f~M· 
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5. That the City be required to repeal aU prior. ~Q~ne~tion.f#~ 
polie·ies and prepare a new connection fee policy that is valid under Idaho 
and U.S. law, and that .the Plaintiff and any other-interested member oft:he. 
public have the opportunity to review and provide input ht the 
development ofs.uch policy. 
6. A declaration by the Court that arty pl'oposed fee by the 
City to ·'fund the c-osts of growth', be implemented according to the strict 
provisions of the Idaho Development Fee Impact Act. 
7. That a det~nnination be made of the precise amount of 
connection and user fees that have been improperly coHected and utilized 
since at least 2005. 
8. That Plaintiff be awarded damages in an amount to be 
detem1ined by the. court at trial for overcharging .the amount due i1 for 
search and copying costs of records under Pl-aintifrs .freedom of 
information request. 
(Building Contractors C.'-omplaint, p. 13-14 ( emphasis added)). The clear purpose of the Building 
Contractors case ·was to obtain declaratory and injunctive reJief invalidating the water and 
wastewater capacity tees and to obtain damages associated with the coIJection of the capacity 
fees (,r 7). In this case, the Plaintiffs-are- seeking to amend to obtain the same relief afforded in 
the BuildingCortJracto1's matter) namely, to amend the complaint to ••add declatato-ry and 
injunctive relief invalidating the water and sewer connection fees as well as damages.~' (Pl 
Motion for Leave to Amend, pp. J -2). The capacity fee has previously been adjudicated by this 
.Court and found to be appropriate and. within the permissible framework of Idaho law. 
Ultimately, the same parties and same claims involved in the BuildingContractfJrs case are 
involved here with the proposed amendment. Because. res j~dicata serves to ~ duplicativ~ 
cJaims previously decided by courts, the proposed. amended complaint should be. denied. 
DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO "PLAINTIFFS~ MOTION 
FOR LEAVE TO FILE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT - I J 
648
C.QNCLl,JSJON 
Based on the· foregoing, Defendant City of Pocatello respectfully requests that this Court 
deny Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave To Fi]e First Amended Complaint. 
Dated this 1'" day of July, 2015. 
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A ttomeys for Defendant City of Pocatello 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE ST ATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY 
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on 
behalf of itself and all others similarly 
situated, ED QUINN, on beha]f of himself 
and all others similarly situated. 
Plaintiff: 
v. 
CITY OF POCA TELLO, an Idaho 
municipality, 
Defendant 
Case No. CV-2014-1520-0C 
DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION ro 
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE 
AMIC-US CURIAE BRIEF 
COMES NOW Defendant, Chy of Pucatel1o; by and through its ijttorney of record, and 
hereby submits this Opposition to Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae- Brief of Nation 
Association of Home Builders In Opposition To Det)ndant's Motion for Summary Judgment as 
follows: 
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ARGUMENT 
A. There Is No Legal Support To File An Amicus Curiae Brief W.ith The District 
Court. 
Before the C-0urt is· a Motion for Leave to File Amkus Curiae Brief of National 
Association of Home BuiJders In ·opposjtion to Defendant's Motion for Summary _Judgment. 
The National Asso.ciation of Home -Builders' (the "Association") request is not well taken and 
should be denied. 
The Association suggests. without any support that filing an amicus curiae brief with the 
4istrict court is.acceptable and that the fact tbat numero.us amicus curiae briefs have been filed in 
the appellate context that this Court should likewise accept the filing. It ~tands to reason that 
amicus briefs would only be found in the appeUate context because there is a specific a:Ppellate 
rule governin,g such a filing. Rule 8, Idaho Appellate Rules, states: 
An attorney, or person or entity through an attorney, may appear as .amicus 
.curiae in any proceeding m'.,_request of:th!.Supreme_Court; or by leave 
of the Supreme Court upon written application served upon aIJ parties. 
setting forth the particular employment, if any, the interest of.the 
applicant in the appeal or proceeding and the name of the party in who~e 
support the a.micus curiae would aP,pear. The application shaH also -state 
whether leave is sought to file an amicus curiae brief or participate in oral 
argument, or both. Any objection to the appearance of an amicus curiae 
must be made by motion within 14 days of !~ITi~e of t!te a_pJ!licaqon in 
the manner provided for motions under- Rule 32. Leave.to appear 1:1s 
amicus_eu.riae shall be by written enter of the Supreme Court which 
shaJl specify the manner.of appearance by the amicus curiae attorney and 
state the time for filj_ng_of ap_ya.micq~_crui!!e brief. 
(Emphasis added). Thus, the filing of an amicus brief is filed only after the Idaho Supreme Court 
approves the tiling and -sets forth in a separate order the time for filing an an1icus· brief. 
Permitting_ the filing of amicus briefs in appellate proceedings cannot reasonable lead to a 
conclusion of a ''suhstantiai willingness by the Idaho com-is" to consider other viewpoints of 
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third parties. in the district court. Acceptance of amicus briets in appellate proceedings is founded 
upon Rule 8 and not a general q.e~ire to allow third pa,rties to inject iheir viewpoints into 
litigation, especially at tl1e district court level. 
There is no statute, rule, ot controlling case identifying or pennitting the filing of an 
amicus brief in a district court. To suggest there is substantiaJ willingness by the Idaho courts to 
consider a variety of viewpoints is overly .simplistic and ignores a specific appellate rule 
permitting a brief 011Jy a;fter 1;1. request is granted by the Idaho Supreme Com1. Thus, it is 
improper to file an amicus brief until leave has been granted. In this case, not only is there no 
legal support for the proposition that a an1i.cµs brief could be filed with the District Court, but the 
Association improperly filed the brief with the Court. The Court sh01,dd deny the· request to file 
an amicus. curiae brief and also strike from the .record the improperly filed brief. 
While there is no support for the filing of an amicus brief, to the extent the Court does-
permit the filing of the an1icus briet: the City files its objection and requests that the Cout1 grant 
the City's Motion for Summary Judgment and dismiss the matter with prejudice. 
B. The Interests Of The Association Are Irrelevant To This Litigatlon 
The Association claims its Amicus Brief is important to this litigation because it ·has a 
vi.able interest in this litigation. However~ upon closer review of the Amicus Brief: it is clear that 
their i nvo lvem-ent in this Htigation is unnecessary. A review of the brief reveals that the 
Association's only concer.n. is a renewed a.nempt to invalidate the capacity foe and they have no 
interest in the collection of a. PILOT in the user foe. The entire argument is designed to educate 
.the Court about the impact the PILOT has on "home builders" in the City of Pocatello. The 
Association's position presents distorted, inflated and irrelevant statistics that presuppose 
significant datnage to the construction industry in Po.catelJo. None of the statistics are relevant to 
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the issues being ~ddtessed by the Court. Namely~ this litigation centers on two classes seeking 
reli.ef: (1) Capacity Fee Payers In the City of Pocatello, arid (2) User Fee Payers in the City of 
Pocatello. Of interest to the Association is the first class, "capacity fee payers" because that is the 
only class that could arguably ~ffect home building, What the Associ.ati.on ignores is that the 
capacity fee has previously been .deemed an appropriate fee in Loomis v. City .of Hailey. J 19 
Idaho 434., 807 P.2d 1272 (I 991 ). This Court further concluded in the Building Contractors case 
that ·the. City's collection of the capacity fee, including the amount collected, was appropriate and 
consistent with .Idaho statute and law. The Association is arguing issues that have previously 
been adjudicated in the Building Contract()rs matter. As such, the arguments advanced are 
irrelevant and fai] to address any of the issues in this case. 
It is also apparent from the. An1icus Brief that the Association is ignorant to the fact that 
the capacjty fee has never contained a PILOT fee. In the Building Contractors matter. th.e 
Ciipacity fee· and the amount of the fee was· declared to be reasonable and appropriate. However, 
this Court took issue \\~th the City3s collection of the PILOT component ofthe·user fee. It is the 
user fee alone that contained a capacity fee. (See Defendant's Memorandum In Support of 
.Motion.fhr Summary Judgmenl, pp. 6~8~ Defendant's Reply Memorandum in Support qf.lv.fotion 
for Summary Judgment, pp. 2·4). Immediately .following the Court's conclusion regarding the 
PILOT. the Chy readjusted the. user fee. because it wa.~ the onJy fee -that contained the PJLOT 
component. (Id). Thus. the user .fee, which is paid by city residents for water and sanitation 
services. is irrelevant to building costs. confinning the Association lacks any relevant 
relationship to this litigation. 
Finally, the Association lacks any standing in this matter, as they would have no 
entitlement to any potential recovery. The Association has not paid user fees nor has it paid 
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capacity fees. As such. there is no reasonable relationship between the Association and this 
litigatfon. Ultimately. AH of the issues raised by the Association are either irrelevant or 
duplicative of the Plaintiffs• argumentli. The Court ·should strike the Association• s Amie us Brief 
from the record. 
C. The Amicus Brief Is Duplieative. Of Argu.ments Advanced By Plaintiffs. 
The Associati-on advances the same arguments made by Plaintiffs in this matter, 
rendering their brief duplicative. The AmiC1.J$ ·Brief is unnecessary it that it advances the same 
arguments already presented to the Court. Spedfically. the Association argues the foHowing_: (1) 
the PILOT qualifies as a property interest, (2) that the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause applies. 
Both of these arguments have been advanced and fully briefed by· Plajntitfs i:n their initia.1 
opposing brief and again in the supplemental briefing. A review of the Association's brief on 
these issues presents no novel theory or new argument that was not tiddr~ssed by Plaintiffs. 
With respect to wh.ether the PILOT-qualifies· as a property interest and Takings Clause 
applies, the City has previously brief~d this issue in Defendant's Memorandum In Support of 
,Motion.for Summa,y Judgment on pages 8 through IO. lt was further addressed it~ D~fendant 's 
Reply Mem.orandum in Support .q/Motionfor Summary Judgment at pages 6 through 7.. None of 
the authority cited by the Association is factually analogous to the instant m~tter and does 
nothing-to change the Citis analysis. As such, no argument on whether the PILOT component 
of the user fee .is an unconstitutional taking is necessary. 
D. The Amicus Brief Is Not Helpful To The Coart Nor Is It Timely. 
Mucl1 of the argument advanced by the Association relat!!S to the significant effect the 
PILOT wiJI have on bome building in Pocatello, Idaho. The Association purports that if the 
PILOT fee is not returned to the Plaintiffs, that h01ne- building will be detrimentally affected. 
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1bis argumen:t is tenuou~. specu_lative, and. without fom1dation that the statistics have any 
reasonable relationship to Pocatello, Idaho. ln reality, the cost of building is not influenced by 
the PILOT component of the user fee. As with the Plaintiff~ the real motive of the Association is 
to have the capacity fee overturned. As this C9urt is ~ware, that issqe was previously addressed 
in the BuildinfJ Contractors maiter and the capacity fee was declared to be reasonable, proper, 
and in Jin~ with Idaho law. Mo.unting_a second attack on the capac.ity fee is barred by the 
.doctrine ofresjudica/a. (See Defendant's Opposition To Plaintiffs' Motion fo1· Leave To File 
First Amended Complaint, pp. 9~ 11 ). 
The Amicus Brief also provides no a~istance to the Court because it advances no new 
relevai1t argument not previousJy addressed by Plaintiff; Plaintiffs, are represented by well-
qualified cc.>unsel that properly represent the Plaintiffs' interests. The .Association's efforts are 
merely duplicative of Plaintiffs' counsel's efforts. The only new argument advances is that .the 
building industry is affected by increases in fee.s that must either be born. by the builder or }Jassed 
on to buyers. There is no validity to this argument, however, because the capacity fee hl:lS ne··Ver 
contained a PILOT component. Further, as discussed above, these are not relevant cons.iderations 
when deciding whether the Building Contractors matter has retroactive or prospective 
-application and what amount, if any, of the PILOT foe may be returne~ to user fee paye:rs. 
Finally,s the Amicus Brief should ·be stricken and ignored by the Court because it is 
untimely. While Rule 8 of the Idaho Appellate Rules does not speak to timcliness, the Federal 
Rules of Appellate Proce.dure do. Specifically, Rule 29, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
states that ''[-a]n iµ'tllCUS curiae must fiJe its brief, accompanied by a motion for filing When 
necessary, no later_ than 7 days after the _princip;albrief of the _:party being_!!!RP:ortcd is 
:fi!,1J .. " IRAP 29(e) (emphasis added). The City moved for swnmary judgment on March 16, 
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20 l 5. Plaintiffs filed their initial opposition brief on April 1, 2015. The matter was· arg.1.ted to the 
Court on April 13, 20) 5., wherein the.Court permitted Plaintiffs additional time to submit 
supplemental briefing. All of the briefing on the pending Motion for Summary .Judgment was 
submitted to the Court for resQlution on June 5, 2015. Now, more than a month after briefing as 
been completed and the matter submitted to the Court, the Association is attempting to reopen 
the tnatter. While the Federal Appellate Rules are not binding on this Court. they do suggest that 
timing of an amicus brief is important.Q.Dd must be considered. Themotion to allow the 
submission of an Amicus Brief should be denied because the Amicus Brief ~s untimely Md 
unnecessarily burdens the Court's docket~ further delays the resolution of this matter, and 
unfairly pr~judices ·the City by having to respond to ·an additional motion for summary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Defendant City of Pocatello respectfuily requests that the. Court 
deny the National Association of Home- Buitders' request to submit an A,micus l;uriae brief. 
Further Defendant requests that the Court !,trike the improperly filed Amicus Curiae brief from 
the Court's .record. 
Dated this ,?"' day of Jul~( .. 2015. 
~AKEp.HALL 
--J 
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY 
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on 
behalf of itself and all others similarly 
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself 
and all others similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
municipality, 
Defendant. 
Case No.CV-2014-1520-0C 
RENEWED MOTION FOR LEA VE TO 
FILE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 
COMES NOW, "Plaintiffs by and through their counsel of record and pursuant to Rule 
15(a) and 20(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby move for an order allowing 
plaintiffs leave to file their First Amended Complaint, in the form attached hereto. This 
"renewed" motion is not different in any way than the previous motion to amend, and is filed 
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for the sole purpose of alleviating any concern that the Court or defendant may have over the 
timing of the memorandum filed in support of the motion contemporaneously filed herewith. 
The general effect of this amendment would be to add declaratory and injunctive relief 
invalidating the water and sewer collllection fees as well as damages due to the recent arbitrary 
and capricious actions of the Defendant. 
This amendment is necessary because, at the time of filing the original complaint, 
Plaintiffs were unaware of the internal actions taken by the Defendant that are the subject of 
these additional claims, and/or were taken after the complaint was filed, which were learned 
through discovery. 
:, -
Plaintiffs will also request hearing to further support their motion through oral 
argument. 
DATED this 8th day of July, 2015. 
Nath M. Olsen 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
&OLSEN 
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY 
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on behalf 
of itself and all others similarly situated, ED 
QUINN, on behalf of himself and all others 
similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
municipality, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2014-1520-0C 
AMENDED COMPLAINT JURY 
DEMAND AND REQUEST FOR CLASS 
CERTIFICATION 
COMES NOW the Plaintiffs, Hill-Vu Mobile Home Park, Ed Quinn and all others 
similarly situated and for a complaint against the above named Defendant allege as follows: 
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JURISDICTION 
I. This action is brought for damages and other appropriate relieftmder 42 USC § 1983 
for violation of the Plaintiffs' civil rights under the color of state and federal law. 
2. Defendant, the City of Pocatello (City) is a municipality incorporated in the State of 
Idaho ~d administered pursuant to I.C. § 50-101 et al., and located within Bannock County. 
3. The Court has jurisdiction over the City tmder I.C. § 5-514. 
4. Bannock County is the proper venue for this action under LC. §5-402 or 404. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS · 
5. The City has implemented "system capacity fees," sometimes referred to as 
"connection fees" or "capacity fees" which a person must pay along with a separate "building 
permit fee;' prior to or in relation to new construction. Capacity Fees consist of separate fees 
charged for water, waste _water, and waste collection as set by the City Council on an annual 
basis. 
6. Usually at the same time the City sets Capacity Fee rates, the City sets monthly "User 
Fees" for customers of the City water, wastewater and sanitation collection system. 
7. The City deposits the collected Capacity and User Fees into separate accotmts for 
water, waste water, and sanitation. 
8. Pursuant to Idaho law and the State and Federal Constitution, Capacity and User fees 
can only be used for their intended purposes, including operation, maintenance, repair, 
replacement of the existing system and bond repayment. 
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9. Around 2005, the City initiated a policy with regard to the Capacity and User Fees 
titled under various names, including "Return on Equity,""Rate of Return," "Franchise Fee," and 
"Payment in Lieu of Taxes" hereafter collectively referred to as "PILOT. 
10. In late 2006, City Mayor Chase requested an opinion from the Attorney General for 
the State ofidaho (IAG) on the legality of the PILOT policy. In an opinion dated February 6, 
2007, the IAG told the City that the policy did not comply with law, setting forth the statutes and 
case law supporting such opiJ?on. The City did not disclose the IAG' s opinion to the public. It 
also disregarded the opinion and continued with the PILOT policy. 
11: Since 2007, no less than $30 million has been transferred by the City from the 
water, sewer and sanitation accounts under the guise of its PILOT program to fund the general 
activities of the City. No less than $6 million has been transferred as such since 2011. 
12. The City has also admittedly promoted, planned and spent Capacity Fees for capital 
improvement projects that expand the water, wastewater and waste collection systems without 
first obtaining a bond as required under the Idaho Revenue Bond Act (IRBA). The IRBA only 
allows Capacity Fees to be utilized for maintenance, repair and replacement of the existing 
system. 
13. The Building Contractors Association of Southeast Idaho (BCASEI) filed an action 
in the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State ofldaho in and for Bannock 
County (Case No. CV-2011-5228-0C) (Idaho Case) challenging the legality of the City's 
Capacity Fee and User Fee policies, and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. 
AMENDED COMPLAINT JURY DEMAND AND REQUEST FOR CLASS 
CERTIFICATION - Page 3 
I 
' 
! 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
! 
( 
I 
664
14. In a November 15, 2013, Memorandum Decision and Order the Idaho Court held that 
the City's PILOT programs; or any other program with a similar intent are unconstitutional and a 
violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond Act. 
15. During the discovery stages of the Idaho Case, the City failed to produce the 2007 
IAG opinion and any related correspondence or documents pertaining to that opinion although 
such information was clearly requested. The IAG opinion and its related correspondence was 
provided only through a subpoena by the BCASEI issued directly to the State of Idaho in January 
of 2013. 
16. The BCASEI had to pay the City over $2,500 just to obtain the City's financial 
records to determine the flow of the Capacity and User Fees. 
17. The City has also either destroyed or failed to keep and maintain records 
pertaining to its Capacity and User Fee policies. Some records have been destroyed after the City 
became aware of potential claims with regard to these policies. Such conduct constitutes a 
violation of the Idaho Municipal Records Retention Act I.C. § 50-907, et al., and spoliation of 
evidence. 
18. During the course of the litigation in the Idaho Case, as a reaction to a court decision, 
the City withdrew no less than $2,608,220 from the general fund equivalent to the amount of 
Capacity Fees collected by the City since 2007, and have deposited such funds into separate 
accounts, $1,391,089 in City "Fund 37" and $1,217,131 in City "Fund 38." 
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19. In the summer of 2014, the Plaintiffs moved for a pre-judgment writ of attachment to 
freeze the newly created Funds 3 7 /3 8 as a potential source of recovery for damages. After the 
motion was filed, the City of Pocatello approved its FY 2015 Budget. 
20. As confinned by the sworn statements of City CFO Joyce Stroeschein, under the 
FY 2015 Budget all of the monies in Funds 3 7 /3 8 have been spent or are dedicated toward the 
"bond covenants" or debt obligations of the City. Including the amounts collected since March 
of 2013. that amount now allocated toward "debt retirement" constitutes no less than 
$2.878.849.56. representing the amount of connection/capacity fees collected from 2007 through 
August of 2014. 
21. The City historically promoted "Red Oak " studies conducted in 2006 and 2010 as 
the supporting basis for the assess~ent of user and connection fees in the City of Pocatello, 
including the current fees (which are approved on an annual basis by the City council). The 
reports were utilized to justify a capacity fee rate jump of 1,500% alone between 2006 and 2007. 
with a consistent increase of between 8% to I 0% each year since then and until at least 2015. 
22. The Red Oak Studies (prepared for water and wastewater respectively) explicitly 
indicate that the "debt service" payments are to be derived from the revenues obtained from the 
monthly user fees. That debt obligation is part of the "revenue requirements" factored into the 
monthly fee rate recommended by the studies. The studies are also explicit in that the capacity or 
connection fees are based solely on the "r~lacement" of the existing system through capital 
improvement projects. 
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23. The Red Oak studies then make a virtually identical disclosure with regard to the 
assessment and calculation of the connection/capacity fees: 
To detennine net equity in the system, replacement costs of the net equity in the system~ 
replacement cost of the existing backbone system is reduced by the outstanding debt on 
related facilities. Eguity is not reduced by accumulated depreciation. Once a new 
customer connects to the (water/wastewater) system. that customer begins paying charges 
for service similar to all existing customers. These charges typically include payment for 
retirement of outstanding debt. For this reason, it is necessary to deduct outstanding 
debt from system value before developing these (capacity) fees. 
24. In direct contradiction to the Red Oak studies relied upon by the City in its 
connection fee rates, none of fees assessed and collected were ever used for "replacement" of the 
"existing backbone" of the system. Rather. those funds were first transferred to the general fund 
for general pur,pose use by the City. The City then transferred the equivalent of what it had 
collected in connection fees during that period into newly created Funds 37/38. The City then 
expended or budgeted all of the funds toward debt service which was to be covered by the user 
25. The Red Oak studies falsely disclosed both the intent and the actual use of the 
connection fees, as well as the basis for calculating the connection fees. 
COUNT I - UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKING 
26. All previous allegations are restated and incorporated herein by reference. 
27. The 5th Amendment of the United States Constitution, as applied to the states under 
the 14th Amendment, prevents the taking of private property without due process of law or 
without just compensation. 
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28. Idaho Const. Art. I§ 14 essentially incorporates the 5th Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution. 
29. Under U.S.C. 42 § 1983, a person who is deprived of their rights under the color of 
any act, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any public entity is entitled to redress 
at law or in equity. 
30. Under the doctrine of "Res Judicata" the Court should accept and adopt the 
declaratory ruling by the Idaho court that the fees transferred for use under the City's PILOT 
policy were impermissibly assessed and collected. 
31. In addition, the City's use of Capacity fees for the purpose of capital improvement 
projects that expand the system are likewise impermissible and a violation of the IRBA. 
32. Additionally. the City's use of Capacity Fees for the pur;pose of bond repayments are 
strictly prohibited and unconstitutional in that under Idaho Const. Art. VIII § 3 such payments 
must "solely'' come from the monthly rates. 
3 3. The City's unlawful fee policies have resulted in the taking of private property of the 
Plaintiffs and similarly situated individuals. 
34. The City's actions have resulted in a violation of the Constitutional rights, by the 
taking of private property without due process of law and without just compensation. 
35. The Plaintiffs and similarly situated individuals and entities have suffered injury 
caused by the City charging an unlawful fee and seek compensation for damages in an amount 
which will be proven at trial, which in any event is many times in excess of$25,000. 
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COUNT II - UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
36 .. All previous allegations are restated and incorporated herein by reference. 
37. Plaintiffs have conferred a benefit on the City in the fonn of Capacity and/or User 
Fees which have been used by the City for purposes not authorized by the Idaho Constitution. 
3 8. The City has been knowingly and willingly receiving an improper benefit at the 
expense of the Plaintiffs and other similarly situated individuals and entities. 
39. Under the circumstances, it would be unjust for the City to retain this benefit 
without properly reimbursing Plaintiffs and others who have paid the fees. 
COUNT Ill- INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
40. All previous allegations are restated and incotporated herein by reference. 
41. The City did knowingly assess a Capacity Fee under the false premise that such fees 
would not be calculated and/or used for bond repayment, which is strictly prohibited under the 
state law and constitution. 
42. Evezy Capacity Fee dollar that has been collected and used by the City has either 
been used for improper pw:;poses of the general fund or for bond retirement in contravention of 
what was publically claimed and disclosed by the City. 
43. The City has and continues to implement a Capacity policy that is unlawful. 
inequitable. and a violation of Plaintiffs' members' rights. 
44. The continuance of the City's Capacity Fee policies will result in waste or irreparable 
injuzy to Plaintiffs and its members. 
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45 .. Plaintiffs and its members are entitled to injunctive relief requiring the City to cease_ 
and desist its current unlawful Capacity Fee collections and policies. 
46. The City should further be enjoined from relying upon the Red Oak studies for its 
Capacity Fee rates. which will require a declaration that the current Capacity Fees are not lawful 
or enforceable. 
COUNT IV-EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL AND/OREQIDTABLE TOLLING 
47. All previous allegations are restated and incorporated herein by reference. 
48. The City knowingly made a false representation of, concealed and/or destroyed 
material facts to the detriment of the Plaintiffs. 
49. Alternatively or in addition, essential information bearing on the Plaintiffs' claims 
could not be discovered through reasonable diligence. 
50. Alternatively or in addition, the City's fee policies, i.e. PILOT program and capital 
expansion without proper bonding procedures, were void as a matter oflaw. 
51. The Plaintiffs had no knowledge of the concealed or falsely represented material 
facts. 
COUNT V - ATTORNEY FEES 
52. All previous allegations are restated and incorporated herein by reference. 
53. The Plaintiffs have retained the services of the above named legal counsel to 
pursue their rights. 
54. The Plaintiffs are entitled to recover their attorneys fees and expenses under LC. 
§12-117, 58-115, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and any other applicable statute or rules. 
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CLASS ACTION CERTIFICATION 
55. All previous allegations are restated and incorporated herein by reference. 
56. Plaintiffs bring this action individually and on behalf of a Class consisting 
of all individuals or entities who have paid Capacity or User Fees to the City since 2007. 
57. Class certification, including the possibility of subclasses, is warranted and 
appropriate under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
Plaintiffs pray for the following relief: 
1. For a monetary judgment consisting of all improperly collected and spent Capacity and 
User Fees since 2007, plus interest at the statutory rate of 12% per annum. 
2. That there be immediate injunctive and declaratory relief preventing the enforcement 
of the current Capacity Fee assessments until as such time the City can enact a legal and pro12er 
Capacity Fee. 
3. That the City should be required to deposit all monies collected from the unlawful fee 
into a common fund and all members of the class should be allowed to petition the fund for a 
recovery of their damages. 
4. That punitive damages be awarded for the City's wrongful conduct pertaining to the 
Plaintiffs' equitable estoppel claim. 
5. An award of attorney fees and costs, and further that the City should be required to 
reimburse the damages fund for any such awarded attorney fees based upon the allegations 
contained herein so as not to further harm the class. 
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6. Any other legal or equitable relief deemed justified by the Court. 
PLAINTIFFS REQUEST A JURY TRIAL FOR ANY ISSUES TRIABLE BY JURY 
DATED this __ day of _____ , 2015. 
PETERSEN Moss HALL & OLSEN 
Nathan M. Olsen 
Attorneys for the Plaintiffs 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY 
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on 
behalf of itself and all others similarly 
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself 
and all others similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
municipality, 
Defendant. 
Case No.CV-2014-1520-0C 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
RENEWED MOTION FOR LEA VE TO 
FILE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Plaintiffs through Counsel of Record hereby provides the following memorandum in 
support of their Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint. This memorandum is 
supported by the pleadings previously filed in this case. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE FIRST 
AMENDED COMPLAINT - Page 1 
673
0 
Rule 15(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure governs the amendment of pleadings. In 
relevant part, it provides, that after a responsive pleading has already been filed: 
" ... a party may amend a pleading only by leave of court ... and leave shall be 
freely given when justice so requires." 
Rule 20(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, provides in part that: 
''All persons may be joined in one action as defendants ifthere is asserted against jointly, 
severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect of or arising out the of same 
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of 
law or fact common to all of them will arise in the action." 
The plaintiffs' amended complaint makes several necessary amendments, that because of 
the nature of such changes, including new claims, could not be made until after recent 
developments. This included facts that either were not known or did not occur until after the 
filing of their complaint. The general effect of this amendment would be to add declaratory 
and injunctive relief invalidating the water and sewer connection fees as well as damages due 
to the recent arbitrary and capricious actions of the defendant. This includes, in particular the 
improper allocation of connection fees toward bond retirement which is contrary to the Idaho 
Constitution and the defendant's represented intended uses for the fees, which it also based the 
calculation of the fees. 
Whether or not to grant leave to amend is a decision left to the sound discretion of the 
court. In the interest of justice, courts should favor liberal grants of leave to amend a complaint. 
Hines v. Hines, 129 Idaho 847, 934 P2d 20 (1997). This rule's purpose is two-fold. First, it is to 
allow each claim to be determined on its merits rather than on a procedural technicality. Second, 
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it is to relegate pleadings to the limited role of notice pleading, rather than place artificial and 
unwarranted limitations on the litigation. Clarkv. Olsen, 110 Idaho 323, 715 P.2d 993 (1986). 
Accordingly, Idaho trial courts have routinely granted these motions as a matter of 
course. Exceptions have been made when there is a significant prejudice to the opposing party. 
For example, if the motion is made after court-imposed deadlines, adds parties that were earlier 
dismissed, at a time that multiple discovery deadlines had passed, a court might rightly refuse to 
allow the amendment. Maroun v. Wyre less Sys., 141 Idaho 604, 114 P .3d 97 4 (2005). But if 
there is no substantial reason, refusing to grant leave is an abuse of discretion. Carl H 
Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866,993 P.2d 1197 (1999); Idaho School for 
Equal Educ. Oppor. ex rel. Eikum v. Idaho State Bd of Education ex rel Mossman, 128 Idaho 
,.,,·, 
2726, 912 P.2d 644 (1996). 
In this case, the defendant would not be prejudiced by the amended complaint. At the 
last hearing in this matter, the Court vacated the trial date set for this matter in August of 2015. 
Although the secondary date for the trial was initially set January of 2016, it is not clear yet 
whether this will be the trial date as well. The Court now has before it the plaintiffs' motion for 
class certification and defendants' motion for summary judgment. The Court also made it clear 
in the prior hearing that the parties would have ample opportunity to brief and/or conduct 
discovery on the complex issues in this case. 
No such reason to deny the motion to amend exists here, substantial or otherwise. The 
amendments to the complaint are warranted by recent developments in the case. There is no 
prejudice from allowing the amendment. 
Because justice so requires, the motion for leave to amend must be granted. 
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DATED this gt11 day of July, 2015. 
Nath lsen 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State ofldaho, with my office in 
Idaho Falls, Idaho, and that on the 8th day of July, 2015, I served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document on the persons listed below by first class mail, with the correct postage 
thereon, or by causing the same to be delivered in accordance with Rule S(b), l.R.C.P. 
Persons Served: 
Blake G. Hall, Esq. 
HALL ANGELL & STARNES, LLP 
1075 S. UtahAve., Ste. 150 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
FAX: (208) 621-3008 
EMAIL: bgh@hasattomeys.com 
Honorable Stephen S. Dunn 
Bannock County Courthouse 
624 E. Center, Rm. 302 
Pocatello, ID 83201 
FAX: (208) 236-7208 . 
EMAIL: karlav@bannockcounty.us 
Method of Service: 
~l ( )hand ( ) fax () email 
~l ( ) hand ( ) fax ( ) email 
(Chamb rs Copy) 
Nathan M. Olsen 
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BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ. 
SAM L. ANGELL; ESQ. 
NATHAN R. STARNES, ESQ; 
HALL ANGELL STARNES,. LLP 
1075 S Utah Avenue, Suite 150 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Telephone (208) 522-3.003 
Fm. (208) 621-3008 
JSB No. 's 2434, 7012 & 7484 
bgl.l@lhas.attomeys.Gom 
sl~}hasattomQY:c;.com 
nrs@hasattorneys.com 
Attorneys for Defendant City of Pocatello 
2015 JUL 16 PM 4: DO 
BY~~ 
IN THE PISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STA, TE OF IOAHO,. IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY 
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, oi1 
behalf of itself and all others similarly 
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself 
and all oth_ets similarly situated, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
municipality, 
Defendant. 
Case No, CV-2014-1520-0C 
DEFENDANT~s RESPONSE IN 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIF.FS' 
RENEWE;D MOTION TO AMEND 
COMPLAINT 
COMES NOW Defendant, City of Pocatello, by and through its attorney of record, and hereby 
submits this Response in OpposiJion·to P]aintiffs' ReneWe4 Mopon for Leave to Amend Complaint ~s 
follows: 
ARGUMENT 
Before the court is the Plaintiffs<> renewed motion for· leave of court to am.end their 
compl&int. The Plaintiffs se.ek to ren~ their motion to ameil.d their complaint "for the sole. 
purpose of alleviating any concern the Court or Defendant may have over the timing of the. 
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memorandum filed in support of the motion to amend". (PL Renewed Motion for Leave to 
Amend, pp. 2). The City requests the Court deny the Plaintiffs' renewed motion bec~use it is 
identical to the Plaintiffs'· first motion to amend its complaint, and therefore, unnecessary. 
The Plaintiffs' renewed motion presents no substantive issue or argument that was not 
previously raised ih its first motion to amend its complaint. Rather, the Plaintiffs' renewed 
motion is a thinly veiled attempt to avoid a previous violation ofrµle 7(b)(3)(C), and any 
consequences following such a violation under rule 7(b)(3)(D). A c0urt may deny a moving 
party's motion, witho_ut notice, 'if the· moving party does not requ_est oral _argwn~nt and does not 
file a brief within fourteen (14) days. I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3)(D). The Plaintiffs' first motion to amend 
th.eir complaint violated 7(b)(3)(C) by not filing their supporting bri~f within 14 days after 
indicating their intent to file a brief. Plaintiffs also failed to request a bearing for oral argument in 
their first motion, The City mise.d this issu.e in. its first brief opposing the Plaintiffs' motion. 
(Defendant's BriefOppos_ingMotion to Amend pp. 2·3).1ne Plaintiffs' renewed motion should 
not be accepted because the motion is -only an attempt to avoid procedural rules. Further, ·no good 
cause for the failure ~o comply with th~ procedural rules was given. As such, the Plaintiffs, 
renewed motion should be stricken from the record. 
In the· event the Court does not deny the Plaintiffs' renewed motion for the reason.s ~tat.ed 
tlbove~ the Plaiutiffst motion should still he denied for reasons stated in the City's. first brief 
opposing the Plaintiffs motion to amend. Specifically, the renewed motion should be denjed 
because the Plaintiffs lack sufficient good cause for the court to pennit the amended complaint. 
(Defendant's Brief Opposing Amendment pp. 4 ). Furthennore, the renewed motio11 should be 
denied because the Plaintiffs' proposed amendment to their complaint is. barred by the doctrine 
of r~s judicata. (Defendant's Bri~f Opposing Amend_ment pp. 9). Hereinafter. the City would. like 
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to incorporate sect1ons .. H .. and '·c· of its original brief to the court oppo.sing the Plaintiffs, first 
motion to amend their complaint. The arguments from ~ections· "B'~ anq '"'C;., still apply to the 
renewed motion and provide ample justification to deny the unwarranted amendment. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Defendant City of.Pocatello respectfully reqµests that this Court deny 
Plaintiffs' Ren~wed Motion for Leave To File First Amended Complaint 
~ Dated this~ day of July, 201S. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing.document ~pon the following 
this lb .fl:...day of July;, 2015, by the method indicated below:. · 
Michael D. Gaffney, Esq. 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Fax.; 529·9732 
Nathan M. Olsen, Esq. 
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN 
485 '·En Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Fax: 524·3391 
[)J"Mailing [ 1 Hand Delivery 
~ Fax [· J Overnight Mail 
[)<{Ma.mng 
[ J Hand Delivery 
[>J Fax 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
BLAll G. HALL 
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BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ. 
SAM L. ANGELL, ESQ. 
NATHAN R. STARNES, ESQ. 
HALL ANGELL STARNES, LLP 
1075 S Utah Avenue, Suite 150 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Telephone (208) 522-3003 
Fax (208) 621-3008 
/SB No. 's 2434, 7012 & 7484 
bgh@hasattorneys.com 
sla@hasattorneys.com 
nrs@hasattorneys,com ·. 
Attorneys for Defendant City of Pocatello 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF IBE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY 
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on 
behalf of itself and all others similarly 
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself 
and all others similarly situated, 
Plaintiff, 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an-Idaho 
municipality, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2014-1520-0C 
ORDER 
Based upon the Defendant's Motion to Vacate Hearing and good cause appearing 
therefor; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the hearing currently set for August 10, 2015, at 2:00 
p.m. be rescheduled for August 17, 2015 at the hour of 2:30 p.m. 
DATEDthls_i" _day of August,2015. /1.t);;;~ -4.. 
~-
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing docwnent upon the following 
this _7th_ day of August, 2015, by the method indicated below: 
Michael D. Gaffney,Esq. 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Fax: 529-9732 
Nathan M. Olsen, Esq. 
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN 
485 "E" Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Fax: 524-3391 
Blake G. Hall, Esq. 
HALL ANGELL STARNES, LLP 
1075 S Utah Avenue, Suite 150 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Fax: 621-3008 
ORDER RESCHEDULING HEARING - 2 
[ ] Mailing [ l Hand Delivery [A Fax 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Mailing 
[ } Hand Delivery 
[ ./J Fax . 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Mailing 
[ l Hand Delivery 
[ .;j Fax 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
D~~L 
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SAM L. ANGELL, ESQ. 
NATHAN R. STARNES, ESQ. 
HALL ANGELL STARNES, LLP 
1075 S Utah Avenue.Suite 150 
Idahq Falis, Idaho 83402 
Telephone (208} 522-3003 
Fax (2.08) 621-3008 
!SB No. 's 2434, 7011 & 7484 
bgll@_hasattorneys.com 
s1a@hJisattorney$.com 
nr.s@hasattorne~.com 
Attorneys for Defendant City of Pocatello 
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JN THE 01STR1CT COURT OF THE SIX'l'H JUDICIAL D1STRlCT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY 
HILL-VU MOBILE H;OME PARK,, on 
behalf of itself and all others similarly 
situated; ED QUINN, on behalf of himself 
and all others silnilarly situated, 
Plaintift: 
v. 
CITY OF POCA TELLO, an Idaho 
municipality, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-20 l 4-1520~0C 
DEFENDANrs RESPONSE IN 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT 
COMES NOW Defendant City of Pocatello, by and through its attorney of record, and 
hereby submits this Opposition Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Complaint as follows: 
INTRODUCTION 
On August 17, 2015, the Court took up argument regarding Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend 
Complaint. Given the untimely filing of a .substantive brief on the motion .• the Court provided 
Defendant's fourteen days to provide a response to the motion. In addition the opposition 
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previously t1led with the Court on July 7, 2015. the City supplements their response with the 
following objections confirming d~nial of the motion is appropriate .. The motion to amend should 
be denied for tv.ro reasons (1) the deadline to amend th,e Complaint elapsed on Fe.bruary 17, 
2015; and (2) the re.lief being $ought through the amendment cannot be granted rendering the 
amendment futii'e. 
A. ·· The Scheduling Order Required Amendments to the Complaint No Later than 
February 17t 2015. 
Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Leave to Amend on June 12. 2015. A memorandum in 
support did not accompany the motion. Upon the City's objection for failing to support the 
motion with argument, Plaintiffs then filed a renewed motion to am!!nd on Ju.ly 8, 2015. Neither 
motion to amend was timely and no good ca.use was provided for failing to timely make a motion 
to amend; On December 19, 2014, the Court lodged the Order Setting Jury Trial ("Scheduling 
Order''). The Scheduling Order mandated that "M_Q'.flQ~§_IO AJ).Q_fART.lES .. QRAME~P. 
PLEADINGS shall be filed no later than 60 days afterth.e date of this Order." Scheduling Order; 
p. 2-3 (emphasis in original). Any motion to amend the complaint was required no later than 
February 17, 201.S. The purpose of the Court ordered scheduling deadlines is to control the 
subsequent course of the action and ·"shall not b~ modified except. by leave of the district judge .. 
. upon a showing of.good cause." I.R.C.P. 16(a). See also Johnson v. Mammoth Rec:reations, 
Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 60.8 (9th Cir.1992); US. Dominator, Inc. v. Factory Ship Robert E. Resqff, 
768 F .2d 1099, 1104 (9th Cir. 1985) (court may deny as untimely a motion filed .after the 
scheduling order cut-off date where no r~quest to modify the order has been made); Dedge v. 
Kendrick, 849 F.2d J 198 (11th Cir. 1988) (motion filed after the scheduling order cut-off date is 
untimely and may be denied solely on that ,growid). 
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Here, Plaintiffs filed the motion to amend well after the court imposed d_eadHne for 
.amending- a com_plairit. Absent from the.motion is any acknowledginent of the sched.u'ling order 
deadline-s .• a request to alter the de~dlines or discussion of the req11ired good cause for why th~ 
deadHne should be ignored. Rule 16's "'good cause" standard primarily considers the diligence of 
the party $eeking the amendment. &e Martin v. Ilohlit, 133 Idaho 372, 376,. 987 P.2d284, 288 
(1999). 1 Plaintiffs faiJ to set forth any reasonable explanation for their untimely motion. As noted 
previous]y, in the .First Af±idavit of Joyc.e Stroschein she specifically articulates that the capacity 
fees were only used to repay bond· indebtedness for the water and wastewater infrastructure. ( I 51 
Stroschein Af'f., para. 17~20). Stroschein's affidavit discussing how the City was spending the 
capacity fees was.filed on August 29. 2014. The underlying tacts Plaintiffs claim support the 
filing of the amendment have been known for near-ly one year. There is no good cause that exists 
for failing. to' seek an extension to file. As the Ninth Circuit has held: 
A scheduling order "is not a frivolous piece of paper_, idly entered, which 
can be cavalierly disregarded by counsel without peril.·~ The district 
court1s decision to honor the terms of its- binding ·scheduling order does not 
simply exalt procedural technicalities over the merits of Johnson's case. 
Disregard of the order would undermine the court's ability to control its 
docket, disrupt the agreed-upon.course of the litigation, and reward the. 
indolent and the cavalier . 
.Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 915 F.2d 604, 610-11 (-9th.Cir. 1992) (citations omitte.d). 
Since the deadline for amending the complaint elapsed on February 19, 2015, and no· good cause 
1 Because ldaho's. Rule 16 is identical in all materia1 respects to the analogous federal rule 16, 
courts can look to rulings on the scope of the federal rule for additional in interpreting the Idaho 
rule. ComptCi"l 1'. Compton, IOI Idaho 328,334,612 P.2d 1175, 1181 (l980t 
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exists for failing to time]y file the motion_, the Court should dismiss the motion on this basis 
alone. 
B.. The Relief Being Sought Through The.Amendment Cannot Be Granted, Rending 
The Amendment Futile. · 
Despite the disregard for the scheduling order, the Court could also deny the motion 
because the proposed amendment is futile. The primary argument advanced by Plaintiff for 
Amending the Complaint is to have the capacity fee invalidated and the capacity fees r.efunded.: 
"[t]he general effect .of this amendment would be to add -declaratory and injunctive relief 
invalidatin_g the ,vater andsewer connection.fees as well as damages due. to the recent 
arbitrary and capricious actions of the Defendant.~' (Motion for Leave To File First Amended 
Complaint, p. 1-2). The relief requested through the Amendment is unavailable because it is 
barred by the doctrine of r~s judicata, rending the amendment futile, Specifically, the Court 
previously held in the Building Contraclol'S case that the City's collection of the capacity fee and 
the amount ofth~ capacity fee chat$ed was appropriate: ··[t]he City connection and user fees are. 
not arbitrary or unreasonably imposed. 1b£1P.t..P.9...JJ!ion and collection of the (OJJ!t~~_tj~-~n~ 
A~tt (Me:;rrio Decision and Order On Reconsideration, p. 26 (emphasis added)), Because the 
coUection and amoW1t of the capacity fee was constitutional and not in violation of the Idaho 
Revenue Bond Act, the p.roposed amended complaint seeking· to invalidate ihe capacity fee and 
have the collected fees refunded cannot be accomplished. The doctrine ofres Judi.cat a bars 
reopening these issues in this litigation, 
Plaintiff suggests that ·the doctrine of res judicata does .not apply. To establish application 
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of the doctrine of res judicara, it1 summary the City must demonstrate that the following: (I') a 
full and fair opportunity to litigate in the present acrion; (2) the i$_su~ ·being deci4ed in the prioi' 
litigation was identical to the issue· being presented in the present action; (3) the presented issue-
was actually decided in the prior litigation; (4) there was a final judgment on the merits in the 
prior litigation; and (S) the party ~gainst whom the issue is asserted w.as ~ party or .in privjty 
with a party to the present litigation. Kootenai Elec, Co-Op., lnc. v. Lamar Corp., 148 Idaho 116., 
2-19 P .3d 440 (2009). The can satisfy ea.ch of these elements confirming appli_cation of the 
doctrine of res judicata. to the relief requested by the proposed amended complaint. 
Herc, th~ Plaintiffs have, and continue to htJ.v~. a fuJI a.n.d fair opportunity to litigate h1 the 
present action. All of the issues. previously raised have been fully briefed by both parties. The 
issue being raised in th.rough the proposed Amended Complaint is identical to the issue 
previously addressed in the Building Contractors matter. One of the primary issu~s raised by 
through the proposed Amended Complaint is invalidating the capacity fee (which was fully 
briefed in the Building Co.ntractors case}. As noted above~ the Court s-pecifi.cally concluded the 
capacity fee was constitutional and the amount collected was not improper. There is no legal 
basis to suggest that the capacity fee be invalidated .. which is the primary relief requested in the 
proposed Amended Complaint. (Memo Decision and Order On Reconsideration) p. 26). There is 
no dispute that the Building Contractor.\· case reached final resolution on the mel'i1s. Finally, the 
party against whom the issue is asserted was a pa.rty or in .nrivjty with a party to the pres~l'lt 
litigation .. Suggesting that the Plaintiffs here, (represented by Ed Quinn) are not in privity with the 
Plain ti ff in the Building Contractors case. The Pl~ntiff hete is the same person who .also signed 
affidavits as the president of:the Building Contractors Assooiation. The requested reliet: 
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invalidation and recover of the capacity fees. would only benefit the builder.s in PocateUo who 
were repre~ented by rhe Building Contractors Association.2 In sum, aH of the elements of res 
judicata have been proven. The. reHef sought-through the amended complaint cannot be awarded 
because it is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. As such, the Court should deny the 1notion to 
amend. 
However, even if the Court were to disregard the· doctrine of res judicata, the relief 
sought cannot be pl'Ovided, rendering the amendment futile. First,_as noted above, there is 110 
legal basis to invalidate the collection of the capacity fee or the amount collecte~. Second, the 
contention that the capacity fee was nots.pent consistently with the Revenue Bond Act and the 
Idaho Constitution is completely without merit Consistent with Idaho law> the revenues 
collei;;ted pursuanl Lo Idaho's Revenue Bond Act (the "Act") must. be used in conformity with the 
explicit recognition that "fees are not utjlized for general fund or for future expansion of the 
water and sewer system." id. at 440, 807P.2d at 1278. The record in this_ case is devoid of any 
evidence that t.h~ City was spending the capacity fees for general fund purposes or future 
expansion of infrastructure. Conversely, the record contains explicit testimony ftom City CFO. 
Joyce Stroschein, that the capacity fees were only used to repay debt service for existing 
infrastructure. As confirmed by M.s. Stroschein: 
The City. has never_ used the capacfu'ftes to fund future _growth.nor 
bas it transferred_the_money_ to the General Fund for use or repayment 
ofG~eraJ Fund debts. Rather, the City has only used the.capacity fees to 
pay for operation, maintena_nce, and replacement of t!~ting 
!~f.r.!l!l(!!~.t~tt'-· Bond retirement for a given year is intertwined with the 
continued operation of the Citfs water and wastewater systems. It would 
_be factually incorrect to sugge&t that the bond retirement for a given year 
2 RecalJ that the Building Contractors avoided standing issues despite neve:r having paid a 
.capacity fee because it represented builders who had paid the capacity foes. 
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is not part of the: continued 9.P~-~tjgQ 3.P4.m~.i:n.(~~~~-~~ of the City's 
infrastructure. 
(41h Stroschefo Aff., 14 (emphasis added)). Spending the ccl,pacity fee on the. opetation, 
maintenance, and- replacement of existing infrastructure· is appropriate ancl consi_stent with the 
plain language of the Revenue Bond Act and Idaho Constitution. There is no evidence in the 
record that could even be construed in favor of the Plaintiffs that would create .a genuine issue of 
fact sufficient to withstand a moti.on for summru.y judgment Whether the capacity fee has been 
correctly allocated is a legal issue resolved solely by the Idaho Revenue Bond Act and the Idaho 
Constitution. As such, the proposed amendment is futile3 and the motion to amend sho-µld be 
denied. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the fore.going, Defendant City of Pocatello respectful1y .requests that the Court 
deny Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint. 
Dated this ,?/ day of.August, 2015. 
3 
.Because the capac-ity fee is constitutional and the amount of the fee was appropriate, the only 
potential relief would be an order from the Court to allocate the ca,pacity fees in a different 
manner. The capac.ity fees would no be returned to ·those who paid capacity fees because the 
collection and amounts of the capacity fee was. appropriate. 
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Attorneys for Defendant City of Pocatello 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE S.IXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF'THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY 
HILL· VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on 
behalf of itself and all others similarly 
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself 
and all others similarly situated, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
municipality, 
'Defendant. 
DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO 
AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF 
· COMES NOW Defendant, City of Pocatello, by and through its attorney of record, and 
hereby submits this Opposition to Amicus Curiae Brief.of Nation Assoeiation of Home Builders 
In Opposition To Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ~s follows: 
fNTRQPUCTION 
On August 17, 2015, the Court took up argument regarding National Assocfation of 
Home Builders' Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief.filed in opposition to Defendant's 
'DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMJCUS CURIAE BRIEF - .I 
692
.. 
.:-.,,,.,.· 
.. .., - ~ -- ~ - ~ -- . - --- ···- . . ··:a-... . - . -
/.,.-:--··--.·~:1 
\,_ / 
Motion for Summary Judgment.· The Court granteq leave to the National Association of Home 
Builders_ to file their Amicus Curiae Brief and provided Defendant's fourteen days to provide a 
respon$e. As noted in the opposition briefing, many of the ~gum~nts advanced by the 
Association are duplicative of the Plaintiffs· arguments. The other arguments are irrelevant ·and 
confitm the Associat'ion' s singular desh'e to invalidate th~ connection fee only. As this Court has 
announced previously, the connection fee has never containe<i a PILOT component. 
ARGUMENT 
The Association advances tllree arguments in their brief: (1) the PiLOT qualifies as a 
property interest~ (2} that the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause applies; and (3) the PILOT 
component of the connection fees will n~gatively harm the building industry in PocateUo, Idaho. 
The first two arguments have been the subject of significant briefing an.d only specific and 
relevant issues wi11 be addressed. The third issue .is completely unfounded, as the connection tee 
has never contained a PILOT component. 
A. The PILOT b Not A Qualifying Property Interest. 
Like Pla.intiffst the Association contends that the PILOT component of the user fee that 
was collected by the City is a property interested protected under the Fifth Amendment. 
Importantly, the PJLOT cannot be charatterized as anything but .a tax. This fact was establi-shed 
in the Building Contr1,1ctors matter .. (Building Contractors ~Memorandum Decision on 
.Reconsideration, p. 22). As a tax_. under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment~ numerous 
courts have routinely recognized that taxation. is not considered· a takit~g. See. e.g., Unite.d .States· 
v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 53, 110 S.Ct. 387,. I 07 L.Ed.2d 290 (J 989) (holding that a 
deduction of a tribunal user foe ftorn a settlement award is not a taking); Commercial Builder$ lr. 
Sacramento, 941 F.2d -872, 876 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that a purely financial exaction does not 
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constitute a taking); Coleman v. C.l.R .• 791 F.2d 68, 70 (7th Cir, 1986) {holding that taxes are 
not takings, unless the Government tries to "achieve through special taxes what the Takings 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment forbids if done directly."); Atlas Corp. v. Unite..d States, 895 F .2d 
745, 756 (Fed.Cir. 1990) ("Requiring money to be spent is not·a taking of property''); 
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. United States~ 46 Fed. CJ. 29, 40 (2000) C'Requiring money to be 
spent is not a taking of property"): Branch v. United States, 69 F.3d ]57I, 1576 (Fed.Cir. 1995) 
(1·ejectiug the argument that a red.eral statute constitute:d. a taki.ng, "''because the property allegedly 
taken was money"). The logi.c behind not caUing a tax a taking is sound becau~e the City would 
be paying money fot money received. Bram:h ,,. Uniied Stales, 69 F.3d I57 l (Fed;Cir. 1995), 
cert. denied_, 519 U.S. 810; l17 S.Ct. 55, 136 L.Ed,2d 18 ( 1996). The cases cited by the 
Association have been previously addressed and are not dispositive of this issue and <io not add 
to the analysis because the ci(ed cases do not address ta,x collections. Ultimately, the PILOT was 
a tax ai1d there is no property interest in a collected tax.. 
B. The Association's Brief Demon_strates A Fundamental Misunderstanding Of The 
PILOT Component Of The User Fees. 
There is no dispute that the PILOT component of the user fee ~s decb,red improper in 
(he Building Contractors matter. The City has never challenged this ruling and immediately 
ceased collection of the PILOT following this Court's ruling. (See generally February 3, 2014 
De~tsion on Plaintijf 's Applicattonfo1' Order to Show Cause.). The Association seemingly 
suggests, without any-factµal suppon, that th~ connection fee contained a PILOT. This is an 
erroneous statement and confirms the real motivation of the Association is to have the capacity 
fee overturned. As this Court is well @.Ware, the PILOT was only incorporated into the user fee 
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and the connection fee has never contained a PILOT. (See First Affidavit of Joyce. A. Stro.shein.1, 
~Iii 8, 13; February 3, 2014 Decisiori qn Plaintiffs Application for Order to Show Cause, p. 1, 4-
5). As such •. there is no viable argument advanced by the Asso~iation that the connection 
contains a PILOT component. 
Rather, the relevant question is whether the Plaintiffs' are entitled to a refund of the 
PILOT. As has been. fulJy addressed by the parties, the signifi.cant and dispositive issue before 
the Court is whe~her the JJuil4ing Contractors case was designed to be retroactive or prospective 
in application. The Association's arguments do not address this issue. Substantial and persuasive 
autQo-rity has be~n submitted to this Court strongly advocating for a prospective application. 
C. The Statistics Cited By The Association Are "Irrelevant And Does Not Change The 
Validity Of The Connection Fee. 
The Association cit~s 'irrelevant statistics to suggest that the connection fee ·should be 
invalidated because it may hann the building industry in Pocatello. Claims that the building 
industry is affected by increases in fees that must either be born by the builder or passed on to 
buyets are irrelevant and do not address the merits of the City's Motion f6r Summary Judgment. 
In the Building Contracto.rs matter~ the capacity fee was upheld as a constitutional fee and the 
amount of the fee was not deemed to. be unreasonable or improper. The Court didf however, 
declare. the- PILOT fee improper. This litigation centers on an-attempt tQ recuperate the PILOT 
component of the user fee. 
The PILOT was only incorporated into the user fee alone and, as ha$ been extensively 
1 Paragraph 8: "The existence of the PILOT .is iiTelevant to the policy decision to require 
capacity fees for new utility connections. There is no overlap between the PIL TO component of 
the use fee and the conn~ction/capacity fee. The City has never charged a PILOT component to 
the c-onnection/capacity fee." Paragraph 13: "The City has never charged a PILOT component to 
the connection/capacity fee and the two different fees have no relationship . ., 
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briefed by the pan:ies, the connection fee has never contained a PILOT. Thus, the argument 
advanced by the Association that the capacity fee will hann the building industry is incorrect and 
v..ill not be changed by the results of this litigation. Because the capacity fee has never contained 
a PILOT component, the fee will not ·be adjusted by the outcome of thjs litigation. Ac¢ordingly, 
citing statistics about fees ham1ing the building industry is not appJicable here.2 
Finally, any suggestion that the City cannot distinguish between a: user fee and a capacity 
fee ig misplaced and ignores the City's action of segregating all of the connection fees ever· 
collected and pladng them into Funds 37 and 38. The City can fully account for all of the 
capacity foes ever collected. The City will continue to coll~ct the capa1::ity fee because it is 
con~titutional and has been previously declared as appropriate. Ultimately, th.ere is no legitimacy 
to the Association~s claims that the PocateUo building industry will be affected by this liLigatiorr. 
In sum, the arguments advanced by the Association are not helpful in resolving the Citfs 
motion for S\lmrnaryjudgment .. The Court should find that the application of the Building 
Contmctors matter only has prospective application and dismiss this matter with prej.udice. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Defendant City of Pocatello respectfuUy requests that the Court 
grant the City's Motion for .Summary Judgment and dismiss Plaintitls' case with prejudice. 
Dated this 31 day of August. 2015. 
2 The c.ited statistics are generalit..ed statistics· that make no reference to the building industry in 
Pocatello, Idaho. Any claim that.that the building industry will be banned is pure coajecture. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIX1H JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
Register No.CV-2014-01520-0C 
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on ) 
behalf of itself and all others similarly ) 
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself ) 
and all others similarly situated, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
-vs- ) 
) 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho ) 
municipality, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
MINUTE ENTRY & ORDER 
On August 17, 2015, the above entitled matter came before the Court for the purpose of a 
hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint and Motion to File 
AMICUS Curaie Brief on National Association of Home Builders in Opposition to Defendant's 
Motion for Summazy Judgment filed by Steven Taggart. Nathan Olsen, appeared on behalf of the 
Plaintiff, Blake Hall, appeared for the Defendant and Steven Taggart appeared on behalf of the 
National Association of Home Builders. 
Sheri Nothelphim performed as Court Reporter for this proceeding. 
Register CV-2014-01520-0C 
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The Court heard argument from Steven Taggart and counsel for the Defendant. 
The Court advised that the Motion to File AMICUS Curaie Brief shall be granted. The 
Court is allowing counsel for the Defendant 14 days to respond. 
The Court heard argument from counsel regarding the Motion for Leave to File First 
Amended Complaint. 
The Court advised that this Motion would be taken under advisement and a written decision 
shall be issued. 
DATE September 2, 2015. 
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Steven Taggart · 
Maynes Taggart PLLC 
PO Box 3005 
Idaho Falls, ID 83403 
DATED this __ 7 ____ day of 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH IDDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on 
behalf of itself and all others similarly 
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself 
and all others similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
municipality,' 
Defendant. 
---------------
) 
) Case No. CV-2014-1520-0C 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
MEMORANDUM DECISION GRANTING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DISCUSSING 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR CLASS 
CERTIFICATION, AND DENYING 
PLAINTIFFS' RENEWED MOTION FOR 
LEAVE TO FILE FIRST AMENDED 
COMPLAINT 
This case comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification, and Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Leave to File First 
Amended Complaint. Having reviewed the facts and law, the Court now issues this decision, 
· granting summary judgment for Defendant, discussing Plaintiffs' motion for class certification, 
and denying Plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint. 
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FACTS1 
This case originated with Building Contractors Association of Southeast Idaho v. City of 
Pocatello ("Building Contractors") case, Bannock County Case No. CV-2011-5228-0C, over 
which this Court presided.2 As the Building Contractors case directly pertains to this case, the 
Court will lay out a brief factual history. The City of Pocatello ("the City" or "Defendant") owns 
and operates water and sewer systems for residents of~he City. The wastewater treatment facility 
is the Water Pollution Control Facility ("WPCF") and serves the cities of Pocatello and 
Chubbuck and other areas within Bannock County. The WPCF was financed by issuing revenue 
bonds pursuant to Article 8, Section 3. of the Idaho Constitution and the Idaho Revenue Bond 
Act. There are two different types of fees associated with the water and sewer systems: I) user 
fees and 2) connection/capacity fees. User fees are monthly fees that every user of the water and 
sewer system pays for the service they receive. The City adopted a connection/capacity fee in 
Fiscal Year 2007 upon the recommendation of a water and wastewater study provided by Red 
Oak Consulting. The connection/capacity fees for water and sewer services are one-time fees 
assessed only to builders of new construction and the fees are based on an "equity buy-in" 
system, which is designed to recover a new connector's proportionate share of the City's 
wastewater backbone facility costs. 
At the time of Building Contractors, a "Payment-In-Lieu-Of-Taxes" ("PILOT") was a 
component of the user fees charged to the water and sewer department.3 The City conceded that 
the PILOT component was essentially a tax charged directly to the City's own water and sewer 
1 The following facts have been taken from the Parties' pleadings and affidavits in the record. 
2 Both Parties agreed, during the April 13, 2015 hearing, that the Court could take judicial notice of the facts in the 
Building Contractors case. 
3 The PILOT component has been called various names over the years, including "rate of return," ''return on equity," 
and "franchise fees." The "return on equity" policy referred to city-owned public utilities making a transfer to the 
general fund. The City renamed the transfer "Payment-In-Lieu-Of-Taxes'' in 2011. 
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department to transfer water and sewer funds to the General Fund, as if the department was 
operating like a private utility company. Prior to March 2013, the connection/capacity and user 
fees were comingled into the water and sewer funds, then the money was transferred from the 
water and sewer funds into the General Fund.4 Both the water and sewer department recovered 
the PILOT component through a fee charged to all users of the water and sewer system. The City 
· has shown that it does not charge a PILOT component to.t]:1e connection/capacity fees, but only 
to the user fees charged to customers of the systems. 
In Building Contractors, the plaintiffs, the Building Contractors Association of Southeast 
Idaho, sought declarative and injunctive relief against the City's connection/capacity fees, 
alleging that the fees were in violation of the Idaho Constitution and the Idaho Revenue Bond 
Act. The Court ultimately issued its Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant's Motion to 
Reconsider and Plaintiff's Amended Motion for Reconsideration ("Reconsideration Decision") 
on November 15, 2013, in which it concluded: 
1. The City's connection and user fees are not arbitrary or unreasonably imposed. The 
imposition and collection of the connection and user fees themselves are not 
unconstitutional acts or a violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond Act. 
2. There is no evidence that the connection fees are being used by the City to fund future 
capital improvements in violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond Act. 
3. Through the use of the PILOT fee transfer program, or any other transfer program with a 
similar intent, such as a rate of return program or a return on equity program, the Court 
declares that the City is imposing an impermissible tax to the extent that connection and 
user fees are being assessed a PILOT fee for general fund purposes, and such practices 
4 The water and sewer departments currently have money held in four different fund groups. Funds 31/32 are 
operating funds comprised of user fees collected by the water and sewer department, respectively. Funds 31/32 also 
contained the PILOT component to the user fees charged by the departments. Funds 37/38 hold the 
connection/capacity fees collected by the water and sewer departments. It was created in March of2013 with 
beginning balances drawn from the corresponding operating funds in an amount equal to the total amount collected 
in capacity fees since 2007. Funds 60/61 are the debt service funds from the water and sewer department. 
Previously, money transferred into Funds 60/61 from Funds 31/32, but since 2013 the money has been transferred 
from Funds 37/38. Funds 73/74 are construction funds where proceeds from bonds are placed for water and sewer. 
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must cease and are hereby enjoined because they are unconstitutional and a violation of 
the Idaho Revenue Bond Act. This means that connection and user fees must be adjusted 
to the extent that th~y include a charge for the PILOT fee. In addition, no PILOT fee 
transfers from any water or sewer account to the general fund are permitted. 
However, to the extent that connection and user fees are being transferred from 
the water and sewer accounts to the general fund, through any appropriate process, 
however named, for the purpose of paying expenses related to the operation, 
maintenance, replacement, and depreciation of existing water and sewer systems, 
including only those general City expenses needed to operate the water and sewer 
departments, such as HR, financial, legal and accounting, such transfers are permitted and 
are not hereby enjoined. 5 
On December 19, 2013, after the Reconsideration Decision, the City adjusted the user 
rates and discontinued assessing the PILOT component to the user fees. Each Pocatello resident 
user saw an approximate 10% decrease in their water and sewer utility bills. Subsequently in 
Building Contractors, there was an order to show cause hearing in which the Court conclucled 
that there was insufficient evidence to show that the PILOT component was used in calculating 
the connection/capacity fees. The Court determined that the evidence indicated the 
connection/capacity fee was calculated entirely separate from any consideration of a PILOT 
component and that the evidence unequivocally demonstrated that the PILOT component was 
only assessed to the user rates. 
This current case is brought by Plaintiffs Hill-Vu Mobile Home Park, Ed Quinn, and, 
potentially, the identified clas.ses of Plaintiffs ("Plaintiffs") who are users/customers, seeking a 
refund for the City's imposition of the PILOT component in past years, which was found 
unconstitutional and in violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond Act in Building Contractors. 
Plaintiffs initiated this litigation to have the Court award damages based on three claims: ( 1) 
unconstitutional taking in violation of Article 1, Section 14 of the Idaho Constitution and the 
5 Reconsideration Decision, p. 26. 
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Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution as applied to state action 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) state law unjust emichment; (3) state law equitabie estoppel 
and/or equitable tolling. Plaintiffs moved to certify two classes of users and Defendant moved 
for summary judgment. After a hearing on both matters on April 13, 2015, the Court allowed 
both parties to submit supplemental briefing. In the interim, the National Association of Home 
Builders made a motion for leave to file an amicus curiae brief in opposition to Defendant's 
motion for summary judgment and Plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint. The Court held_ a 
hearing on those issues on August 1 7, 2015 and granted the National Association of Home 
Builders' motion for leave to file an amicus brief, and has considered the same. The Court also 
allowed Defendant additional time to respond to the amicus curiae brief and Plaintiffs' renewed 
motion to amend. Thereafter, the Court took the matters ·under advisement. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"Sununary judgment is proper 'if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw. '"6 The party moving for 
summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating that there are no genuine issues of 
material fact.7 A mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt is not sufficient to create a 
genuine issue of material fact. 8 
When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the court "liberally construes the 
record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, drawing all reasonable 
6 Vreeken v. Lockwood Eng'g, B. V., 148 Idaho 89, IOI, 218 P.3d 1150, 1162 (2009) (quoting I.R.C.P. 56(c}). 
7 Vreeken, 148 Idaho at 101,218 P.3d at 1162. 
8 Mendenhall v. Aldous, 146 Idaho 434, 436, 196 P.3d 352, 354 (2008}. 
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,,;·:··,. 
inferences and conclusions in that party's favor.''9 "If there are conflicting inferences contained in 
the record or reasonable minds might reach different conclusions, summary judgment must be 
denied."10 However, "[i]t is well established that a party against whom a motion for summary 
judgment is sought 'may not merely rest on allegations contained in his pleadings, but must 
come forward and produce evidence by way of deposition or affidavit to contradict the assertions 
of the moving party and establish a genuine issue of material fact. '"11 
ANALYSIS 
I. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
The Court begins its analysis with the Motion for Summary Judgment, concluding that if 
that Motion is resolved in favor the City, other pending motions are likely rendered moot. 
Therefore, as to the merits of the case, Plaintiffs challenge three of Defendant's factual 
assertions. First, Plaintiffs assert that the PILOT component should be considered a fee, not a 
tax. Second, Plaintiffs dispute that the PILOT component was immediately discontinued after the 
Court's decision in Building Contractors and assert that the PILOT was collected into 2014. 
Third, Plaintiffs maintain that the PILOT component was charged to the connection/capacity 
fees. Each of these disputed facts will be discussed in turn before moving to Plaintiffs' other 
substantive claims. 
A. PILOT Component as a Tax 
As a threshold matter, this Court must determine whether or not the PILOT component is 
considered a tax or a fee in order to analyze Plaintiffs' claims. Defendant argues that the PILOT · 
component was found to be a tax, albeit an unconstitutional tax, under this Court's decision in 
9 Avila v. Wahlquist, 126 Idaho 745, 747, 890 P.2d 331,333 (1995). 
10 Bilow v. Preco, Inc., 132 Idaho 23, 27, 966 P.2d 23, 27 (1998). 
11 McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 770, 820 P.2d 360,365 (1991) (quoting Olsen v. J.A. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 
706, 791 P.2d 1285 (1990)); see also I.R.C.P. 56(e). 
Case No. CV-2014-1520-0C 
MEMORANDUM DECISION GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 
DISCUSSING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION, AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS' 
RENEWED MOTION FOR LEA VE TO FILE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Page6 
706
Building Contractors. 12 Plaintiffs disagree and allege that the PILOT is a fee because the 
connection/capacity fee and the use fee were both designated as ''fees," thus any component of 
those fees, i.e. the PILOT, carries the same designation. 
''Fees and taxes are generally distinguished in that fees are for the purpose of regulation 
whereas taxes are solely for the purpose of raising revenue."13 If a fee or charge is imposed 
primarily for revenue raising purposes~ it is in essence a tax and can only be upheld under the 
power of taxation.14 Article 4, § 6 of the Idaho Constitution permits municipal corporations to 
impose their own taxes, however, such power is limited by the taxing power given to the 
municipality authorized by the legislature.15 In Loomis v. City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434, 807 P .2d 
1272 (1991 ), the Idaho Supreme Court pronounced a two-part test to analyze the validity of a fee 
or tax: "First, we must detennine whether the connection fee constitutes an impermissible tax. 
Secondly, we must determine whether the connection fee is appropriately and reasonably 
assessed. ''16 Under the first step of the analysis, a court must consider if, on its face, whether the 
fee is a tax or a regulation. This first step was thoroughly analyzed in the Court's prior decisions 
in Building Contractors. The Court found, regardless of what the transfers were called or 
described, that the PILOT component was an impermissible tax because it was a method to 
generate revenue transferred into the General Fund. Notably, this Court stated in its 
Reconsideration Decision: 
After the connection and user fees were comingled into the water and sewer funds, the 
evidence supports, and the City concedes, that the City then transferred money from the 
water and sewer funds into the General Fund under transfers that have been called by 
12 Throughout this opinion, the Court will use the tenns "illegal tax," ''impermissible tax," "disguised tax," 
"unconstitutional tax," and "improper tax" synonymously. 
13 BHA Investments, Inc. v. State, 138 Idaho 348, 352-53, 63 P.3d 474, 478-79 (2003). 
14 Idaho Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 126 Idaho 740, 743, 890 P.2d 326,329 (1995). 
15 Brewster v. City of Pocatello, 115 Idaho 502,504, 768 P.2d 765, 767 (1988). 
16 Id. at 437, 807 P.2d at 1275. 
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various names~ PILOT/rate of return/return on equity/franchise fees. The City concedes 
that this PILOT charge is a tax charged to the City's water and sewer department as if it 
was ·operating as a private utility conipany. 17 
*** 
Also similar to Brewster, the Court finds below that the City's PILOT fee policies 
transferring revenue from connection and user fees are not regulatory fees permissible 
under the City's police power because it does not bear a reasonable relationship to the 
cost ofregulating the water and sewer systems. Rather, this Court has found, similar to 
Brewster, that the PILOT fee transfers are impermissible taxes because they are used to 
generate revenue to meet the needs of the public at large. 18 
*** 
Since the PILOT fees are or have been transferred from revenue collected from "rates, 
fees, and charges" of the water and sewer system, i.e., connection fees and user fees, and 
are not used for a regulatory purpose nor for purposes allowed by the Idaho Revenue 
Bond Act, the Court finds, as a matter of law, that the PILOT fee transfers are 
impermissible taxes assessed against the user fees, connection fees, or both - all of which 
is contrary to Idaho statutory and case law. 19 
*** 
Additionally, any PILOT fees drawn from user fees are also impermissible taxes.20 
*** 
The Court DENIES the City's Motion to Reconsider the Court's March 28, 2013 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
finding that the PILOT fee transfers are impermissible taxes on the water and sewer funds 
which are derived from the revenue collected from the connection fees and/or user fees. 21 
In this case, the analysis to determine whether or not the PILOT component is considered 
a regulation or tax is exactly the same as it was in the underlying case. It is clear from the 
decision in the underlying case that not only did the City concede the PILOT component was a 
tax, but this Court determined the PILOT component, irrespective of whether it was part of the 
connection/capacity fees or user fees or what it was titled, was considered an impermissible tax. 
17 Reconsideration Decision, p. 8 (internal citations omitted}. 
18 Id at 17-18. 
19 Id at 22. 
20 Id at 23. 
21 Id at 25. 
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Therefore, this Court reaffirms the conclusion that the PILOT component is an impermissible 
tax. 
B. Collection of the PILOT after the Reconsideration Decision 
Next, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant did not immediately discontinue charging the 
PILOT component after the Court's 2013 decision in Building Contractors. Plaintiffs assert the 
component was collected into 2014. However, the PILOT transfer to the General Fund during 
Fiscal Year 2014 in the amount of$206,904 was actually made in October of2013.22 The 
remaining transactions for FY2014 were cancelled after the Court issued its Reconsideration 
Decision in November 2013.23 Thus, Plaintiffs' have identified no evidence that Defendant 
continued to charge the PILOT component to the user fees after the Court's fmal decision in 
Building Contractors. 
C. PILOT as a Component in the Connection/Capacity Fees 
As the Court determined that the PILOT component is a tax, the Court must then 
determine whether or not there was a PILOT component contained in the c01mection/capacity 
fees before considering Plaintiffs' substantive claims. Defendant argues that the collection of the 
colUlection/capacity fee was fully analyzed in Building Contractors and the Court concluded that 
the connection/capacity fee was appropriate and not improperly collected. Plaintiffs maintain that 
the connection/capacity fee contains a PILOT component. 
Initially in Building Contractors, it was unclear whether or not the PILOT component 
was a part of the connection/capacity fees. However, in this Court's decision on the Order to 
Show Cause, its position was clarified: 
22 Second Affidavit of Joyce Stroschein, p. 4, 19. 
23 Id 
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Plaintiff has filed an application for order to show cause, requesting that the Court enter 
an order suspending the assessment and collection of connection fees until the City 
recalculates the connection fees, as it has the user fees. Plaintiff argues that the record 
contains sufficient evidence indicating that the City included the PILOT fee in calculating 
the necessary connection fee it would charge. After reviewing the facts in the record, 
specifically those cited by Plaintiff, the Court concludes that there is insufficient evidence 
that the PILOT fee was used in calculating the connection/capacity fees, and declines to 
enter the Order to Show Cause.24 
*** 
Although the above facts indicate that the water and wastewater utility rates were set after 
taking the connection fee into account, there is nothing in the above cited evidence to 
indicate that the PILOT fee was used to calculate the proper connection fee. To the 
contrary, the evidence in the case indicates that the connection fee was calculated entirely 
separate from any consideration of a PILOT fee.25 
*** 
Even if the statements made by Mr. Swindell were to be treated with limited weight, as 
Plaintiff argues they should be, the Gallagher report, which Plaintiff relies upon in 
making its arguments, clearly indicates that water and wastewater user rates were 
calculated differently than connection fees, and that the PILOT was considered only in 
setting the water and wastewater user rates. 26 
The evidence pointed to by Plaintiff simply does not refute the statement in Mr. 
Swindell's fourth affidavit, that there is no connection between capacity fees and PILOT 
fees. In fact, reviewing the evidence ~learly demonstrates that the PILOT was only 
assessed to the user rates. As the City has adjusted the user rates there is no basis for 
granting Plaintiff's Application for Order to Show Cause. 27 
Here, Plaintiffs have not provided any new evidence to show the PILOT component was 
used to calculate the connection/capacity fees. Interestingly, Plaintiffs attempt to use the Court's 
prior decision in Building Contractors to argue that the Court "already found and decided that 
the transfers of co~mingled funds into the general fund were, in effect, "a charge" to both the 
24 Decision on Plaintiff's Application for Order to Show Cause, CV-2011-5228-0C, filed February 13, 2014, p. 1. 
25 Id., p. 4. 
26 Id., p. 5. 
21 Id. 
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user and connection fee payers."28 To the contrary, in its previous decision, the Court found that 
revenue collected from both the connection/capacity and user fees from the water and sewer 
funds could have been poured into the General Fund via the PILOT component.29 Yet while the 
Court did determine that the user fees contained a PILOT component, it did not conclusively find 
that the connection/capacity fees contained a PILOT component. The Court concluded that, if the 
connection/capacity fees were being assessed a PILOT component for general fund purposes, 
such practices were unconstitutional and were enjoined as a violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond 
Act. However, as shown from the Order to Show Cause Decision, it is clear that the City had 
included a PILOT component in calculating the user fees. This Court shed light on the confusion 
regarding the connection/capacity fees and categorically established that there was no evidence 
to show that the PILOT component was used in calculating the connection/capacity fees. In this 
case, Plaintiffs have relied on the evidence and decisions from Building Contractors, which do 
not support their assertions. 30 Thus, there continues to be no evidence to establish that the 
connection/capacity fees contained a PILOT component. 
D. Idaho Tort Claims Act 
Turning then to the Plaintiffs' substantive claims, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs' state-
law claims fail under· the Idaho Tort Claims Act. The Court looks to both whether valid tort 
claims have been asserted and whether Defendant is immune from any or all of Plaintiffs' state 
law claims, even if those claims were valid. To evaluate whether the Idaho Tort Claims Act 
("ITCA") is applicable, either as an assertion of a valid claim or whether any immunity exists, a 
court must engage in a three-step analysis: 
28 Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to City's Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 7 (emphasis included}. 
29 Reconsideration Memorandum Decision, p. 12. 
30 As discussed fully below, the Cowt denies Plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint and as such, disregards any 
new factual assertions and claims that are outside the scope of the pleadings. 
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First, we must determine whether "tort recovery is allowed under the laws of Idaho." This 
is essentially a determination of whether there is such a tort under Idaho Law. Second, 
this Court determines if "an exception to liability under the ITCA shields the alleged 
misconduct from liability." Finally, "if no exception applies, [we examine] whether the 
merits of the claim as presented for consideration on the motion for summary judgment 
entitle the moving party to dismissal."31 . 
The first step in the analysis is whether Plaintiff's claim is allowed under the laws of 
Idaho. Under J.C.§ 6-903, a governmental entity is subject to liability for money damages 
arising out of certain conduct and those of its employees acting within the course and scope of 
their employment to the extent a private party would be liable. Here, even Defendant has 
conceded that Plaintiffs have alleged wrongful conduct that could subject a governmental entity 
to liability in their three state law claims - unconstitutional talcing, unjust enrichment, and 
equitable estoppel/equitable tolling. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs' three state law claims 
are initially allowed under Idaho law. 
The second step is whether "an exception to liability under the ITCA shields the alleged 
misconduct from liability."32 J.C. § 6-904A provides, in pertinent part: 
A governmental entity and its employees while acting within the course and scope of 
their employment and without malice or criminal intent and without reckless, willful and 
wanton conduct as defined in section 6-904C, Idaho Code, shall not be liable for any 
claim which: ..... Arises out of the assessment or collection of any tax or fee. 
Therefore, even if the Plaintiff's state tort claims could qualify as valid claims under J.C. 
§ 6-902, under§ 6-904(A), Defendant cannot be liable for any claim that arises out of the 
assessment or collection of any tax or fee. All of Plaintiffs' state law claims - unconstitutional 
taking, unjust enrichment, and equitable estoppel/equitable tolling - arise out of the collection of 
31 Rees v. State, Dep't of Health & Welfare, 143 Idaho 10, 14--15, 137 P.3d 397, 401-02 (2006) (internal citations 
omitted). 
32 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
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the PILOT component, which was found to be a tax.33 Thus, all of Plaintiffs' claims arise out of 
the collection of a tax by Defendant, which is an exception to liability under the ITCA that 
shields the alleged misconduct from liability.34 Consequently, Defendant is immune from 
Plaintiffs' state law unconstitutional taking, unjust enrichment, and equitable estoppel/equitable 
tolling claims because they arise out of a collection of a tax by a governmental entity. No further 
consideration of the third factor is necessary and summary judgment is GRANTED to 
Defendant, as to each of those state law claims. 
E. U neonstitutional Taking 
As swnmary judgment was granted to Plaintiffs' state law claims, the only claim 
remaining is Plaintiffs' federal unconstitutional takings claim under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution. Defendants argue that the PILOT component is a 
tax, albeit an unconstitutional tax, but that the collection of a tax is not considered a taking 
because taxes are not a recognizable protected property interest. Plaintiffs disagree and assert the 
PILOT component collected by the City is a property interest protected under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendment. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees that private 
property will not be taken for public use without just compensation.35 There is a two-step 
analysis to a takings claim: (1) plaintiffs must establish it possess~ a compensable property 
interest and (2) that the government entity took that private property interest for public use 
without just compensation.36 
33 The Court would note, hypothetically, if the PILOT component had been considered a fee, that summary 
judgment would still be granted for Defendant on Plaintiffs' state law claims because the immunity under I.C. § 6-
904A applies to the assessment and collection of a tax or fee. 
34 See Rees at 14-15, 137 P.3d at 401-02 (internal citations omitted). 
35 U.S. Const. amend. V. 
36 See Lucas v. South Carolina Costal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992); See Shortv. U.S., 50 F.3d 994, 1000 
(Fed. Cir. 1995). 
Case No. CV-2014-1520-0C 
MEMORANDUM DECISION GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY ruDGMENT, 
DISCUSSING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION, AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS' 
RENEWED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Page 13 
713
( 
Plaintiffs' taking claim is a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, which is characterized by federal 
standards, not state standards, in "the federal interest in uniformity and the interest in having 
'firmly defined, easily applied rules."37 To that end, this Court will apply federal case law in 
interpreting Plaintiffs' federal takings claim. "Summary dismissal of a taking claim is 
appropriate where the circumstances alleged in the complaint, even if taken as true and all 
reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the plaintiff, cannot establish that a talcing has 
occurred. "38 
Initially, the Court must determine where there is a compensable property interest. There 
is a wealth of federal cases where courts concluded that a government-imposed obligation to pay 
money, i.e. a tax, is not a per se taking of private property within the meaning of the Fifth 
Amendment. Courts have employed several approaches in making this conclusion, but taken 
together, the cases lead to an ultimate determination that a tax is not a compensable taking. Some 
courts have made that determination on the groWids that money is not "property" within the 
meaning of the Takings Clause.39 Other courts "have concluded that a governmental-impose 
obligation to pay money are not the sort of governmental actions subject to a takings analysis."40 
37 Osborn v. Salinas, 131 Idaho 456,458,958 P.2d 1142, 1144 (1998) citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 270, 
105 S. Ct. 1938, 85 L. Ed. 2d 254 (1985) (internal citation omitted). 
38 Atlas Corp. v. United States, 895 F.2d 745, 756-57 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
39 United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 62 n. 9, 110 S.Ct 387, 107 L.Ed.2d 290 {1989) (considering and 
rejecting the view that money is private property that can be physically occupied by the government: "Unlike real or 
personal property, money is fungible."); Atlas Corp. v. United States; 895 F.2d 745, 756 (Fed.Cir.1990)("Requiring 
money to be spent is not a taking of property."); Unity Real Esta.te Co. v. Hudson, 178 F.3d 649, 674-78 (3d Cir. 
1999)(rejecting the application of a takings analysis to the tax imposed by the Coal Act). 
4° Commonwealth Edison Co. v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 29, 40-41 (2000) a.ffd, 271 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2001); 
See Branch v. United States, 69 F.3d 1571, 1576-77 (Fed.Cir.1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 810, 117 S.Ct. 55, 136 
L.Ed.2d 18 ( l 996)("[T]he principles of takings law that apply to real property do not apply in the same manner to 
statutes imposing monetary liability."); Meriden Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. FDIC, 62 F.3d449, 455 & n. 2 (2d 
Cir.1995) (per se takings analysis is inapplicable to congressional imposition of monetary liability); Commercial 
Builders v. Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872, 876 (9th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 931, 112 S.Ct. 1997, 118 L.Ed.2d 
593 (I992)(a purely financial exaction does not constitute a taking). 
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The Federal Circuit in Branch described why a takings analysis does not fit the obligation to pay 
money to the government: 
To be sure, analyzing the assessment under the principles of takings law is awkward. If a 
particular governmental action is deemed a taking, it means that the government may 
engage in the action but must pay for it. Thus, if the assessment growing out of the cross-
guarantee provision was a talcing of the assets of the Maine National Bank, the 
government has to pay for what it took. But because the property allegedly taken in this 
case was money, that leads to the curious conclusion that the government may take the 
bank's money as long as it pays the money back. 41 . 
Here, Plaintiffs must first establish they have a compensable property interest to complete 
the takings analysis. According to federal law, regardless of what grounds the determination is 
made upon, Plaintiffs' claim fails at this step because the Takings Clause is not implicated by the 
collection of a tax. This Court recognizes that the tax here, the PILOT component to the user 
fees, was previously held to be impermissible. However, a tax, even an impermissible tax, is still 
a tax. The same laws and standards apply to a governmental-imposed obligation to pay money, 
even one found to be impermissible. As the Sixth Circuit stated, in a case concerning the 
overpayment of income taxes that a city retained, "since the Fifth Amendment takings clause is 
not implicated by the collection of taxes, it is not implicated by a miscalculation of the tax 
credits."42 In United Stat~s Shoe Corp. v. United States, 296 F.3d 1378 (Fed.Cir.2002), the court 
found that the government-imposed tax was not a per se taking of private property, even though 
the tax at issue was declared unconstitutional.43 Therefore, even if taken as true that the PILOT 
component is an impermissible tax and all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the 
Plaintiffs, they still cannot establish that a taking has occurred because collection of a 
41 Branch v. United States, 69 F.3d 1571, 1575-76 (Fed. Cir. 1995). The same awkwardness exists here, i.e., where 
Plaintiffs ( or the classes of users) seek to be reimbursed money that can only be collected from the same users that 
would receive the reimbursement. 
42 Laborde v. City of Gahanna, 561 F. App'x476, 479 (6th Cir. 2014). 
43 Id. at 1383-84. 
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governmental-imposed tax is not subject to a takings analysis. Accordingly, an analysis of the 
second takings step, i.e., to ascertain if the PILOT component was used without just 
compensation, is not required as Plaintiffs did not established that an illegal tax is a compensable 
property interest. Summary judgment is GRANTED to Defendant as to Plaintiffs' federal takings 
claim concerning the user fees. 
F. Retroactive Application 
Plaintiffs claim that this Court's ruling in Building Contractors has a retroactive effect. 
Defendants oppose that view and assert there is no evidence that the Court meant for the 
decisions in Building Contractors to apply retroactively. Retroactive application to past and 
pending cases is left to the sound discretion of the court.44 While the usual rule is that decisions 
of the Idaho Supreme Court apply retroactively to all past and pending cases, the Court still has 
the discretion to limit the retroactive application in a decision.45 The Court has provided: 
We may hold that it does not apply even to the case in which the decision was 
announced; or that it applies only to that case and not to other past or pending cases; or 
that it applies to both that case and pending cases, but not to past cases.46 · 
When deciding whether to limit the retroactive application of a decision, courts weigh 
three factors: (1) the purpose of the decision; (2) the reliance upon the prior law; and (3) the 
effect upon the administration of justice if the decision is applied retroactively.47 Courts balance 
the first factor against the other two to determine whether to limit the retroactive application of 
the decision. 48 
44 BHA Investments, Inc. v. City of Boise, 141 Idaho 168, 173, 108 P .3d 315, 320 (2004). 
45 Id 
46 Id. 
47 Id (citing Thompson v. Hagan, 96 Idaho 19,523 P.2d 1365 (1974)). 
48 Id. (citing Jones v. Watson, 98 Idaho 606, 570 P.2d 284 (1977)). 
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The Court has already extensively discussed Building Contractors and the determinations 
made in that case, so it will limit the factual discussion in analyzing the retroactive effect of that 
decision. There, this Court determined "that any fee which includes a PILOT component is 
unreasonable, arbitrary and contrary to statute" and found that:49 
... any portion of the user and/or connection fees that are assessed in order to pay the 
PILOT fee to the City, .do not conform to the statutory requirements of LC. § 50· 1028 
and must be excluded from any fee assessment going forward.50 
First, the purpose of the Building Contractor's decision was to prevent Defendant from 
continuing to charge the PILOT component once it was held to be unconstitutional. Defendant 
immediately complied with the directive and ceased collection of the PILOT component, 
fulfilling the purpose of the decision. As to the second factor, reliance upon prior law, the Court 
assesses what prior law Defendant relied upon, not the laws the Court relied upon.51 Defendant 
relied upon what it perceived to be compatible prior law, i.e., City of Chubbuck v. City of 
Pocatello, 127 Idaho 198, 899 P .2d 411 (1995), before initiating the PILOT component. In that 
case, the Idaho Supreme Court ruled that Pocatello could charge a rate of return component for 
Chubbuck's wastewater treatment because the Revenue Bond Act allows the collection of 
revenue to cover the costs of operation, maintenance, replacement and depreciation, including 
creating and maintaining reserves for such expenses. 52 Based on that decision, Defendant began 
charging the PILOT component, a rate of return, to user fees. This Court distinguished the City 
49 Reconsideration Decision, p. 24 (emphasis added). 
so Id 
51 See BHA Investments Inc., 141 Idaho at 173, 108 P.3d at 320 (where the Court analyzed the City's reliance on an 
ordinance and a statute.). 
52 City of Chubbuck v. City of Pocatello, 127 Idaho 198, 202, 899 P.2d 411, 415 (1995); I.C. § 50-1033(b), (e); see 
also Loomis v. City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434,441,807 P.2d 1272, 1279 (1991) ("We hold that under these 
circumstances a municipality may collect fees, rates or charges pursuant to the power granted in the Idaho Revenue 
Bond Act to pay for maintenance, depreciation and replacement of system components."). 
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of Chubbuck decision in Building Contractors, holding that a rate of return is acceptable if 
charged to another city, but not to residents or utility customers of the city providing the service. 
The third factor considers the effect upon the administration of justice, '''that is, the 
number of cases that would be reopened if the decision is applied retroactively,' or the increase 
in the number of cases resulting from the determination regarding the decision's retroactivity."53 
There is no evidence here that any cases would be reopened if Building Contractors is applied 
retroactively. As to the concern over the number of cases that could arise, Defendant points out 
that there could be a number of cases if the decision is applied retroactively because each water 
user would potentially be able to recover the PILOT component. There is.a valid concern that if 
Building Contractors is applied retroactively, City resident would be adversely affected. In order 
to recover the PILOT component, property taxes would increase and significant financial and 
human resources would be needed to determine the amount of the PILOT to be returned to each 
user, especially considering the different classifications of users. Again, a practical consideration 
is that applying the decision retroactively would simply require collection of fees from the very 
customers (in many cases) who would be receiving those fees back. 
In balancing the purpose of the decision against reliance upon prior law and the effect 
upon the administration of justice, the Court declines to hold that the Building Contractors 
decision should be applied retroactively. This Court finds that the purpose of the Building 
Contractors case was accomplished once Defendant stopped charging the PILOT component. 
That factor weighs heavily against retroactivity as the main purpose of the Building Contractors 
decision was served because the decision ensured Defendant would not continue charging an 
unconstitutional tax. In addition, the factor of reliance is very strong in this action. Defendant in 
53 BHA Investments, Inc. 141 Idaho at 173, 108 P.3d at 320 (internal citations omitted.) 
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good faith believed it had the authority to charge the PILOT component based on an Idaho 
Supreme Court decision, but again, once the determination came down that it did not have the 
authority under City of Chubbuck, Defendant ceased collecting the tax. Moreover, the effect on 
the administration of justice would be substantial and has a probable adverse effect on the 
residents of Pocatello. In Building Contractors, it was made clear that the ruling to discontinue 
charging the PILOT component was assessed "going forward" and now the Court, in its 
discretion, con:finns that the decision in Building Contractors applies to pending cases, but not to 
past cases. 54 Therefore, after weighing the three factors, summary judgment is GRANTED to 
Defendant on this issue. 
II. Plaintiffs Motion for Class Certification 
Although the merits of the case have been fully deliberated above, the matter of class 
certification is taken up for discussion. It could be appropriately argued that the question is now 
moot and need not be decided or discussed at all. The Court adds some consideration of the 
question only for the benefit of the parties and potential appellate courts should this matter be 
appealed. 
In its motion for class certification, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 23, Plaintiffs move that two 
classes be approved: (1) Capacity Fee Payers in the City of Pocatello and (2) User Fee Payers in 
the City of Pocatello. The class representative for Capacity Fee Payers is Ed Quinn, a builder, 
who would represent approximately 1,374 potential class members that have paid the 
connection/capacity fees for new construction from Fiscal Year 2007 through 2013 to 
Defendant. 55 The class representative for the User Fee Payers is Hill-Vu Mobile Home Park, 
54 Id 
55 Affidavit of Ed Quinn, p. 2-3. 
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owned and managed by Logan Robinson, which would represent approximately 16,000 potential 
class members that have paid user fees from Fiscal Year 2007 through 2014 to Defendant. 56 
Class certification is within the discretion of the trial court. 57 The burden of establishing -
the requirements to certify a class, by a preponderance of the evidence, is on the party seeking to 
bring a class action.58 Generally, the scope of review ofan order denying or granting a motion to 
maintain a class action is narrow.59 In order to certify a lawsuit as a class action, the trial court 
must find that all four factors in Rule 23(a) exist and that at least one factor in Rule 23(b) exists. 
The prerequisites to a class action under Rule 23(a) provide: 
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of 
all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) 
there are questions oflaw or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the 
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and ( 4) the 
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.60 
If the court finds that a necessary factor is absent, it does not need address the other 
factors. 61 The federal rule for class certification, F.R.C.P. 23, is substantively identical to Idaho's 
rule. 62 When a rule in Idaho is identical in all material respects to an equivalent federal rule, the 
56 Affidavit of Logan Robinson, p. 2-3. 
57 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, -U.S.--, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2551, 180 L.Ed.2d 374 (2011); Consol. 
Edison Co. ofN.Y., Inc. v. Richardson, 233 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed.Cir.2000); Jones v. United States, 118 Fed.Cl. 
728, 732 (2014). 
58 Bettwieser v. New York Irrigation Dist., 154 Idaho 317,324,297 P.3d 1134, 1141 (2013), reh'g denied(Apr. 9, 
2013) 
59Pope v. lntermountain Gas Co., 103 Idaho 217,237,646 P.2d 988, 1008 (1982). 
60 I.R.C.P. 23(a). The prerequisites are commonly referred to as numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy. 
61 BHA Investments, Inc., 141 Idaho at 171-72, 108 P.3d at 318-19. 
62 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) provides: (a) Prerequisites. One or more members of a class may sue or be 
sued as representative parties on behalf of all members only if: ( 1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all 
members is impracticable; (2) there are questions oflaw or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of 
the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will 
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. 
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Idaho Supreme Court has allowed our courts to look to those federal cases for assistance in 
interpreting the Idaho rule.63 
To begin with, "courts have held that the class must be adequately defined and clearly 
ascertainable before a class action rnay proceed. "64 The United States Supreme Court in Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes declared: 
Rule 23 does not set forth a mere pleading standard. A party seeking class certification 
must affinnatively demonstrate his compliance with the Rule-that is, he must be 
prepared to prove that there are in fact sufficiently numerous parties, common questions 
of law or fact, etc. We recognized in Falcon that "sometimes it may be necessary for the 
court to probe behind the pleadings before coming to rest on the certification 
question," ... and that certification is proper only if "the trial court is satisfied~ after a 
rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied ... " Frequently 
that "rigorous analysis" will entail some overlap with the merits of the plaintiffs 
underlying claim. That cannot be helped. " '[T]he class determination generally involves 
considerations that are enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiffs 
cause of action.' " Nor is there anything unusual about that consequence: The necessity 
of touching aspects of the merits in order to resolve preliminary matters, e.g., jurisdiction 
and venue, is a familiar feature of litigation. 65 
Considering numerosity, a plaintiff must provide some evidentiary basis beyond a bare 
allegation of the existence of numerous class members. 66 Yet, a court may "draw reasonable 
inferences from the facts presented to find the requisite numerosity."67 
For the second prerequisite, commonality, even a single common question will suffice.68 
Commonality requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the class members "have suffered the 
same injury." 69 Not only must the proposed class have suffered a violation of the same provision 
63 Martin v. Hoblit, 133 Idaho 372,376,987 P.2d 284,288 n. 3 (1999) citing Compton v. Compton, 101 Idaho 328, 
334,612 P.2d 1175, 1181 (1980). 
64 Ries v. Arizona Beverages USA LLC, 287 F.R.D. 523,528 (N.D. Cal. 2012) citing Chavez v. Blue Sky Natural 
Beverage Co., 268 F.R.D. 365,376 (N.D.Cal.2010). 
65 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551-52, 180 L. Ed. 2d 374 (20ll)(intemal citations omitted.) 
66 Id at 2551. 
67 McCuin v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., 817 F.2d 161, 167 (1st Cir.1987). 
68 Dukes at 2556, 
69 Id. at 2551 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. o/Sw. v. Falcon, 451 U.S. 147, 157 (1982)). 
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of law, but their claims must depend upon a common contention. "That common contention, 
moreover, must be of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution-which means that 
detennination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one 
of the claims in one stroke."70 Questions concerning merit ''may be considered to the extent-but 
only to the extent-that they are relevant to determining whether the Rule 23 prerequisites for 
class certification are satisfied.''71 Commonality is sufficient with "[t]he existence of shared legal 
issues with divergent factual predicates" or "a common core of salient facts coupled with 
disparate legal remedies within the class. 72 
Next, the Ninth Circuit emphasized how to analyze typicality: 
Where the challenged conduct is a policy or practice that affects all class members, the 
underlying issue presented with respect to typicality is similar to that presented with 
respect to commonality, although the emphasis may be different. In such a case, because 
the cause of the injury is the sam.e ... the typicality inquiry involves comparing the injury 
asserted in the claims raised by the named plaintiffs with those of the rest of the class. We 
do not insist that the named plaintiffs' injuries be identical with those of the other class 
members, only that the unnamed class members have injuries similar to those of the 
named plaintiffs and that the injuries result from the same, injurious course of conduct. 73 
The test of typicality is "whether other members have the same or similar injury, whether 
the action is based on conduct which is not unique to the named plaintiffs, and whether other 
class members have been injured by the same course of conduct."74 It does not require that the 
class members be identically positioned to each other or to every class member. 75 
10 Id. 
71 Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1195, 185 L. Ed. 2d 308 (2013). 
72 Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998). 
73 Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 685 (9th Cir. 2014). 
74 Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d497, 508 (9th Cir.1992). 
75 Id., 754 F.3d at 686; See Ellis, 657 F.3d at 985 n. 9 ("Differing factual scenarios resulting in a claim of the same 
nature as other class members does not defeat typicality."). 
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As to the last prerequisite, the requirement is concerned with whether "the named 
plaintiffs are appropriate representatives of the class whose claims they wish to litigate."76 To 
ascertain whether the representation meets this standard, courts ask two questions: "(1) Do the 
representative plaintiffs and their counsel have any conflicts of interest with other class 
members, and (2) will the representative plaintiffs and their counsel prosecute the action 
vigorously on behalf of the class?"77 Rule 23(a)(4) only requires that named plaintiffs understand 
their duties and are willing to perform them. 78 Adequate representation by counsel "depends on 
the qualifications of counsel for the representatives, an absence of antagonism, a sharing of 
interests between representatives and absentees, and the unlikelihood that the suit is collusive."79 
Plaintiffs define two classes to be certified, the Capacity Fee Payers and the User Fee 
Payers, in order to recover damages from the collection of the illegal PILOT component in the 
capacity/connection and user fees. 80 
A. Capacity Fee Payers 
As to the Capacity Fee Payers, the class would be defined as members who have paid the 
cmmection/capacity fees for new construction that contained an illegal PILOT component from 
Fiscal Year2007 through 2013 to the City of Pocatello.81 "It is axiomatic that for a class action 
to be certified a "class" must exist."82 Looking ~yond the pleadings, there is some overlap with 
the merits of the underlying claim here in order to determine if a class of Capacity Fee Payers 
76 Dukes at 2550. 
77 Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 957 (9th Cir. 2003). 
78 Local Joint Executive Bd of Culinary/Bartender Trust Fundv. Las Vegas Sands, Inc., 244 F.3d 1152, 1162 (9th 
Cir. 2001). 
79 In re N Dist. o/California, Dalkon Shield IUD Products Liab. Litig,., 693 F.2d 847, 855 (9th Cir. 1982), as 
amended(July 15, 1982) citing 7 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure§§ 1765-1769 at 615-57. 
80 The Court recognizes that the detennination for class certification comes at the same time as summary judgment, 
but class determination will only overlap with the merits of the case to the extent necessary when considering the 
factual and legal issues. 
81 Plaintifft' Memorandum in Support o/Class Certification, p. 12. 
82 Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655,669 (7th Cir. 1981). 
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can even exist. Plaintiffs' proposed class definition presumes that the connection/capacity fees 
contained a PILOT component. As this Court extensively discussed above, there is no evidence 
that the capacity/connection fees contained a PILOT component. There cannot be a class 
consisting of connection/capacity fee users who have paid into the illegal PILOT component 
when the PILOT component was never part of the connection/capacity fees. The proposed 
Capacity Fee Payers were never assessed the illeg~l tax, thus Plaintiffs' proffered definition and 
the class cannot exist. Therefore, the Court would have denied Plaintiffs' motion to certify the 
class of Capacity Fee Payers. 
B. User Fee Payers 
The second proposed class, User Fee Payers, is defined as members as who have paid 
user fees that contained an illegal PILOT component from Fiscal Year 2007 through 2014 to the 
City of Pocatello.83 Unlike Capacity Fee Payers, it is clear that the user fees did contain a PILOT 
component, so the class can exist and the definition is adequate. Beginning with numerosity, the 
class would certify all user fee payers in Pocatello, approximately 16,000 users. Defendant did 
not contend that the class was not numerous and it is apparent to the Court that the amount of 
members in the class would be so numerous that joinder of all user fee payers would be 
impracticable. 
As for commonality, Plaintiffs submit the following common question of law and fact: 
Whether user ... fees transferred to the general fund under the improper and illegal 
"PILOT" programs constitute a taldng for which the fee payer are entitled compensation. 
Here, all proposed members would share the same factual and legal basis. The class 
members are any and all residents of Pocatello that paid user fees for water and sewer services to 
83 Affidavit of Logan Robinson, p. 2-3. 
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Defendant during the applicable years, fees that were then impennissibly transferred as an 
improper tax. Plaintiffs contend that action constitutes a taking of property under the Idaho and 
United States Constitutions and/or unjust enrichment entitling the class to compensation. All user 
fee payers suffered the same injury, paying the illegal tax contained in the user fees, irrespective 
of whether the users paid different amounts of fees. Further, all users would employ the same 
legal claims that depend on a common contention-that the collection of the illegal PILOT 
component was a taking - in their pursuit of damages. However, as is set forth amply above, any 
state tort claims cannot be asserted against the Defendant for the collection of a tax, regardless of 
the names by which the tax was called. In addition, there can be no "takings" claim with regard 
to the collection of an illegal or unconstitutional tax. Thus, although the Capacity Fee Payers 
meet the requirement of a common question of law or fact, it is impossible to certify a class if the 
substance of the claim cannot be legally asserted. 
The third prerequisite is whether the class representative's claim is typical of the claims 
of the entire class. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs' class representative is not typical of the 
putative class because the representative user fee payer, Hill-Vu Mobile Home Park through 
Logan Robinson, is a residential user and does not represent commercial, industrial, multi-
family, etc. users in Pocatello. The interests and damages awarded to a single residential user in 
Pocatello may be different from those of a commercial, industrial, multi-family, etc. user in 
Pocatello. As the only user fee payer representative is a residential user, Hill-Vu's residential 
account does not encompass all categories of user fee payers in Pocatello. It seems clear that Mr. 
Robinson paid his residential user fees and suffered an injury from the alleged taking as a result 
·of the improper tax, like all the residents who paid user fees. But, the burden is on the alleged 
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representative to make a clear showing that all claims by all customers would be the same and 
that has not been done here. Thus, there has not been a sufficient showing of typicality. 
Looking at the final prerequisite, conflict of interest, Defendant argues that Mr. 
Robinson, operating as Hill-Vu, is not an adequate representative of potential class members 
because he only represents residential users and not commercial, industrial, renters, multi-unit 
accounts, etc. Defendant asserts each group of user fee payers would have varying interest as 
members that Mr. Robinson would not represent. Plaintiffs assert that the user fee class 
representative has sufficiently represented the interests of the class, has conferred with counsel, 
produced documentation, and propounded discovery. If damages had ever been an outcome in 
this case, it is likely that renters, for example, would not bear the burden of higher property 
taxes, while commercial and residential property owners would. It is not clear whether that 
would create a conflict of interest between some users and others. While all users would have a 
common interest in receiving compensation for the past collection of an illegal tax, it has not 
been sufficiently established that the interest is common enough to certify a large class of very 
different types of users. The Court is not talcing the position that there is conflict of interest 
between counsel for Mr. Robinson and other potential members of the class, but only that the 
differences among potential class members may present a conflict which has not been and cannot 
be fully reviewed by the Court at this time. The Court concludes that it would not have certified 
the class of User Fee Payers for the reasons identified above. Thus, no further discussion of 
I.C.R.P. 23 is required. 
III. Plaintifrs Renewed Motion For Leave to File First Amended Complaint 
Plaintiffs wish to amend the complaint to add new facts and allege a new claim based on 
the City's alleged improper spending of the connection/capacity fees for bond repayments. A 
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district court has the discretion to grant or deny a motion to amend a pleading. 84 I.R.C.P. 1 S(a) 
provides that after a responsive pleading has been filed, "a party may amend a pleading only by 
leave of court ... and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. ,,gs In the interest of 
justice, courts should favor liberal grant of leave to amend a complaint.86 "The pwpose behind 
allowing a party to amend its complaint is so all claims will be decided on their merits and to 
provide notice of the claim and the facts at issue."87 Our Idaho Supreme Court has adopted the 
reasoning of the U.S. Supreme Court in interpreting the comparable federal rule: 
In the absence of any apparent or declared reason-such as undue delay, bad faith or 
amendment previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of 
allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.-the leave sought should, as the 
rules require, be freely given.88 
"The time between filing the original complaint and the amended complaint is not decisive."89 
Rather, ''timeliness is important in view of the Foman factors such as undue delay, bad faith, and 
prejudice to the opponent."9° For example, in Clark v. Olsen, the district court abused its 
discretion by denying the plaintiffs motion to amend without a justifying reas_on, even though 
seven years separated the original and amended complaints and the defendants had moved for 
summary judgment prior to the motion to amend.91 Appropriate factors to consider include 
r 
whether the proposed amendment would delay upcoming hearings or trial, whether the motion to 
amend comes after court-imposed deadlines have passed, and whether substantial work has 
84 Terra-W., Inc. v. Idaho Mut. Trust, LLC, 150 Idaho 393,395, 247 P.3d 620, 622 (2010); Harris v. Rasmussen, 106 
Idaho 322, 324, 678 P.2d 114, 116 (Ct. App. 1984). 
85 1.R.C.P. 15(a). 
86 Hines v. Hines, 129 Idaho 847,934 P.2d 20 (1997). 
87 Iron Eagle Development, LLCv. Quality Design Systems, Inc., 138 Idaho 487,492, 65 P.3d 509,514 (2003). 
88 Carl H. Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 871, 993 P.2d 1197, 1202 (1999) (quoting 
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S.178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227,230, 9 L.Ed.2d 222,226 (1962)) (internal quotations omitted). 
89 Carl H. Christensen Family Trust at 871, 993 P.2d at 1202. 
90 Id 
91 Clark v. Olsen, 110 Idaho 323, 324-26, 715 P .2d 993, 994-96 (1986). 
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already been completed. 92 A trial court may also consider whether the amended pleading sets out 
a valid claim or whether the opposing party has an available defense to the newly added claim.93 
The court may not, however, weigh the sufficiency of the evidence related to the additional 
claim.94 
Here, Plaintiffs seek to amend the complaint to add new facts and allege a new claim 
based on the City's alleged improper spending of the connection/capacity fees for bond 
repayments since Fiscal Year 2015. Plaintiffs based their new factual assertions on Joyce 
Stroeschein's affidavits and the Red Oak Studies conducted in 2006 and 2010. Plaintiffs' 
allegations include that the "Red Oak studies falsely disclosed both the intent and the actual use 
of the connection fees, as well as the basis for calculating the connection fees." Plaintiffs' new 
claim is for declaratory and injunctive relief invalidating the water and sewer 
connection/capacity fee as they are unlawful and unenforceable under Article 8, Section 3 of the 
Idaho Constitution. Initially, Defendant objected to the motion to amend because Plaintiffs did 
not abide by Rule 7(b )(3) as Plaintiffs indicated in their Motion for Leave to File First Amended 
Complaint that they would be filing a brief within 14 days and requesting oral argument. 
Plaintiffs did not file a brief or request oral argument, but instead submitted a Renewed Motion 
for Leave to File First Amended Complaint with a supporting memorandum approximately a 
month later. However, the Court allowed Defendants additional time to submit supplemental 
92 See, e.g., Weitz v. Green, 148 Idaho 851,858,230 P.3d 743, 750 (2010) (holding that the district court did not 
abuse its discretion when it denied a motion to amend filed "well over a year'' after the initial complaint because the 
amendment "would require additional evidence and witness gathering." and the facts alleged by the movant would 
not establish the proposed amended claim); Hinkle v. Winey, 126 Idaho 993, 997, 895 P.2d 594, 598 (Ct.App.1995) 
(holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to amend when the proposed 
amendment was based on facts arising a year or more after the facts giving rise to the original complaint and 
allowing the amendment "almost certainly" would have required "a delay of the trial"). 
93 Spur Products Corp. v. Stoel Rives LLP, 142 Idaho 41, 44, 122 P.3d 300,303 (2005). 
94 Id. 
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briefing on the issue after the hearing on August 17, 2015, so the Court considers that no harm or 
unfairness has befallen Defendant for not having adequate time to brief the Court on this issue. 
Next, the Court takes into consideration the relevant factors in determining whether or 
not to allow Plaintiffs to amend their complaint, beginning with undue delay and timeliness. 
Plaintiffs motion to amend their complaint comes after court-imposed deadlines have passed. 
On December 19, 2014, the Court entered its Order Setting Jury Trial ("Scheduling Order"), 
which mandated that ''motions to add parties or amend pleadings shall be filed no later than 60 
days after the date of this order."95 Under the Scheduling Order, any motion to amend the 
complaint must have been filed by February 17, 2015. Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Leave to 
File First Amended Complaint on June 12, 2015, well past the deadline, and stated a 
memorandum brief would follow within two weeks pursuant to I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3).96 Plaintiffs filed 
their Renewed Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint on July 10, 2015, again well 
past the Scheduling Order deadline. Additionally, while Plaintiffs argue their new allegations did 
not arise until well after the complaint was filed, Plaintiffs assert they learned about the improper 
use of connection/capacity fees for bond repayment from the affidavits of Joyce Stroschein.97 
However, the Court notes that the new factual assertions and claims stem directly from the First 
Affidavit of Joyce Stroschein, which was filed on August 29, 2014, and the Red Oak studies 
from 2006 and 2010. The Red Oak studies have been available since the underlying case and 
certainly from the very beginning of this action. Allowing the amendments when the information 
Plaintiffs relied upon was available nearly a year ago would only further delay the litigation to 
95 Order Setting Jury Trial, p. 2-3. 
96 Plaintiffs did not subsequently file a supporting memorandum within two weeks. Instead, Plaintiffs filed a 
renewed motion to amend their complaint on July 10, 2015 along with a supporting memorandum. 
97 Strangely, ·while Plaintiffs depend on Stroschein's affidavits as part of the factual basis for their new claims, at the 
same time, Plaintiffs assert they are prejudiced as a result of Stroschein 's fourth affidavit being filed after the motion 
for summaryJudgment hearing. 
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allow Defendant time to respond to the new issues, which could have been raised much earlier, 
Further, substantial work has already been completed by both Parties. Defendant's motion for 
summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs' claims entailed abundant briefing on all sides, as did 
Plaintiffs' motion for class certification. 
Additionally, Defendant argues that the proposed amendments are futile because the 
record shows that the connection/capacity fees were only used to repay debt services for existing 
infrastructure consistent with the Idaho Revenue Bond Act, and not "utilized for general fund or 
for future expansion of the water and sewer system. "98 Plaintiffs argue their amended claims 
have merit because the City has improperly assessed and used connection/capacity fees for bond 
repayment in violation of the Idaho Constitution and statutory laws and contrary to what it had 
presented in the Red Oaks study. Without weighing the sufficiency of the evidence related to the 
new claim, the Court notes it has already held that the collection of the connection/capacity fees 
were consistent with Idaho law and the only relief avaiiable has been mandated by in Building 
Contractors, where the Court ordered the City to properly budget and expend the 
connection/capacity fees according to law. The validity of Plaintiffs' new claim is extremely 
questionable as Plaintiffs are requesting the same relief requested in Building Contractors, i.e., 
"declaratory and injunctive relief invalidating the water and sewer connection fees."99 
As to prejudice, Plaintiffs assert that Defendant will not be prejudiced because the trial 
has been pushed to its secondary date in January of 2016, but that date may be pushed as well. 
This Court disfavors moving trial dates and while there may be a need to do so again at a later 
date, Plaintiffs cannot proclaim that since moving the trial date may happen, Defendants are not 
98 Loomis, 807 p.2d at 1278. 
99 Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend, p. 1-2. 
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prejudiced. Defendant asserts it is prejudiced because the new cause of action has already been 
adjudicated in Building Contractors. 
Defendant also brings up a res judicata defense. In regards to claim preclusion or res 
judicata, the Idaho Supreme Court has declared: 
Claim preclusion bars a subsequent action between the same parties upon the same claim 
or upon claims "relating to the same cause of action ... which might have been made." 
There are three requirements for claim preclusion to bar a subsequent action: (1) same 
parties, (2) same claim, and (3) final judgment. Additionally, this Court has interpreted 
claim preclusion to hinge on whether the matter "might and should have been litigated in 
the first suit." The burden of proof for res judicata is on the party asserting the affirmative 
defense and it must prove all of the essential elements by a preponderance of the 
evidence.100 
. First, Defendants argue that plaintiffs in the Building Contractors case are in privity with 
Plaintiffs in this litigation because the named Plaintiff, Ed Quinn, was the President of the 
Building Contractors Association of Southeast Idaho and submitted affidavits in the Building 
Contractors case alleging the same facts. Second, Defendant argues that the relief sought in the 
amendment has already been addressed in Building Contractors. Plaintiffs there sought to 
invalidate the capacity fee and now Plaintiffs here seek to do the same and recover damages 
associated with the paid fee. Third, Defendants assert the Court previously held that the 
collection of the connection/capacity fees and the amount of the fees charged were appropriate 
and not in violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond Act, thus a final judgment was entered as to this 
issue. Plaintiffs emphasize that Ed Quinn was not a party to the previous action, thus the res 
judicata defense fails. Plaintiffs also assert that they are alleging the City has improperly 
allocated connection/capacity fees toward bond repayment since Fiscal Year 2015 and beyond, 
10° Kootenai Elec. Co-op., Inc. 11. Lamar Corp., 148 Idaho 116, 120,219 P.3d 440,444 (2009) (internal citations 
omitted). 
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which was not an issue that was decided or identical to the issues decided in the Building 
Contractors case as it occurred after that case was decided. 
The Court declines to find that res judicata applies in this instance. However, given the 
numerous other factors considered-undue delay, timeliness, court-imposed deadlines, 
substantial work being done, prejudice, and validity of the claim - the Court, in its discretion, 
DENIES Plaintiffs' renewed motion to amend their complaint based on those factors. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court concludes that the PILOT component is regarded as a governmental-imposed 
illegal tax, which was only charged to user fees and not connection/capacity fees. The PILOT 
component was ceased after this Court's decision in Building Contractors and there is no 
evidence that it was collected into 2014. The Court grants summary judgment to Defendant on 
all claims. Further, the Court declines to apply the decision in the Building Contractors case 
retroactively. Lastly, Plaintiffs' renewed motion to amend their complaint is denied. 
. The question of class certification is moot. However, the Court has included some 
discussion of that question for the benefit of the parties. 
The trial in this matter is vacated. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATEDthis (l,fj__ dayof Af~ , 2015 
~ 
District Judge 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIIB COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on 
behalf of itself and all others similarly 
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself 
and all others similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
municipality, 
Defendant. 
--------------
) 
) Case No. CV-2014-1520-0C 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
JUDGMENT 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: Judgment is entered in favor of the 
Defendant and against the Plaintiff and said case is DlSMISSED. 
DATEDthis tf/T/J.. dayof A}~ ,2015 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY 
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on behalf 
of itself ~md all others similarly situated, ED 
QUINN, on behalf of himself and all others 
similarly sintated, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CITY OP POCATELLO, an Idaho 
municipality, 
Defendant. 
Case Number: CV-2014~1520~:QC ·· 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
Plaintiffs, Hill-Vti Mobile Home Park and Ed Quinn thro1.1gh counsel of record and 
pur.suw1t to Rule l l(a)(2)(B) and/or Rule 59(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, 
rage:: . .::14 
' ' 
' - :· 
res.pectfully moves this Court for fill order reconsidering its ":Memorandum Decision Granting 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Discussing Plain.tiffs~ Motion for Class 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER - Page 1 
E_ •' -~ 
. ··., J 
736
f:, 
/ 
\ 
.L o.L.0u1 I.I.Lu J~s.ge:.:l,,,, 
Certification, and Denying Plaintiffst Renewed Motion for Leave to File First Amended 
Complaint' al1d "Judgment .. entered on November 10~ 2015. The supporting n1emorandlllll and 
a request for oral argument will be filed within 14 days as set forth unde1· IRCP § 7(h)(3)(C). 
This Motion is st1ppo11ed by the affidavits and pleadings previously filed as well as the record ii-1 
this case and in Baunock County Case No. C:V-20 I 1-5228-0C (Building Contractor;~ v. City qf 
Pocatello). 
As will be specifically addressed in Plaintiffs forthcoming memorandum. the Court 
overlooked a n11mber of relevant facts and clear authority it its decision. Moreover, in that the 
City was allowed to introdiice entirely new argwnents and additional alleged facts in its reply 
briefs~ Plaintiffs did not have sufficient opportunity to respond as allowed under the Idaho Rules 
of Civil Procedure, and therefore making the Court's awarding summary judgment premature. 
. DATED this 24th day ofNoven1ber, 2015. 
NathanM. Olsen 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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Blake G. Hall, Esq. 
HA.IJ, ANGELL & STARNES, LLP 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THI SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAIIO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY 
HI~L-VU MOBILE HOME PARK. on behalf 
of itself and all others similarly situated, ED · 
QUINN, on behalf of himself and all others 
similarly situated, 
Plaintiff..'>, 
vs. 
CITY OF POCATELLO) an Idaho 
municipality, 
Defendant. 
Case Number: CV-20l4-1520-0C 
MOTION TO DISALLOif\1. ·· 
Plaintiffs, by and through counsel ofrecorcl, and pursuant to l.R.C.P. 54(e)(6) and (d)(6); 
hereby objects to an award of Defonclmrt City of Pocatello~s attorney fees and costs and moves 
the Court to Motion to Disallow Defenda11t's Attomeys I:ees and Costs. 
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hearing, well in excess of what would be reasonably required for such a hear.ing. Additionally. 
much of Defendant's ~ransaction detail is blocked out and Defendant 'has ~ailed to provide any 
c-.xplanation or analysis of.differentiation of the fees it is allegedly claiming resulted from 
Pla.intifls' ~1frivolous" and "non-frivolo\1s" claims. Given the fact that much of the rec.ord in this 
case was. already developect in the prior case, a11d a.11 that occurred were a couple of pre:wtriaL 
motions and limited discovery, Defendant's reas1Jnable fees should be no more than half of what 
it fa claiming. 
4. Defendant is not entitled to $368 in travel expenses., because such ex.pensei; are not 
~·exceptional" under IRCP § 54( d). 
DATED this 4th day of December, 2015. 
Na M.Olsen 
. Attorneys tbr Plaintiffs 
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If deemed necessary by the Court for further briefing or argument on Plaintifrs' Motion to 
Disallow -- notwithstanding the Defendant's blatant and apparent deficiencies with it~: fee request 
- Plaintiffs' Motion will be fi.rrther supported by a memorandum and tequest for }lea,ing filed 
within 14 days in accordance with Rule 7 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and will also be 
addressed in part in their forthcoming memorandum in support of their motiun .lbr 
reconsideration. The Plaintiffs' basis for this motion can be sun.unarizecl as follows; 
1. Defendant has tailed to timely or properly file it~ attomey fee request under the 
applicable statutes, including IC § 6-918A, wlrich provides the "exclusive" i·emedy for the 
awarding of attorneys fees in an action to "recover money damages'' for claims against 
~overnment entities, or applicable federal statutes for Plaintiffs' federal takings claims. 
2. Defendant is not entitled to sanctions u11der IRCP § 1 l(a)(l) because it has not shown 
that Plaintiffs' claims were both not "well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law Ol' 
good faith argument for the extension, modification. or reversal of existing law'; lllld "interposed 
for any impropi.,:ir purpose~ such as to harass or to cause mmecessary delay or lleedless increase in 
the cost of litigation.'' Of further note, Defendant has not shown "with clear and convincing 
evidence" that Plaintiffs were "guilty of bad faith in the commencement, conduct, ma:i.t1tenance 
or defense ofthe action," the burden of proof required under IC § 6~918A. 
3. Defendant's: attomey fees are excessiv~ unreasonable or otherwise deficient under the 
factors set forth under lRCP § 54(e)(3). For instanCe7 Def'endant's attom.eys spent over 24 hours 
and neatly $5,000 in working on a 1'sur reply brief' to address Plaintiffs' argument!i- which 
Defendant is now claiming were ··without foundation" and •'frivolous." Defendant's ai'torneys 
also spent nearly 65 attorney hours and .approximately S 11,000 to prepare for a "show cause" 
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IN THE DISTlUCT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY 
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on behalf 
of itself and all others similarly situated, ED 
QUINN, on behalf of himself and all others 
sjmilady situated, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
municipality, 
Defendant. 
Case Number: CV-2014-1520-0C 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
Plaintiffs, HUl-Vu Mobile Home Park and Ed Quinn through counsel of record and 
pursuant to Rule 1 l(a)(2)(B) and/or Rule 59(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, provide the 
following memorandum in support of their Motion to Reconsider the Court's "Memorandum 
Decision Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Discussing Plaintiffs' Motion 
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for Class Certification, and Denying Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Leave to File First Amended 
Complaint" and HJudgment" entered on November 10, 2015 (Memorandwn Decision). This 
memorandum is supported by the affidavits and pleadings previously filed as well as the record 
in this case and in Bannock County Case No. CV-2011-5228-0C (Building Contractors Case), 
including in particulat pleadings identified herein. 
SUMMARY 
Plaintiffs request that the ColU't reconsider two key mlings in its Me111ornndtm1 Decision, 
while reserving thefr rights to address the Court's "discussion" with regard to class certification 
in the event that their Motion to Reconsider is granted. First, the Comt should reconsider 
whether the impermissible PILOT fees that were collected under a City resolution establishing 
"user fees" for utility services pursuant to IC§ 50-1028, et al., but then were used for the 
unauthorized PILOT program for general revenue purposes could still be considered a "taking" 
for purposes of the federal and state constitution. In addition, the Court should acknowledge that 
there are at least disputed facts as to whether the City• s imposition of the PILOT program was 
indeed ''reckless" or "willful" making it liable under IC § 6-904A, given its complete disl'egard 
of the legal advice that it sought from the Idaho State Attomey General prior to implementing the 
pl'Og.t·am in 2007, among other facts in the record suggesting such conduct. 
Second, the Court should reconsider whether it has misapplied its authority to not 
"retroactively" apply the Building Contractors Case. A closer review of the authority 011 this 
issue suggests that only the Idaho Supreme Court has jurisdiction to decide whether its decisions 
should not be retrnactively applied. Fut'ther, Plaintiffs largely rely upon previous Idaho Supreme 
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Court authority decided well before the City implemented its PILOT pmgram, some of which is 
cited by this Court in the Building Contractors Case, essentially rendering the "retroactivity'' 
claim 111oot. Finally, the Court should consider whether the complete prohibition of the Plaintiffs 
to recover damages from harms done to them as a result of the impermissible PILOT fee 
adversely "effects the administration of justice." 
Finally, in the event that the Court grants Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsidel', the timeliness 
issues with regard to their motion to amend their complaint will be moot. Therefore, for 
putposes of judicial economy, the Court should allow Plaintiffs' motion to amend which simply 
addresses hanns that occmred in relation to this case after their initial complaint was filed in this 
matter. 
LEGAL STANDARD FOR MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
In Idaho, motions to reconsider are authorized by Rule 1 l(a)(2)(B) of the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure. I.R.C.P. § 1 l(a)(2)(B). The Rule provides that 1'a motion fol' reconsideration of 
any interlocutory orders oftbe trial court niay be made at anytime before the entry of final 
judgment but not later than fourteen (14) days after the entry of the final judgment.'' Id. The case 
law applying Rule 11 ( a)(2)(B) permits a patty to present new evidence when a motion is brought 
under that rule, but does not 1'equire that the motion be accompanied by new evidence. Johnson 
v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 472, 147 P.3d 100, 104 (Idaho 2006). It is entirely permissible for a 
trial court to reconsider its own interlocutory orders for facial errors 01· errors of law. Id. A 
motion to reconsider a final judgment may also be properly filed under I.R.C.P. 59(e), or 
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· considered under that Rule. Ross v. State, 141 Idaho 670, 671, 115-PJd 761, 762 (Id. App. 
2005). 
The burden is on the moving party to "draw to the comt's attention any new evidence that 
the movant may be relying upon." Id. "Indeed, the chlef virtue of a reconsideration is to obtain a 
full and complete presentation of all available facts, so that the truth may be ascertained, and 
justice done, as nearly as may be." Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of N. Idaho, 
118 Idaho 812, 823, 800 P.2d 1026, 1037 (1990). 
ARGUMENT 
I. The User Fees Collected Under the City Resolution Which Were Impermissibly 
Used for the PILOT Constitutes a "Taking'' Because tJie City bad No Authority to 
Impose tile PILOT in the First Place. 
The Court's Memorandum Decision suggests that once it determined in the Building 
Contractors Case that the PILOT was a "tax,n a recovery under the takings provisions of the 
federal constitution and 42 USC § 1983 does not apply. (Mem. Dec. pp. 14~ 16.) However, upon 
closer review of the facts and authority. this is an incorrect approach taken by the Court and 
would in effect deprive plaintiffs from ever being able to obtain relief for the tmauthorized 
collection and use of fees for general revenue purposes- which is clearly not what the Idaho 
Supreme Court has intended in its prior decisions. 
In taking anothe1· more thorough look at this issue, the Court should consider the 
resolutions that the City implemented from which the PILOT was· derived. The City Resolutions 
establishing the User Fees for each of the years that the impermissible PILOT programs we1'e in 
existence contai11s the following virtually language: 
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.WHEREAS, Pocatello Municipal Code Section 13.16.180 authorizes sanital'y sewer rates 
and plant capacity fees to be set from time to time by Resolution; aud, 
WHEREAS, the City Council retained the engineering firm of Red Oak Consulting to 
prepare a rate study to pmject revenues and costs for 2011~2015 and to recommend necessary 
sanitary sewer rates thereafter; and 
WHEREAS, the City Council has determined that fees and charges for the sanitary sewer 
system as previously set by Resolution (applicable resolution) should be revised for Fiscal Year 
(applicable year) in accordance with that study; 
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE MAYOR AND COUNCIL OF THE 
CITY OF POCATELLO THAT SEWER RATES AND FEES FOR FISCAL (YEAR) 
SHALL BE AS FOLLOWS: 
(Feb. 13, 2015, Aff. LoganRobh1sonpar. 2, Ex. A) 
As has been referenced numerous times in this case and the pl'evious Building 
Contractors Case the "Red Oak studies,, that the City relied upon in establishing the fee rates 
never classify any portion of the utility fees as "taxes;' but rather as "fees" collected fo1· the 
purposes .allowed under IC § 50-1033, et al. Additionally, the City's CFO Dave Swindell i11 his 
initial affidavit in support of the City's Motion for Summary Judgment in the Building 
Contractors Case refers to the PILOT as a "fee" throughout, classifying it as a "franchise feet 
"impact fee,U or "internal franchise fee" thl'oughout. (Oct. 9, 2012, Af£ of Dave Swindell par's 
1-13.) 
Thus, the facts unquestionably show that the City implemented and represented the 
PILOT as part of the utility "fee'' under the guise ofIC § 50-1028, et al. The City only decided to 
re-term the PILOT as a "tax" well afte1· the fact, and clearly for the sole purpose of attempting 
avoid liability. 
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This attempt by the City to re-classify its fee as a "tax'' to avoid liability has been tried by 
other public entities in a takings claim, and has been soundly rejected by the Idaho Supreme 
Court. The Coul't should again consider the underlying facts and procedural histo1·y in BHA 
Investments, Inc. ~. CUy of Boise, 141 Idaho 168, 108 P.3d 315 (2004). In this case, the district 
court had accepted the City of Boise's argument that its "liquor license transfer fee,, was in fact a 
"disguised tax" and therefore the plaintiffs were required to "pay the tax under pmtest,, pursuant 
to Idaho law in order to preserve a claim of recovery. Id. 141 Idaho at 176, 108 P .3d at 323. The 
Idaho Supreme Court resoundi11gly defeated such notion, _with the following analysis and holding 
which is highly l'eleva11t to this case: 
We have held that when a govemmental entity imposes what is on its face a tax, the 
taxpayer must pay it under protest in order to preserve the right to claim a refund. Walker 
v. Wedgwood, 64 ldaho 285, 130 P.2d 856 (1942) (income tax); Shoup v. Willis, 2 Idaho 
108, 6 P. 124 (1885) (property tax). We have also held that a city's imposition of a 
purported fee that does not bear a reasonable relationship to sel'vices to be provided by 
the city is in reality the imposition of a tax. Brewster v. City of Pocatello, 115 Idaho 502, 
768 P.2d 765 (1988). We have not held, however, that when a city imposes a fee that it 
has no authority to impose at all, such fee must be paid under protest before it can be 
recovered. 
The purpose of the analysis regarding excessive fees is to prevent a city from imposing an 
illegal tax by masquerading it as a fee. TI1at analysis does not apply, however, where the 
city does not have the authority to impose either the tax 01· the fee. If it has no auth01•ity 
to impose any fee at all, it cloes not matter whether the fee imposed bears a 
reasonable relationsbip to the services p.-ovided. It is illegal neardless of the 
amount of the fee. In tltis case, the City did not have the authority to impose either a 
fee for the transfer of a liquor license or a tax on the transfe1· of a liquor license. 
Therefore, the analysis of whether liquor license transfer fee was in reality a disguised tax 
does not apply. 
We have decli11ed to apply the payment-under~protest requit·ement to an action seeking 
recovery of unlawful fees. In Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Ass'n, Inc. v. Idaho 
Public Utilities Conunissiou, 125 Idaho 401, 871 P.2d 818 (1994), we held that interstate 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO RECONSIDER--Page 6 
748
motor cartiers were entitled to recover the portion of their state registration fees that 
exceeded the amount authorized by federal law even though they had not paid those fees 
under protest. There was no stati1te requiring that the fees be paid under protest in order to 
challenge them, and we refused to apply the payment-of-tax-under-protest requirement to 
the motor carriers in that case. 
The City ordinance denominated the sum owing as a "transfer f~e. 11 not a tax. Ju 
BHA I, tile City argued that it was a properly imposed fee and not a tax. Now. the 
City contends it was a tax all along and that Bravo and Splitting Kings should be 
genied recovery because tlley clid not J>ay that "tax" under protest. Where the Cit~ 
denominated the sum owing as a "fee," the payment .. of .. fax-un<ler-protest 
requfrement does not apply. The district comt ened in holding. that Bravo and Splitting 
Kings were required to have paid the liquor license transfer fee under protest in order to 
bl'ing this action. 
Id. ( emphasis added) 
In essence, the BHA Cmut has clearly indicated that a City can't impose what it first 
classifies as a 11fee," and then avoid liability by later identifying it as a "tax." As the Supreme 
Court aptly notes, it is not really a question as to whether the monies were used as a "fee" or a 
"disguised tax," but rather whether the city had the authority to impose the fee in the first place I 
Id. In BHA, the City of Boise had no legal ai1thority to impose a "liquor license transfer fee» and 
therefore it mattered not how tbe City classified the fee, i.e. as a "fee" or "tax." Id. In addition1 
the BHA Court held that the unauthorized fee constituted a 11taking" of private property, 
compensable under the "United States and Idaho Constitutions'' and not subject to the Idaho Tort 
Claims Act. Id. 141 Idaho at 172, 108 P.3d at 319. 
The same principle applies here. The City imposed a usel' fee upon the users of the 
system pursuant to resolution and IC § 50-l 028, et al. It then used a significant po11io11 of those 
fees for the unauthorized PILOT ( and all of its various named iterations, i.e. the "impact fee," 
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"internal franchise fee/' "Retum on Equity/' etc ... ). The City never had authority under law to 
implement the PILOT regardless of its classification or improper use as a general revenue somce 
or a "disguised tax.,, Thus, it is and should be considered a "taking" subject to compensation 
under the Idaho and U.S. Constitution; 
TI1e Supreme Court has also rece11tly clarified this issue to further suggest that a 
"disguised tax'' is still considered a "fee', for the pm:poses of a takings claim. In re Certified 
QuesNon of Law 'White, 156 Idaho 77,320 P.3d 1236 (2014). In that case, the Idaho Supreme 
Court received a certified question from the U.S. District Court fo1· the District of Idaho with 
regard to when the statute of limitations applied upon the payment of a tax. Id. However, in so 
doing, the Court discussed the differences between what is considered a "tax'' and a "fee,, for the 
purposes of a taking under the Idaho and Federal Constitution, stating: 
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to acknowledge some confusion resulting from 
the parties' interchangeable use in their briefing of the terms II fee" and II tax. 11 A tax is 
genemlly a tax. A fee can be either a legitimate fee or a disguised tax. 
Id, 156 Idaho at 82, 320 P .3d at 1241 1236 (2014) (emphasis added) 
Thus, the Supreme Court has fmiher clarified that a fee used as a ''disguised tax" is still a fee for 
purposes of a takings. Thus, in this case, even if the PlLOT were classified as a "disguised tax," 
it is still an improperly collected "fee" for the pmposes of a takings action. · 
Finally, as inherent in the BHA decision, to not allow plaintiffs to recover the improperly 
collected fees because they are re-classified as "taxes" would be unjust and would in fact 
condone improper conduct of the City. In BHA, the City of Boise was clearly attempting to avoid 
liability after-the-fact by re-defining their improper fee as a "tax', which was "not paid under 
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pmtest" by the plaintiffs, and therefore not recoverable. The City i11 this case takes a similar 
track, attempting to avoid liability under the takings provisions of the Idaho and U.S. 
Constitution by first collecting the monies as a "fee" and then conve1ting them for use as a "tax'' 
fo1· general revenue purposes. The effect of allowing this impropriety would be toforever bar the 
damaged fee paye1·s from 1·ecovering improperly imposed fees illegally and unconstitutionally 
used for jegeneral revenue" purposes. That is the very injustice that the Supreme Coul't 
emphatically addressed in BHA Investments, and should not be tolerated by this Court. 
Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration should therefore be granted. 
II. There are Disputed Facts as to Whether the Imposition of the PILOT Fee was 
Recldess, Wilful or Wanton Conduct making it Actionable under IC § 6R904A. 
In dismissing the plaintiffs' "state claims/' in particular their "unjust elll'ichment," and 
"equitable estoppel" claims, the Court's Memorandum Decision relies upon IC§ 6-904A which 
exempts entities from liability under the Idaho Tort Claims Act for claims which "arise out of the 
assessment or collection of any tax or fee." (Mem. Dec. pp. 11-13.) However, in so doing, the 
Court provided no analysis as to whether there was factual support that the City acted "without 
malice" and "without reckless, willful and wanton conduct' which is defined under IC § 6~ 
904D(2), and which would make the City liable under IC§ 6-904A even under the plaintiffs' 
state claims. 
"Reckless, willful and wanton conduct" is defined in the act as "intentionally and 
knowi11gly (doing) or (failing) to do an act creating unreasonable risk of harm to another, and 
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which involves a high degl'ee of probability that such harm will result." IC § 6~904A. The term 
"malice'' in a civil context, as been defined very similarly by the Idaho Supreme Court: 
At a minimum, malice involves the intentional commission of a wrongful or 
unlawful act without legal justification or excuse, whether or not the injury was 
intended. 
Anderson v. City of Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176, 187, 731 P.2d 171, 182 (1986). 
The record in this case (which includes the Building Contractors Case) contains a 
substantial amount of evidence that - construing the facts most favorably to the plaintiff as the 
moving pal'ty - at the· vety least raises a materially disputed fact as to whether the City has acted 
with such intent, and therefore allowing tllis question to go before the jury. 
Chiefly, in 2007, the City made a request to the Idaho State Attorney General for an 
· opinion as to the legality of the PILOT, which it then completely defied and disregarded. (See 
again the Attoiney General's file attached to the Feb. 13, 2013, Affidavit of Nathan Olsen, 
submitted in the Building Contractors Case. 1) Then Mayor Roger Chase not only wrote to the 
Attorney General seeking his opinion on the matter, he personally met with the Attorney General 
as well. (Id. Ex. B.) In his cotrespondence to the Attomey General, Mayor Chase admitted that 
he wanted to "move the city away from (unpopular) property taxes and to a fee based system." Id. 
He then sought Han opinion to make sure your office is still comfortable with the City charging 
(the PILOT"), Id. On February 6, 2007, the Attorney Generars office did indeed provide a 
1 The Comt should also take into account Mr. Olsen's affidavit wherein he notes that the 
City failed to prnvide its correspondence with the. AG in its discove1-y responses, therefore 
purposefully withholding this highly relevant evidence which was obtained only by a subpoena 
directly to the AG. 
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detailed legal opinion indicating that the City's PILOT fee "does not conform to the requirements 
of existing case law.,, (Id. Ex. C.) 
On April 10, 2007, the City attorney requested that the Attomey General "reconsider" its 
opinion in light of the Supreme Cou1t decision City of Chubbuck v. City of Pocatello, 127 Idaho 
198, 899 P.2d 411 (1999), among other decisions. (Id. Ex. D.) On April 19, 2007, the Attorney 
General's office responded, indicating that "we have carefully reviewed the issue, the l'elevant 
autho1'ities, and the arguments that have been raised; however, based on this review and 
consideration, we are not inclined to change our previous conclusions.'' (Id. Ex. E.) The letter 
then ftuther advises the City as follows: 
Regardless of whether the largest percentage of the fee is imposed for other than revenue 
raising purposes, the fact remains that one prut of the fee has been calculated with the 
specific intent of providing funding for municipal services that are separate and apart 
from the w1del'lying regulato1y purpose. No matter what these flmds are called, to the 
extent they are 11ot reasonably related to the regulated activity, it is our opinion that they 
are an impermissible revenue raising assessment. 
(Id. Ex. F). 
Notwithstanding this clear advice and warning from the State Attorney General's office -
provided at the City's own request, the City nevertheless pl'Oceeded with its illegal and illK 
advised PILOT fee which improperly collected nearly $30 million until it was shut down by 
Court order in November of 2013. The City also took measures to hide the fact that it had 
received this advice. Fmther, it co11tiimed to advance the City of Chubbuck v. City of Pocatello, 
127 Idaho 198,899 P.2d 411 (1999) as a legal basis for the PILOT, despite the Attomey 
General's advice of its 111applicability. Ajm·y could find that the conduct of this City was 
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"creating unreasonable risk of harm" to the plaintiffs, including a "high degree of probability 
that such harm will result." IC § 6-904C(2). In other words, the jury may find that the City 
knowingiy proceeded with implementing this blatantly illegal PILOT program, at a massive and 
unsuppo1'ted cost to rate-payers, and that this conduct is wilful, reckless, etc. 
Additionally, the Court should not disregard plaintiffs' "spoliation,, and "destruction of 
records" claims contaitied within their Complaint, which is further evidence of the City's 
reckless and wilful conduct. (Complaint par. 17.) Again, these claims are supported by the 
record in the Building Contractors Case, including the pleadings and affidavits provided i11 
support of the "Plaintiffs Renewed Motion for Sanctions under IRCP 3 7(b )" filed on May 26, 
2013 .. · The Court will recall that there were a large number of records on this issue that should 
have been maintained by the City u11der the public records retention statute, but were otherwise 
discarded or destroyed- eve11 after the City became aware of the plaintiffs' claims. (See again, 
the Mem. and affidavits filed i11 support the motion on May 26, 2013.) These are additional 
facts that should go to the jury's consideration. 
In s1mm1ru·y, in that the Comt did not even consider the City's conduct in implementing 
the impermissible PILOT fee, plaintiffs' motion for consideration should be granted even under 
their claims falling under the Idaho Tort Claims Act. There is evidence to suggest that the City 
acted with "malice', and with "recklessness/' etc .. :, that removes the exemption of liability under 
IC§ 6~904A. 
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III. The Authority Relied Upon by the Court on the Retroactivity of the Bnil<ling 
Contracto1·s Case Docs Not Apply. 
The Court's Memorandum Decision detel'mines that the City is not liable to plaintiffs' 
claims in this case based upo11 its decision in the Building Contractors Case because its decision 
will not be 11retroactively'' applied. Upon closer review, this ruling misapplies this principle and 
is in many l'espects n011sensical. 
Again, the Idaho Supl'eme Court's decision in BHA Investments, Inc. v. City of Boise, 
141 Idaho 168) 108 P.3d 315 (2004) contains the applicable authority fol' when a decision should 
not be applied retroactively. This Court should take a much closer look at BHA, including the 
principles behind non-retroactive application and its limitations. BHA 's procedural history 
indicates a prior Supreme Court decision wherein the Court had determined that the "tl'ansfer 
fee" in dispute was not authorized by law. See, BHA Investments, Inc. v. City of Boise, 138 Idaho 
356, 63 P.3d 482 (2003). After remand, the district made a number of other decisions 011 the case 
which were then appealed and addressed in the second BHA case. In addition, a companion case 
B1'(IVO Entertainment, L.L. C. v. City of Boise was filed on the very same issues, which was 
dismissed by the district cotll't which held that the Supreme Cow·t's decision in first BHA case 
should not be "retl'oactively applied." BHA 11141 Idaho at 171, 108 P Jd at 318. One issue on 
appeal was whether the Supreme Comt's decision in the first BHA decision finding the fee to be 
unauthorized should be "retroactivelt' applied. It is critical to consider the complete holding of 
the BRA Comt on this issue: 
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The decisions of this Court apply pl'Ospectively, to all fnttire cases. The issue is whether 
and to what extent they apply retroactively to past or pending cases. The usual rule is that 
decisions of tliis Court apply retroactively to all past and pending cases. State v. Tipton. 
99 Idaho 670, 587 P.2d 305 (1978). For policy reasons, however, this Court has 
discretion to limit the retroactive application of a particular decision. We may hold that it 
does 11ot apply even to the case in which the decision was announced; or that it applies 
only to that case and not to other past or pending cases; or that it applies to both that case 
and pending cases, but not to past cases. Jones v. Watson, 98 Idaho 606, 570 P.2d 284 
(1977). When deciding whether to limit the retroactive application of a decision, we 
weigh three factors: (1) the pmpose of the decision; (2) the reliance upon the prior law; 
and (3) the effect upon the administration of justice if the decision is applied 
retroactively. Thompson v. Hagan, 96 ldaho 19,523 P.2d 1365 (1974). We balance the 
first factor against the othe1· two to determine whether to limit the retroactive application 
of the decision. Jones v. Watson, 98 Idaho 606,570 P.2d 284 (1977). 
Id. 141 Idaho at 173, 108 P .3d at 320, (2004)( emphasis added) 
Upon fiuiher review of the precise ruling of the Supreme Court and its supporting "policy 
reasons, •t whether there is a restriction on the ''retroactiven application of a decision clearly 
applies only to appellate decisions, or decisions of the Supreme Cowi, and are further limited to 
decisions that in effect "overrules" or "rejects" a prior law. A detailed disc1.IBsion of this policy is 
discussed by the Idaho Supreme Court in Jones v. Watson, 98 Idaho 606, 608"609, 570 P.2d 284, 
287-88 (1977). In Jones, the Court notes that appellate decisions have the added element of 
establishing "rules" or "stare decisis,, to which society is bound. The Comt fi.uiher references 
upon the principles set forth in 10 ALR3d 1377-78, which suggests that the decision on whether 
or not to "retl'oactively" apply a decision is only applicable to a ''judicially changed rule,, or an 
"ove1rnli11g decision." hi other words, the central question is first whether the previous law is 
"changed" or "ovenuled" as a result of the appellate decisions, before there is even any 
discussion as to whether this new authority can be applied retroactively. 
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Given the full consideration of the policy on this issue, this Court's ruling that prevented 
plaintiffs from seeking relief for liabilities established under the Building C011trnctors Case is not 
supported by applicable law. First, this Court simply does not hold the same status as the 
Supreme Court or an appe11ate court, whose decisi011s have widespread ramifications, i.e. in the 
establishing of "rules" that all of society must abide. It therefore did not have jurisdiction in the 
first place to decide whether it could limit the "retroactive" effect of its decision. 
Further, this Court's decision did not establish any ''mle" that "changed" or ''overruled,, 
any prior existing law or 1·ule- and in/act the reverse is tl'ue. This Cotut's J\4emora11dui;n 
Decision issued on November 15, 2013, in the Building Contractors Case is replete with 
numerous references to Idaho Supreme Court decisions that were decided well before the City 
implemented its PILOT program. In other words, the 2013 decision did not "change" or 
"overrule" prior or existing I'Ule, b1.1t rather affirmed prior rules established by the Idaho Supreme 
Co1.ut which made the PILOT fee impermissible under law.2 In essence, there is no ''retroactive" 
application of the law here, but rather the Citis conduct being challenged in this case is 
"prospective" to the rules and precedent previously established by the Idaho Supreme Cotnt. All 
this Court did in its Novembe1· 2013 decision was uphold those rules. 
2 The City shouldn't be allowed to errantly rely upon the City of Chubbuck v. City of 
Pocatello, 127 Idaho 198, 202, 899 P .2d 411, 415 (1995) decision either to exempt itself from its 
improper conduct. The retroactivity doctrine certainly should not apply to even a good faith 
misinterpretation of existing authority, which would negate almost any potential liability and 
again is not a proper application of the reotroactivity principle. 
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Of flll'ther note, in this case the plaintiffs are not relying entirely upon the decision of this 
Court in the Building Contractors Case for its authority in supporting their claims in this case. 
Plaintiffs' briefing in this case is replete with Idalm Supreme Court authority decided well before 
the City's ini.plementation of the PILOT fee, and in particular the BHA Investments decision 
decided iu 2004. There is simply no authority or justification that allows this Court to in effect 
nullify the application of prior rules established by the Idaho Supreme Comt - which in actuality 
is a perverse use of its power. · 
Finally, the Coutt' s errant reliance on this "retroactivity" principle is plainly manifest in 
the resulting inconsistencies. The Court is preventing the plaintiffs from relying upon findings or 
rnlings in the Building Contractors Case which support their claims, while at the same time 
relying upon such rulings and findings which support defendant's claims. For insta.11ce, the Court 
. 
has decided to "retroactively" apply the Building Contractors Decision with regal'd to whether 
there was PILOT component in the connection fee, but will not apply its decision retroactively 
with regard to the City's liability prior to on its impermissible PILOT program. In other words, 
the Court relies heavily upon the Building Contractors Case in granting summary judgment to the 
City on i~sues decided in the case, effectively granting such decisions "retroactive," but not doing 
the same for the plaintiffs. This in itself demonstrates the misguided approach taken by the Court 
on this issue, and the need for reconsideration: 
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IV. The Court Disregards the Hal'sh and Unjust Ramifications of its Decision to Deny 
Plaintiffs' Relief. 
Even if the Court had authority to conduct an analysis of whether it should ''retroactively" 
apply the Building Contractors Case (i.e. via the three factors outlined in BHA Investments), its 
decision does not address whatsoever the manifest injustice and damages that plaintiffs, 
including in particular Hill-Vu Mobile Home Park (Hill-Vu), as a result of the City's illegal 
PILOT program. 
The Memorandum Decision notes the potential "adverse effects" of having to repay the 
fees improperly collected in the PILOT program. However, it disregards the serious harms that it 
caused Hill-Vu and other rate payers. Hill-Vu's owner Logan Robinson-who is not a resident 
of the City of Pocatello-indicates in his May 21, 2015, affidavit that the City had collected 
$840,000 from him in user fees since the implementation of the PILOT program. 
Conservatively, assuming that 10% of those fees consisted of the PILOT component, no less than 
$84,000 was improperly taken by the City. That is serious and substantial harm to which this 
Court paid no heed. The Court's analysis should not be one sided. It should not also simply 
a1.ltomatically disregard the harms to other rate payers. 
Again, there is no authority or justification for the Court to decide not to retroactively 
apply the Building Contractors Case (including the Idaho Supl'eme Court authority cited in the 
case). Regardless, the Court must consider the injustice or harms that the City's improper 
conduct caused, and yet adds another reason to reconsidel' its Memorandmn Decision. 
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V. In the Event that tl1e Court Grants their Motion to Reconsider, Plaintiffs Should be 
Allowed to Amend Their Complaint. 
If the Comt grants plaintiffs1 motion to reconsidel', in the interest of justice, it should at 
the same time reconsider and grant plai11tiffs' motion to amend their complaint. In that there is 
no trial date set for this matter, the deadlines set in the Court's prior scheduling order- which 
were contingent upon the trial date - are no longer applicable. This essentially renders moot the 
Couit' s basis to deny plaintiffs Motion to Amend. 
The Plaintiffs' amended complaint simply adds additional relief based upon co11duct of 
the City on this matte!' that occurred after plaintiffs filed their initial complaint. Plaintiffs allege 
that the City's decision to allocate the equivalent of all the connection fees collected from 2007 
through 2015 toward bond re-payment (regardless of whether it was used for water and sewer 
bonds) is a blatant violation of the Idaho Constitution and its supp01ting statutes, as well as a 
misl'epresentation of the intended use of these fees as stated in the Red Oak studies. (See 
proposed Amended Complaint.) The complaint alleges that such as un~authorized use of the fees 
constitutes a taking and further warra11ts declamtory and injunctive relief. 
Because these are claims that largely became ripe after the 2013 Building Contracto1·s 
Case had been decided, they are in effect new claims, and nothing prevents a separate action 
from being filed on these claims. However, because many common law rutd facts apply to these 
new claims that exist in this case, it is in the best interest of judicial economy to simply allow the 
amendment so all of the issues could be considered at the same time in the same Cou1t. This 
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would also prevent the expense of filing a separate claim and moving to consolidate the claims 
under IRCP § 20(a). 
CONCLUSION 
The legal issues and facts in this case are extraordinarily complex, but also have 
significant ramifications. Although much of this Motion to Reconsider asks the Court to again 
consider authority and facts previously cited, the Court should take a more in depth and 
deliberate look at this authority and the application of the facts in this case. In so doing and 
pursuant to the foregoing, the Court should grant plaintiffs' motion to reconsider. 
DATED this 81h day ofDecember, 2015. 
Nathan M. Olsen 
Attomeys for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, with my office in 
Idaho Falls, Idaho, and that 011 the g•b day of December, 2015, I served a trne and correct copy of 
the foregoing document 011 the persons listed below by first class mail, with the correct postage 
thereon, Ol' by causing the same to be delivered in accordance with Rule 5(b), I.R.GP. 
Persons Served: 
Blake G. Hall, Esq. 
HALL ANGELL & STARNES, LLP 
1075 S. Utah Ave., Ste. 150 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
FAX: (208) 621-3008 
EMA IL: bgh@hasattomeys.com 
Honorable Stephen S. Duim 
624 E. Center, Room 302 
Pocatello, ID 83201 
FAX: (208) 236-7208 
EMAIL: karlnv@bannockcounty.us 
Method of Service: 
( ) mail r~ ( ) fux ( ) email 
( ) mail ( ) hand ( ) fax ;I email 
(Chambe1's Copy) 
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BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ. 
SAML. ANGELL, ESQ. 
NATHAN R. STARNES, ESQ. 
HALL ANGELL STARNES, LLP 
J.075 S Utah Avenue, Suite 150 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Telephone (208) 522-3003 
Fax (208) 621-3008 
l'SB No. 's 2434, 7012 & 7484 
bgh@hasa1tomeys.com 
§la@hasattomeys.com 
nrs@hasattomexs.com 
Attorneys for Defendant City of Pocatello 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY 
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on 
behalf of itself and all others similarly 
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf ofhimself 
and all others similarly situated, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
municipality, 
. Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2014-1520-0C 
DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 'fO 
RECONSIDER 
COMES NOW Defendant, City of Pocatello, by ancl through its attomey of record, 
pursuant to Rules l l{a)(2){B) and/or 59(e), Idaho Rules ofCivi1 Procedure, and herehy requests 
that the Court deny Plaintiffs~ Motion to Reconsider. 
INTRODUCTION 
Before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider, which seeks to have this Court 
second-guess its prior summary judgment ruling and also rulings in the Building Conrractors 
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case. Throughout the brief, Plaintiff merely suggests that the Court make a "closer r,~viewofthe 
facts and authorityt take "another more thorough look at this issue," that the Court should 
.. again consider tbe underlying facts and procedural history," failed to closely examine the law, 
consider the "complete" holdings of cases, misapplied the law. or rendered a "nonsensical" 
decision in applying the matter prospectively. {Pl. Memorandum In Support Of Motion to 
Reconsider) p. 4, 6, 13 ). The present motion is merely an attempt to reargue the same issues that 
were fully briefed and considered by the Court. 
Plaintiff has failed to provide the Court with any new evidence or law that would justify a 
reversal of the prior motion for summary judgment. Rather, the Plaintiffs cite the same authority, 
evidence, and affidavits previously filed with the Court. Nothing new to consider was provided, 
rather a plea to re-examine the same information and law that has been carefully examined her.e 
and in the Building Contractors case. This careful examination led to a well·reasoned and legally 
supported decision on Defendant's Motion for Summ~ Judgment. Because there is no new 
evidence or Jaw advanced in Plaintiff's motion. denial of the motion for reconsideration is 
appropriate. Plaintiffs' present motion is nothing but an improper attempt to get the Court to re,. 
examine previously argued issues, not only from the instant case but also from the Building 
Contractors matter. Because the instant motion is nothing but an attempt to reargue the same 
issues and merely requests the Court to "take another look" at the issues, an award of attorneys' 
foes is appropriate. See I.RC .P. 11. 
ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs seek reconsideration of the order granting summary judgment to Defendant on 
all claims advanced by Plaintiffs. Plaintiff brings this motion under either Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 11 (a)(2)(B), which governs motions for reconsideratio1t1 of interlocutory orders or 
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under Rule 59(e), which is the vehic;;le for altering or amending a judgment. "The decision to 
grant or deny a request for reconsideration generally rests in the sound discretion of the trial 
court." Campbell v. Reagmi, 144 Idaho 254, 258, 159 P.3d 891, 895(2007) (quoting Carnell v. 
Barker Mgmt. Inc., I 37 Idaho 322,329, 48 P.3d 651,658 (2002)). Because a recom:ideration 
motion ''is not a vehicle for re~litigating old issues, presenting the case m1der new theolies1 
securing a rehearing on the merits, or otherwise taking a 'second bite at the apple'': (See Sequa 
C01p. v. GBJ C01p., 156 F.3d 136, 144 (2nd Cir. 1998)), "[aJ party seeking reconsideration must 
show more than a disagreemen,t with the Court's decision, and recapitulation of the c:ases and 
arguments considered by the court before rendering its original decision fails to carry the moving 
party's burden." United States v. West/ands Water Dist., 134 F.Supp.2d 111l~1131 (E.D.Cal. 
2001) (internal citations omitted). Simply pu~ motions for reconsideration are not 'the proper 
vehicles for rehashing old arguments," United States v. De Rong Shang, No. 2:11-CR-110· 
RLH, 2012 WL 234646, at* I (D. Nev. Jan. 25, 2012) (emphasis added); see also Curtis v. MH. 
King Co.~ 142 Idaho 383, 388, 128 P .3d 920,. 925 (2005)). The motion to reconsider 1s not 
"intended to give an unhappy litigant one additional chance to sway the judge." Durkin v. 
Taylor, 444 F.Supp. 879, 889 (E.D.Va.1977) (emphasis added). The burden rests on tl1e party 
seeking iteeonsideration to present new evidence or Jaw that warrants a change in the Court's 
prior ruling. Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 4 73, 147 P.3d l 00, 105 (2006). 
lJ1 the instant case, Plaintiffs have presented this Court with W! new evidence or Jaw. 
Plaintiffs only cite information that was previously available to, and in fact was cousidcrcd by 
the Court, merely asking the Court to take a "more thorough look" at infonnation that Plaintiffs 
believe the Court did not understand and/or consider. Tile entirety of Plaintiffs' nwtion is 
premised on the flawed assumption that this Court did not analyze and consider the evidence and 
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law cited to the Court in the briefing by the Parties. There is no basis for such assumptions. In 
summary, Plaintiffs• motion is nothing more than a veiled attempt to take a "second bite at the· 
apple," which is an inappropriate basis for a motion for reconsideration. 
A. The City Bas Never Claimed the PILOT Was a Fee in This Litigation. 
Tile first claim for reconsideration centers entirely 011 whether the PILOT was a tax or 
fee. Curiously, Plaintiffs advance an argument that was squarely addressed in the Building 
Contractors matter and bas no bearing on tl1is case. Plaintiffs are seeking reconsideration hex:e uf 
an issue that was addressed by the Court in the Building Contractors case-namely, whether the 
PILOT was classified as a fee or tax. Plaintiffs erroneously suggest that the City has attempted to 
misclassify the PILOT in an attempt to gain some advantage in this litigation. Thfa argument is 
completely contrary to the facts here and in the Building Contractors matter. As this Court noted 
in its Memorandum Decision and Order, the City has maintained throughout this litigation that 
the PILOT was a tax. Any argument that the PILOT was a fee was advanced en.tirely by the 
Plaintiffs in this matter. (Order, p. 6· 7). 
In analyzing the PILOT, the Court properly looked at the purpose of the charge. bl 
considering whether the PILOT was a fee or tax, the Court noted, "a court must consider if, on 
its face, whether the fee is a tax or a regulation. This fll'St stm !Vas thorougblv am!Jyzed in tl!£ 
~Court's prior decisions in Building Cbntractors/' (Otder, p. 7 (emphasis added)). The Court 
recognized that ··the analysis to detennine whether or not the PILOT component is coni;;idered a 
regulation or tax is exactly the same as it was in the underlying case." (Order, p. 8 (emphasis 
added)). Namely1 that the Court unequivocally analyzed the PILOT, as continued by the City in 
Building Contractors, and concluded that the PILOT was a tax because it was a method to 
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generate revenue transferred to the General Fund. (Order, p. 7). The Courts discussion of thi$ 
issue was thorough and fully analyzed the PILOT. (Order, pp. 6.;9). 1 
Ultimately, this request of Plaintiffs is improper because it seeks reconsideration of an 
issue that was definitively addressed and analyzed in the Building Contractors case. This· is 
precedent that cannot be ignored by the Court and is binding on the parties. There: is no viable 
argument to reconsider an issue established in a prior case. 
B. No Evidence Was Presented By Plaintiffs That The City Acted 'With ''Malice or 
Criminal Intent" And With "Reckless, Willful And Wanton Conduct." 
Plaintiffs suggest that the Court should have found there was a dispute of fact with 
respect to the application of the Idaho Tort Claims Act, Idaho Code § 6-904A( 1 ). A n~view of the 
record and the records submitt~ in support of the Motion to Reconsider (which are the same 
documents that were submitted in the Building Contractors and on summary judgmellt here) do 
not support any finding that the City acted with Malice or Criminal Intent and with Reckless 
Wi11ful and Wanton Conduct. 
Idaho Code § 6~904A states in relevant part as follows: 
A governmental entity and its employees while acting within the course 
and scope of their employment and without glice or criminal i}!tent 
yd without reckless, wfilful and wanton con<lyg as defined in section 
6~904C, Idaho Code, shall not be liable for any claim which: 
1 Plaintiffs suggest that classification of the PILOT as a fee would make the taking "riot subject" 
to the Idaho Tort Claims Act citing BHA Investments. (Pl. Memo In Support, p. 7). ElHA makes 
no such ruling and Plaintiffs misread the plain language of the case. Further, as addressed in 
Idaho Cc,de § 6-904A, the Tort Claims Act would apply equally to a tax or fee·. (See Order, p . .13, 
fo. 33 ('"The Court would note~ hypothetically, if the PILOT component had been considered a 
foe, that summary judgment would still be granted for Defendant on Plaintiffs· state law claims 
because the immunity under J.C. § 6~904A applies to the assessment and collection of a tax or 
foe.")). 
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1. Arise,s out of the assessment or collection of any tax or f~. 
LC.§ 6 .. 9Q4A(l) (emphasis added). 
Thus, under Jdaho Code§ 6·9048(5), Plaintiffs must be able to show that the City acted 
with "malice or criminal intent" and with "reckless, willful and wanton conduct ... 1' "Reckless, 
wiJlfuJ and wanton c-onduct" is a statutorily defined term. Reckless, willful and wa:11ton conduct· 
is defined as "when a person intentionally and knowingly does or fails to do an act creating 
unreasonable risk of harm to another, and which involves a ,high degre~.J.!f..ernhfbility th!! 
such harm will result." (Emphasis added). While not statutorily defined, the J.d;iho Supreme 
Court has clarified the definition of ~•malice"' under the Idaho Tort Claims Act as follows: 
"malice here means 'actual' malice, which we define as the: intentional comr!}ission of a 
,nrongful or unlawful act, without legal justification or excuse and with ill wiJ!t whether or 
not injury was intended." Anderson v. City of Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176. 188,731 P.2d 171,183 
(1986). ···criminal intent" has also been defined by the Idaho Supreme Court as ··th1:, intentional 
.m..1£ll!!!!!sion of what the person knows to be a crime." James v. City qf Boise, 158 Idaho 713, 
730, 351 P.3d 1171, 1188 (2015), reh'gdenied (Jwie 19, 2015), reh'g denied (July 20, 2015). 
In this case, there has never been any argument or evidence that the City acted witb 
malice o,r criminal intent and with reckless, willful aud wanton conduct. Plaintiffs would ask this 
Court to simply find a genuine issue of fact without presenting any actual evidence of malice or 
criminal intent and reckless, willful and wanton conduct. A review of Plaintiffs, briefing reveaJs 
that Plaintiffs never suggested, argued, or even mentioned the words malice, criminal intent, and 
reckless, willful and wanton conduct in their briefing on the City' Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Plaintiffs are now relying on an opinion letter from tl1e Attorney General's Office as a 
basis to claim malice or criminal intent and reckless, willful and wanton conduct. Attomey 
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General Opinions are considered advisory only and are not binding authority. See Hansen v. 
White, 114 Idaho 907. 915, 762 P.2d 820, 828 (1988}; Sandpoint Convalescent Services, Inc .. v. , 
Idaho Department f.!f Health and Welfare, 114 Idaho 281, 283, 11. 4, 756 P.2d 398, 400, n. 4 
(1988);Hol{v Care Ctr. v. State, Dep't of Employment, 110 Idaho 76, 82, 714 P.2d 45t 51 (1986). 
The Attomey General's opinion even confirms that their letters were merely an '1opinion'' and 
were an "infonnal and unofficial response." (Olsen Aff., .Exs. C and E). The, City ·Nas certainly 
entitled to disagree with the Attorney General's Opinion and rely, on the binding authority found 
in City of Chubbuck v. City qf Pocatello, 119 Idaho 434, 807 P .2d 411 (199:5). As noted by ~his 
Court, the City "relied upon what it perceived to be compatible prior law. i.e.t City t.f Chubbuck 
v. City of Pocatello, 12? Idaho 198, 899 P.2d 411 (1995), before initiating the PILOT 
component." (Ordert p. 1 7). 
This Court. however. "distinguished the City of Chubbuck decision in Building 
Contractors, holding that a rate of return is acceptable if charged to another city, but not to 
residents or utility customers of the city providing the service. Reliance 011 City q{Chubbuck and 
disagreeing with an advisory Attorney General's Opinion cannot be classified as malice or 
criminal intent. Indeed, as was confirmed by the Affidavits of David Swindell in the Building 
Contractors matter, the PILOT was enacted to keep property taxes lower. (2nd Swindell Aff.~ 41! 4; 
3rd Swindell Aff., ,r 12). It is illogical to suggest that the attempt to keep property taxes lower 
would be an act carried out with malice (i.e., an "intentiona1 commission of a wrongful or 
unlawful act, without legal justification or excuse and with ill wilJ.") or criminal intent (i.e., the 
;'intentional commission of what the person knows to be a crime."). The record is also devoid of 
c:vidence to suggest that the City acted with reckless, willful and wanton conduct (Li::., a .. person· · 
intentionally and knowingly does or fails to do an act creating unreasonable risk of harm to 
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another"). Attempting to maintain a lower property tax cannot be deemed to be an unlawful or 
wrongful act. While the City was deemed to have not correctly applied Idaho law,- it was -
certainly not perfonned with malice or criminal intent and reckless, willful and wanton conduct. . 
As suchi the Plaintiffs' claims that fall within the Idaho Tort Claims Act fail and Pla1ntiffs have 
never provided this Court with any evidence to suggest otherwise. 
C~ The.re is No Legitimate Factual Basis Fo1· a Spoliation or Dest1·uction of Records 
Claim. 
Arty claim for spoliation is not well taken and should be ignored by the Court. The Court 
will recall that a claim of spoliation and destruction of evidence was advanced in the Building 
Contractors matter. Plaintiffs sought sanctions and an inference of spoliation, which was denied 
by the Court. Plaintiffs h~ve not raised this issue in this litigation until this motion for 
reconsideration as they are again attempting to advance the same claim in this 11tigation. All 
discovery from the Building Contractors matter was completed and in the possession of 
Plaintiffs' counsel. As the Court will note, there has been no motion to compel discovery in this 
case. Th1!re is no basis to advance th.is claim here. 
As with the Building Contractors matter, the City has not withheJd any eviderice in this 
matter. There is no basis for the allegations that the City has withheld, discarded, or destroyed 
documents in this matter. As addressed previously, all of the documents in the City's actual 
possession that it had located were produced. Additiona11y, the City fa.cilitated a record 
production that numbered in excess of 20,000 pages of documents from Red Oak Consulting. 
Prior to commencing the Building Contractors case, Plaintiffs' counse.J conducted an extensive 
public records request in 2010 and received near1y lOtOOO pages of documents from; 5 boxes. 
Presumably those documents were review~d and analyzed and subsequently produced by 
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Plaintiff through "discovery. This argument was previously considered on the same ~xounds in the 
Building Contractors matter and entirely without merit. 
Moreover, the claimed spoliation and destruction of documents, if any, would not 
overcome the dearth of evidence of malice or criminal intent and reckless, willful W;lnton 
conduct. As noted in the Building Contractors briefing, the documents were not maintained and 
were destroyed consistent with the City's document retention policies. The briefing in the 
Building Contractors matter fully covers the appropriateness ofthe City's actions. None of the 
City's conduct would overcome the presumption of immunity under Idaho Code 6w904A. 
JD. The Court is Entitled to Confirm That its Own .Oecision Was Meant to Have 
Prospective Application. 
Plaintiffs inappropriately suggest that the Court did not properly analyze the c:ase law and 
facts of this matter, misapplied the law and rendered a ~•nonsensicaJ" decision. {See Pl. 
.Memorandum !11 Support Of Motion To Reconsider, p. 13). This position is quite presumptuous 
and ignores the lengthy and well reasoned Memorandum Decision and Order drafted by this 
Court that properly analyzed applicable case law. To suggest that the Court did not intend to 
have the Building Contractors decision be prospective only is dfaingenuous and ignores the plain 
language of the Court: "In Building Contractors, it was made clear that the ruling to discontinue 
charging the PILOT component was assessed '"l!!ing forwa~(!!'' and now the Court, in its 
discretion, confirms that the decision in Building Contractors applies to )E!endl!yg cases, but 
J!!2t.J!.J>ass cases." (Order, p. J 9 (emphasis added)). As noted by the Court, ,iretroactive 
application to past and pending cases is left to the sound discretion of the court." (Order, p. 16). 
In this case, the Court was confirming its intent, as the author of the Building Cont-'Ylctors case, 
to apply the decision prospectively. The Court detailed its reasoning for prospective application: 
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''the purpose of the Building Contraclor 's decision was to prevent Defendant from continuing to . 
charge llhe PILOT component once it was held to be unconstitutional.'' (Order, p. 17). As the 
Court recognized, the City immediately complied with this- mandate. The Court did not abuse its 
discretion in confinn the origina] intent of prospective application of the Building Contractors 
holdings. 
Moreover, there is no validity to the argument that a Court cannot apply a cm~e it decided 
prospectively. Further, Plaintiffs' argument that only the Supreme Court has authori.iy to apply a 
case prospectively is mistaken. For example, in Jones v. Wats_on, 98 ldaho 606, S70 P,2d 284 
(1977), the district court ruled that a holding in an unrelated case should only hav,~ prospective 
applicatilon. The Idaho Supreme Court analyzed the criteria used to determine the effect of a 
ruling and concluded that .. the trial court ruled correctly in applying the decision in Lipe v. 
Javelin Jprospectively." Id. at 609, 570 P.2d at 287. Certainly the Idaho Supreme Court has the 
ultimate responsibility in confinning whether the Court was correct in its applic:ation. BHA 
lnvestmen-ts, Inc. v. City of Boise. 141 Idaho 168, 108 P .3d 31 :5 (2004), do1~s not ~tand for the 
proposition that only the Idaho Supreme Court can pronounce prospective application. Rather, is 
confirms that the district court has the ability to make a detenni11ation of prospective app1ication. 
and the Idaho Supren:ie Court has the ability to review such determinations. To suggestthat this 
Court does not have the ability to determine whether a case is applied prospectively is a severe 
misstatement of the law. 
Again, the Court here did not need to make a dctcnnination to apply Building 
Contractors prospectively because that was already done by the clear language pronounced by 
this Court. (See Building Contractors Nov. l Si 2013 Memo Decision un.d Order On 
Reconsideration, pp. 24 and 26 ( concluding that assessment of the PILOT "must be excluded 
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from any fee assessment going foiward.")). The Court merely confinned this pronouncement 
here. Ultimately, Plaintiffs are simply requesting the Court second-guess itself without providing 
.- .. 
::::\jt 
'.;(t: 
,:· f} 
any new evidence in law that would support reconsideration. There is certainly no validity to a . .·. i q 
suggestion that the Court failed to closely examine the law. consider the ·~complete" holdings of 
cases, misappJicd the law, or rendered a "nonsensicaf' decision in applying the matter 
prospectively. (See Pl. Memorandum ln Support Of Motion To Reconsider, p. 13). The Court · 
should deny Plaintiffs' request for recoll)ideration. 
E. There Is No Evidence Of Any Harsh And Unjust Ra1iaifications To Plaintiffs'. 
PJaintiffs' make the unsupportable and conclusory statement that the Court ignored or 
disregarded the claimed "serious harms" the non~repayment of the fees would have on Hill~ Vu 
.and othier ratepayers. There is no foundation that the Court did not fully and appropriately 
consider all aspects of a repayment of the PILOT. As this Court is aware, the City provided 
testimony of how a damage award would be calculated and p.aid. The City confinned that the any 
damage award would be paid by increased property taxes born only by property owners in the 
City. The Court confinned tlris, recognizing the financial and. human resources to calculate any · 
award, as well as "a practicaJ consideration is that applying the decisi-On retroactively would 
simply require collection of fees from the very customers (in many cases) w'ho would be 
t'eceiving fees back.'~ 
The Court properly summarized the ramifications of retroactive application on all 
Pocatello residents: '"the effect on the administration of justice would be substantial and has, a 
probable adverse effect on the residents of Pocatello." (Order, p. 19). In making such a 
statement, it is apparent that the Court analyzed the potential burdens associated with a damage 
award from all angles, including the claimed banns to ratepayers. Any claim of subi:,tautial hann 
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to Mr. Robinson and others, is completely disingenuous. As noted in the briefing, J\.1r. Robinsop, 
.as a property owner in the City would bear a significant increase in his property taxes 'that wo~d 
likely exceed any recovery. Thus, any claim that rate payers suffered a serious and substantial' 
harm is without foundation. Rather~ the only evidence in the record is that a damage award 
would seriously mtd substantially harm affect individuals such as Mr. Robin.son through 
increased property taxes that exceed any damage recovery. (See 3rd Stroshein Aff., 1~1· 3-9). 
F. The Court Properly Denied Plaintiffs' Motion For Leave To Amend. 
There is no basis for reconsideration of the denial of P1aintiffs' Motion for Leave· to . 
Amend. Even assuming that the Court granted the motion for reconsideration, there would be no 
legitimate argument to reconsider the denial of the Motion for Leave to Amend. Plai.ntifl's simply 
assume that with a new trial date that all relevant scheduling dates would be vacated and reset.· · 
This is aITT unfounded proposition. The date for amending the complaint has long since expfred. 
Moreover, as fuUy addressed in the briefing, the purported claim is legally unsupportable and 
should be denied because it would be a frivolous amendment subject to immediate di:~mnissal. 
G. The Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider is Frivolous and Attorneys' Fees Should Be 
Awarded. 
The City requests an award of attorneys' fees for responding to Plaintiff's Motion 
pursuant to Rule 11, I.C. § 12-117 and I.C. § 6-91 SA. Plaintiffs, motion fails to advance any 
cognizable support justifying reconsideration. Rather, Plaintiffs simply ask the Court to take a 
second look at law and evidence previously submitted and argued to the Court. Plaintiffs 
requests reconsideration of issues that were actually addressed in the Building Contractors 
matter or issues that were otherwise clearly addressed~ using the same evidenc:e and law 
considered in the underlying Motion for Summary Judgment. The instant motion is frivolous and 
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can only be described as a drain on judicial resources. This matter has resulted in a _significant . 
waste of judicial resources and tremendous costs for the Defendant. The theme in this matter is 
Plaintiffs~ general dissatisfaction with the Court's legal rulings and a dogged determination to 
improperly chaUenge issues that have been addressed by the Court. As such, this Motion for 
Reconsideration is frivolous and an award of attorneys' fees is warranted. See Gusta1•es v . . 
Gustaves, 138 Idaho 64, 71, 57 P.3d 775, 782 (2002); see also In re Doe, 149 Idaho 669, 675, 
239 P.3d 774, 780 (2010). An award of Attorneys, fees are requested and wmrnnted pursuant to 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and 11 and Idaho Code Sect~ons 6-918Aand 12-117. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Defendants respectfully request that the Court den:v Plaintiffs' 
Motion to Reconsider. 
DATED this J.L day of December. 2015. 
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INT~ DISTRICT COURT OF THE Sl:XTH JUll>ICIAL DISTRIC1' 
OF THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN ANn 1roR BANNOCK COUNTY 
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK., on behalf 
of itself and all others shnilarly situated, ED 
QUINN2 011 behalf of himself and all others 
similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CITY OF POCATELLO. an Idaho 
mtmicipality, 
Defendant. 
---~--ID"IIIIFI_I ___ _ 
Case Number: CV-2014-1520--0C 
MEM0l~.ANDU1VI IN SUPPOJRT OF 
MOTION l'O llECONSll][)Jf.R 
Plaintiffs1 Hill ft Vu Mobile Home Park and Ed Quinn through counsel of record provide 
the following Reply in support of their Motion to Rec:on$ider. This Reply is supported by the 
pleadings and record in this case, itl.Clucling itt the Bannock County Case No. CV-2011..:5228-0C 
(Building Contractors Case). 
~------
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This Reply addresses a number of'ntlsnomers contained within "Defendant'f: Opposition 
to Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsicler"including the followmg: 
I. Plnintiftst Motion to Reconsicler is Appropriate to Correct Errors Regai·dless of 
New Evidence. 
1n primarily citing authority outside of Idaho, the Defendant City of Pocatello (City) . 
argues that "new evidence" is necessary or essential in a Motion to Reconsidea; and Hi.a( it is ,;not , 
- ' I,·. ··,: 
appropriate f~t the 1lial court to take another look at the facts ~d law in the· case. (Def s- Op~~ 
Br. Pp- 2-3 .) That argument holds no merit. ln fact, the oft cited Idaho authority indicated in 
Johm,·on v. Lambros, 147 P.3d 100. 105, 143 Idaho 4687 473 (Idaho App. 2006) sng~;,:stq 
otherwise: 
- ' 
Indeed) a rule requil'i11g 11ew evid_e11ce on a motion for reconsideration would bt! a cause 
for concem. Jt would Jjreveni"a party jrorri drawifl.g the trial court's attention to 1trrors of 
law or fact in the initial decision, precluding co1·rection of even flagrant errors ,?xcept 
through an appeal. 
Id. (emphasis added) 
Additionally, the Idaho Supr~me Court has recently held: 
A motion tor reconsideration is a motion which allows the court-. when ne-vv law is 
applied to previously presented facts, when m~w facts are applied to previoTJsly presented 
:taw, or ru1r combination thereof- to reconsider the correctness of an 'i11terlocutory 
order. 
Johnson v. North Idaho College11 153 Idaho 58~ 62,278 P.3d 928~ 932 (2012) (emphasis added). 
The legal issues in this case are complex and the record in the case, wllich inducles the 
Building Contractol's Case, is vast. Tu their motion for reconsideration, the Plainti:ff1, have 
i;>rovided additional authority and analysis with regard to the law. and iu particular tel the rarely 
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considered concept of .limiting the "retroactive application,, of a· Court decision. TJ.11.:: P:b:dntiffs 
have also referred to additional information contained in the record about how the PILOT h~s 
been classified as a''fee'' from the very outset, and have pointed to evidence in the reccii:d that 
suggest that the City could have acted with malice in its enactmeut of tqe PILQT. 
Hence, the Plaintiffs have shed additional light on both the law aJO.d the facts in this case, 
which is completely appropriate and acceptable in a Motion to Re,consider. The Plah1tiffs·have 
:3imply requested the Q:iurt to correct certain le,b1Bl and/or factual errors with its initial cfocisiDn -
which is not only acceptable~ but is in fa.ct encouraged by the Idaho Supreme Court if even for 
the reason of avoiding m.1 1muecessary appeal to correct such errors. Id 
u. The City hos Not Met its Bu1·deil on Summary Judgment and Requests: tlu'l1 the 
Court Overstep its Bounds. · , r 
Given the City's response to Plaintiffs Motion to .Reconsider, it is worth reminding the 
Court that it is the City who has brought a summary judginerrt motion and therefore has the · 
heightened ·burdell to d~prive Plaintiffs, consideration of their claims by a jury through sunnnmy 
judgment. Conversely. in defeating a motion for summary judgment, the non-n1ovir.1g Jparty 
merely needs to "by affidavit or othetwise .•. set forth specific facts showing that ther1:: i.s a 
genuine issue for trial." IllCP § 56(e). The City is hnp1'0perly requesting thaL llrl.s Comt 
disregard certain evidence on the record and also to make an intei11retation of certain disputed 
facts, and thus usurping the Constitutionally protected role of ~e jury. 
The trial court's limited and restricted role in .making factual detenniuations in s11mma1y 
judgment motions and the moving party's strict burdt:m. in providing sumrnazy judgment was · 
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recently reiterated, ru.J.d emphasized by the Idaho Supreme Court in Nield ·11. Pocatello H~~alth 
Servs .• Inc., 156 Idaho 845,857,332 P.3d 714, 757 (2014): 
As we: have reiterated in our recent cases, upon a motion for su1mnary j udgmemit,, all .. 
disputed facts are liberally co11strued in favor of the non-moving party. TI1e bur~en of 
proving the absence of a material fact rests at all times .upon the moving party. This 
burden is onerO\.lS because even n[c]ircumstan:tial evidenc,: can create a genui.m, :issue of 
material fact. 11 Moreover. all reas01lable it1ferm1ces which ,can be made from the.record 
shall be made in favor oftbe party resisting the= moli.on. {f'the recor,l r:ont,1.ins c,01if/ictiT1ig 
inferences. upon wliicli,reasonable minds miglit reach diflerentcon.t:lusi(Jld', a '·· :' · 
·Sl,!liima,y)lldgn,ent must b(? denied because dll doubts aJ•e to lie res()•lw~d agaifr.ist ti,~ 
movhig party. The requiren1ent that all reasonable infureuces be constiued in thfi light 
. most favorable to the non-moving party is a strict one. Nevertheless, when a pat'l;y moves .. · 
:for sununmy judgment the opposing partyis case must not. rest on mere speculatkm 
because a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue of fact. 
Notwithstanding the utility of a swmnmy judf.,'lnent, a. motion for summary judgment · 
should be granted with caulior1. Furiliermo1·e, it is well-establislied that on si11mna,y 
judgment, a: trial court is. 11.()t tillowed to weigh tlie :evidence and reso,[ve all ·ti1nibts. ,. · 
against t/1.e mova1it: , - · 
The trial c01,ut, when confronted by a motion for summary judgn1e11~ must d,:~te.r:m.ine if 
there a1'e factual issues which should be resolved by the trier of fae,1:s. On such a :motlon it 
is not the ftu1c1ion of the trial court to weigh the evidence or to determine those issn.es. 
Moreover, all doubt't must be 1·esolved against the party moving for ,i si1-mmar.}~ 
jitdgment. 
Additionally, a motion for summary judgmeut should be denied if the pleadings, 
admissions, depositio11s. and affidavits raise any ques1ior1 of credibility of witnc}mses ot 
weight of the evidence~ 
Id. (citations omitted)(en1phasis added) 
'.ln essence. this 'Court oversteps its bol.U.lds when it makes conclusions, weighs evidence 
or even inferences with regard to conflicting facts in !he case. 11bat responsibility squardy 
belongs with the jury. 
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In this case ~w as they arc allowed to do 011 a Motion to Re<;onsider (see 'irifra Sr;:c:tiori I) ·-
the Plaintiffs have ~ointed to evidence 011 the record to suggest that the City acted with malice 
and recklessness under IC § 6-904A{l) with regard to its enactment of the PILOT fee. (See· again 
Plffs Mcm. Supp. MTR pp. 9-12.) Plaintifts note tha:t prior to. er.m.c1ment of the PILOT. the City 
sought m1 opinion from the Idaho Attorney General on the legality of the program. with the 
express intent of foist~ng more of the ge11eral reve.ntie requirements of the City onto :fee:,,JP.ayers 
l'atber than through the regular channel of property ta.ices. fd. Plaintiffs suggest that the City's' '. 
de:fian~ and disregard of the AG oph:rlon which tt sought, or in other words acting against the 
adv.ice of its own cotmsel to implement an unlawful program that improperly shifts reve:m1e 
burdens to fee payers; could be· construed as acting_{with-malice and recklessness.1 ·P.la:intiffs. · 
.. 
:linther suggest that there is evidence on the record to suggest that the City improperly (fostroycd 
or failed to :maintain certain records, and to disclose certain infbnuation relevant to the Plaint.iffst 
clain1s~ which can further demonstrate the City's reckless conduct. 
Rather th.an let a jury decide whether this conduct rises to the level of malice a11d. reckless. · 
willful and wanton conduct. the City instead inappropriately reque.sts that the C_ourt n:mke that 
determ:u:iation. (Def. Opp. Br. pp. 6-8.) Regardless of what the Court may think or believe with 
tegard to the City's conduct in light of the AG opinion and otl1er conduct, it must "r<'i~:olve all, 
doubts'" in favor of the Plaintiffs as the non-moving party, fflld allow the jul"y to interpr{~t. the · 
1 Its also worth noting that the Mayor's correspondence in this matter actually personally 
re:fers to the Plai:llrt;iff HillM Vu' s ow11er Logan Robinso,n, thus furthe1· sugsesting ''Hl wU:I'"' directed 
specifically to Mr. Robinson in the City's defiance of the AG opinion. See Feb. 13, 201.3~ Olsen 
Aff. Ex. A~ Dec. 26, 2006 letter from Mayor Chase to AO Lawronce Wasden. 
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I. 
City's actions. Shnply put~ the Court shonld not decide this matter, and should ther(,fore· deny 
the City's motion for summary judgment. 
III. Authority; Cited by the City Furthcl" Confirms the Plaintiffs' Argument tJl:tat the 
Court Erred 1n its Application of the Retroactivity·Dm:trinc. 
Interesti11gly, the City asserts the Idaho Supreme Couit decision Jones v. Watson, 98 
Idaho 606, 570 P.7d 284 (1977) for the •'propositlon" that the ~determination of prospective , 
• . : ,· ' ; ~- : ' ·, • • i ' ' 
application,, is not limited to the decisions of the Su.preme Court- calling Pla~11tifls"" a,:si:ertkfrt, 
• ..! • ' 
otherwise ua severe misstmeme11t of the law." (Def m Opp. Br. p. 10.) In actuality, the Jorres_ 
decision only further affirms Plaintiffs' argument a11d the policy therein, and should further 
assure the Couit of the need to co1Tect its error. 
· .•. ' l 
In Jones. duritlg the proceedings in the distlict court; the Idaho Supretne Com1 i:;sued ~ 
decision Lipe v. Javelin Tire Co., Inc., 96 Idaho 723, S36 P .2d 291 (1975) which sp(:1c:itically 
"'ove1Tuled'" prior Supreine Court authority on the issue in question (relating to the interpretation 
of the long mm statute on the statute oflimitatio11s) . .Jones, 98 ldaho at 608-610, 570 .P.2d at 
286"88. The district couit decided not to retroncti vely apply the Lipe decisiort. Id. 
Much of the Jor11iY decision. addressM the policy and linritations of the retroactive 
.application doctrine: 
. '•.• 
The alter.native of prospective application of decisions hfL~. a sound ba.~ds it:t policy and 
.legal theo1y. As the Washington Supreme Co1xt noted: 11So it is that the doctr.iue of 
prospective overruling has attached in many areas: in constitutional law, contracts} torts; 
criminal law. taxation, and in the field of procedure. giving the doctrine both ss1nction and 
acceptance throughout qur jurisprudence. Pros.JJective overr11Ung ilnp11.rts tlmtfinal 
,rlegree. of l'e,:llien.ce, to d,e otherwise rigid concepts of st,ire decl.ns, so .nece.!i'$1lry to 
prevent the. system from hecoming b1·ittle. It enables the law under stare declr!.s to grow 
and chang~ to meet the everwchanging needs ofan ever-c.hanging society and y~;t,, at once. . -
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to preserve the very society which gives it shape. The determination of whether an 
overruling' decision shall be applied retroactively or prospectively. is a matter li~ft to ·state 
1oou1is fur determination on a case-by-case basis. As tlie Alaska Supreme Court noted:· 11 A 
.~tate supreme cottrl has unfettered discretion to· apply a particular ruling either pureiy 
prospectively, purely retroactively~ or partially retroacfivdy, limited only 'by the juristic~ 
philosophy of the judges their conceptions of law. its origin and nature." 
Tile tleterminntion of whether a rule is to be given retrotcic:tive. aJ7plktt.tion i.§' generally 
made pu.1'Suant to a balancing process, wherein the gtdn to be achievecl in .~he 
ia:dministratio~1 of justice by accomplishment of the p,urpose of tlte.l!J'JJ!..J1:lUJ:t.(1tJ.,e Jirst 
,d·iterion) is balance,/ against the a1lve1'Se effects on tJ,e atlministriitio~ of jtjr~rti'ce , . :. 
,resuliingfrom the extent to wllich t/Je courts kave mistakenly but hi gootlj1tjftlt ,reii(!d ; 
on the prevailing ruk (the second criterion) and from an application of tJ,e m~w rule. 
for the pur poie of reconsiderbig deter,nin.ations already fmally made pursna:nt to tlte 
then pnwniling rule (the thirr.l criterion). 
ld (citations omitted) (emphasis added) 
,. 
In essence~ the Jones decision affnms the need for the ''overruling decision" ofa "prevailing· 
rule" ,or stare decises b~fore there is even a collsideration of whether the ·~new rule~' should be 
tetroactively applied. Id. It also further suggests that this power is limited to the "stat,::: supreme 
court" which- is. the judicial body that sets the rule. 
In tbis case. the Court's Memorandum Decision in the Building Contractors Case was not 
in any way an "overruling decision'' of a "prevailing xule.'' Ilrfact, the reve1·se is tr.ue~. It iu truth 
relies upon pl'ior Idaho Sup1:eme Court authority in it:11 decisioµ. The Plaintiffs in this c~se are 
relying on this very same prior Supreme Cou1t authority, o.,; the "prevailin.g mles" in support of 
their claims in this case - as well as additional Supre1ne Court authority (i.e BliA Investments) 
decided well before the City implemented its impermissible PILOT program. 
,. 
Further, in actuality, the Court in this case has erl'antly deprived Plaintiffs from r,elying 
upon the e~isting authority or "prevailing rule~t set by the Supreme Court. That approach simply · 
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is inapposite of the policy adopted by Idaho with regard to the retroactive application of Supr!;!me. 
Court rules. Surely the district court does 11ot have authority to effectively disregard or suppl~t 
rules established by the higher authority of the Supreme Court. l'hat is an imp~oper use of the 
district court's power and jurisdiction. 
In short, the district court's Memo1·andum Decision in the Building Contractors Case was_ 
not mi "overruling" decision of a "prevailing mle/ butratb.er an affinnation of exis6llg rnles --
adopted by .th~ Supreme Court. Therefore, this Court neither has the basis no:r the awtho-rity to 
only ''prospectivetyt·apply thesel'ulcs. and doing so is an error. 
CONCLUSION 
Pursuant to the foregoing~ as well as the argum.ents and evidence set forth. in Plaintiffs' 
_prior pleadings, including those not refuted by the City, this Court should grant Plaintil:fs' 
~. j I J, I 
Motion to Reconsider. 
.. } 
DATED tl1is 61h day of January, 2016 .. 
PETERSEN Moss HALL & OLSEN 
~"~---~ Nathan M. Olsen . 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-·---~~--
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CHR.11FICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State ofldaho, with :111y office.'ili . }i 
Idaho Falls, Idaho. and that on the 61Ei day of January. 2016, I served a true and corre.ct copy oftl;le 
:foregoing document on the persons listed below by frrst class mail, with the correct postage 
thereon, or by causing the same to be delivered in accordance with Rule S(b), I.R.C.P. · 
Persons Served: 
Blake G. Hall, Esq. 
:HALL ANGELL & ST~BS~ LLP 
1075 S. Utah Ave., Ste·. 150 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
FAX: (208) 621-3008 
Ii.MAIL: bgh@hasattomeys.tom 
}Io11orable Stephell s~ Dmm 
624 E. Center, Root.n 302 
Pocatello, ID 8320) . 
FAX: {208)236-7208 
EM.All..; kar1av@bannockcomuy.us 
Method of Service: 
( ) mail. ( ) hand ( 4ax ( ) e1mii1 
( ) mail .( ) hand ( ) fux ( ..,.;;mail 
(Chambe.rs Copy) 
~-~-Stephen D. Hall . 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on 
behalf of itself and all others similarly 
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself 
and all others similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
· municipality, 
Defendant. 
) 
) Case No. CV-2014-1520-0C 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
MEMORANDUM DECISION DENYING 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
This case comes before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration ("Motion") 
of this Court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant, filed November 10, 
2015. For reasons set forth below, this Court denies Plaintiff's Motion. 
FACTS 
The underlying facts of this case, and a companion case, Building Contractors 
Association of Southeast Idaho v. City of Pocatello ("Building Contractors"), Bannock County 
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Case No. CV-2011-5228-0C,1 have been fully set forth in prior decisions, are incorporated 
herein by reference, and will not be repeated. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 1 I(a)(2)(B) provides that "[aJ motion for reconsideration 
of any interlocutory orders of the trial court may be made at any time before the entry of final 
judgment but not later than fourteen (14) days after the entry of the final judgment." Final 
judgment was entered in this case but no argument is made the Plaintiffs' Motion is untimely. 
The decision of whether to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration made pursuant to Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure I l(a)(2)(B) is left to the sound discretion of the trial court.2 The party 
requesting the motion for reconsideration is permitted to present new facts or law to aid the court 
in its reconsideration but is not required to do so.3 However, if new evidence is presented the 
burden is on the moving party to bring the new evidence to the courts attention. 4 
ANALYSIS 
Plaintiffs state that their Motion addresses two primary issues. The Court views the 
Motion as raising three primary issues and the Court's analysis will be limited to those issues. 
They are: 1) whether the collection of the PILOT fees, which this Court has determined was an 
impermissible tax, can still be a constitutionally prohibited ''taking" even the fees are a tax, 
rather than a fee; ·2) whether questions of fact exist regarding Plaintiffs' state claims, which were 
1 See this Court's original decision on summary judgment ("Building Contractors MJS") and subsequent decision 
on Reconsideration in Building Contractors ("Building Contractors Reconsideration"), and the Court's decision on 
summary judgment in this case ("Hill-Vu MSJ"), filed November 10, 2015. The Parties have consistently agreed 
that the Court can and should take judicial notice of the facts in Building Contractors, and that case is relied on by 
Plaintiffs in this motion as well. 
2 Van v. Portneuf Med. Ctr., 147 Idaho 552,560,212 P.3d 982, 990 (2009). In reviewing whether a trial court 
abused its discretion, this Court applies a three-part test, which asks whether the district court: (1) correctly 
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of that discretion; and (3) reached its 
decision by an exercise of reason. 
3 Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 147 P.3d 100 (Ct App. 2006). 
4 Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat'! Bank, 118 Idaho 812,800 P.2d 1026 (1990). 
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dismissed pursuant to an application ofl.C. § 6-904A; and 3) whether the Court improperly 
failed to allow damages through a retroactive application of the Building Contractors decisions. 
1. The PILOT "tax" is not a constitutional taking. 
Plaintiffs continue their argument that the PILOT fee in this case was not a tax, but a fee. 
That issue has been fully analyzed by this Court previously.5 Plaintiffs cite the City resolutions 
and other facts where the City classified the PILOT as a fee rather than a tax and argue that this 
shows that the Court's prior takings analysis is in error. The Court disagrees. As stated 
previously, the critical point is what the money charged is used for, not what it is called. The 
Loomis case was clear that "if rates, fees, and charges are imposed primarily for revenue raising 
purposes they are in essence disguised taxes subject to legislative approval and authority. "6 
Based on the Court's prior analysis, there is no question that the PILOT fees were disguised 
taxes. 
Nevertheless, Plaintiffs argue that even if this is true, the collection of those taxes is still a 
constitutionally prohibited taking because the City never had the authority to impose the fee in 
the first place, citing BHA Investments, Inc. v. City of Boise.7 Plaintiffs ·reliance on BHA is 
misplaced: That case involved a liquor license transfer fee charged by the City of Boise. The 
Idaho Supreme Court held that there was no statutory authorization for the imposition of such a 
fee and, as such, the fee could be recovered under a "takings" analysis. However, the Court also 
stated: "We have also held that a city's imposition of a purported fee that does not bear a 
reasonable relationship to services to be provided by the city is in reality the imposition of a tax. 
5 See Building Contractors MSJ, pp. 17-23; Building Contractors Reconsideration, pp. 19-23, Hill-Vu MSJ, pp. 6-9. 
6 Loomis v. City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434,437, 807 P.2d 1272, 1276 (1991) (citing Brewster v. City of Pocatello, 
I 15 Idaho 503, 768 P.2d 766 (1989))(emphasis added). 
7 141 Idaho 168, I 08 P.3d 315 (2004). 
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Brewster v. City of Pocatello, 115 Idaho 502, 768 P.2d 765 (1988).''8 In Brewster, which was 
cited with approval in the Loomis analysis, the City of Pocatello was attempting to impose a 
street use fee to assist in the maintenance of city streets, but that fee was struck down as being a 
disguised tax. In Loomis, an equity buy-in fee similar to that charged in this case was approved 
as in compliance with the Idaho Revenue Bond Act. Both those cases clearly and fully set out 
the statutory authority for cities to assess fees for water, sewer and related facilities.9 It is not the 
authority to charge the fee that was ever in question, but whether the fee is being used 
improperly for revenue raising purposes and was, therefore, a disguised tax. In this case the City 
clearly had the authority to charge the fees, but to the extent it used those fees for improper 
purposes, that portion of the fee was a disguised tax and could not be collected. This is not a 
constitutional "taking" but an improper method of raising revenue. Plaintiffs' contention that the 
City did not have the authority to charge the fee is legally unsupportable. 
In summary, the City was authorized to charge the fee in question, but the PILOT portion 
of the fee was a disguised tax used for improper revenue raising. The analysis of this Court that 
a tax cannot be a proper basis for a claim of unconstitutional "taking," under either the Idaho or 
U.S. Constitutions is consistent with the law that applies. 10 Plaintiffs' Motion in this regard is 
DENIED. 
2. The City's PILOT fee was not collected with malice and reckless, willful and 
wanton conduct. 
In analyzing the Plaintiffs' state tort claims, this Court relied on I.C. §6-904A for the 
proposition that such claims cannot be asserted for the collection of a tax. Plaintiffs correctly 
8 Id. 141 Idaho at 176, 108 P.3d at 323. 
9 This Court has reviewed that analysis in other decisions. Building Contractors MSJ, pp. 15-17; Building 
Contractors Reconsideration, pp. 19-23. 
io See Hill-Vu MSJ, pp. 13-16 
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point out that the Court did not fully analyze this case in light of the preliminary language of that 
statute which reads: "A governmental entity and its employees while acting within the course 
and scope of their employment and without malice or criminal intent and without reckless, 
willful and wanton conduct as defined in section 6-904C, Idaho Code, ... "11 In other words, no 
state tort claims associated with the collection of a tax may be made as long as the governmental 
entity, the City of Pocatello in this case, has not acted with malice and the City's conduct is not 
reckless, willful and wanton. The last phrase is defined in LC. §6-904C as follows: '"Reckless, 
willful and wanton conduct' is present only when a person intentionally and knowingly does or 
fails to do an act creating unreasonable risk of harm to another, and which involves a high degree 
of probability that such harm will result." The City is correct in stating that both "malice" and 
"reckless, willful and wanton" conduct must be shown. The statute does not define "malice." 
However, it is generally accepted that "[o]ne acts with actual 'malice' when moved by a spiteful, 
malignant purpose that is unrelated to a legitimate interest." 74 Am. Jur. 2d Torts § 19. Since 
§6-904C requires a lack of "malice or criminal intent," this statement of the Idaho Supreme 
Court, which specifically references this statute, is instructive: 
The term malice has been variously defined. See generally 52 Am.Jur.2d, Malice, 
§ 1. At a minimum, malice involves the intentional commission of a wrongful or 
unlawful act without legal justification or excuse, whether or not the injury was intended. 
Tinkerv. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 485-86, 24 S.Ct. 505,508, 48 L.Ed. 754 (1903). This is 
referred to as "legal" malice. 52 Am.Jur.2d, Malice, § 1. However, the use of the 
disjunctive term "or" in the phrase "without malice or criminal intent" indicates that 
malice as used here qualitatively differs from criminal intent. LC.§ 6-904. Criminal 
intent closely equates to the above definition of "legal" malice. Thus, the term malice as 
used in§ 6-904 must refer to more than mere "legal" malice. Malice here must refer to 
"actual malice." Accord, Ladnier v. Murray, 572 F.Supp. 544, 549-50 (D.C.Md.1983), 
reversed in part on other grounds, 769 F.2d 195 (4th Cir.1985). "Actual" malice 
encompasses the conunon meaning of the word, which connotes ill will. 52 Am.Jur.2d, 
Malice, § 1. We conclude and hold that malice here means "actual" malice, which we 
11 However, the Court does note that this applicability of this statute to this set of cases has been raised and 
discussed previously and this is the first time the Plaintiffs have asserted that anything the City did was with malice 
and reckless, willful and wanton conduct. 
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define as the intentional commission of a wrongful or unlawful act, without legal 
justification or excuse and with ill will, whether or not injury was intended. 12 
Plaintiffs refer primarily to the fact that the City sought the opinion of the Idaho attorney 
general as to whether the PILOT was properly included in water and sewer rates. The attorney 
general gave his opinion that the PILOT improperly generated revenue. Nevertheless, and based 
on its own view of an existing case, City a/Chubbuck v. City of Pocatello, 127 Idaho 198,899 P. 
2d 411 (1999), the City chose to proceed with the PILOT. Ultimately the PILOT was declared to 
be an illegal tax in Building Contractors. This, Plaintiffs' reason, is evidence that the City did an 
intentional and illegal act which created an unreasonable risk ofhann, i.e., higher utility rates, 
with a substantial likelihood that such harm would result. The Court disagrees. 
All of the evidence referred to in the Court's prior decision, which support the conclusion 
that the City was attempting to generate additional revenue, also unequivocally supports the 
conclusion that the City was doing so to shift the tax burden from property taxes to user fees, and 
had implemented the PILOT based on an analysis of both statutes and case law. 13 Thus, it is the 
Court's view, as a matter of law, that there is no evidence to support the conclusion that the City 
acted, in implementing the PILOT, in a way which was intentionally illegal and designed to 
create an umeasonable risk of harm to Pocatello ratepayers. If this were the case, virtually every 
taxing decision would be suspect. More importantly, however, Plaintiffs must also show that the 
City acted with actual malice, meaning with ill will, and no such showing of any kind has been 
made in this case. 14 
12 Anderson v. City of Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176, 188, 731 P. 2d 171, 183 (1986){emphasis added). Both parties cited 
portions of this entire quote, but the more complete statement sets forth the standard for malice more accurately. 
13 Building Contractors MSJ, pp. 18-23; Building Contractors Reconsideration, pp. 20-23. 
14 Plaintiffs make a secondary argument on this issue, claiming that there is some evidence. in the Building 
Contractors case to support a contention of "spoliation of evidence." Plaintiffs Memorandum, p. I 2. However, the 
Court finds this contention to be without merit, as it references primarily allegations made and not further referenced 
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The. Court confirms its prior decision that the Plaintiffs' state tort claims are barred by the 
application of LC. §6-904A. Plaintiffs' Motion in this regard is DENIED. 
3. Building Contractors will not be applied retroactively. 
Finally, Plaintiffs challenge the Court's decision to not apply the Building Contractors 
decisions retroactively, essentially asserting that only the Idaho Supreme Court can make such a 
decision. First, the Court notes that it addressed the question of retroactivity in its original 
decision only because Plaintiffs were claiming that this Court intended the Building C~mtractors 
decisions, which struck down the PILOT, to allow a claim for reimbursement of any PILOT 
collected. This Court was simply reaffirming its prior decision that the Court, in the Building 
Contractor decisions, specifically stated that the decisions were prospective only. 15 
Again, Plaintiffs misread BHA Investments, Inc. v. City of Boise. Clearly the Idaho 
Supreme Court was discussing whether to apply its decision prospectively or retroactively. But 
there is nothing in BHA to suggest that district courts cannot make the same determination in the 
appropriate circumstance. As noted by the City, that is exactly what happened in Jones v. 
Watson, 98 Idaho 606,570 P.2d 284 (1977). Just because a district court decision is subject to 
appellate review does not mean that only the Idaho Supreme Court ~an make a decision about 
retroactivity. 
More importantly, the contention is not relevant here. The current case was never about 
whether Plaintiffs would be allowed to recover PILOT fees paid in the past, through an 
application of the dee:ision in Building Contractors. This case was and is being decided on the 
merits, i.e., is there a legal basis for the recovery of the PILOT fees, which had previously been 
declared improper? This Court has determined that the answer to that question is in the negative, 
in Building Contractors, or discovery sanctions sought which were not granted. See Building Contrators MSJ, pp. 
30-33. 
15 Building Contractors Reconsideration, p. 24. 
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i.e., no recovery is allowed. To the extent that Plaintiffs are·seeking to circumvent the question 
ofrecovery on the merits of the claim, but instead are trying to recover just because this Court 
declared the PILOT illegal in 2013, this Court has determined that such may not be permitted. In 
short, Building Contractors, which was limited to the legality of the PILOT fee, will not be 
applied, by itself, to allow recovery of the PILOT fees paid without any other legal justification 
therefore. 
Plaintiffs Motion for review of the Court's retroactivity analysis is DENIED. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. Defendant's 
request for attorney fees, based on the contention that the Motion for Reconsideration was 
frivolous and without foundation, is also DENIED. Plaintiffs did raise one new issue as it 
applied to the application of I.C. §6-904A, and did reasonably seek further review of certain cases 
of the Idaho Supreme Court. Although the City appropriately argues that, for the most part, the 
Motion raises issues which have been thorough analyzed and decided previously, the Court is not 
left with the abiding belief that the Motion was frivolously pursued. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATEDthis <g~ dayof ~ , 2016. 
~ 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the \ () day of ._ ~c:JQ , 2016, I 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document upon each of the following individuals 
in the manner indicated. · 
Blake G. Hall, Esq 
HALL ANGELL & STARNES, LLP 
1075 S. Utah Ave., Ste. 150 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Michael D. Gaffney, Esq 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Nathan M. Olsen, Esq. 
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN 
485 "E" Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Steven Taggart, Esq. 
MA YNES TAGGART PLLC 
P.O. Box 3005 
Idaho Falls, ID 83403 
DATED this \f) day of , ~)c ].'") 
(',1 U.S. Mail 
( ) Overnight Delivery 
( ) Hand Deliver 
( ) Facsimile 
(./j U.S. Mail 
( ) Overnight Delivery 
( ) Hand Deliver 
( ) Facsimile 
('J) U.S. Mail 
( ) Overnight Delivery 
( ) Hand Deliver 
( ) Facsimile 
I 
(.,iU.S.Mail 
( ) Overnight Delivery 
( ) Hand Deliver 
( ) Facsimile 
, 2016. 
\ 
Deputy Clerk 
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FfLEB 
.. ~BANNOCK COUNTY 0 1 4="nw. r.r Tl·'E t\Q t ·r. 
't. .... nn v1 d ·• v· Uri/f 
20f6FEB 10 PH f: 49 
BL.,, .. At 
DBPLJ.1. Y ·CLE:Rlf 
IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on 
behalf of itself and all others similarly 
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself 
and all others similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
municipality, 
Defendant. 
--------------
) 
) Case No. CV-2014-1520-0C 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 
REQUEST FOR COSTS AS A MATTER OF 
RJGHT, DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
REQUEST FOR DISCRETIONARY COSTS 
AND DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's request for costs and attorney fees. 
Plaintiffs have objected to Defendant's request. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In any determination of an award of costs and fees, the threshold question is which party 
prevailed. I.R.C.P. 54( e )(1) states: "In any civil action the court may award reasonable attorney 
fees, which at the discretion of the court may include paralegal fees, to the prevailing party or 
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parties as defined in Rule 54(d)(l)(B), when provided for by any statute or contract." [Emphasis 
added]. I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B) governs the prevailing party issue: 
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs, 
the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or result of 
the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. The trial court 
in its sound discretion may determine that a party to an action prevailed in part 
and did not prevail in part, and upon so finding may apportion the costs between 
and among the parties in a fair and equitable manner after considering all of the 
issues and claims involved in the action and the resultant judgment or judgments 
obtained. [Emphasis added by this Court.] 
The determination of who is the prevailing party is committed to the sound discretion of the trial 
court. Rockefeller v.Grabow, 139 Idaho 538, 82 P.3d 450 (2003). 
The legal basis for an award of costs is I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l). Some costs are awarded to a 
prevailing party as a matter of right and some costs can be awarded in the discretion of the Court. 
Discretionary costs are allowed "upon a showing that said costs were necessary and exceptional 
costs reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of justice be assessed against the adverse 
party." When objections to discretionary costs are made the Court "shall make express findings 
as to why such specific item of discretionary cost should or should not be allowed." Such costs 
may also be disallowed without objection, in the discretion of the Court and upon express 
findings. The determination of whether a cost is "exceptional" involves an evaluation both of the 
cost itself, i.e., whether it is the kind of cost commonly incurred in the type of litigation at issue, 
and whether the case itself is exceptional. City of McCall v. Seubert, 142 Idaho 580, 130 P.3d 
1118 (2006); Hayden Lake Fire Protection Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 109 P.3d 161 (2005); 
Fish v. Smith, 131 Idaho 492, 960 P.2d 175 (1998). 
The award of attorney fees is governed by I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l), which provides that such an 
award is discretionary, to the prevailing party, "when provided for by any statute or contract." 
Whether to award fees and the amount of the fees awarded are matters of discretion, unless it 
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involves a specific determination of a statute which allows for attorney fees. Grover v. 
Wadsworth, 147 Idaho 60,205 P.3d 1196 (2009); Taylor v. Maile, 146 Idaho 705,201 P.3d 1282 
(2009); Contreras v. Rubley, 142 Idaho 573, 130 P.3d 1111 (2006). 
If fees are awarded, the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, must consider the 
factors set forth in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3). Sanders v. Lankford, 135 Idaho 322, 1 P.3d 823 
(Ct.App.2000); Boe/ v. Stewart Title Co., 131 Idaho 9, 16, 43 P.3d 768, 775 (2002); Brinkman v. 
Aids Insurance Co., 115 Idaho 346,351, 766 P.2d 1227, 1232 (1988). The district court must, at 
a minimum, provide a record which establishes that the court considered these factors. Building 
Concepts, Ltd v. Pickering, 114 Idaho 640,645, 759 P.2d 931,936 (Ct.App.1988). A trial court 
need not specifically address all of the factors contained in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) in writing, so long 
as the record clearly indicates that the court considered them all. Brinkman, 115 Idaho at 351, 
766 P.2d at 1232. In addition, a court need not blindly accept those attorney fees requested by a 
party, and may disallow those fees that were incurred unnecessarily or unreasonably. Craft Wall 
of Idaho, Inc. v. Stonebraker, I 08 Idaho 704, 706, 701 P .2d 324, 326 (Ct.App.1985). The party 
seeking fees has the obligation to provide sufficient information to support the award and, failing · 
. 
to do so, the fees will not be awarded. Hackett v. Streeter, 109 Idaho 261, 7.06 P.2d 1372 
(Ct.App. 1985). 
FACTS 
The facts of this case are fully set forth in this Courfs decisions on the City's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and the.Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration and will not be repeated here. 
In short, Plaintiffs sought reimbursement of a portion of certain water and sewer fees paid 
between 2007 and 2013 related to the City's collection of a PILOT component in those fees. The 
claim was based on multiple legal theories, both constitutional and statutory. The Plaintiffs 
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claims were dismissed in the decision granting the City's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
that decision was confirmed in the decision on the Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration. 
As noted above, the threshold question is whether one party prevailed. In this case that 
question is easily answered. Summary judgment was granted to the City on all claims and the 
Plaintiffs did not prevail on any of their claims or theories. The City is the prevailing party in 
this matter. 
ANALYSIS 
1. Costs. As the prevailing party, the City is entitled to an award of costs permitted as a 
matter of right under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C). The only costs sought as a matter ofright are $66.00 
for a filing fee and those costs are awarded. The discretionary costs sought are $368 .60 in travel 
expenses for counsel traveling to Pocatello from Idaho Falls on various occasions. It is up to the 
parties as to who is hired to represent them and the Court confirms the right of any party to do 
so. It is common for parties in southeastern Idaho to retain counsel from a variety of cities 
. within that area. But travel expenses for an attorney hired 50 miles from Pocatello, while 
reasonable and necessary, are not exceptional under these circumstances and those costs will not 
be awarded. 
2. Attorney Fees. The threshold issue in any request for attorney fees and costs is which 
party prevailed. The City prevailed and argues it is entitled to attorney fees and costs under LC. 
I.C. §12-117 and I.R.C.P. 11. Idaho Code § 12-117 applies to the award of attorney fees and 
costs where one of the parties is a municipality. See Hehr v. City of McCall, 155 Idaho 92, 305 
P.3d 536 (2013): 
Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any proceeding involving as adverse parties a 
state agency or a political subdivision and a person, the state agency, political subdivision 
or the court hearing the proceeding, including on appeal, shall award the prevailing party 
reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and other reasonable expenses, ifit finds that the 
nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. LC. § 12-117. 
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Under this statute an award of fees and costs is only appropriate where "'the other party 
acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law."' Ciszek v. Kootenai County Bd Of Com 'rs, 151 
Idaho 123, 135,254 P.3d 24, 36 (2011) (quoting Burns Holdings, LLC v. Madison County Bd Of 
County Com'rs, 147 Idaho 660,664,214 P.3d 646,650 (2009)). 
Similarly, I.R.C.P. 11 (a)(l) provides in pertinent part: "The signature of an attorney or 
party constitutes a certificate that the attorney or party has read the pleading, motion or other 
paper; that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief after reasonable inquiry 
it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the 
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that· it is not interposed for any improper 
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of 
litigation." When pleadings are filed which fail to comply with this obligation then attorney fees 
can be awarded. For practical purposes, the standard is the same as LC. §12-117. 
It is the Court's view, in its discretion, that the Plaintiffs' had a reasonable basis in both 
fact and law to pursue their claims in this case. The issues were important and required careful 
consideration of the law that applied. The Plaintiffs did not file pleadings in violation of I.R.C.P. 
1 l(a)(l). The claims were well grounded in fact and justified a thorough review the applicable 
law. No fees are awarded here. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Court awards costs as a matter of right to the 
Defendant in the amount of $66.00, but declines to award either discretionary costs or attorney 
fees. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
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DATEDthis 'bf}- dayof r~ , 2016 
District Judge 
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in the manner indicated. 
Blake G. Hall, Esq 
HALL ANGELL & STARNES, LLP 
1075 S. Utah Ave., Ste. 150 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Michael D. Gaffney, Esq 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Nathan M. Olsen, Esq. 
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN 
485 "E" Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Steven Taggart, Esq. 
MA YNES TAGGART PLLC 
P.O. Box 3005 
Idaho Falls, ID 83403 
DATED this \C, 
(~1 U.S. Mail 
( ) Overnight Delivery 
( ) Hand Deliver 
( ) Facsimile 
(1) U.S. Mail -
( ) Overnight Delivery 
( ) Hand Deliver 
( ) Facsimile 
(l) U.S. Mail 
( ) Overnight Delivery 
( ) Hand Deliver 
( ) Facsimile 
(/j U.S. Mail 
( ) Overnight Delivery 
( ) Hand Deliver 
( ) Facsimile 
, 2016. 
\ 
Deputy Clerk 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on 
behalf of itself and all others similarly 
situated, ED QUINN, on behalf of himself 
and all others similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
municipality, 
Defendant. 
--------------
) 
) Case No. CV-2014-1520-0C 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
AMENDED JUDGMENT 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: Judgment is entered in favor of the 
Defendant and against the Plaintiff and said case is DISMISSED. Costs are awarded to the 
Defendant in the amount of$66.00. 
DATEDthis gt1..- day of ~ 
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\ 'I'\.,' <\ I\ I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _ l , day of ,· ::}r .. \-) , 2016, I 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document upon ;;ch of the following individuals 
in the manner indicated. 
Blake G. Hall, Esq 
HALL ANGELL & STARNES, LLP 
1075 S. Utah Ave., Ste. 150 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Michael D. Gaffney, Esq 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Nathan M. Olsen, Esq. 
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN 
485 "E" Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Steven Taggart, Esq. 
MAYNESTAGGARTPLLC 
P .0. Box 3005 
Idaho Falls, ID 83403 
c,1u.s. Mail 
( ) Overnight Delivery 
( ) Hand Deliver 
( ) Facsimile 
V) U.S. Mail 
( ) Overnight Delivery 
·c ) Hand Deliver 
( ) Facsimile 
( .I) U.S. Mail 
( ) Overnight Delivery 
( ) Hand Deliver 
( ) Facsimile 
(Ii') U.S. Mail 
( ) Overnight Delivery 
( ) Hand Deliver 
( ) Facsimile 
DATED this \C'> day of '---~· ...... e ,..\~~:) ___ , 2016. 
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\ ~, 
Michael D. Gaffney 
Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA 
2105 Coronado St., Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Telephone: (208) 523-5171 
Fax: (208) 529-9732 
ISBN: 3558 
Nathan M. Olsen 
Petersen Moss Hall & Olsen 
485 "E" Street, Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Telephone: (208) 523-4650 
Fax: (208) 524-3391 
ISBN: 7373 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/ Appellants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BANNOCK COUNTY 
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on behalf 
of itself and all others similarly situated, ED 
QUINN, on behalf of himself and all others 
similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs/ Appellants, 
vs. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
municipality, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Case Number: CV-2014-1520-0C 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Filing fee: $129.00 
Fee Category: L.4. 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, CITY OF POCATELLO; THE PARTY'S 
ATTORNEY, Blake G. Hall, 1075 S. Utah Ave., Suite 150, Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402; 
and THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - l 
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\ 
I. The above named appellants, Hill-Vu Mobile Home Park, on behalf of itself and 
all others similarly situated, Ed Quinn, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, 
appeal against the above named respondent, City of Pocatello, to the Idaho Supreme Court from 
the "Judgment" entered in the above entitled action on the 101h day of November, 2015, and the 
"Amended Judgment" entered in the above entitled action on the 10th day of February, 2016, 
Honorable Stephen S. Dunn presiding. 
2. Appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgments 
described in paragraph 1 above are appealable under and pursuant to Rule 1 l(a)(l), I.A.R. 
3. The preliminary statement of the issues on appeal that the appellants intend to 
assert in the appeal are as follows: 
A. Did the District Court err in dismissing Plaintiffs' claims on summary 
judgment? 
4. Has an order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record? No. 
5. Is a reporter's transcript requested? No. 
6. The appellants request the following documents to be included in the clerk's 
record in addition to those automatically included pursuant to Rule 28, I.A.R .. See attached 
Exhibit A (highlighted documents only). 
7. I certify: 
A. That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for 
preparation of the reporter's transcript if a transcript has been requested; 
B. That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid. 
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C. That the appellants' filing fee has been paid; and 
D. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to Rule 20, I.A.R. 
DATED this 18th day of March, 2016. 
Nathan . lsen 
Attorney for the Appellants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State ofldaho, with my office in 
Idaho Falls, Idaho, and that on the 181h day of March, 2016, I served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document on the persons listed below by first class mail, with the correct postage 
thereon, or by causing the same to be delivered in accordance with Rule 5(b), I.R.C.P. 
Persons Served: 
Blake G. Hall, Esq. 
HALL ANGELL & STARNES, LLP 
1075 S. Utah Ave., Ste. 150 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
FAX: (208) 621-3008 
EMAIL: bgh@hasattomeys.com 
Honorable Stephen S. Dunn 
624 E. Center, Room 302 
Pocatello, ID 83201 
FAX: (208) 236-7208 
EMAIL: karlav@bannockcounty.us 
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Request h.,,·Attorney Fees; /s J Dunn 02/08/16 
Amended Judgment; Judgment is entered in 
0211012016 favor of the Def and ag the plaintifss this case is 
DISMISSED, costs are awarded to the def inthe 
amount of $66.00: s/ Judge Dunn 2-8-2016 
·---
Connection: Public 
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Case History - ··,-........ 
-~ 
Building Contractors Assn of Southeast Idaho .. ) 
Bannock 
f------ Building Contractors Assn of Southeast Idaho vs. City Of Pocatello ~- l 
11 CV-2011-0005228- . . - . Stephen S . Closed I case:OC D1str1ct Filed: 12/09/2011 Subtype: Other Claims Judge: Dunn Status. 04124120141 
Defendants:City Of Pocatello 
I 
I 
Plaintiffs:Building Contractors Assn of Southeast Idaho 
Disposition: Date Judgment Disposition Disposition P rt· Type Date Type a ies 
01/15/2013 Other 
City Of Pocatello (Defendant), 
Building Contractors Assn of 
Southeast Ida.ho (Plaintiff) 
In 
Favor 
Of 
All 
Parties 
l Register of Date 
!actions: 
· 1 
I 
12/09/2011 Court Records 
12/09/2011 New Case Filed-Other Clafms 
12/09/2011 Complaint Filed 
12/09/2011 Summons Issued 
. Filing: A - All initial civil case filings of any type not listed in categories B-
12/09/2011 H, or the other A llstings below Paid by: Nathan M. Olsen Receipt 
number: 0042615 Dated: 12/9/2011 Amount: $88.00 (Check) For; 
1210912011 Plaintiff: Building Contractors Assn of Southeast Idaho Attorney Retained 
Nathan M. Olsen . 
0112312012 Affidavit of service - srvd on City of Pocatello on 1-11-2012 thru Ruth 
Whitworth (summons and complaint) 
02/21/2012 Answer to complaint; aty Blake Hall for def 
02/21/2012 Defendant: City of Pocatello Attorney Retained Blake G Hall 
0212812012 Order for Submission of Informatlon for Scheduling Order /s J Dunn 
02/27/12 
0310312012 Stipulation pursuant to order for submission of information for 
scheduling order; aty Nathan Olsen 
03/21/2012 Order Setting Jury Trial /s J Dunn 03/15/12 
03/21/2012 Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 02/12/2013 09:00 AM) 
03/21/2012 Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 05/?1/2013 09:00 AM) 
0312612012 not~ce of service - plntfs first set of discovery requests to def: and this 
notice: aty Nathan Olsen 
0512112012 Notice of service - Plntfs first discovery requests and this notice : aty 
Blake Hall 
0612212012 Motion to compel discovery and to allow additional interrogatoies; aty 
Nathan Olsen 
0612212012 Affidavit of Nathan M Olsen in support of motin to compel discovery and 
to allow additional interrogatories; aty Nathan Olsen 
06/22/2012 Notice of hearing; set for 7-23-2012: s/ Nathan Olsen 
06/27/2012 Hearing Scheduled (Motion 07/23/2012 02:00 PM) 
0711312012 Memorandum in support of motion to compel discovery and to allow 
addltional interogtories: aty Nathan Olsen 
07/19/2012 Defendants Opposition to Motion to compel; aty Blake Hall for def 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 07/23/2012 02:00 PM: District 
07/24/2012 Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: Sheila Fish Number of Transcript 
Pages for this hearing estimated: less 100 
07/31/2012 Order on Motion to Compel; /s J Dunn 07/30/12 
0910712012 Notice of service - srvd Defs Supplemental responses to plaintiffs first 
discovery requests and this notice: aty Blake Hall for Def City of pocatello 
0911912012 Notice of service - Defs Third Supplemental responses to plaintiffs first 
discovery requests and this notice: aty Blake Hall for def City of Pocatello 
Notice of service - Defs Fourth Supplemental Responses to plaintiffs first 
· lO/l6/20l2. discovery requests: and this notice: aty Blake Hall for def Clty of 
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Pocatello 
11/13/2012 Motion for summary judgment; aty Blake Hall 
1111312012 Affidavit of D?ivid K Swindell in s or · 
.. ju gme , a e all for def aty of Pocatello 
1111312012 Defendants Memorandum in support of motion for summary judgment; 
aty Blake Hall for Defendant City of Pocatello 
11/13/2012 Notice of hearing; set for 12-10-2012@ 3pm: 
1111412012 Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Judgment 12/10/2012 03:00 
PM) 
1111512012 Notice of service - Defs First set of Interrog and requests for production. 
of documents to plntf: aty Blake Hall for def 
1112012012 Plaintiff's 56(f) Motion for ~ontinuance to Allow Discovery in Advance of 
Summary Judgment Heanng (Olsen) 
Affidavit in Support of Plaintiff's 56(f) Motion for Continuance to Allow 
11/20/2012 Discovery in Advance of Summary Judgment Hearing and to Vacate Trial 
Setting (Olsen) 
11/20/2012 Motion to Vacate Trial setting (Olsen) 
11/20/2012 Notice of Hearing (Olsen) 
11/20/2012 Motion to Shorten Time (Olsen) 
1112312012 Defendant's Opplsition to plaintiffs 56f Matron for continuance; aty Blake 
Hall for Def City of Pocatello · 
11/23/2012 Affidavit of Justin Armstrong; aty Blake Hall for def City of Pocatello 
1112712012 District Court Hearing Held 11/26/12 Court Reporter: Sheri Turner 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less 100 
1112712012 Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment scheduled on 
12/10/2012 03:00 PM: Hearing Vacated 
1112712012 Hear!ng result for Jury Trial scheduled on 02/12/2013 09:00 AM: 
Hearing Vacated 
1112712012 Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Judgment 01/17/2013 03:00 
PM) 
Minute Entry and Order; Def Motion for Summ Judgment reset for 
1112912012 01/14/13 @ 3 pm; Deposition of David Swindell to be completed by 
12/14/12; Plaintiff response to Summ Judgment due by 01/4/13; Def 
reply by 1/11/13; 2/12/13 trial vacated; /s J Dunn 11/28/12 
12/03/2012 Defendants witness disclosure; aty Blake Hall for def City of poc 
1210612012 Notice of taking Deposition duces tecum of David K Swinde~I; set for 12-
14-2012 @ 9am: aty Nathan Olsen forplntf 
1210612012 Amended Notice of taking deposition duces tecum of David K Swindell; 
aty Nathan Olsen for plntf 
12/06/2012 Motion for order shortening time; aty Blake Hall for def City of Pocatello 
1210612012 Defendants Motion to quash subpoena for records to Red Oak 
Consulting; aty Blake Hall for def 
12/06/2012 Notice of hearing; set for 12-10-2012@ 2pm: 
1210712012 Stipulation to withdraw subpOf:na and vacate hearing on motion to 
quash; aty Blake Hall for def 
12/10/2012 Hearing Scheduled (Motion 12/10/2012 02:00 PM) 
12/18/2012 Notice of Compliance (Olsen for Plaintiff) 
01/04/2013 Affidavit of Syd Wood; aty Nathan Olsen 
0110412013 Plaintiffs response to defendants Matin for summary Judgment and 
Motion to strike; aty Nathan Olsen 
01/04/2013 Affidavit of Nathan M Olsen; aty Nathan Olsen 
01/04/2013 Affidavit of Ed Quinn; aty Nathan Olsen 
01/04/2013 Motion for relief; aty Nathan Olsen 
0110412013 Notice of hearing; set for Motion for Relief on 1-14-2013 @ 3 pm: aty 
Nathan Olsen 
Ol/ll/2013 Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 12/10/2012 02:00 PM: Hearing 
Vacated . 
01/11/2013 Motion for Order Shortening Time (Hall for Def) 
01/11/2013 Notice of Hearing on Motion to Strike (Hall for def) 
01/11/2013 Def's Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Hall for Def) 
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01/11/2013 Defs Motion td;;;·thke Affidavit of Ed Quinn and Syd Wood (HalhviDef) 
01/11/2013 Opposition to Plantffs Motion to Strlke (Hall Def Def) 
O 1/11/2013 Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Relief under IRCP 3 7(b) (Hall for Def) 
Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment scheduled on 
01/25/2013 01/14/2013 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: Sheri 
Turner Number of Transcrlpt Pages for this hearing estlmated: less 100 
. ' 
Supplemental response to defs motion for sumniaryjudgmentand in 
02/13/2013 support of plaintirrs'IR"CP 37 MbLIPfi fm Sdtlc!fnns: acy l<larnan Qlsen f§r 
...- ~rnt( 
02/13/2013 Affidavit of Natban Olsen · at'>( Nathan Olsen for plntf 
; 211412013 Notice of service - Plaintiffs Supplemehntal Answer to Defs First set of 
Interrog and req for production to plaintiff: aty Nathan Olsen for plntf 
0212712013 Defendants surreply in support of motion for summary judgment; aty 
Blake Hall for def City of Pocatello 
03L2812013 Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant's Motion foe St1mmary 
~ . · PJdgrneot: /5' J Dunn0312Btl 3 . _ 
03/28/2013 Stipulation to Waive Jury Trial 
04/18/2013 Stipulation to Vacate Trial Setting (Olsen; Hall · 
0412212013 Defendants Memorandum in support of motion for reconsideration; aty 
Blake Halt for def City of Pocatello 
0412212013 Notice of hearing; set for 5-13-2013 @ 2pm: aty Blake Halt for def City 
of Pocatello 
0412212013 Defendants Motion for reconsideration; aty Blake Hall for def City of 
Pocatello 
04/26/2013 Continued (Jury Trial 09/04/2013 09:00 AM) 
04/26/2013 Order Re-Setting Jury Trial /s J Dunn 4/26/13 
04/26/2013 Hearing Scheduled (Motion 05/13/2013 02:00 PM) 
0510612013 Response in opposition to defendants motion for reconsideration; aty 
Nathan Olsen 
0510612013 Response in <?P~osition to Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration; 
- . (Olsen for Plaintiff) 
0510912013 Defendants reply Memorandum in support of motion for reconsideration; 
aty Blake Hall for def 
05/09/2013 Second affidavit of DAvid K Swindell; aty Blake Hall for def 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 05/13/2013 02:00 PM: District 
05/17/2013 Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: Sheri Turner Number of Transcript 
Pages for this hearing estimated: less 100 
05/28/2013 Affidavit of David Hunter; aty nathan Olsen 
05/28/2013 Affidavit of AIIetz; atv oathan Olsen 
,.,- . ..~ .. . .. · ..... 
0512812013 Memorandum ih s_upport of-plai~tiffs ~enewed motion ft:ir sanctions u~der 
.. · IRCP 37b and Motion for recons1derat1on; aty nathan Olsen for plntf 
0512812013 Affida~it of Nathan M Olsen in su · cp 37h Motion for 
~ sanctions: at Nat 
0512812013 Notice of hearing; set for Renewed Motion sanctions on 6-10-2013@ 
_ 2pm: aty Nathan Olsen 
0513112013 Defendant's Motion for Additional Time Pursuant to IRCP 56(f) (Hall ofr 
Def) 
05/31/2013 Affidavit pf NMathan R. Starnes (Hall for Def) 
05/31/2013 Notice of Hearing; Def's Motion pursuant to IRCP 56(f) 
05/31/2013 Motion for Order Shortening Time (Hall for Def) 
0610512013 Defendants opposition to renewed motin for sanctions under IRCP 37b: 
aty Blake Hall for def City of Pocatello 
0610512013 Second affidavit of Nathan R Starnes; aty Blake Hall for def City of 
Pocatello 
06/07/2013 Affidavit of Nathan Olsen; aty Nathan Olsen 
0610712013 Objection to defs Motion for Additional time pursuant to IRCP 56f: aty 
Nathan Olsen 
Reply to Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Renewed Motion for 
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06/07/2013 Sanctions Und~; 1RCP 37(b) (Olsen for Plaintiff) 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 06/10/2013 02:00 PM: District 
06/14/2013 Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: Sheri Tu mer Number of Transcript 
Pages for this hearing estimated: less 100 
0612412013 Notice of taking deposition of Justin Armstrong; on 7-9-2013@ 9:30 
am: aty Nathan Olsen for plntf 
0612612013 Amended Notice of taking deposition of Jon Herrick on 7-15-2013@ 
1: 1 S pm: aty Nathan Olsen for plntf 
07/01/2013 Stipulation for substitution of counsel; aty Blake Hall for def 
0710112013 Notice of taking deposition of Jon Herrick on 7-9-2013@ 9:30; aty 
Nathan Olsen for plntf 
0710112013 Amended notice of taking deposition of Justin Armstrong; on 7-15-2013 
· @ 1:15 pm: aty Nathan Olsen for plntf 
0710912013 Defendants opposition to plaintiffs motion for reconsideration; aty Blake 
Hall for Def City of Pocatello 
0710912013 Affiavit of John Gallagher in support of motion for summary judgment; 
aty Blake Hall for def · 
0711212013 Defendants opposition to plaintiffs motion for reconsideration; aty Blake 
Hall for def City of Pocatello 
0711212013 Affidavit of John Gallagher in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Hall for Def) 
0810612013 Motion to Strike and Exclude the Testimony and Report of John 
Gallagher (Olsen for Plaintiff) 
08/06/2013 Plaintiff's Amended Motion for Reconsideration (Olsen) 
0810612013 Memor~ndu':' in Support of Plaitniff's Amended Motion for 
Recons1derat1on (Olsen) 
Notice of Hearing; Amended Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to 
08/06/2013 Strike and Exclude the Testimony and Report of John Gallagher on 
08/19/13 2 pm (Oslen for Plaintiff) 
08/06/2013 Affidavit of David L Hunter (Olsen for Plaintiff) 
08/06/2013 Affidavit fo Nathan M Olsen 
0810912013 Hearing Scheduled (Motion 08/19/2013 02:00 PM) Amended Motion for 
Reconsideration and Motion to Strike and Exclude 
0811312013 Defendant opposition to plaintiffs motion to strike and exclude testimony 
and report of John Gallagher; aty Blake Hall 
0811312013 Defendant opposition to plaintiffs amended motion for reconsideration; 
aty Blake Hall for def 
08/13/2013 Affidavit of John Gallagher; aty Blake Hall for def 
08/13/2013 Third Affidavit of DAvid K Swindell; aty Blake Hall for def 
08/13/2013 Affidavit of Blake Hall; aty Blake Hall for def 
0811612013 Plaintiffs reply memorandum in support of motion to strike and exclude 
the testimony and report of John Gallagher; aty Nathan Olsen for plntf 
Motion to strike the August 12 2013 affidavits of John Gallagher and 
08/16/2013 DAvid K Swindell for consideratjion in support of defendants motion for 
summary judgment; aty Nathan Olsen for plntf 
0811612013 Reply t.o def~ndants opposition to plaintiffs amended motion for 
recons1derat1on; aty Nathan Olsen 
08/19/2013 Affidavit of service - s/ atty Nathan Olsen for plntf 
0812112013 Decision on Plaitniff's Mof1on to Strike and Exclude the Testimony and 
Report of John Gallagher /s J Dunn 08/20/13 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 08/19/2013 02:00 PM: District 
0812312013 Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: Sheri Turner Number of Transcript 
Pages for this hearing estimated: less 100 Amended Motion for 
Reconsideration and Motion to Strike and Exdude 
0812612013 Fourth Affidavit of David K Swindell; aty David Swindell for def City of 
Pocatello 
0812812013 Hear!ng result for Jury Trial scheduled on 09/04/2013 09:00 AM: 
Hearmg Vacated 
Affidavit of Nathan M Olsen in support of supplemental Memorandum in 
09/30/2013 support of plaintiffs amended motion for reconsideration; aty Nathan 
Olsen 
Supplemental Memorandum in support of plaintiffs Amended Motion for 
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09/30/2013 reconsideration;< .. ly Nathan Olsen 
-----11/15/2013 Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant's Motion to Reconsider 
- and Plaintiff's Amended Motion for Reconsideration; /s J Dunn 11/13/13 
Final Judgment; Judgment is partially granted for plaintiff, Building 
Contractors, Association of Southeast Idaho, and partially granted for Def 
City of Pocatello: (it is hereby dedared that any assessment of a PILOT 
1111512013 fee by the City of Pocatello to the municipal water and sewer department 
ls impermissible. Further, the City is enjoined from using the PILOt fee 
as part of the calculation of u.ser and or connection fees charge to the .\ 
public. to any other extent judgment is granted for Defendant:) s/ Judge j 
unn 1-13-2013 
11/15/2013 Case Status Changed: closed 
1112712013 Memorandum of authority in support of plaintiffs memorandum of fees 
and costs against defendant: aty Nathan Olsen for p lntf 
1112712013 Memorandum of costs and attorneys fees and affidavit of Nathan Olsen; 
aty Nathn Olsen for plntf 
12/09/2013 certificate of compliance; aty Kirk Bybee 
1211012013 Defendant objection to plaintiffs memorandum of fees and costs; aty 
Blake Hall for def 
1211912013 Notice of waiver of objection to plaintiffs memorandum of fees and costs; 
aty Nathan Olsen for plntf 
1212012013 Defendants motion to strike plaintiffs notice of waiver of objetion to 
plaintiffs memorandum of fees and costs; aty Blake Hall for def 
12/20/2013 Notice of hearing; set for 1-6-2014@ 2pm: la 
12/23/2013 Hearing Scheduled (Motion 01/06/2014 02:00 PM) 
12/23/2013 Case Status Changed: Closed pending clerk action 
12/31/2013 Application for order to show cause; aty Nathan Olsen for plntf 
1213112013 Affidavit of Nathan Olsen in support of application for order to show 
cause; aty Nathan Olsen 
Plaintiffs response to defs motion to strike plaintiffs notice of waiver of 
1213112013 objection to plaintiffs memorandum of fees and costs and response in 
opposition to defs objection to plaintiffs memorandum of fees and costs; 
aty Nathan Olsen for plntf 
1213112013 Notice of hearing; application for Order to Show Cause on 1-6-2014@ 
2pm 
0110212014 Motion to shorten time for hearing on plaintiffs application for order to 
show cause; aty Nathan Olsen for plntf -
Defendants notice of intent to produce testimony and evidence at 
01/02/2014 plaintiffs heaerintg on its application for order to show cause; aty Blake 
Hall for def 
0110212014 Defendants objection to plaintiffs application for order to show cause; aty 
Blake Hall tor def 
01/02/2014 Notice of hearing; set for 1-6-2014@ 2pm: aty Nathan Olsen for plntf 
Defendants Reply motion to strike plaintiffs notice of waiver of objection 
0110312014 to plaintiffs memorandum of fees and costs and reply opposition to defs 
objection to plaintiffs memorandum of fees and costs: aty Bleke Hall for 
def · 
0110312014 Defendants Motion to strike portions of affidavit of Nathan M Olsen; aty 
Blake Hall for def 
0110312014 Defendants Motion to strike plaintiffs application for order to show cause; 
aty Blake Hall for def 
01/08/2014 Hearing Sc_heduled (Motion 01/27/2014 02:00 PM) 
Hearing result fo"r Motion scheduled on 01/06/2014 02:00 PM: District 
O 1/09/2014 Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: sheri Nothelphim Number of 
Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less 100 
0110912014 Minute Entry and Order; Court take Request for Fees and Costs under 
advisment; /s J Dunn 01/08/14 
0111012014 Order Denying Plaintiff's Request for Attorney Fees and Costs /s J Dunn 
1/10/14 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 01/27/2014 02:00 PM: District 
01/29/2014 Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: Sheri Nothelphim Number of 
Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less 100 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on behalf) 
of itself and all others similarly situated, ) 
ED QUINN, on behalf of himself and all ) 
other similarly situated, ) 
Plaintiffs/ Appellants, 
vs. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
municipality, 
Defendant/Respondent, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
_____________ ) 
Supreme Court No. 44074 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
I, Robert Poleki, Clerk of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bannock, do hereby certify that the 
above and foregoing record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound 
under my direction as, and is a true, full, and correct record of the pleadings and 
documents as are automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho appellate 
Rules. 
I do further certify that there were no exhibits marked for identification or 
admitted into evidence during the course of this action. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal 
of said Court at Pocatello, Idaho, this~ day of f'{\G 2016. 
ROBERT POLEK!, 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
819
(Seal) 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNlY OF BANNOCK 
HILL-VU MOBILE HOME PARK, on behalf) 
of itself and all others similarly situated, ) 
ED QUINN, on behalf of himself and all ) 
other similarly situated, ) 
Pia intiffs/ Appellants, 
vs. 
CITY OF POCATELLO, an Idaho 
municipality, 
Defendant/Respondent, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
_________ ) 
Supreme Court No. 44074 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, ROBERT POLEKI, Clerk of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, 
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bannock, do hereby certify that I 
have personally served or mailed, by United States mail, one copy of the 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT and CLERK'S RECORD to each of the Attorneys of 
Record in this cause as follows: 
Blake G. Hall 
Hall Angell Starnes, LLP 
1075 S Utah Avenue, Suite 150 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Nathan M. Olsen 
Petersen Moss Hall & Olsen 
485 E. Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal 
of said Court at Pocatello, Idaho, this __ day of , 2016. 
ROBERT POLEKI, 
Clerk of the District Court 
(Seal) Bannock County, Idaho Supreme Court 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
